moral realism
The metaethical position that there are objective facts about what is morally right and wrong.
As defined in ms_34
Where it comes up · 31
- 124 - In Search Of Reality4 claims
- 107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality4 claims
- Joe Carlsmith — Preventing an AI takeover3 claims
- 321 - Reckoning With Parfit3 claims
- 100 | Solo | Life and Its Meaning3 claims
- 137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality3 claims
- How America Recovers from All This | Yale Conversations with David Brooks | Yale University2 claims
- Rob Wiblin interviews Tyler2 claims
and 23 more
Most important claims · 10 of 55Search all claims for “moral realism” →
- Against the view that 'moral realism or the void'—that nothing matters unless mind-independent moral truth exists—consider a metaethical fairy who gives you $100 if there is a Dao but burns you and a hundred children alive if there isn't: you should not take this deal, because your allegiance to your values (like not being burned alive) is more solid than your commitment to any metaethical interpretation of those values.Joe Carlsmith — Preventing an AI takeover
- Even a religious perspective does not solve the question of why ethics binds us, because as Plato pointed out in the Euthyphro, one must still ask whether something is good because the gods say so or whether the gods say so because it is good—so theists, moral realists, and anti-realists alike face further questions about the status of ethics.Do All Creatures, Great and Small, and Made From Silicon, Have Rights? (with Jeff Sebo)
- When it comes to realism, moral realism is on every bit as good footing as mathematical realism, because the obvious dis-analogies do not survive scrutiny: that math settles things once and for all with proof while ethics argues endlessly, that math gets applied to the physical world with no moral analog, and that we can explain our moral beliefs via evolution without appealing to their truth while having no such explanation in the mathematical case — none of these marks a deep dis-analogy.137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality
- The deeper case for moral realism is not finding a list of values everyone agrees on, but that it is possible for all of us to be wrong about what is good—there are places on the map of possible experience we are unaware of, such that if we knew what we were missing we would converge there.354 - Is Moral Progress A Fantasy
- Both morality and science require axioms to get off the ground, but the axioms needed for morality are not a subset of those needed for science: science's possible-worlds method lets us go look and discover what is, whereas the principle that we should avoid maximal suffering for conscious creatures cannot be learned that way—it is an extra value axiom one must choose, and the double standard is asking morality to be self-justifying in a way science never is.124 - In Search Of Reality
- Harris's moral framework is not based on his current moral intuitions (like gay marriage being legal) but on the intuition of moral realism—the claim that it's possible to be wrong, possible not to know what you're missing, possible to be cognitively closed to true facts about well-being and the states of consciousness a better mind could access.52 - Finding Our Way In The Cosmos
- Morality can be understood as a navigation problem: imagine a universe of the worst possible misery for everyone, where everything that can suffer suffers maximally with no good coming of it — that is bad if the word 'bad' means anything, and moving away from it is good; this minimal premise is all that is needed to set the consequentialist machine in motion.48 - What Is Moral Progress
- Carroll holds that whatever moral guidelines are, they do not have reality in the same sense that tables, chairs, atoms, and the expansion of the universe are real; they are not part of the physical universe, which obeys laws of physics without containing any moral stances.53 | Solo -- On Morality and Rationality
- Based on how analytic ethicists actually reason—taking pre-theoretic intuitions and systematizing them into reflective equilibrium—Carlsmith doubts the 'everyone converges' prediction: an agent starting only with intuitions to maximize paperclips has no mechanism by which reflection injects mind-independent moral truth, so a real paperclipper put through reflection would not arrive at rich human morality; we'll get empirical evidence as AIs are trained.Joe Carlsmith — Preventing an AI takeover
- Two predictions are sometimes attributed to moral realism: that diverse minds converge on the right morality, and that society becomes more moral over time. But moral anti-realism comfortably explains observed convergence (e.g., Aristotle and us both endorsing the march of history) through sufficiently similar agents endorsing sufficiently similar reflective processes that history in fact instantiated, so observed moral progress is at most a very weak update toward realism.Joe Carlsmith — Preventing an AI takeover