What this covers

Economist Brad DeLong traces the economic history of the "long 20th century" from 1870 to 2010, arguing that humanity cracked the problem of wealth production but never solved how to distribute or use it justly. The conversation centers on how three institutional inventions—the industrial research lab, the modern corporation, and global markets—broke the age-old Malthusian Trap around 1870. Before that point, technological progress inched forward at under half a percent annually, only to be swallowed by population growth, leaving living standards nearly flat for millennia. After 1870, innovation accelerated to roughly 2.1 percent yearly because these institutions routinized discovery, deployment, and diffusion worldwide. The result: world income per capita rose roughly fifteenfold from 1870 to today.

Yet that enormous productive capacity never yielded utopia. DeLong frames the twentieth century as a tension between Hayek and Karl Polanyi: Hayek held that markets generate wealth but not justice, and that pursuing justice through bureaucracy leads down the road to serfdom; Polanyi countered that a pure market economy is inhuman because it makes wealth the only source of social power and people revolt against that. Social democracy briefly succeeded after World War II but collapsed in the 1970s when people grew to resent redistribution they saw as undeserved, paving the way for the neoliberal order. DeLong argues the core failure lay in what he calls baking, slicing, and tasting the pie—we solved production but stumbled over fair distribution and whether people actually live happy, secure lives. His diagnosis extends to finance as extractive, the loss of corporate research institutions, and the tension between market efficiency and the human craving for deservingness and stability.

Sharpest takeaway

DeLong argues that around 1870 the modern corporation, the industrial research lab, and globalization combined to break humanity out of the Malthusian trap and made utopia materially attainable, yet the 20th century fell short because we solved the problem of producing wealth far better than the problems of distributing and using it justly.

  • Before 1870 technological progress (under ~0.5%/yr) was neutralized by Malthusian population growth, leaving living standards roughly flat for millennia
  • After 1870 technology grew ~2.1%/yr because the research lab, corporation, and global market routinized discovery, deployment, and diffusion
  • The political-economy struggle between Hayek's market logic and Polanyi's insistence on social justice explains why abundance never produced utopia

The argument · threads6 threads · 23 claims
0.73

Markets are the only mechanism to crowdsource production decisions, but pure markets make wealth the sole source of power, prompting people to demand welfare states or authoritarian alternatives.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • People will not stand for a system in which wealth is the only source of social power, insisting they have a right to a stable community and environment, to an income level they feel they deserve given their work and training, and to job stability; when technology revolutionizes the economy every generation and threatens all of these, people react, sometimes by building welfare states and sometimes by acclaiming a Fuhrer at Nuremberg or building gulags.

    “People simply will not stand for this, and it becomes really, really important when technology is revolutionizing the economy every generation”

  • The soul of the 20th century is best framed as a contest between Friedrich von Hayek, who held that the market produces wealth but not social justice and that pursuing social justice via bureaucracy leads to serfdom, and Karl Polanyi, who held that a pure market economy is inhuman because it makes wealth the only source of social power and people will revolt against that.

    “the market economy will produce wealth and thus abundance, but it will not produce social justice. And so the right answer is to throw social justice over the side”

  • After 1870 humanity solved the problem of baking a large enough economic pie, but failed at the apparently second-order problems of slicing it equitably so people have enough and tasting it so people live happy, healthy, secure lives; these distributional and utilization problems have flummoxed us ever since, which is why we live well short of utopia despite extraordinary productive capacity.

    “you have the problem of slicing it equitably so that people have enough... and then the problem of utilizing it to live lives in which people are kind of happy, healthy, secure and safe... those problems, the problems of slicing and tasting have flummoxed us since 1870”

0.71

Wealth is almost entirely inherited knowledge and cooperative division of labor that individuals never paid for, so unequal desert beliefs fail to justify current inequality.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • GDP statistics measure how much things cost rather than how much they are worth to people, so for information and entertainment goods there is an enormous wedge between value and cost; a book bought for $12 may be worth $100-$200 in experience to a reader, meaning techno-utopians may be right that our statistics understate true welfare gains.

    “this enters the GDP accounts with only $12 of value, and vastly more than the factor cost and vastly more than the $1.20 that you actually get”

  • The University of Chicago intellectual move holds that where the market appears to be failing it is actually succeeding if you look deeply enough, counterposed to the Berkeley move that where the market appears to be succeeding it is actually failing in some more subtle way; DeLong argues the Chicago view is wrong because of computational, communicational, and power-exertion inefficiencies that make it easier to abuse individual poor people than to run a perfectly efficient market.

