What this covers

This is a conversation between Peter McCormack and Macro Alf, founder of The Macro Compass, about what "money printing" means and whether the US is heading into a debt spiral. It starts with the plumbing. Quantitative Easing (QE)) swaps bonds for Bank Reserves, which Alf says do only two jobs: settling payments between banks and meeting liquidity rules. He argues that banks lend when they have creditworthy borrowers, adequate yields and acceptable returns on equity, not because reserves are plentiful. A bank loan such as a Mortgage creates a new asset and a matching deposit. That claim is contested.

The second stretch tests the argument against history. Japan's QE from 1995 to 2020 coincided with falling bank loans, which Alf ties to a Balance Sheet Recession, where households are paying down debt and a 0% rate cannot create borrowing demand. He then contrasts that with Real Economy Money, created by private credit or by a fiscal deficit. On his account, roughly $5 trillion of US deficits between early 2020 and mid-2021 put spendable deposits straight into private accounts and drove inflation. He also credits the US-Europe growth gap of 2013–2019 to American deficits versus European austerity, and notes that triple-A countries like Denmark and Switzerland push their private sectors into heavy debt.

The later sections turn to credit cycles and sovereign risk. Alf says credit systems run procyclically, that recessions have been suppressed for fifteen years, and that downturns now come by "elevator" rather than "stairs". Peter adds that inflation hits the poorest hardest. They consider a fully reserved Bitcoin-style system, which would remove the ability to stimulate in a downturn. The closing section covers dollar demand from exporters like Brazil, why pension funds hold long-duration treasuries whatever the credit rating, and the choice the US faces as interest payments approach $1 trillion: tighten and destroy money, or run bigger deficits and risk confidence.

Sharpest takeaway

Macro Alf argues that money creation operates through two distinct channels—financial money (bank reserves created by central banks) and real economy money (created through government deficits or private credit)—and that conflating them fundamentally misleads policy and public understanding of inflation, monetary policy, and economic stimulus.

  • Bank reserves cannot directly stimulate lending or the real economy; they only facilitate interbank settlements and regulatory liquidity requirements
  • Real economy money creation occurs through fiscal deficits (government spending) or private sector credit (bank lending), not central bank balance sheet expansion
  • The 2008-2021 period demonstrates that massive QE and low rates failed to drive lending in Japan (1995-2020) and that fiscal stimulus (2020-2021 US deficits) was orders of magnitude more inflationary than monetary expansion

The claims · ranked33 claims · weighted by value

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0.80

Bank reserves serve only two functions for commercial banks: (1) enabling settlement of transactions between banks at the end of each day, and (2) meeting regulatory liquidity requirements that force banks to hold liquid assets on their balance sheets.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“bank reserves basically fulfill two main roles for a bank. The first is they allow banks to settle transactions with each other...they give reserves to each other...Second function, it's a regulatory liquidity function. So we have imposed rules on our system for which banks must own a bunch of liquid assets on their balance sheet.”

0.80

Between 1995 and 2020 in Japan, the Bank of Japan conducted aggressive quantitative easing that expanded the money supply and bank reserves significantly, yet during the same period bank loans actually declined, demonstrating that increased reserves do not automatically lead to increased lending.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“There is a chart that I posted on the macro compass a couple of times, which is incredible. It's from the BIS. And it shows between 1995 and 2000, the amount of bank reserves in the system in Japan went through the roof...And the amount of bank loans went down during the same amount of years.”

0.80

Banks make lending decisions based on three conditions: (1) the existence of creditworthy borrowers with actual demand for loans, (2) loan yields being high enough to compensate for risk, and (3) acceptable return on equity given regulatory capital requirements; without all three conditions, increased reserves will not drive lending regardless of reserve quantity.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“To make a loan, a bank looks at three things. Do I have a creditworthy borrower that has a demand for loan in the first place? If there is no demand, a bank cannot shove you with credit. You need to show up and ask for credit first...Second condition, you need loan yields...to be good enough to reward you against the risk...And the third condition is return on equity. So, regulators attach a certain capital...if regulations says you need to retain a lot of equity against that loan, banks might be disincentivized to loan.”

