
What this covers
This is a 45-minute lecture by Michael Sugrue on Edmund Husserl, covering his career, his method, and its weaknesses. Sugrue begins with the man: a mathematician trained under Weierstrass, a "closet Platonist," and a notoriously recondite, compulsive writer who coined neologisms. He was dismissed from Freiburg in 1933 for being Jewish and was replaced by his student Martin Heidegger. Sugrue frames the project as epistemological, like René Descartes': a presuppositionless foundation for knowledge, a science of sciences meant to correct all other activities.
The middle of the talk walks through the machinery. The epoche brackets the external world, not as skeptical denial but as irrelevant, leaving the raw data of being human. Reduction leads consciousness back to what is structural. Intentionality is borrowed from Franz Brentano, who held that mental life cannot be reduced to chemistry. Free imaginative variation adds and subtracts predicates to separate the essential from the contingent. Sugrue also takes up Husserl's answer to the problem of other minds, intersubjectivity, which he calls never clearly defined, and the late concept of the lifeworld, which contrasts lived experience with the abstractions of natural science.
Sugrue is openly critical. He argues that nobody has a procedure for deciding which predicates are essential, that the possible predicates are infinite, and that re-introspecting to confirm a finding is like buying a second copy of the same newspaper. He adds that Husserl rarely performs a phenomenological investigation, spending his time refining the method instead. The more contested turn is the claim that reading Ludwig Wittgenstein first dissolves the problem, since essences then become features of language rather than of mind. Sugrue also sets continental inwardness against Anglo-American outward-looking empiricism, noting that both traditions struggle to bridge inner and outer. He closes with a singing analogy for the cost of precision and a defense of the quest for unified knowledge, even if the grail is never found.
Husserl's phenomenological project, though ultimately failing to achieve its ambitious goal of certain knowledge, makes a crucial point that experience comes before theory—one should preserve the richness of internal experience even if philosophical precision must be sacrificed, rather than truncate human experience to fit narrow theoretical frameworks.
- Continental philosophy prioritizes internal experience and consciousness as foundational, whereas Anglo-American empiricism sacrifices the entire internal world to gain precision about the external
- The strength of Husserl's critique is that he refuses to let scientific theory dictate what counts as real experience; if a theory doesn't match lived experience, the theory is wrong, not the experience
- The problem of bridging internal and external knowledge is endemic to both traditions, but the continental willingness to be nebulous about internal states preserves more of what it means to be human than Anglo-American eliminationism
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Husserl's philosophical project, like Descartes', is fundamentally epistemological: to construct a new foundation for knowledge through a radical move that attempts to create certainty in the face of contingency and uncertainty, seeking a presuppositionless foundation to human knowledge that would function as a science of sciences to inform, direct, and correct all other human activities.
“like descartes what husserl wished to do was to construct a new foundation for knowledge it's a radical epistemological move which attempts to create certainty in the face of contingency and the uncertainty that is generated by the other realms of knowledge so in some way respects perhaps like kant what husserl's project involves is finding a presuppositionless foundation to human knowledge and what this would be is a sort of science of sciences that would inform and direct and correct all the other activities of the human mind including natural science”
Intuition is not inherently a fishy, mushy, or doubtful category; certain intuitions are not controversial and are not doubtable—for example, my direct intuition of whether I have a headache is knowledge that only I can possess and that no external observation or mathematical proof can invalidate or override.
“i can answer these questions even though you can't i know if i have a headache or not and what would somebody else external to me presume to tell me that no i don't have a headache you're going to correct me on that matter no of course it's silly right well may i suggest that my knowledge of my headache is a direct intuition of my experience my psychic state right and i don't need anybody else to help me out here”
Husserl's early background in mathematics is very important, and like most mathematicians, he is a closet Platonist with a tendency to look for something universal and abstract in all thinking, having received his PhD under Weierstrass in Germany in the 1880s with definite Platonic tendencies and commitments.