    “this is a University of Chicago intellectual move, where it looks like the market is failing, it's actually succeeding if you look deeply enough at it. And this is counterposed to the Berkeley intellectual move, that even if you think the market is succeeding... it's failing in some more subtle way”

  • In a poor society where average productivity is low, the only way for you and your family to have enough is to join an elite that lives well by taking from others through an exploitation and domination machine of thugs with spears, tame accountants, propagandists, and bureaucrats; history is mostly written by those propagandists, accountants, and bureaucrats who present this arrangement as natural and good.

    “the way you're going to do that is to become part of an elite that actually lives well by taking a lot of stuff away from others, by an exploitation and domination machine. You have thugs with spears, you have their tame accountants, their tame propagandists, their tame bureaucrats”

  • DeLong's prescription is to try social democracy again: since we are now rich enough, society should provide extensive public goods and income support, accept that many people may pursue creative work without large money flows, and stop insisting that people must work hard in socially approved ways to deserve a good life—though he concedes this is utopian because people deeply want others to get what they deserve.

    “I'm still a semi-unreconstructed social democrat. I think we should try that again, and we should try that again by saying that we're now rich enough that people are generally inventive and ingenious”

  • Nearly all our wealth is due to an enormous inherited structure of knowledge and a cooperative division of labor that none of us has ever paid for—no one pays royalties to whoever invented the alphabet or to Maxwell for electromagnetism—so the belief that people become rich by themselves is mistaken, and a good society should recognize that socially valuable work like raising children or caring for relatives deserves support even without a money flow.

    “most of our wealth, in fact, indeed all of our wealth is due to things that none of us have ever paid for. None of us pays royalties to the descendants of Ishbaal, who first decided in 1000 BC that you should use a stylized picture of an ox to represent the phoneme”

0.65

Technological acceleration after 1870 required institutional innovations—industrial research labs, modern corporations, and global markets—that routinized discovery, deployment, and diffusion.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Technological growth jumped to roughly 2.1% per year from 1870 to 2010 because the last pieces of an institutional configuration fell into place: the industrial research lab to routinize discovery, the modern corporation to routinize deployment, and the fully global market economy to make deployment profitable while letting others copy and diffuse the technology worldwide.

    “we finally get the last pieces of the institutional configuration to fall into place, the industrial research lab to rationalize and routinize discovery and development, the modern corporation to rationalize and routinize some development and deployment, and then the fully global market economy”

  • Before the industrial research lab, an inventor had to also be scientist, engineer, machinist, financier, impresario, and pitchman, which made it nearly impossible for brilliant but socially inept innovators to succeed; the lab let them specialize, as when George Westinghouse surrounded Nikola Tesla with an industrial research lab to carry through alternating current.

    “before the industrial research lab, if you're an inventor, you also have to do everything else: Scientist, engineer, machines, technician, financier, impresario, pitch man”

  • A market economy is essentially the only way to crowdsource the problem of figuring out what to produce and how to produce it better, because any alternative concentrates decision-making where the knowledge isn't and fails to turn every human brain toward improving productivity.

    “you almost surely need to have a market economy of some sort, because that's pretty much the only way to crowdsource the problem of figuring out what to produce and how to produce it better”

  • The most useful unit of analysis for modern economic history is a 'long 20th century' running from 1870 to 2010, because in 1870 a phase transition occurred where everything changed, and only at this point does economics become the most important lens for understanding the world.

    “after 1870, everything has changed, and that was the important thing to make, to mark out when you write an economic history of the world”

0.57

The long twentieth century ended around 2010 with American decline, halved technological growth, financial crisis, and recognition that climate change not wealth defines our era.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Because finance trades money for money across time and states of the world rather than good for good, the value created at any margin is very thin, so there are generally only two ways to make money in finance: find a genuine win-win margin where money is worth different amounts to different people, or find someone who doesn't understand the risks you are asking them to bear and load those risks onto them.