0.78

Banks do not use reserves to make loans; when a commercial bank makes a loan, it expands its balance sheet and creates new money, but this expansion is independent of the amount of reserves it holds because only banks have reserve accounts at central banks and households/borrowers cannot directly access reserves.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“Banks don't use reserves to make loans. Geez, this is the most misunderstood concept in modern finance. A reserve is an asset for a bank...When a commercial bank makes a loan, it's not like transforming or multiplying the existing amount of reserves...a bank expands its balance sheet. It creates the new money by lending...reserves are not used to lend money. Also, because I don't have a reserve account, you don't have a reserve account, nobody else has. There is no direct channel for this financial form of money to enter the real economy.”

0.78

There are two fundamentally distinct forms of fiat money in modern economies: financial money (bank reserves created by central banks and used only by banks for interbank settlement and regulatory compliance) and real economy money (created through government deficits or private credit, which circulates among households and corporations and is potentially inflationary).

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“there are a lot of different forms of fiat money. And there are two main forms. One is the money that we use...the private sector. Households, corporations...a financial form of money. It's money for banks. Those are bank reserves.”

0.75

Fiscal surpluses destroy real economy money by taxing citizens more than the government spends, thereby reducing private sector spending power and slowing the economy, making them the inverse of fiscal deficits in terms of inflationary impact.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“If I am taxing Peter more, I can do the opposite exercise. I am destroying Peter's wealth. I'm taking Peter's ability to create money through his income, his work, whatever, and I'm saying, 'Peter, I'm sorry. Let's cancel that money. I'm going to tax you more. So, I'm destroying money and I'm slowing down the economy very rapidly.'”

0.75

Credit-based systems generally run procyclically (stimulating during booms, tightening during busts) rather than anticyclically because politicians and central bankers prioritize maintaining control and predictability; politicians won't sacrifice short-term growth to pursue long-term structural reforms because results take 5-10 years while the electoral cycle is 2-5 years.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“what central banks and politicians care the most about, which is get back control...Credibility, status quo, get back into a box that is controllable and predictable is the number one, two, three, four, and five priority...I have an election in 2 and 1/2 years...if I spend my political capital on all that stuff, the results will be evident in 5 to 10 years from now, and I'm going to lose the electoral cycle.”

0.74

When a central bank conducts quantitative easing, it creates bank reserves (a liability on the central bank's balance sheet) and exchanges them for bonds held by the private sector, thereby removing bonds from the system and injecting reserves into the banking system.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“the central bank wants to buy bonds. So, they from the liability side of their balance sheet, they expand it. They print digitally new bank reserves...they take these bank reserves and go and buy bonds from the private sector...the private sector overall has less bonds available, and banks are given in exchange bank reserves.”

0.74

When a bank makes a mortgage, it expands its balance sheet by creating both a new asset (the mortgage loan) and a new liability (the bank deposit created from the loan proceeds), thereby creating new money equal to the loan amount; the seller of the property receives new bank deposits, which are real economy money that can be spent.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“when a bank makes a mortgage...Peter doesn't have the money...the bank is going to lend money...Peter gets a credit, a mortgage, 500,000 euro...He buys the house from the seller...the seller had a house, now has 500,000 euro...He deposits the money in the banking system...Peter has a house...with money that he didn't have before. A new loan is created...And also a new bank deposit is created...So, bank lending creates new money.”

0.74

During a balance sheet recession like Japan's 1990s, households are deleveraging (paying down debt) and have no demand for new credit, making the interest rate irrelevant to borrowing decisions; 0% rates cannot create demand where none exists.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“Is it because the demand isn't there for the loans? So, it's very simple...banks don't lend reserves...if there is no demand, a bank cannot shove you with credit. You need to show up and ask for credit first.”

0.69

In triple-A rated countries (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Australia, Switzerland), government debt-to-GDP ratios are very low while private debt-to-GDP ratios are extremely high, meaning these governments deliberately chose not to print money for the private sector through fiscal spending or tax cuts, forcing households and corporations to lever up instead through mortgages and corporate debt.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“in all triple A rated countries left in the world, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Australia...In all of them, government debt to GDP is very low. Private debt to GDP is extremely high...we basically said the government doesn't want to create new money for the private sector...In Switzerland...they have a balanced budget or a surplus every year...they get it through private credit. Households and corporations in Switzerland borrow up to their nose.”

