
A History of Philosophy | 49 Reactions to David Hume
What this covers
This is a lecture from a college history-of-philosophy course, with a lecturer and a second instructor who takes over some sections. It looks at what came after David Hume, starting from his empiricism, modeled on Newton and treating nature as value-free. The lecture then follows the British moral philosophers who tried to rebuild ethics on his psychology. Joseph Butler gets the most detailed treatment. His conscience is a faculty of judgment, not an infallible inner voice, and it can be blurred and in need of informing. It is one of four god-given propensities, alongside particular passions, self-love, and benevolence, and Butler's ethics has an Aristotelian shape in which virtue is each propensity working as intended.
The middle of the lecture is about motivation. Hume grounds obligation in benevolence, set against the egoism) of Thomas Hobbes. The speaker argues that the egoist reply, that benevolence merely satisfies us, loses its force once self-interest and benevolence are seen as not opposed. The lecture also notes that even cruel people care for someone, and it raises the "morally non-functional" person who lacks moral sensitivity altogether. A running dispute among the moral sense philosophers concerns whether the faculty is cognitive, as Butler and Reid held, or emotive, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson held.
The lecture also challenges Hume's epistemology. It sets the Scottish realists' direct realism against the representational theory of knowledge and cites Gestalt psychology against atomistic ideas. It also discusses Hume's pragmatic answer to his own skepticism, Newman's distinction between certainty and certitude, and the two kinds of ethical intuition), about principles and about particular cases, with G.E. Moore and C.D. Broad as twentieth-century heirs. The most contested turn is the argument that a biblical ethic can be universalist without being absolutist. Ruth Benedict's relativism is set against the claim that some prohibitions, such as torturing infants for pleasure, command near-universal agreement.
The speaker traces how Hume's moral sentimentalism—grounding ethics in universal benevolence and sympathy rather than reason—provided a foundation for 18th-century moral sense philosophers to construct a universally valid ethics without divine command or innate ideas, while also introducing the is-ought problem that continues to challenge empiricist ethics.
- Hume resolved the is-ought gap by appealing to sentiment/benevolence as the source of moral obligation, not reason alone
- Moral sense philosophers built on Hume's psychology by adding a natural moral faculty (conscience) that provides both cognitive and motivational force to ethical judgments
- This framework achieves universality through universal human psychology rather than objective truths or relativism
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Hume's empiricism, modeled on Newton's scientific method, treats the natural world as value-free and devoid of inherent moral significance; therefore, if values arise at all, they must arise as instrumental means to some end that humans postulate.
“the problem is that the 18th century concept of scientific method is that scientific thinking scientific method is value-neutral you see or if you like that the world which science is is investigating the Newtonian universe is a value free world the world of value free facts and indeed if all that you have is in the Newtonian picture the particles of matter and blind forces at work then there is no inherent purpose to the natural world”
Joseph Butler's biblical concept of conscience differs from the popular moral intuition that conscience is an infallible inner voice; rather, conscience is the capacity to make judgments (from the Greek synorasis: seeing things together), and it can be blurred and inaccurate and needs informing.
“you might wonder about the biblical use of the term conscience I'm inclined to think that Butler has packed a lot more into the word conscience and the New Testament does where if I'm not mistaken the the word itself which is sin I Jesus by detto and the preposition son together with means simply the ability to see things together to put two and two together to make judgments”
Butler's ethics has an Aristotelian structure: virtue consists in the proper functioning of the human propensities as God intended them to function, and the virtuous person is one in whom these propensities operate in their optimal way.
“the virtuous person is one in whom they function in that best way possible a proper functioning human being is the virtuous human being that sounds like Aristotle remember Aristotle's conception of the good it's happiness is the proper functioning of a rational being and a whole life”
There are two distinct types of ethical intuition: (1) intuitionism about overall principles (principles like 'benevolence' are known intuitively) and (2) intuitionism about particular cases (specific actions are known to be right/wrong intuitively).
