capital requirement
A regulatory rule requiring financial firms to hold a minimum amount of equity capital relative to their assets, reducing leverage and crisis risk.
As defined in Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy
Other definitions
Regulatory requirement that banks hold a minimum ratio of equity capital relative to risk-weighted assets; increases for riskier assets, reducing their profitability and incentive to hold/lend them
Money Printing & the Debt Spiral with Macro Alf
Where it comes up · 5
- Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation3 claims
- Money Printing & the Debt Spiral with Macro Alf2 claims
- Anat Admati on Bank Regulation and the Bankers' New Clothes1 claim
- Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy1 claim
- Jim Millstein on the Massive Risks of Any 'Mar-a-Lago Accord' | Odd Lots1 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “capital requirement” →
- Banks make lending decisions based on three conditions: (1) the existence of creditworthy borrowers with actual demand for loans, (2) loan yields being high enough to compensate for risk, and (3) acceptable return on equity given regulatory capital requirements; without all three conditions, increased reserves will not drive lending regardless of reserve quantity.Money Printing & the Debt Spiral with Macro Alf
- The banking industry's argument that higher equity requirements would tie up money, take it out of the economy, or make banks unable to function is false; equity is not idle cash set aside but a way of funding loans, and most corporations fund largely with equity without harm, so higher bank equity removes distortions rather than impairing function.Anat Admati on Bank Regulation and the Bankers' New Clothes
- Because legislators are more likely to lose a seat for taking an action with traceable negative effects than to fail to gain one, they are highly risk-averse; incumbents exploit this by warning that any reform will have large, unpredictable bad consequences, pushing policymakers toward modest or kludgy measures that protect the existing regime.Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy
- Credit ratings from agencies like Fitch, S&P, and Moody's have little real economic meaning (Fitch gave AAA to subprime mortgages two months before the 2008 crisis; Greece and Italy were rated AAA), yet they matter institutionally because they drive regulatory capital requirements that affect bank and pension fund demand for treasuries.Money Printing & the Debt Spiral with Macro Alf
- Historically prudential regulation focused on cash ratios rather than capital ratios; starting in the 1980s the focus shifted to capital ratios as the device for ensuring honest behavior and buffering losses, even though the combination of cash and capital is what truly matters.Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation
- There are two ways to reduce a bank's risk of insolvency from asset losses: holding a higher proportion of cash on the asset side, or financing with a higher proportion of equity/capital on the liability side. For any desired probability of insolvency, a bank can reach it with various combinations of cash and capital, so prudential regulation should impose cash requirements alongside capital requirements.Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation
- Bank capital is best understood as a shock absorber: it is the set of claims on the bank that can realistically fall in value when the bank's assets fall in value, so that when losses occur, someone other than the taxpayer absorbs them. From a regulatory standpoint, we want enough on the balance sheet that can be called capital so that asset declines are absorbed by stockholders rather than the U.S. taxpayer.Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation
- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are approaching their minimum capital requirements (CCT1 levels) and are estimated to be just two years away from reaching fully capitalized status, while stress tests show their losses in severely adverse scenarios would be less than $10 billion.Jim Millstein on the Massive Risks of Any 'Mar-a-Lago Accord' | Odd Lots