propriety
The sense of what is appropriate or proper conduct in a given circumstance; a learned standard of behavior central to Smith's moral theory.
As defined in Vernon Smith and James Otteson on Adam Smith
Where it comes up · 7
- Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V30 claims
- Vernon Smith and James Otteson on Adam Smith5 claims
- Shampoo, Property Rights, and Civilization (with Anthony Gill)2 claims
- Michael Munger on How Adam Smith Solved the Trolley Problem2 claims
- What Is Capitalism? (with Mike Munger)1 claim
- Michael Munger on Permissionless Innovation1 claim
- Michael Munger on Desires, Morality, and Self-Interest1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 42Search all claims for “propriety” →
- Each notion of propriety corresponds to a referent community: within a given community, average conduct is respectable, above-average is praiseworthy, and below-average is blameworthy; people can move up to an 'exalted propriety' belonging to a more select, wiser, higher-standard community, where what was praiseworthy in the lower community is merely average—a dialectic of unending refinement toward the wise and virtuous man.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Adam Smith's idea that humans want to be 'loved and to be lovely' means being cognizant of and wanting to conform to the social rules around you so others will want to interact with you in the future; the desire to be lovely—to be seen as a person of propriety—acts as an internal brake on behavior even when one cannot be caught.Shampoo, Property Rights, and Civilization (with Anthony Gill)
- There is a striking absence in Smith's book—a 'dog that doesn't bark'—of any class, national, or racial stereotyping: across his sweeping claims about propriety, morality, conscience and prudence, Smith never says these differ among the classes or among groups like the Irish, making him a remarkable egalitarian for 1759 who attributes equal moral capacity (not just rational self-interest) to all human beings.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Smith's impartial spectator is like a conscience and functions as a practical heuristic: when deciding what to do, ask what a disinterested observer who knows everything about the situation would approve of — this term represents the culmination of a lifetime of inductive experiments in which we receive feedback and internalize a sense of propriety as the voice of an impartial spectator.Vernon Smith and James Otteson on Adam Smith
- Part IV concerns the effect of utility (social usefulness, beneficial outcomes) on moral approbation; Smith disagrees that moral approval is based directly on utility, holding instead that approbation is always enshrouded in a sense of propriety based on spectatorial sympathy, so the journey from utility to approbation necessarily makes a stopover at propriety, while propriety nonetheless tends to conform to utility by providential design.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Each notion of propriety corresponds to a referent community: within community-i, propriety-i is normal/respectable, above it is praiseworthy and below is blameworthy; but people can move up to an 'exalted propriety' of a more select, wiser, higher-standard community-j, where what was praiseworthy for community-i becomes merely average—a dialectic of unending refinement that also describes how an individual develops more self-command and prudence over time, becoming a different person in twenty years.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Each notion of propriety corresponds to a referent community: within a given community, propriety is what is normal and respectable, with deviation above counting as praiseworthy and below as blameworthy; people can mentally move up to an 'exalted propriety' of a higher, wiser, more select community, so what is merely average in the superior community was praiseworthy in the lower one—a dialectic of unending refinement toward the wise and virtuous man.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Each notion of propriety corresponds to a referent community: within a given community, the average behavior is respectable, above it is praiseworthy and below it is blameworthy; but Smith identifies that people sometimes move up to an 'exalted propriety' belonging to a more select, higher-standard community, so that what was praiseworthy in the ordinary community becomes merely average in the select one—a dialectic of unending refinement toward the wise and virtuous man, paralleled within an individual who develops more self-command and prudence over a lifetime.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- In part four Smith argues that moral approbation is never based directly on utility (beneficial social outcomes) but is always 'enshrouded' in a spectatorial sympathy and an almost aesthetic sense of the beauty/propriety of conduct; the journey from utility to approbation necessarily makes a stopover at propriety, and propriety tends to conform to utility only because God set up the sentiments so that our notions of propriety serve utility—though imperfectly.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Part four argues that moral approval (approbation) is never based directly on utility (useful social outcomes); rather, the journey from utility to approbation necessarily makes a stop at propriety—approval is always enshrouded in a sense of propriety arising from spectatorial sympathy, an almost aesthetic reaction to the beauty of conduct—while God-given sentiments tend (imperfectly) to make propriety conform to utility.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V