0.69

Credit ratings from agencies like Fitch, S&P, and Moody's have little real economic meaning (Fitch gave AAA to subprime mortgages two months before the 2008 crisis; Greece and Italy were rated AAA), yet they matter institutionally because they drive regulatory capital requirements that affect bank and pension fund demand for treasuries.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“The answer is pretty much zero in the very let's say deep sense...Fitch, S&P, and Moody's gave AAA rating to subprime mortgages two months before the crisis unfolded...Italy was rated AAA+ and Greece was rated AAA...from the deep sense of thing they really don't matter, but they still are an important part of this weird architecture that we have created around our financial system.”

0.69

About 70% of global transaction in goods and services are denominated in dollars, meaning countries like Brazil and Saudi Arabia earn dollars from exports and must invest them somewhere safe; they typically buy US treasuries because they are liquid, have a good repo market, are well-regulated, and are denominated in dollars.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“about 70% of the transaction of goods and services that happen in the world are denominated in dollars...if Brazil is selling soybeans, they're getting dollars in exchange for soybeans. And so, they get these dollars...the dollar enter the Brazilian banking system...they ultimately need to be invested in some assets...what's the asset? Well, you're looking for something that is very liquid, has a good repo market, you can trust it, it's well regulated, denominated in dollars. So, you buy treasuries.”

0.69

Interest payments on US government debt are rising (near $1 trillion annually), which is both an outflow for the government and income for debt holders; if interest payments become too large a share of tax revenues, the government faces two options: (1) stop issuing debt by raising taxes and cutting spending (destroys money and slows economy), or (2) run larger deficits to pay interest (dangerous path of debt snowballing that may erode market confidence).

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“Interest payments from the United States on their debt are interest income for somebody else...the moment that your interest payment represent a larger and larger portion of your tax revenues...you might run into some decision-making to do, right? And there are really two ways to do this. Well, the first is to say, uh I'm going to stop issuing all this debt, right?...The second way is, well, I might run more deficits so that I print new money, with which I can try and repay my interest on that. It's a very dangerous path to go through because what happens is you're basically snowballing your debt.”

0.69

Private sector credit creation requires a productive intention behind the borrowing (e.g., investing in a business, buying a house to live in) that serves as an initial filter for productivity, whereas government deficit spending allocates money unilaterally without requiring borrower consent or productive intent.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“to create money through private sector credit you need a willing borrower to start with as we discussed this before it's not like the bank can make you a mortgage if you don't ask for one you have to show up there you have to have a productive intention behind this creation of credit...the government isn't really the best allocator of resources historically right? So when the government does deficits they are unilaterally without asking for your consent they are unilaterally deciding where to allocate newly created money.”

0.69

Financial system architecture is now so embedded, leveraged, and complex that breaking points can be extremely vicious; downturns occur via 'elevator' rather than 'stairs' because of cascading deleveraging in an interconnected system.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“you go up via the stairs, and you go down via the elevator in such a system because it's so leveraged and so financially complicated, really. And the financial architecture is so embedded and leveraged now that, obviously, the breaking points can be extremely vicious. So, I understand where you say 'When am I going to get fucked?' because the jump risks in such a system are something to always consider.”

0.69

Inflation disproportionately affects the poorest, with even 2% inflation having catastrophic effects on the lowest income households over multiple years because their purchasing power erodes faster than wages adjust.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Peter (host)

“we know inflation disproportionately affects the poorest the most. Um I've referred to Ovik Roy's article. He said even at 2% inflation has a you know, over multiple years has a catastrophic effect on the poorest.”

0.68

When the US government ran fiscal deficits of approximately $5 trillion between early 2020 and mid-2021, this created new bank deposits (real economy money) directly into private sector bank accounts that could be spent immediately, and this magnitude of money creation vastly exceeded the economy's ability to increase goods and services supply, resulting in inflation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“when you do 5 trillion dollars of debt all at once, like the United States did between early 2020 and mid of 2021, well, guess what? It's a lot more money to be spent. And can you expand the supply of services, the supply of goods as rapidly as the demand goes up? No, you can't. That's 5 trillion. It's too much. So, what's the the release valve? It's inflation.”