“his early background was in mathematics which is very important josurel is perhaps like all mathematicians is a sort of closet platonist i think that mathematicians on the whole tend to look for something universal and abstract in all the thinking that they do and husserl who got his phd under wyastros in germany in the 1880s has a definite set of platonic tendencies and commitments”
Husserl was a professor at the University of Freiburg until 1933 when he was dismissed from his post because he was Jewish; National Socialism came in and he was replaced by one of his students, Martin Heidegger, and at that time it became clear to Husserl that Western culture was collapsing.
“he was a professor at the university of freiburg until 1933 when he was dismissed from his post because he was a jew right national socialism comes in and he gets replaced by one of his students martin heidegger and at that time it seems clear enough to husserl that western culture is collapsing”
Edmund Husserl is one of the most important and influential figures in 20th century philosophy, despite—or perhaps because of—the fact that he is a particularly difficult philosopher to interpret, with extremely recondite style, voluminous writings that are almost compulsive, and a tendency to construct neologisms for new conceptual paths into the psyche and mind.
“so edmund husserl is one of the most important and influential figures in 20th century philosophy and this is despite the fact or perhaps because of the fact that he's a particularly difficult philosopher to interpret his style is extremely recondite his writings are voluminous almost to the point of compulsiveness and he has a tendency to construct neologisms to correspond to the new paths that he's breaking into the realm of this of the psyche or the realm of the mind”
Husserl constructs the concept of intersubjectivity to explain how phenomenological psyches and transcendental egos communicate with each other—an idea that is never completely or clearly defined, allowing us to form a linguistic community with other minds.
“what husserl did in kind of pounding on the desk in the in a kind of cartesian way is to construct the idea of intersubjectivity in other words the way in which these phenomenological psyches these transcendental egos communicate with each other is or or the matrix in which they communicate with each other is his idea of inter-subjectivity an idea which is never completely or clearly defined it allows us to form a sort of linguistic or verbal community with other minds”
Brentano, from whom Husserl borrowed the idea of intentionality, established that the facts of mental life and psychic life are irreducible and cannot be talked about in terms of chemicals or other external physical phenomena.
“churceurl was a student of brentano which is an interesting fact because freud was also one of brentano's students and from brentano apparently a very influential teacher he borrowed as freud did the idea of intentionality and that's revolves around the proposition that the facts of mental life of our psychic life are irreducible in other words we can't talk about love and hate and hope and guilt and lust in terms of chemicals”
The epoche (bracketing or suspension of belief in the external world) is not skeptical denial of the existence of tables and chairs like Descartes' doubt, but rather a mathematical bracketing of the entire external world as irrelevant to the phenomenological investigation, leaving out scientific theorems, mathematical deductions, and cause-and-effect relationships (since we don't directly see causation, only sequences), leaving only the pure raw data of being a human being.
“what sorrow wants to do is first of all suspend the whole external world now it's not that he just believes in it in other words he's not being skeptical of the existence of tables and chairs the way descartes did in the discourse on method he's not denying their existence he's just saying that the whole external world is irrelevant bracketed right in a strict mathematical sense of bracketing a problem because remember he had his training as a mathematician so we're going to bracket the problem of the external world and leave out all that stuff all right and bracketing the external world means that we're going to leave out a great deal of human experience”
Phenomenological statements are descriptive but not empirical in the sense of observing external phenomena; they describe exclusively the internal contents of the psyche (the intracosm) and are derived a priori—meaning they are non-empirical and necessarily true—about what it means to be a human being.
“it will be descriptive but it won't describe anything out there it's going to describe exclusively the stuff that's in here all right so it's going to be a descriptive theory of the intro cosm all right and what he's looking for is absolute certainty without presuppositions and it will always be about internal intentional actions what he's trying to do here is derive a priori statements”
Husserl's method of free imaginative variation for finding essences involves attributing predicates to a thing, then adding and subtracting them in imagination to determine which predicates are contingent (can be dispensed with) and which are essential (cannot be dispensed with).
