causal

Evolution justifies game theory via Nash equilibria

In an evolutionary game where players play repeatedly and successful strategies reproduce more, the only equilibria of that dynamical system are Nash equilibria of the underlying game; this justifies using game theory wherever social evolution has occurred, because evolution favors strategies that converge on Nash equilibria—for example fingers players evolving toward 50-50.

causalpending

Speaker

Herbert Gintis

Evidence Quote

“In an evolutionary game... then the only equilibria of that dynamical system is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. And that justifies using game theory in situations where you've had social evolution... if you have a whole bunch of people playing one finger, two finger, throwing fingers, they will evolve towards 50-50.”

Source

164 | Herbert Gintis on Game Theory, Evolution, and Social Rationality— Sean Carroll's Mindscape
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:09:19 AM

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