as-if hypothesis
Friedman's methodological claim that it doesn't matter whether agents literally optimize, only whether they behave as if they do and the model's predictions hold.
As defined in John Kay and Mervyn King on Radical Uncertainty
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- After repeatedly using the as-if argument, economists forget it is an as-if and start believing people actually do maximize — the same fallacy as value-at-risk, where a firm not collapsing makes you think you've measured risk accurately — and then leap to policy and social-welfare conclusions based on a model that merely seems to work in some settings.John Kay and Mervyn King on Radical Uncertainty
- Milton Friedman's 'as-if' methodology fails because any model prediction contains many assumptions — both the maximizing behavior and the model's structure — so when a prediction is falsified you can never identify whether the as-if assumption or some other part of the model is wrong; in practice economics has forecast woefully, predicting nothing significant and then dismissing it as an unexplained shock.John Kay and Mervyn King on Radical Uncertainty