What this covers
Business Breakdowns host Matt Reustle talks with Masumi Nishida, who invests activistly in Japanese small caps, about how that market is built and why it is changing. The valuation picture comes first. At the start of the year roughly 40% of about 3,500 listed companies traded below 1.0 times book. Around 30 companies under $1 billion trade at negative enterprise value, and the cheapest names sit at 2 to 4 times EV/EBITDA. Masumi ties this to excess cash and equity, which depress return on equity, since cash-generative, low-capex businesses see ROE fall every year unless they return cash.
The middle of the conversation covers governance and culture. Only about 12% of companies have majority independent directors, and those directors tend to be accountants, professors, and lawyers. Masumi explains the term hiratori for a junior board member in practice, and notes that most CEOs hold almost no equity. She also describes Japanese legal tools with no U.S. equivalent, such as setting buybacks and dividends directly at the AGM. Her case study is Dalton at Mitsuboshi Belting. A 10% buyback proposal was rejected, yet within weeks the company moved to a 100% payout ratio and the stock roughly doubled.
The contentious turns concern control. Banks historically refused to finance hostile bids, and cross-shareholdings effectively gave boards a veto. Masumi argues that negative-EV stocks can still be value traps without a buyer to provide an exit. She contrasts roughly 3% LBO financing in Japan with about 10% in the U.S., and cites a CEO who bought his $200 million company with $500,000 of his own equity. Toshiba serves as a cautionary governance example. The Tokyo Stock Exchange reforms and the 2023 M&A guidelines are treated as the catalysts.
Japanese small-cap equities are cheap because cash hoarding, cross-shareholdings, and the absence of a market for corporate control trap value, and recent TSE and M&A guideline reforms are opening those companies to activist pressure that can unlock returns.
- Cross-shareholdings of 40-50% make shareholder proposals fail on proxy votes, so activists must rely on engagement and public pressure.
- The 2024 M&A guidelines created a process for evaluating outside bids, which has increased hostile takeover attempts from about one per year to five or six.
- The TSE reform asks listed companies to manage ROE, ROIC, PBR, and WACC, giving investors common ground to press on capital allocation.
Japan's governance reforms and takeover-driven discipline still trail the U.S. market's standards.
- The Tokyo Stock Exchange initially asked listed companies for one independent director and now requests one-third, a step toward governance reform that began in 2015, while U.S. listings require majority independence.
“only, say, 12% of companies listed in Japan have majority independent directors. So there's a long way to go”
- Japan's current market for corporate control is basically what the U.S. market was like in the 1980s, before takeover activity disciplined valuations.
“So Japan today is basically what the U.S. market was in the 1980s.”
Liquidity excuses for refusing buybacks are weak, and pay structures split firms into two incentive regimes.
- Because cross-shareholders hold large stakes, Japanese companies can use a ToSTNeT program to buy back 10% of their shares in the market before it opens, letting shareholders tender, so the liquidity excuse for refusing buybacks is weak.
“they can do this thing called a ToSTNeT program, where they can actually buy 10% of the company in the following morning before the stock market opens at a price.”
- Japanese global champions use global compensation structures because they hire global talent, while most other Japanese companies pay executives largely in cash, a split that separates the market into two different incentive regimes.
“for those companies, because they have to hire global talent, the compensation structure is much more global.”
Engine belt replacement parts make the product behave like a long, high-margin aftermarket franchise.
- Engine belts are replaced roughly every five years unless there is a major model change, and replacement parts are where most of the profit comes from, so the product behaves like a 15-year high-margin franchise.
“effectively, we saw this as a great product, a high-margin business, a 15-year product trading at two times EV/EBITDA”