“there are two different kinds of ethical intuition... there is one kind that makes out the overall principles to be known intuitively by this moral sense there is another that makes out that what you do in a particular case becomes evident to the moral sense”
The Scottish realists maintain that we have direct awareness not just of individual properties but of structured relations (like causation), which undermines Hume's claim that causation is not directly observable but only inferred through association.
“we have a direct awareness of holes not just at the animal atomistic in ingredients the director Wehrman awareness of relations there for like the causal relation and that is precisely what the scottish realists are doing”
Ethics is fundamentally normative—it is not a description of what people in fact do (which is sociology) but prescriptive guidance on what one ought to do and what the good is.
“any ethic is more than a description of what in fact people do that's not ethics that's sociology yes I know if you want and if you want to talk about ethics you're talking of something that's normative yes a what ought I to do what is the good that I should pursue”
David Hume was the first philosopher in the history of ethics to systematically point out the is-ought problem: that factual statements about what is the case cannot logically entail statements about what ought to be the case without an additional premise about values.
“it's to David Humes credit that in the history of ethics he's the first one to really point up that question the is ort question”
John Henry Newman distinguishes between logical certainty (demonstrative proof) and certitude (psychological certainty), and argues that many important beliefs, while not logically certain, are psychologically certain in the form of certitude.
“an earlier kind of psychology of belief than William James and is less pragmatic is John Henry Newman in the 19th century at Oxford who wrote a book called a grammar in aid of assent a grammar in aid of assent I think the paperback that still in print goes under the title a grammar of I of assent simply that well what he does really is to make a distinction between two kinds of certainty that he called certainty and certitude certainty and certitude where certainty has to do with logical certainty demonstrative certainty and soda - Daz to do with psychological twenties might expect he argues for the certitude rather than the certainty on those matters”
Hume grounds moral obligation in sentiment, particularly in the sentiment of benevolence—a universal, natural feeling in which people naturally want what is good for others—which contrasts with pure egoism like that of Thomas Hobbes.
“it's the sentiment that he has to turn in order to get at any kind of moral obligation and you you recall they're the the picture that we were talking about what kinds of sentiments or feelings well initially the appeal is to benevolent say a universal natural feeling of benevolence literally wanting what is good for others this in contrast to the sheer egoism of somebody like Hobbes”
Hume's psychology of belief offers one solution to his own skepticism: certain beliefs work pragmatically and are psychologically unavoidable, so we believe them not because we have proven them but because our nature compels us to do so.
“one of them undoubtedly is Humes that is to say a psychology of belief that has a pragmatic basis for belief that is to say there are certain things it just plain works to believe it works psychologically to believe in fact insofar as the passions take their usual course it would be the most natural thing in the world uh beliefs”
Joseph Butler identifies conscience as one of four god-given mental propensities of the human mind: particular passions (desires for specific objects like food or sex), self-love (self-interest), benevolence (care for others), and conscience (which balances self-love and benevolence).
“these four kinds of Brits propensity are first of all particular passions where he seems to be speaking particularly of desires desires for satisfaction and so they the feelings the emotions the desires associated with hyung girl with sex with anger okay particular desires for particular objects propensity as well for self-love that's the self interest a propensity for benevolence loving others and the fourth propensity that he calls conscience”
Some philosophical claims face paradox in speech and action: if someone says they don't believe in external reality but their behavior shows they do (e.g., they avoid arsenic), their verbal claim contradicts their practical commitment, revealing that the disbelief is not genuine.
“obviously the very pragmatics of language and action as such that there are certain affirmations we make in the process and it's paradoxical if people deny when they speak what inaction they affirm”
Some behaviors are morally dysfunctional not because the person chooses evil but because they lack the capacity for moral judgment altogether—what we call in moral psychology 'morally non-functional' individuals who simply have no moral sensitivity.
“do you in those cases say as I think Butler would there's something that's not functioning right you see and we have that way of talking about it in moral psychology today we say there are certain people who for whatever reasons are morally non functionally and they just have no capacity of saying right and wrong they have no moral sensitivity at all”
The atomistic theory of ideas (Locke and Hume's view that simple ideas come to us discretely one at a time) is incompatible with the empirical evidence from Gestalt psychology, which shows that experience comes to us as structured wholes rather than discrete atomic units.
