17 claims in “health economics”
Automated medical scribes reached near-full adoption quickly, and doctors used the freed time to schedule more meetings and do more work, though some also used it for yoga, as shown in a NBER Summer Institute paper.
Insured group pools of 10 to 1,000 employees cannot spread risk as well as the individual market, so small and middle-market employers face higher rate increases.
The dentist problem is a major failure of markets: a dentist has more information about your teeth and is motivated by money, yet patients accept recommended procedures without argument because they have ceded control while in the chair.
Patients often say no to their dentist but then cancel the appointment rather than argue on the spot, and the same holds for doctors; the psychological loss of control is compounded by third-party payment, which leads providers to assume patients will not object to costs.
Consumers know remarkably little about the dental and health care they buy, and information about medical quality is a public good that society resists creating, because people are uncomfortable letting others take chances on stochastic medical outcomes and prefer the illusion that everyone is being taken care of.
Hard-to-find odds information on tooth complications such as a tooth growing down into a fang reflects a fear factor: people do not want to know medical information even when it exists, and hospital death-rate comparisons across doctors are highly imperfect and unpopular.
The extra care from free medicine was judged by doctors to be as medically appropriate and as serious in diagnosis as the care the paying group received, so the extra care was not trivial.
The RAND null result could be due to study limits: it lasted only three to five years, had too few elderly and too few deaths to measure mortality, and used one experiment of thousands rather than millions of people.
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, begun in the late 1970s, randomly assigned about 5,000-7,000 people in six US cities to free ('blank check') medical care or to cost-sharing plans.
Before RAND, decades of correlational studies across states, counties, and countries found health correlated with exercise, sleep, wealth, diet, and air pollution, but not with medicine.
Free medical care increased total medical spending and utilization by about 30-40% over the three-to-five-year RAND period (about 32% more quantity at zero price), which is elastic but not extreme demand.
The RAND free-care group showed no measurable improvement in health: none of about 25 physical measures or the overall health measures changed, and no subgroup (rich/poor, initially sick/healthy) showed an effect, except that free eyeglasses improved vision.
In a late-1980s Pennsylvania study, when hospital mortality rates were published, only about 8% of heart-surgery patients said they looked at the data, only about 5 of 500 said it influenced their choice, and most would not pay $50 for it, even though a 1% versus 5% mortality difference is worth tens of thousands of dollars by ordinary risk-taking.
Pharmaceutical purchases are only about 10-15% of US health spending, roughly $200 billion of the $2 trillion total, so making drugs free would cut spending only modestly and would be a small share of the bill, but it would delay one year's cost growth.
Hanson's core argument is that medicine is not the only thing that seems strange: if healthcare does not affect health, then many other puzzles follow, such as why people keep going to doctors and why they ignore quality information, so one should look for a single holistic explanation rather than ad hoc explanations for each puzzle.
Roberts' rebuttal that patients are sophisticated and that a 1% versus 5% mortality gap could reflect case mix does not fully explain the behavior, since patients who ignore quality data still fail to act even when a trusted doctor-friend's recommendation is available.
Puzzling patterns in health behavior include people wanting medicine from government or employers, married people and parents getting more medicine, women getting more care, and strong demand for regulation of small health risks such as an apple's tiny risk.