factual

Gödel undermined if-axioms-then-theorem conventionalism

The attractive view that any mathematical claim P just means 'if the axioms are true, then P' (avoiding commitment to numbers) fails: if read as a material conditional, an unsatisfied set of axioms makes both P and not-P come out true; and if read as a logical-consequence relation, Gödel's second incompleteness theorem shows it is consistent to say false things about consistency, since a consistent arithmetic conjoined with the claim that it proves an inconsistency is itself consistent.

factualpending

Speaker

Justin Clarke-Doane

Evidence Quote

“if Peano arithmetic, standard arithmetic is consistent, then so is Peano arithmetic conjoined with a claim that it proves an inconsistency”

Source

137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality— Sean Carroll's Mindscape
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:21:37 AM

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