What this covers

This is a university lecture on Ludwig Wittgenstein, delivered by an unnamed philosophy instructor as part of a history-of-philosophy series. It places the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus in a longer line of Scientism, running from nineteenth-century thought into Bertrand Russell's Logical Atomism. Russell wrote the Tractatus's introduction and presented the book as fulfilling his own program. The lecture then follows the Tractatus's machinery: the claim that a fact is the existence of a state of affairs, not a thing, and the mental picture as a model of reality in which each element corresponds to an object. It also covers Russell's call for an ideal language in which each name refers to exactly one thing, which is meant to cure ambiguities like the different senses of "green."

The middle of the lecture turns to what this leaves out. Because meaning is tied to empirical reference, most philosophical questions are called nonsensical rather than false. Ethics becomes emotive, "thou shalt not steal" venting feeling instead of stating fact, and value has no place among observable facts. The lecture links this to David Hume's rule about burning metaphysical texts, his psychological rather than logical account of induction, and Wittgenstein's treatment of causation and the laws of nature as descriptions, not explanations. The contested claim that philosophy is clarification, not doctrine, comes with the dictum that what cannot be said clearly must be passed over in silence.

The lecture also traces the aftermath. It sets Rudolf Carnap against Moritz Schlick on whether talk of immortality could be empirically meaningful, and presents John Hick's "eschatological verification" as a religious reply. It ends with the later Wittgenstein, who rejected the picture theory as lacking clear meaning itself, dismissed ideal languages as parade-ground drill, and replaced scientism with Language Games.

Sharpest takeaway

Early Wittgenstein's Tractatus applies Russell's logical atomism to argue that philosophical problems arise from misunderstanding language's logical structure, and that meaningful discourse is limited to empirically verifiable propositions about facts, with everything else—ethics, metaphysics, the meaning of life—necessarily falling outside the domain of meaningful language.

  • The logic of language has a subject-predicate form that pictures facts; confusion arises when one word names multiple things
  • Meaning is denotational and extensional—only empirically verifiable statements have sense; propositions without empirical reference are nonsensical
  • Philosophy's role is logical clarification of language, not doctrine; what cannot be said clearly must be passed over in silence

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0.80

Scientism—the position that scientific method is the only acceptable method for obtaining reliable knowledge—extends through 19th-century philosophy into Russell's early 20th-century logical atomism and early Wittgenstein's Tractatus.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“this um movement of 19th century philosophy into the russle of the early 20th century represents the uh kind of scientism as it's called which counts scientific method as the only um acceptable method for giving us um reliable knowledge that sort of scientism uh and it is this which then comes through in vonstein”

0.74

Russell developed logical atomism, which attempts to analyze knowledge into logical constituents and organize them into a deductive system based on broad general hypotheses as premises.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“Russell in his logical atomism his attempt to analyze what we purportedly know into its logical constituents and to organize those logical constituents into a deductive system adducing what would ever would be the necessary premises as the hypotheses for that”

0.74

Ambiguity arises because one word can be used to name many different things; for example, 'green' can refer to the name of a person (William Green), a property (the color green or envy), or a place (the green at Cambridge), creating philosophical confusion.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“the thing pertinent to the confusion of language is that one word can be used to name many different things one of his examples is green is green and he points out that the first green is a man call him William green the second green is a property he's envious okay now alternatively he might have said I suppose that that green is the um the name the green is the name of a quadrangle on on the University campus or of the um the Green Meadows along with the River cam at Cambridge the green and maybe in Spring somebody's saying green is green name of a place and a sense quality but uh this is simply his illustration of the fact that words can name different things the same word for different things ambiguity confusion arises philosophical problems arise from confused use of languages in that way”

0.74

Wittgenstein rejects the law of induction (the uniformity of nature) as a law of logic because it is a proposition with empirical sense, and therefore it refers to empirical data, not logical necessity.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“the socalled law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic since it's obviously a proposition with sense proposition with sense is one that refers to empirical data the law of induction the uniformity of nature is referring to the uniformity of empirical data so it's not a law of logic okay”

