critical level view
A population-ethics view holding that bringing someone into existence is only good if their life exceeds a threshold above the neutral 'worth living' zero level.
As defined in 207 | William MacAskill on Maximizing Good in the Present and Future
Where it comes up · 1
Most important claims · 2 of 2Search all claims for “critical level view” →
- Total utilitarianism implies the repugnant conclusion: a sufficiently vast population of lives barely worth living has greater total well-being than a smaller population of blissful lives; Parfit found this repugnant, but a step-by-step argument (dominance addition, then equalizing, iterated, with transitivity) shows you must reject one of several highly compelling principles or accept the conclusion—so every population-ethics view faces an impossibility result.207 | William MacAskill on Maximizing Good in the Present and Future
- Taking a compromise across views of population ethics yields a critical level view: above the zero level (indifference between existing and never having existed) there is a higher critical threshold, and only bringing into existence a life above that threshold counts as good, so adding barely-worth-living lives is not good and may be bad—this rejects unrestricted dominance addition and avoids the repugnant conclusion.207 | William MacAskill on Maximizing Good in the Present and Future