Nash Equilibrium
A combination of strategies in a game where no player has any incentive to unilaterally change their strategy, so everyone is doing the best they can given what others do.
As defined in 164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality
Other definitions
A stable state in a multi-agent system where no individual can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing behavior, used to explain why no one can escape the hyperactive hive mind alone.
304 - Why I Left TwitterGame theory concept where no player can improve their outcome by changing strategy unilaterally while others keep their strategy; a stable point where all parties accept the outcome because alternatives are worse.
U.S. Has Reached ‘Choose Your Poison’ Moment: Save the Dollar or Save Treasuries | Gromen & Makori
Where it comes up · 17
- U.S. Has Reached ‘Choose Your Poison’ Moment: Save the Dollar or Save Treasuries | Gromen & Makori3 claims
- 164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality3 claims
- Scott Aaronson - Quantum Computing, Complexity, and Creativity3 claims
- Dwarkesh Patel Podcast - Eric Jang – Building AlphaGo from scratch2 claims
- 113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness2 claims
- Vernon Smith on Markets and Experimental Economics 5/21/20071 claim
- Crowdsourcing Predictive Algorithms1 claim
- The Dark Side of Conscious Ai | Daniel Schmachtenberger1 claim
and 9 more
Most important claims · 10 of 25Search all claims for “Nash Equilibrium” →
- Computing a Nash equilibrium is a hard problem (PPAD-complete, shown by Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou in 2006): it is not NP-complete because a solution always exists by Nash's theorem, but it is at least as hard as any problem whose solution is guaranteed to exist; unwinding Nash's Kakutani fixed-point existence proof yields an algorithm that may follow an exponentially long trail before reaching the equilibrium.Scott Aaronson - Quantum Computing, Complexity, and Creativity
- In an evolutionary game where players play repeatedly and successful strategies reproduce more, the only equilibria of that dynamical system are Nash equilibria of the underlying game; this justifies using game theory wherever social evolution has occurred, because evolution favors strategies that converge on Nash equilibria—for example fingers players evolving toward 50-50.164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality
- Lack of knowledge about the economy and lack of ability to compute on the knowledge you already have are distinct kinds of deviation from omniscience; Nash equilibrium hardness concerns the latter (computation), whereas Hayek's knowledge problem and the economics of information concern the former, and economists have integrated information problems more successfully than computational ones.Scott Aaronson - Quantum Computing, Complexity, and Creativity
- In the two-thirds-of-the-average game, where players pick numbers from 0 to 100 and the target is two-thirds of the average, typical choices cluster at one or two steps of reasoning, such as 33 and 22, with few choices at the Nash equilibrium of zero.373 | Colin Camerer on the Neuroscience of Economic Thinking
- Universal cooperation can be supported as a Nash equilibrium only if there are no errors, via trigger strategies ('cooperate, but if anyone defects, never cooperate again'); but once errors exist—someone gets sick and misses work—cooperation collapses, models become far more sophisticated, and cooperation is never universal.164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality
- Most participants believe they could have done better in the market, but at equilibrium each person is already doing the best he can given what others are doing, which is John Nash's definition of equilibrium, so their sense of missed gains is mistaken.Vernon Smith on Markets and Experimental Economics 5/21/2007
- An evolutionarily stable strategy is a solution concept for evolving populations: a strategy is evolutionarily stable if, when the whole population plays it, it resists invasion by mutant strategies—mutants die off because the dominant strategy does better against itself (or against the mutants) than the mutants do, so any variant entering the population fails to spread.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- If calculating a Nash equilibrium would take exponential time, we shouldn't expect a real market to find it either; thus the hardness of finding equilibria underscores that an equilibrium's mere existence is not the end of the story, reinforcing the recognized point that economic actors face computational, not just rationality, limits.Scott Aaronson - Quantum Computing, Complexity, and Creativity
- A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies where, when actors play them, none of the actors has any incentive to switch to a different strategy; it is important because it represents an approximately stable set of behaviors and therefore predicts what actors will do, and laboratory experiments show people often play Nash equilibria or something like them.113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness
- A Nash equilibrium is a strategy state in which no competitor can profitably deviate; if you do deviate you only lose on average in the long run, as illustrated by the optimal rock-paper-scissors strategy of randomizing equally across all three throws when you have no information about your opponent.6 | Liv Boeree on Poker, Aliens, and Thinking in Probabilities