0.74

In his Philosophical Investigations (1945), later Wittgenstein abandoned the picture theory of meaning, claiming it has no clear meaning itself—this self-referential criticism of verifiability undermined logical positivism.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“the tractatus was published in 1921 in 1929 he left Cambridge and dropped out of philosophy not coming back until um the 40s and in 1945 he published philosophic investigations in that book he tells us that the picture theory of meaning has no clear meaning and that comment of his gave rise to the self-referentiality criticism of the verifiability theory namely that if to be verifiable a proposition has to be empirically accessible well the verifiability theory of meaning is not empirically accessible so it's not verifiable you'll see and that was one of the things which led to the downfall of logical positivism”

0.74

Later Wittgenstein abandoned scientism and instead developed the concept of language games—diverse forms of life with different language functions, of which scientific language is only one.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“and it was with that that he abandoned this scientism trying to narrow all meaningful discourse to Scientific discourse and um started um talking about language games that is to say there are a variety of different language functions of which scientific type language is only one and I take it that Ryan is saying that aesthetic language might uh be understandable in those ways okay”

0.73

Late Wittgenstein criticized the notion of an ideal language as too artificial, using the analogy that logical and symbolic languages are like parade ground drill for soldiers—fine for teaching discipline but not useful on the battlefield

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Philosophy instructor/lecturer

“and um the notion of an ideal language is too artificial he says things like logical language and symbolic language are like parade ground foot drill for soldiers fine for teaching logical discipline but you don't use them the battlefield you see”

0.69

Russell argues that to avoid ambiguity and multiple reference, philosophy needs an ideal language in which every name refers to exactly one fact, creating a strictly logical language where atomic facts are described by atomic propositions.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“what we need because of the misuse of language what we need says Russell is an ideal language not an actual language not any ordinary language but an ideal language one in which every name every noun refers to just one fact so that no word ever can be used to refer to two different things eliminate ambiguity eliminate double reference eliminate con ations that would be misleading okay a strictly logical language in which the atomic facts are described simply by atomic propositions”

0.69

Wittgenstein's Tractatus argues that philosophical problems exist because the logic of language is misunderstood—specifically, the logical structure of language, particularly its subject-predicate form, is not properly grasped.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“the book deals with the problems of philosophy you might have difficulty identifying what they are as you read it but he says it deals with the problems of philosophy and shows that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood the logic of our language”

0.69

A fact is not a thing, but the existence of a state of affairs, which can be atomic or molecular; things are constituents of states of affairs, and facts are the existence of states of affairs.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“the world is the totality of facts not of things now there's a distinction that's new between facts and things what does he mean a fact is the existence of a state of affairs okay so effect is likely to be complex there can be molecular facts there can be Atomic facts there's Russell okay there can be molecular facts there can be Atomic facts um a fact is the existence of states of Affairs states of Affairs are combinations of objects or things so things are simply constituents of states of Affairs now notice what's happening his point is that words name things okay words name things”

0.69

The law of causation is not a universal law but only the form of particular causal laws; in physics, there are specific causal laws (e.g., principles of mechanics), but no single 'law of causation' in general.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“what about the law of causation which underlies the law of induction in traditional philosophy the law of causation is not a law but only the form of a law law of causation is a general name in mechanics there are minimal principles causal laws in physics there are causal laws there is no the law of causation in general it is simply the empty form of which which particular causal laws participate”

0.69

Philosophy should not be conceived as a body of doctrine but as an activity of analysis; philosophers should 'do philosophy' rather than talk about philosophy secondhand.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“so you should no longer according to Vidgen Stein talk of somebody's philosophy as if it's a body of Doctrine don't talk of hegel's philosophy a body of Doctrine you see you talk rather of people who are doing philosophy now that phrase is something vidin Stein introduced but it's caught on outside of those who agree with vid canstein so that you probably hear us around in this department telling you come on do some philosophy don't just talk about it in secondhand fashion get inside the guy's thinking and do some Philosophy for yourself you see the philosophy is an activity of analysis whatever else it be it's at least that”

