Peano arithmetic
A formal axiom system characterizing the natural numbers, named after Giuseppe Peano.
As defined in 178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real
Where it comes up · 3
- 178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real3 claims
- 137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality2 claims
- Joel David Hamkins1 claim
Most important claims · 6 of 6Search all claims for “Peano arithmetic” →
- The attractive view that any mathematical claim P just means 'if the axioms are true, then P' (avoiding commitment to numbers) fails: if read as a material conditional, an unsatisfied set of axioms makes both P and not-P come out true; and if read as a logical-consequence relation, Gödel's second incompleteness theorem shows it is consistent to say false things about consistency, since a consistent arithmetic conjoined with the claim that it proves an inconsistency is itself consistent.137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality
- Gödel's two incompleteness theorems decisively refute Hilbert's program: the first shows no computably axiomatizable theory containing enough arithmetic can answer all questions (every such consistent theory is incomplete), and the second shows no such theory can prove its own consistency.Joel David Hamkins
- Taking an objective stand on what is consistent with what commits you to objectivity about arithmetic, because consistency claims just are arithmetic claims — that set theory is consistent means there is no natural number coding a proof of '0=1' from its axioms — and by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, if standard arithmetic is consistent then so is arithmetic conjoined with the claim that it is inconsistent, so one cannot say 'let a thousand flowers bloom, any axioms are as good as any other' while still holding there are facts about consistency.137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality
- Our intuition that the natural numbers form one definite intended thing (0,1,2,... and no more) while groups are a broad class is not a real distinction, because Peano arithmetic admits many non-standard models and pinning down 'and no more' is nontrivial—so numbers are no more uniquely picked out than groups.178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real
- Gödelian incompleteness by itself only shows that for some statement P, neither P nor not-P is derivable from a recursively enumerable axiom system; concluding that there are determinate truths we cannot access requires the additional move of assuming a standard model or interpreting the introduced truth predicate a particular way—it is a stipulation, not a forced result.178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real
- Consistency of arithmetic means only syntactic consistency—that no Turing machine ever derives 0=1—and there is a determinate fact of the matter about this, but no decision procedure can show it; embedding it in a stronger system to prove consistency just spins your wheels because you cannot know the stronger system is consistent, so we should accept never being sure arithmetic is consistent.178 | Jody Azzouni on What Is and Isn't Real