“you know enough about the Stoltz psychology to know that the empirical evidence certainly seems to favor that view of experience rather than the the animistic view in terms of conditioning”
There is universal human moral consensus that torturing innocent infants for sadistic pleasure is abhorrent, which suggests that certain moral principles (like prohibition on sadistic cruelty) are universal rather than relative.
“if there's anybody here or for that matter get a much larger audience any sort of mixed audience anybody here who morally approves of torturing innocent infants for sheer sadistic delight of watching them scream in torment and watching their mothers go crazy in anguish obviously there are some things that every human being is going to revolt against”
If we recognize that we get satisfaction from seeing others prosper and pain from seeing them suffer, we must acknowledge that self-interest and benevolence are not opposing forces; therefore, the egoist response that benevolence reduces to self-interest (because benevolence satisfies us) is diffused and loses its force.
“I guess I think if you can allow that it diffuses the situation because the ego is response is going to say well don't you get some degree of satisfaction out of seeing other people getting along nicely when you've had a hand in it you think yeah you do it's it's much more satisfying pleasing to see people able to make ends meet and see them starving it's painful to you know then you've got to take that sort of phenomenon into account so the factual question becomes one of are there any human actions that totally disregarding of all possible self-interest”
A biblical ethic can be universalist without being absolutist; it can emphasize universal principles (like benevolence, justice, mercy) while allowing that particular applications may vary contextually and may even have tragic exceptions (like capital punishment in the Old Testament).
“biblically the classic example of that is that business of eating food offered to idols you think that's a cultural concern depending on the context and so on answer no so the relativist is going to say that all of these it's relative now you'll get a very legalistic absolutist like some of the reconstructionists that will try to make it out all the way through to here is absolute nothing but it seems to me that a biblical ethic it's laying emphasis here but as the Lord require of you but to do justice love mercy as you walk humbly with your God and then spells that out with regards to general areas as in the Decalogue to protect to which in particular cases there may be some tragic exceptions as with capital punishment in the Old Testament”
Ethical relativism (as defined by Ruth Benedict's approach) is the view that all environmental conditions determine ethical beliefs and practices, such that there are no universal ethical principles; however, this definition ignores the fact that all ethical systems must account for situational and environmental differences.
“the definition of ethical relativism which you get in or selection from Ruth Benedict that's in the introductory text that I use defines ethical relativism as the the view that all environmental conditions well that's not a definition of ethical relativism which any ethicist will accept you say because we recognize that there are situational differences depending on economic conditions and climate and so on and so forth in terms of some beliefs and practices”
The moral sense philosophers were divided on a fundamental question: whether the moral sense is primarily cognitive (a matter of reason or knowing, as Butler and Thomas Reid held) or primarily emotive (a matter of taste or sentiment, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson held).
“there is still a major question which divided them the question is whether this moral sin whether this moral sense is basically cognitive or emotive is it a matter of reason or is it a matter of emotion the same question as David Hume was dealing with”
Twentieth-century intuitionists like G.E. Moore hold that the concept of 'good' is an intuitive notion (not further definable), but particular decisions about what to do are made by utilitarian calculation of consequences, not by intuition.
“the twentieth-century intuitionists I think of speaking of this it's the overall principles that are known intuitively I think Butler and the moral sense people are but they may go on as well to the particular cases I mentioned GE Moore as a twentieth-century intuitionist he says that the the concept of good is an intuitive notion that's his principle what you to do in a particular case for Moore that's a utilitarian decision it's not intuitive it's what maximizes the good”
Rejecting nominalism and instead adopting conceptualism (the view that we can entertain abstract ideas like substance, space, and time) allows philosophers to develop an overall conceptual scheme that has empirical reference, even though individual component concepts may not have immediate empirical reference.