0.69

We picture facts to ourselves mentally; a mental picture (or thought) is a mental state that is a model of reality, composed of elements representing objects, with a one-to-one correspondence between elements in the picture and things in the state of affairs being pictured.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“we picture facts to ourselves yeah we picture green as Green With Envy oh we picture the green at um Cambridge as green...we picture facts to ourselves we do in our minds we picture facts a picture that is to say a mental state the picture the picture that mental state is a model of reality it's a mental model okay but in the picture there are elements of the picture that represent objects things so then um what we have is things or objects represented by the elements in the picture by which we represent to ourselves the facts okay the mental picture of a fact which is a state of affairs the mental picture is made up of elements in the mental picture which are um uh referred to by words corresponding to the things which are the constituents of the states of Affairs”

0.68

Modern science's conception of nature rests on the illusion that the laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena; in fact, laws of nature are not explanations and contain no necessity—they are merely descriptions of patterns.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“so the whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena the laws of nature are not explanations of natural phenomena the laws of nature are not laws there's no necessity to them at all”

0.68

Russell wrote the introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and Russell's introduction presents Wittgenstein's work as doing what Russell himself had held out for in logical atomism

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy instructor/lecturer

“Russell wrote the uh introduction to the tractatus there we go and whether or not this was um vien Stein's intention Russell's introduction seems to um seems to say that what vien Stein is doing is what Russell himself had held out for in his logical adamism”

0.68

Philosophy's proper role is logical clarification of language—analyzing uses of language to determine whether they have empirical meaning, not deciding the truth of propositions (which is science's role).

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“philosophy is this critique of language analyzing uses of language in order to determine whether or not they have empirical meaning whether or not they have any sense if they do not then you label them as such forget them if they do then whether they are true or false can be decided by the appropriate empirical Sciences philosophy is not in the business of deciding the truth of anything if all meaning is empirical then the truth of propositions is a scientific matter not philosophical so philosophy becomes as it were the logic of language switchboard which accepts calls asking can you help me with this confused confusing sort of um topic and uh shuttles the calls plugs them into the different Sciences the function of philosophy is simply Logic the logic of language”

0.68

Hume's theory of meaning held that any statement that cannot be translated into language of empirical facts is meaningless; this is the origin of the principle of burning metaphysical texts

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy instructor/lecturer

“the same word fact you say what is a fact a matter of fact a state of affairs you say well if you cannot then according to Hume translate this philosophical language into the language of empirical facts matter of fact statements it's meaningless you remember at the end of his inquiry commit it to the Flames let's have that big book burning of meaningless metaphysical TW”

0.66

Wittgenstein's famous dictum—'What could be said at all can be said clearly; what we cannot talk about clearly we must pass over in silence'—encapsulates the Tractatus's aim to stake out the limitations of what language can meaningfully express.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unknown Lecturer

“the whole sense of this book can be summed up in the following words and he comes back to them on the last page of the book what could be said at all can be said clearly what we cannot talk about clearly we must pass over in silence in other words put up or shut up you see well the aim of the book then is to stake out the limitations of What language can say and show us how it says it”

0.65

Ethical language serves an emotive rather than propositional function—to say 'thou shalt not steal' is to vent feeling about behavior rather than state facts; this leads to the emotivist theory of ethics.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“what then is the function of ethical language language well vien Stein doesn't come out and tell us the logical positivist will say that ethical language is purely emotive to say thou shalt not steal is simply emoting about some people's behavior venting feeling not stating facts there are no ethical facts to be recorded in propositions so this leads then to the emotivist theory of Ethics”

0.64

The procedure of induction has no logical justification, only a psychological justification—it rests on a psychologically grounded belief in causation through constant conjunctions and conditioned expectations, as Hume established

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy instructor/lecturer

“the procedure of induction has no long logical justification now that's David Hume all over again but only a psychological justification David Hume all over again you see yeah the psychological justification in that uh psychologically grounded belief in causation by virtue of the constant conjunctions that conditioner expectations”

0.63

Rudolf Carnap argued that belief in immortality and future states could be empirically meaningful if we later have empirical data in the afterlife, while Moritz Schlick argued such claims are empirically meaningless.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“there was a debate between two individuals both logical positivists Rudolph carap and morit schlick and I think this was um a debate in the British Journal of philosophy of science back in the 20s as I recall in which I think it was um schlick argued that discussion of immortality um of a future state is empirically meaningless carip argued no it might be empirically meaningful if it turns out that we have empirical data thereafter Hereafter you'll see”