“what he calls free imaginative variation let's see what that's like that's how we search for essences and what we're going to do is think of something let's take a human being that's something i'm going to do a phenomenological reduction i'm going to think about that problem now cogitating with me all right all right let's give this a shot um what we're going to do is attribute predicates to this thing human being and then add and subtract them in our imagination and see which of them which of these predicates we believe we can dispense with and which we believe we cannot dispense with”
Husserl believes that the knowing self (the cogito) is both temporally and logically prior to the world that is known by the cogito; in other words, the knower comes before the known, and this emphasis on inwardness and internality is one of the most characteristic intellectual deployments of continental philosophy, in contrast to the Anglo-American tradition which looks outward.
“the knowing self the kagito is in his earl's view both temporally and logically prior to the world that's known by the kagito in other words the knower comes before the known right that has to come first and if you think about the idealist tradition all these guys believe that think about descartes think about uh spinoza think about uh kant the whole idealist or rationalist tradition tends to emphasize inwardness in turn internality and perhaps that's the most not only an important characteristic of facial but i would be inclined to say that that's one of the most characteristic moves the characteristic intellectual deployments of continental philosophy”
Reading Ludwig Wittgenstein before reading Husserl dissolves phenomenological problems because Wittgenstein shows that the whole problem is misconceived; essences are not qualities intrinsic to the human mind but rather qualities intrinsic to a particular language—when you find that self-consciousness is necessary, you're finding something about how we use the word 'essence' in English, not something about the intrinsic nature of the human mind.
“one of the things that sort of ruins husserl for a man is if you have been exposed to ludwig wittgenstein before you do husserl because wittgenstein's work is a wonderful way of dissolving these kind of problems in other words the king says he doesn't want to talk about whether this is true or false look the whole problem is misconceived and that's the real difficulty we have here and let's think about that what the criticism of this is going to be what cyril thinks he's doing when he finds out what the essence of a human being is he thinks he's finding out something about the universal structure of the human mind and that all people have to think that because these words these terms like human being correspond to natural kinds in the world and the natural kinds of the world correspond to natural categories in the in human cognition my point is that's probably not true wittgenstein would help will help us out here wittgenstein says i want to leave i want to lead the fly out of the fly bottle husserl is a guy walking around or like a fly walking around inside the fly bottle unable to get out here's the problem instead of essences being a quality intrinsic to the human mind wittgenstein will point out that essences are equality intrinsic to a particular language so that's when you find out that uh self-consciousness is a necessary predicate for essence you're not finding out the the some quality about the human mind intrinsically which corresponds to essence what you're finding out is about the way we we use the word essence in the english language”
The problem with Husserl's free imaginative variation method is that there are an infinite number of possible predicates that could be attributed to any object, and we will never finish reducing the first predicate, much less complete all the reductions necessary for the entire project.
“one of the great problems here is it seems to me there are an infinite number of predicates and we're never going to get uh we're never going to finish the first thing we try and reduce much less do all the other reductions that are going to be necessary to engage in this project”
Both the Anglo-American tradition and the continental tradition suffer from a common problem when trying to make the jump from one realm to the other—from the exocosm (external world) to the intracosm (internal psyche)—which is that the problem remains the same regardless of which side one starts on: how do we move from one part of the hurdle to the other.
“both the anglo-american tradition and the continental tradition suffer from a sort of common problem when they try and make the jump from one realm the exterior what we might call the exochasm to the what the internal realm the psyche the soul or the mind or what i call the intracosm there's always a problem in making and leaping that hurdle and it doesn't really matter which side you start on the problem is always going to be the same how do we move from one part of the hurdle to the other how do we move from the beginning to the end”
The truth conditions for determining which predicates are essential versus contingent are unclear: we don't have a procedure for discovering agreement among phenomenologists, and when asked how one knows which predicates are essential, the only answer available is 'I introspected and found it to be true,' which is not a satisfactory answer and suggests there is no way to gesture at or communicate the content of intuitions.
