macroscopic
Pertaining to large-scale, coarse-grained descriptions of physical systems (like 'the cat is in the room'), as opposed to exact microscopic states.
As defined in 215 | Barry Loewer on Physics, Counterfactuals, and the Macroworld
Where it comes up · 1
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “macroscopic” →
- The Mentaculus is statistical mechanics plus the past hypothesis: a uniform probability distribution (Liouville measure) over all possible initial conditions of the universe compatible with the low-entropy past hypothesis, which together with the dynamics entails the probability of every nomologically possible sequence of macroscopic events—a probability map of the universe.215 | Barry Loewer on Physics, Counterfactuals, and the Macroworld
- The anti-free-will claim that physics forbids acting differently equivocates on what one conditionalizes on: conditional on the whole macroscopic state of the universe (which nobody could know exactly), one could have acted differently because many microstates are compatible with it; only conditional on the exact microscopic state would the outcome be fixed.215 | Barry Loewer on Physics, Counterfactuals, and the Macroworld
- The fundamental dynamical laws are temporally symmetric in the sense that any macroscopic sequence of events compatible with the laws that can happen in one temporal direction can also happen in the opposite temporal direction—true for all physics we have ever dealt with—which means the laws alone cannot explain why we see ice melting but never spontaneously forming.215 | Barry Loewer on Physics, Counterfactuals, and the Macroworld
- Counterfactuals should be evaluated not by Lewis's similarity-and-miracle approach but by using the Mentaculus probability distribution: condition on the macroscopic state of the universe at a time when the antecedent (e.g., the match being struck) is reasonably likely, then read off the probabilities the Mentaculus assigns to later macroscopic events (whether oxygen is present, the match is dry, whether it lights)—thereby giving truth conditions for counterfactuals without ever violating the laws.215 | Barry Loewer on Physics, Counterfactuals, and the Macroworld
- The question of how higher-scale descriptions work so well despite not being microscopically complete is the crucial question of emergence; contrary to Loewer's appeal to biology and psychology, there are likely physics-based explanations for which macroscopic descriptions are usable, though a complete account does not yet exist.215 | Barry Loewer on Physics, Counterfactuals, and the Macroworld
- Getting rid of miracles requires limiting counterfactuals to macroscopic states, because for any macroscopic state there are many compatible microstates—including bizarre ones where weird things (like turning into a frog) happen—but such outcomes are immensely unlikely, so the Mentaculus assigns high probability to the normal outcome (the match lighting); this raises the deep, under-addressed question of what exactly a macroscopic state is.215 | Barry Loewer on Physics, Counterfactuals, and the Macroworld
- Free will requires no special faculty separating us from physics; it consists in the fact that, given the macroscopic state of the world, there are various compatible microstates such that small differences in our brains make a difference in one temporal direction (the future) but not the other (the past)—because the macroscopic past contains records that fix past probabilities regardless of present brain states. To influence the future just is for one's neurons to make such a temporally asymmetric difference; there is nothing more to it.215 | Barry Loewer on Physics, Counterfactuals, and the Macroworld
- The possible microscopic states can be grouped into macrostates in countless arbitrary ways, but we group them in only certain ways; the answer to why we use those particular groupings ultimately refers back to human biology and psychology rather than physics, since from physics' point of view nothing is more similar than anything else.215 | Barry Loewer on Physics, Counterfactuals, and the Macroworld