physicalism
The philosophical view that everything that exists is physical or supervenes on the physical.
As defined in AMA | November 2025
Other definitions
The view that everything that exists is ultimately physical, with mental phenomena emerging from physical processes.
309 | Christof Koch on Consciousness and Integrated Information
Where it comes up · 33
- 374 - Consciousness And The Physical World4 claims
- 125 | David Haig on the Evolution of Meaning from Darwin to Derrida3 claims
- 25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation3 claims
- 178 - The Reality Illusion2 claims
- Adam Frank2 claims
- 100 | Solo | Life and Its Meaning2 claims
- 154 | Reza Aslan on Religion, Metaphor, and Meaning2 claims
- 249 | Peter Godfrey-Smith on Sentience and Octopus Minds2 claims
and 25 more
Most important claims · 10 of 51Search all claims for “physicalism” →
- Life is fundamentally a process, not a substance: there is no separate mental realm and no living fluid or life-force; living is a property that ordinary physical matter can exhibit under the right circumstances, analogous to how heat turned out to be the motion of atoms rather than the fluid 'caloric.'100 | Solo | Life and Its Meaning
- Even in Newton's classical, deterministic universe — long before quantum mechanics or consciousness debates — physicalism was already untenable, because the value of constants like e governs what is possible in that world yet nothing physical could set or change e; the classical world was already 'haunted' by patterns from outside it.Michael Levin
- The intuitive impasse of the hard problem—that something seems left out when consciousness is reduced to neural firing—does not prove physicalism false; we may simply be in a bad cognitive position to understand how consciousness emerges, so that even a correct answer (e.g. 40 Hz oscillations) might forever feel like a brute fact that explains nothing.374 - Consciousness And The Physical World
- Massless particles like photons do not pose a challenge to physicalism: physicalism does not require mass, rest energy, or sharp localization, and a photon is a physical excitation of a quantum field carrying energy and momentum, so being massless and delocalized is fully compatible with being physical.AMA | November 2025
- Epiphenomenalism, though seemingly the most straightforwardly physicalist philosophy of mind, is problematic because the fact that we talk about and report having conscious experiences means consciousness must have some causal power; the disagreement may be partly semantic over which aspects of first-person experience 'count' as consciousness, or may reflect a deeper distinction.AMA | September 2025
- There is tension in the physicalist response to Mary's Room: the view that 'of course Mary learns something new, her neurons had never fired that way before' may miss the point of the thought experiment, since both Goff and physicalists like Dennett seem to agree that physicalism requires Mary to NOT learn anything new.AMA | May 2025
- Greg Egan's Permutation City idea—that consciousness could persist through a sequence of mental states instantiated on entirely different substrates at arbitrary times and locations yet still feel continuous—is worthy of serious thought and is more compatible with physicalism (since it treats consciousness as a pattern of information processing) than with idealism, though it raises hard questions about what binds successive states into one experiencing subject.AMA | April 2025
- Substrate dependence of a phenomenon like consciousness can be graded analogously to weak versus strong emergence: a weak form merely restates physicalism (material properties enable behavior but can be replicated in other materials with similar properties), while the strongest form posits that the behavior is uniquely dependent on the specific material such that it cannot be replicated in any other substrate.AMA | August 2025
- On strict physicalism, Sherlock Holmes exists only insofar as physical representations and cognitive practices sustain him, so if all instantiations were destroyed there would be no remaining truths about Holmes—an implication many find unintuitive; if one resists this for consciousness (subjective experience resistant to physical reduction), what principled reason distinguishes the two cases?AMA | Feb 2026
- Teleosemantics—the research program of giving a natural biological account of how content is possible in brain and speech, consistent with physicalism—is the only viable approach to naturalizing intentionality, but it faces in-principle knock-down objections, so if it fails, then either dualism is true or there is no fundamental intentionality at all.125 | David Haig on the Evolution of Meaning from Darwin to Derrida