mentalism
A stance in psychology, championed by Chomsky, that takes internal mental structures and representations seriously as the proper object of study, in opposition to behaviorism.
As defined in 15 | David Poeppel on Thought, Language, and How to Understand the Brain
Where it comes up · 3
- A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism2 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections1 claim
- 15 | David Poeppel on Thought, Language, and How to Understand the Brain1 claim
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “mentalism” →
- Chomsky changed psychology, language sciences, and philosophy of mind in the mid-1950s by effectively ending behaviorism—which reduced the mind to the single principle of association underlying conditioning—and successfully arguing for a mentalist stance toward psychology.15 | David Poeppel on Thought, Language, and How to Understand the Brain
- Berkeley's philosophical position becomes substantially more plausible once his three basic positions are understood: nominalism (matter is an abstract idea with no reference), mentalism (all we know are minds and their ideas of primary and secondary qualities), and the claim that God's orderly provision of ideas explains the uniformity of nature.A History of Philosophy | 45 Berkeley Replies to Objections
- Berkeley's idealism denies matter but preserves both the reality of minds and the reality of God. It is phenomenalist about physical objects (we cannot know their independent existence, only appearances) but not completely phenomenalist because minds and God are asserted as real.A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism
- Berkeley argues for mentalism—the view that only minds and their ideas exist—by reasoning that if ideas are mental things and the cause must be like the effect, then ideas must have mental causes, either from one's own mind or from other minds.A History of Philosophy | 44 George Berkeley's Idealism