moral sense
The faculty by which we perceive the world's normative structure—what ought or ought not to be—rather than merely its empirical facts; Callard treats anger as an instance of such a sense.
As defined in Agnes Callard on Anger
Where it comes up · 3
- A History of Philosophy | 49 Reactions to David Hume5 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics2 claims
- Agnes Callard on Anger1 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “moral sense” →
- Anger is not triggered merely by not getting what we want; it is a response to the perception that the world is not as it ought to be. We get angry when we think we don't have something we deserve, so anger is a principled response that takes itself to be principled, and angry people tend to be ready with reasons explaining their anger.Agnes Callard on Anger
- There are two distinct types of ethical intuition: (1) intuitionism about overall principles (principles like 'benevolence' are known intuitively) and (2) intuitionism about particular cases (specific actions are known to be right/wrong intuitively).A History of Philosophy | 49 Reactions to David Hume
- In Hume's technical vocabulary, 'feeling,' 'passion,' 'sentiment,' and 'moral sense' all refer to impressions of reflection—secondary-order impressions arising from reflection on sense impressions and ideas, not to purely emotional responses.A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics
- The moral sense philosophers were divided on a fundamental question: whether the moral sense is primarily cognitive (a matter of reason or knowing, as Butler and Thomas Reid held) or primarily emotive (a matter of taste or sentiment, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson held).A History of Philosophy | 49 Reactions to David Hume
- Twentieth-century intuitionists like G.E. Moore hold that the concept of 'good' is an intuitive notion (not further definable), but particular decisions about what to do are made by utilitarian calculation of consequences, not by intuition.A History of Philosophy | 49 Reactions to David Hume
- Shaftesbury and Hutcheson argue that conscience and moral sense are more akin to aesthetic feeling and taste than to mathematical or demonstrative reasoning, making moral judgment a matter of taste where disagreements cannot be rationally settled, and they argue that aesthetic judgment, like moral judgment, is subjective rather than rationally justified.A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics
- C.D. Broad was a twentieth-century heir to the moral sense tradition who argued (roughly) that he was either an egoist about altruism or an altruist about egoism, using the method of appealing to what seemed obviously true through moral sense or intuition.A History of Philosophy | 49 Reactions to David Hume
- The eighteenth-century moral sense philosophers—Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Joseph Butler—grounded ethics in human psychology by affirming that humans possess a moral sense (in addition to the five physical senses) that functions as a faculty for perceiving, judging, and being motivated by moral truths.A History of Philosophy | 49 Reactions to David Hume