0.63

John Hick proposed 'eschatological verification'—the idea that Christian faith could be verified on the last day when believers could say 'I told you so,' making religious claims empirically meaningful through future experience.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“and John hick the British philosopher of religion um at one stay in his thinking and he's gone through various stages he's now in a very different one but at one stage when he was discussing the meaning of religious language in empiricist terms talked of eschatological verification you see carip seem to say that belief in immortality would be capable of eschatological verification so it's imp Al meaningful well hick wanted to say that um the Christian faith as such is capable of eschatological verification so that on the last day John you can say to somebody hey I told you so”

0.61

In the world of facts (empirical facts), everything is as it is and happens as it happens; no value exists in this world because value is not an empirical fact and is not observable.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“in the world that is to say the world of facts empirical facts in the world everything is as it is everything happens as it happens in it no value exists because value is not an empirical fact it's not empirically observable if there is any value that does have value it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens in the world okay value would have to be something extraneous it must lie outside the world”

0.61

Most philosophical propositions and questions are not false but nonsensical—they have no sense or meaning because they lack empirical reference and therefore do not refer to anything.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“most propositions and questions found in philosophical works are not false they're just nonsensical they have no sense no meaning you think what he means by sense is the referent of a word the word green can refer to various things so a nonsensical use of language is the use of language that has no empirical reference so when in logical positivism you find it stated that metaphysics metaphysical language is nonsensical okay or anything which doesn't pass approval but the verifiability Criterion of meaning is nonsensical you're saying it has no reference it has no empirical reference nothing that it refers to of an empirical nature”

0.61

Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning emphasizes denotational (extensional) meaning—what a word denotes or refers to—making it an empiricist theory of meaning continuous with John Stuart Mill and David Hume's empiricism.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“meaning can be simply denotational what in logic we call the extension The Logical extension of a noun uh what is it that it denotes what are the particulars one or many to which it refers to which it extends so what he is doing is emphasizing almost completely the denotational meaning the extensional meaning of language and in as much as um the states of Affairs seem to be empirical objects this becomes an empiricist theory of meaning”

0.55

Death is not an event in life because we do not live to experience it; therefore, there is no empirical knowledge of death, and the question of immortality or afterlife has no empirical answer.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unknown Lecturer

“death uh death he says is not an event in life we don't live to experience death okay so there is no empirical knowledge of death uh our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits but there's no guarantee of temporal immortality of the human soul survival after death”

0.50

Ethical laws of the form 'Thou shalt' cannot guide action through commands and sanctions; instead, ethical reward and punishment must reside in the action itself rather than in external consequences

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Philosophy instructor/lecturer

“it's clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms so our question is about the consequences of an action and it's unimportant those consequences shouldn't be events but for there must be something about the question we pose there must be some kind of ethical reward and punishment that reside in the action itself you see”

0.34

Isolated words do not assert facts: if someone enters a room saying only isolated words like 'brown house,' they are not asserting anything and would be perceived as acting bizarrely

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy instructor/lecturer

“Words which uh signs names don't assert anything so that if I were to come into the room and simply say brown house few other isolated words you would think I was wacky because I'm just not asserting anything I'm not stating facts”

0.34

Wittgenstein's philosophical career was spent primarily in England after 1912, though he returned to Austria for approximately 20 years

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Philosophy instructor/lecturer

“went to England to study um in 1912 and essentially spent his philosophical career in England uh although for a space of some 20 years he went back to Austria and stayed there”

0.30

Wittgenstein's Tractatus numbering system reflects the way Wittgenstein wrote and taught: he would thin out course enrollees to about half a dozen select students, meet them in his Cambridge rooms, sit astride a hardback chair deep in thought, utter sentences, and expect students to continue the discussion with long pauses waiting for response

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Philosophy instructor/lecturer

“it's an unusual format okay now um sometimes uh you get a whole paragraph by such a number sometimes just a sentence it seems to be a reflection of the way the man not only wrote but taught uh it said that he would um thin out the people who were registering for his courses so he'd have half a dozen people that he wanted and they would meet in his rooms there at Cambridge where the professors have their own living accommodations meet there in his rooms and he habitually would sit a stride a hardback chair uh with his arms on the front of the chair deep in thought and would utter some sentence and expect people in the seminar to um further the discussion often with long pauses waiting for people like David to speak up”