factual
Rabin paradox: small-stakes aversion implies absurd large-stakes aversion
In Matthew Rabin's example, most people reject a coin flip between losing $100 and gaining $110 but accept a coin flip between losing $1,000 and gaining $6M; under expected utility theory with a smooth (everywhere differentiable) concave utility function, rejecting the small gamble at all wealth levels implies such extreme concavity that losing $1,000 would be more valuable than gaining any amount of money whatsoever, which is absurd.
factualpending
Speaker
Lara BuchakEvidence Quote
“in order to explain these, a small amount of risk aversion in low numbers, we have to imply an implausibly large amount of risk aversion in large numbers.”
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:23:20 AM
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