    “there are in general two ways to make money in finance. One of which is to actually find one of these margins where there is a win-win exchange... And the other is to find someone who doesn't understand the risks you're asking them to bear and load the risks off on them”

  • DeLong dates the end of the long 20th century to roughly 2010, marked by the convergence of the decline of American exceptionalism (after the 2003 Iraq war), a halving of measured technology growth in the global north (around 2006), the 2007-2010 financial crisis revealing the limits of Fed competence, the abandonment of full-employment Keynesianism around 2010, and the recognition that global warming, not increasing wealth, would become the defining challenge.

    “in 2010, and the failure to prioritize full employment seems to me to be a good point in the middle to balance”

  • The neoliberal dismantling of the great corporate research laboratories in pursuit of short-term profits, combined with a halving of measured technology growth around 2006, eliminated what should have been many tenure-track-equivalent research jobs, pushing even the best physicists into finance or game design rather than research careers.

    “the neoliberal dismantling of the great corporate research laboratories in the interests of pursuing short-term profits did a huge number on all of your colleagues in the applied physics”

  • DeLong's favorite Mindscape episode was the one on the Krebs cycle (Powering Biology) with Nick Lane.

    “I confess it was the Krebs Cycle... It was Powering Biology. It was Nick Lane.”

  • Writing a non-fiction book of grand scope requires arresting facts, narrative pull, and a unifying grand narrative that is necessarily false but indispensable to making the book cohere; the difficulty grows at least with the square of the number of pages, which is why eight clever disconnected points (a flaw DeLong attributes to MacAskill's work) make a worse book.

    “a grand narrative to guide the structure, which is going to be false, but which you have to have in order to make the book work. It seems to me the difficulty of the problem goes up at least with the square of the number of pages”

0.53

Social democracy failed in the 1970s because redistribution to non-workers violated people's fairness intuitions, opening the way to neoliberalism and market fundamentalism.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Social democracy—a market economy combined with extensive public provision and income redistribution—appeared successful after World War II but failed its sustainability test in the global north in the 1970s because people have a strong sense that social power should match what individuals deserve, viewing too much redistribution to non-working citizens as unfair, which opened the way to Reagan, Thatcher, and the neoliberal order.

    “social democracy, the combination of a market economy, public provision, and then a whole bunch of entitlements... that seemed to fail its sustainability test in the global north, at least, in the 1970s”

  • Hayek's maxim 'the market giveth, the market taketh away, blessed be the name of the market' functions as a Platonic noble lie: it is not something we believe to be literally true, but something we may need to believe to resist the temptation to pursue social justice through bureaucracy, which Hayek thought would end in serfdom.

    “it's in some sense a noble lie in platonic, it's not something we believe that's true, but it's something we need to believe to have as good as a society as we can”

0.52

Before industrialization, living standards stagnated because Malthusian population pressure offset technological gains despite agrarian transition harming human welfare measurably.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The shift from hunter-gatherer to agrarian life made human welfare worse in measurable ways: average adult male height fell from about 5'8 to 5'3, teeth deteriorated, and women were so malnourished that ovulation became hit-or-miss and children's compromised immune systems left them carried off by common illness, requiring eight pregnancies for six live births for three surviving children.

    “average adult male height dropping from 5'8 to 5'3 or so, when we move from being hunter-gatherers to farmers. Our teeth getting infinitely worse”

  • Before 1870, slow technological progress (under half a percent per year) was neutralized by population growth, because patriarchal social structures forced women to keep having children to secure surviving sons, producing irresistible Malthusian pressures that meant better technology was offset by ever-smaller farm sizes, so living standards in 1870 were not much different from 6000 BC.

    “if population growth is slow, which it must be if technological progress is slow, then about a third of women won't have surviving sons, and those produce irresistible Malthusian pressures to keep trying to have kids”

  • Average world income per capita today is roughly $13,000 a year, compared with about $1,200 in 1870 and about $900 in 1500, representing roughly a fifteen-fold rise in living standards measured by cost since the agrarian age.

    “Average income per capita in the world today is something like $13,000 a year, while it was maybe $1200 a year back in 1870 and maybe $900 a year back in 1500”

  • Among the Queens of England between William the Conqueror and Queen Victoria, roughly one in seven died in childbirth, despite being the most cosseted women in southern England, illustrating how dangerous reproduction was before modern medicine.

    “By my count, one in seven of the Queens of England die in childbirth. And these are the most cosseted women in the... In all of southern England”