causal

Trigger strategies fail under errors

Universal cooperation can be supported as a Nash equilibrium only if there are no errors, via trigger strategies ('cooperate, but if anyone defects, never cooperate again'); but once errors exist—someone gets sick and misses work—cooperation collapses, models become far more sophisticated, and cooperation is never universal.

causalpending

Speaker

Herbert Gintis

Evidence Quote

“you can support... a complete cooperation equilibrium in the game just by making a new game and saying, "Look, we'll all cooperate. If it ever one person does not cooperate, then we never cooperate again forever." That's called a trigger strategy. And that's fine until someone gets sick... So if there are errors... cooperation is never universal.”

Source

164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality— Sean Carroll's Mindscape
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:09:19 AM

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