0.68

Most of the GDP overperformance of the United States relative to Europe between 2013 and 2019 can be explained by the difference in fiscal stance: the US ran ongoing deficits (printing real economy money) while Europe pursued austerity (destroying money through higher taxes), resulting in higher nominal GDP growth in the US despite both regions having similar structural growth potential.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“most of the difference in GDP between the United States and Europe between between 2013 and 2019 can be explained by the difference in fiscal stance between the US and Europe...Europe around run austerity programs basically between 2013 and 2019...The United States did less than that. They mostly did deficits between 2013 and 2019. If you take the difference between the US fiscal stance, loose deficits, and Europe...you'll see that most of the GDP overperformance of the US...it's due to the fact that the United States is printing more money than Europe did.”

0.68

The main constraint on unlimited government deficit spending and money creation is inflation and loss of currency trust; if the government manages inflation expectations (e.g., Japan for 30+ years) and the populace continues to accept the currency, the system can sustain indefinitely.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“The only limitation is inflation, really. If you do too much, you go over the edge, then people start to wonder whether that is sustainable or not. But that's a limitation that you can try and manage around...Look at Japan. Japan has been doing this for over 30 years, and not much happens there.”

0.68

A fully reserved (non-elastic) monetary system like the Bitcoin standard prevents new money creation but also prevents governments and central banks from providing counter-cyclical stimulus during downturns when credit shrinks and the economy needs relief.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“The alternative is a non-elastic or much less elastic form of monetary system that basically has let's call it firm money, as a firm anchor, effectively, to the unit of exchange that we use...But during an economic downturn, that might be a problem because you cannot expand credit. You can You don't have an easy way, basically, to make sure that you give more resources to the private sector when they need it the most.”

0.68

Recessions are a necessary part of healthy economic cycles and have been artificially suppressed for 15 years (since 2008), leading to chronic leverage accumulation and increasing fragility rather than health.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“if you think about a healthy economic system, then, generally speaking, they have been historically part of the cycles, right? And now, instead, we're trying to eliminate them... The last true recession was in 2008. That's 15 freaking years ago. And I'm not cheering for one. It's not like recessions aren't good. Nobody likes them. Uh but if you think a necessity.”

0.68

Fiscal deficits expand rapidly when the government wants to 'feel in control' and combat falling asset prices and employment, but they are also pro-inflationary; the problem is not deficits per se but timing them counter-cyclically rather than procyclically as they often are implemented.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“The advantages are, if you use it well, being fully elastic, during downturns, you can anticyclically expand your credit. So, you can stimulate the economy when the economy needs it, right? And you can also create credit for productive purposes. This is a bit utopistic because we don't do neither of that. We tend to run on animal spirits. So, we stimulate when the economy is already running hot. Today, the US government is running an annualized $1 trillion deficit. So, it's literally printing new money for the private sector with inflation not yet fully contained.”

0.66

Pension funds structurally need to own long-duration treasury bonds to hedge their long-duration liabilities (pension payments 30+ years in the future), making them relatively insensitive to credit downgrades or yield-driven trading.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“Big buyers, pension funds. So, why would a pension fund buy treasuries? Well, they are they have long duration liabilities. They promise pension premiums 30 years from now to the pensioners, right? So, as they have long duration liabilities, they need long duration assets as well. And they need these assets first to hedge the interest rate risk of long duration liabilities with long duration assets.”

0.62

In a fully elastic fiat credit system with no hard anchor (like the gold standard), money supply can expand indefinitely without structural constraints; the advantages are that counter-cyclical stimulus is possible during downturns, but the disadvantage is that pro-cyclical stimulus during booms drives inequality and asset inflation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“we have a fully elastic credit system...The advantages are, if you use it well, being fully elastic, during downturns, you can anticyclically expand your credit...The downside is expanding credit generally, if you don't do it for productive purposes, but you do it for increasing house prices, increasing asset prices, it will lead to disparity.”

0.52

The false part of portfolio rebalancing theory is that banks' risk management constraints and capital limits will prevent them from recklessly chasing risk even if they accumulate excess reserves; a risk manager will not allow a bank to increase its risk exposure to Greek or Italian bonds merely because the central bank has provided additional reserves.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“The wrong part of it is the following...you are a European bank treasury and the European Central Bank is running QE...At some point, you won't like all your liquid assets are reserves...Let me buy some Greek bonds, some Portuguese bonds, some Italian bonds. The limits, the risk limits, my risk preference that the risk manager sets is not going to change because the the Central Bank is doing QE. They are not going to allow me to be reckless on risk because I have more bank reserves.”