“a fourth very plainly is to reject nominalism the nominalism of Hume and Berkeley and to go back at least to a conceptualism like Locke head that we can and do indeed entertain abstract ideas such as the idea of substance the idea of space the idea of time so on and so forth and in that way to develop a overall conceptual scheme which as an overall scheme may have empirical reference even though some of the ingredients concepts may not have immediate reference”
The representational theory of knowledge (the view that knowledge requires ideas that represent external reality) keeps us at a distance from external realities; the alternative is direct realism, which maintains direct awareness of reality without the mediation of ideas.
“a second obvious alternative is to reject the representational theory you know the view that we found in Descartes and Locke and following that the de Reynaud and we want to refer to anything extra min Paul we have to have proofs that they exist now that notion that ideas keep us distanced from realities it would mean it would be the representational theory and the alternative is to reject that to maintain in other words a kind of direct awareness a direct realism direct realism”
All humans have some degree of benevolence for some beings, even those who are sadistic or cruel toward most people; this near-universality of benevolence is a psychological fact that supports the claim that benevolence is a universal human propensity.
“even and Butler and people like that do as well even though there are some very sadistic brutes who love to see other people squeal they still have some degree of benevolence for some if only a pet dog you see that some degree of benevolence is never completely eradicated the gangster who's got such a soft spot for his own kids but doesn't think twice about killing a lot of other people yeah the Hitler who was very tender with his girlfriend”
C.D. Broad was a twentieth-century heir to the moral sense tradition who argued (roughly) that he was either an egoist about altruism or an altruist about egoism, using the method of appealing to what seemed obviously true through moral sense or intuition.
“I remember when I was in graduate school I heard a lecture by one of the early 20th century descendants of those moral saints philosophers a British are called broad broa DCD broad and he was lecturing on the question egoism or altruism question mark yes he and he argued that he was either some sort of an egoistical altruist or some kind of an altruistically gooiest he was quite sure which but the method of his reasoning was by appealing to what seemed to him perfectly obvious that's to say we have a moral sense that enables us to to perceive when we understand a situation what's right”
The eighteenth-century moral sense philosophers—Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Joseph Butler—grounded ethics in human psychology by affirming that humans possess a moral sense (in addition to the five physical senses) that functions as a faculty for perceiving, judging, and being motivated by moral truths.
“the moral since philosophers like David Hume they are routing ethics in human psychology in moral psychology they are affirming that we have some kind of moral sense in addition to the five senses some kind of moral sense sentiment”
Hume's skeptical conclusions about knowledge follow logically from his representational theory of ideas (the view that all knowledge comes through ideas that represent external realities), assuming that this is the only path to knowledge.
“how to avoid David Hume scepticism granted the sceptical conclusion that he draws from the theory of ideas the representational theory of knowledge is skepticism the inevitable result logically”
Rejecting empiricism itself and introducing a priori principles (as Kant does) offers a fifth way to respond to Hume's skepticism, though it remains to be determined whether a priori principles help with knowledge of the space-time world (they may help more with ethics than with empirical knowledge).
“the final alternative of course number five is to reject empiricism itself the claim that our only factual knowledge comes from experience to reject empiricism which would involve introducing a pre or AI principles like Aristotle did structural principles categories like Plato did innate ideas well can't goes that route Kant introduces a pre or AI principles in addition to empirical input and of course what remains to be seen as we get into can't not well maybe at the end of this week we'll get started but what remains to be seen as we get into Kant is whether his way of introducing a priori principals gets you any further than human and I guess it depends what you're talking about in can't if you're talking about his ethics perhaps it does if you're talking about knowledge of the space time world it doesn't”
The distinction between ethical egoism (the view that people do pursue only self-interest) and psychological egoism (the view that people should pursue only self-interest) is crucial; Butler's response to egoism focuses on the psychological question: it is a factual question about human motivation.
“you may remember from your intro course you may Dave I don't know if the others read the same piece in theirs but Joseph Butler has a classic response to ethical egoism or rather to psychological egoism the view that every body pursues their own self-interest above all”