0.52

Policymakers currently want to engineer inflation back to the 2-2.5% range because controlling inflation maintains their sense of being in control; they reject both deflation (which makes debt worse) and high inflation (5%+) as uncontrollable, seeking a comfort zone where political incentives work normally.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“they want to bring inflation back down. Why? To gain control...2% inflation target because 2% is enough far away from the scary deflation...they don't want 5% inflation, 6 or 7 uncontrollable inflation. They want 2% inflation...those are the acceptable outcomes. But zero or four or five, again, they are not acceptable because they go outside the comfort zone.”

0.52

BRICS currencies cannot easily replace the dollar as a reserve asset because: (1) Chinese bond markets lack transparency, openness, and rule of law; (2) Brazil lacks the institutional stability and rule of law needed for trustworthy reserve currency status; (3) $12 trillion of offshore dollar-denominated debt creates leverage problems—countries must earn dollars to service it, so exiting dollar income creates default risk.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“the Chinese bond market doesn't particularly strike me as a very open, transparent, and trustable market...would I think that Brazil can be the example for a liquid, transparent, non-corrupted, rule of law dominated country? I can't make the case for that, either...There are 12 trillion dollars of dollar denominated debt that exists today. It has been issued by countries outside the US jurisdiction...How do you repay your dollar debt?...Well, you need dollars to pay dollars...The moment you don't sell them in dollars anymore, you understand that you might have a bit of an issue in servicing your 12 trillion dollars of dollar denominated liabilities.”

0.43

The ECB's TLTRO (Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations) program provided European banks with 4-year funding at negative interest rates, effectively subsidizing bank borrowing; when the ECB changed terms and conditions, banks stopped renewing, funding compressed, and the amount of reserves in the system fell.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“The European Central Bank had a program called TLTRO, targeted long-term refinancing operations...basically it's a lot of words to say, hey European banks, here is a very cheap loan for you...European Bank got a loan from the ECB for 4 years at negative interest rates...And when they changed the terms and conditions on this TLTRO, banks, all of a sudden, didn't find appealing to renew this funding.”

0.41

Between 1989 and 1990, the Imperial Palace of Tokyo was valued at more than the entire state of California, illustrating the magnitude of the Japanese real estate bubble that preceded the 1990s balance sheet recession and subsequent 30-year period of stagnant growth.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“The Imperial Palace of Tokyo in 1989 was valued more than the entire state of California. This is the level that we reached back in Japan in 1989, okay?”

0.41

A bank's personal preference for reserve holdings varies based on its risk tolerance and liquidity preferences; banks that are reserve-scarce will bid up repo rates to access reserves from other banks, and the repo market allows banks to trade reserves among themselves based on individual needs.

causalestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Macro Alf

“each bank works differently. A certain bank might have more needs to settle transaction with each other overnight...So, effectively the distribution of reserves amongst each bank is different depending on the preference of risk and liquidity that a certain bank has. So, it might be that one bank is running scarce on reserves. Okay, so they need to bid them up. They need to find these reserves somewhere. So, they will go in the repo market, try to post some of the collateral they own...they go to other banks and they say, 'Hey guys, you have more reserves, can you lend them to me?'”

0.37

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis published research called 'Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero Interest Bank Reserve Requirements' that addresses the snowballing debt problem and is evidence that even policymakers are beginning to recognize fiscal dominance risks.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“There has been a recent paper that actually I have open right here. It's called, and everybody should read it from the uh some Federal Bank Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. So, it's literally the Federal Reserve branch that is publishing this paper. It's called fiscal dominance and the return of zero interest bank reserve requirements.”

0.20

Macro Alf runs Macro Compass, a macro investment strategy firm focused on making macroeconomic research actionable and practical for investors, combining educational content with actual investment theses.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Macro Alf

“If you Google uh the macro compass, the macro compass.com, it's the website of my company. It's a macro investment strategy firm, which basically means I not only blabber about macro and I Seriously, I try to be as educational as I can and explain all the things in details and follow the economy and follow markets. Most importantly, try to make it practical.”