“how do we know which of these predicates are the essential ones help me out here i can imagine some which it seems fairly clear uh triangles have to have the property of having three sides i can believe that i mean that's not too controversial but i can imagine cases where it wouldn't be clear even among phenomenologists and there were there might be a lack of agreement and i'm not quite sure how we go about finding that out and even if and if i just look at it from my own perspective you know leave out the the social interaction between phenomenologists i look at it in my case and i say all right so i've decided that one of the essential predicates of human being is the fact that it is self-conscious that's just fine now suppose i'm uncertain about that well i guess i can't be uncertain about it because i found out by introspection and i'm certain of all the things that i introspect so i guess i can't be uncertain about that but suppose i talk to one of my students and i say kid one of the essential properties of the human mind is that it's self-conscious suppose he says professor how do you know and what is it to pound the table and say look don't ask me how i know i looked inside myself and i know that's not a very satisfactory answer”
Reduction (from Latin 'to lead back') is the process of being led back to primal consciousness, or alternatively, boiling consciousness down to what is essential and structural, leaving behind all irrelevant material.
“also think of the idea of reduction reduction is a funny word um from latin it means to lead back we're going to be led back to our original kind of primal consciousness another way of thinking of reduction would be the idea of boiling down imagine the consciousness is a big whale and you've got to put it in a pot and boil away all the stuff that's irrelevant so that you can get to something that's essential and structural and permanent there”
Toward the end of his life, Husserl developed the concept of the 'lifeworld' (Lebenswelt), which turns toward the immanence of human experience and consciousness as it appears to human beings, in contrast to the impersonal abstract experience of the world from natural science.
“towards the end of his life um he developed uh the idea of the lebensville the life world and this turn is toward the imminence of human experience and human consciousness let me see if i can explain this idea what he wants to do is to look at the world as it appears to human beings as it is given in human experience as opposed to the impersonal abstract experience of the world that we get from our study of modern natural science”
The problem of other minds is a fundamental difficulty Descartes faced: while he could explain his own existence and consciousness, he ran against a glass barrier in explaining what grounds we have for believing in the reality of other people's psyches.
“the question of other minds descartes always had a problem i mean he didn't have any problem explaining how he knew he existed and what his existence was like but he always ran up against a sort of glass barrier when he tried to explain what grounds we have for believing in the reality of other people's psyche why is this not a kind of wilderness of objects and he thinks that there are other minds but he can't quite explain why or how”
The facts of mental life (love, hate, hope, guilt, lust) are irreducible and real, and the self comes first logically—Husserl constructs the self first and then builds nature, the reverse of the empiricist project of constructing nature first and then the self.
“he believes that the facts of mental life are irreducible and they're real and not only are they irreducible and real but they come first in other words what hussuro wants to do is like that is like the project of descartes he wants to construct the self first and out of that build nature rather than say the uh the empiricist project of constructing nature first and then later on constructing the self”
Phenomenology and empiricism, though different in many respects, share a common property: they are both ultimately based on experience—Hume's empiricism is based on experience of the external world, while Husserl's phenomenology is based on experience of the internal world and reduces only to that with nothing further to gesture at.
“phenomenology husserl's method and empiricism the method of somebody like david hume even though they are so different in many respects share a common property is that they're all ultimately based on our experience hume's phenomenalism his empiricism is based on our on our experience of the external world observing it husserl's phenomenology alternatively is based on our experience of the internal world and it reduces only to that and there's nothing further that we can gesture at”
When Husserl repeatedly introspects to confirm an essential predicate (like saying 'I intuited this yesterday, and I will do it now to confirm'), he is like someone buying another copy of the same newspaper to verify the truth of a story on page one—the repetition doesn't validate the claim because the validation itself comes from the same source as the original claim.
“there was a wonderful i mean think about my hypothetical situation with my student where i said look i intuited this yesterday i did the phenomenological reduction i'm going to do it now and believe me this will confirm what i said yesterday that that the essence of huma of consciousness of human being is consciousness this is a lot like what victinshine said when he said look suppose you bought a newspaper and you had some doubt as to what the story meant or of the truth of a given story on page one how would you find out if the story was true well there are different ways you might do that but one way that you wouldn't do that is to go out and buy another copy of the same paper”
One major problem with phenomenology is that there are very few examples in Husserl's work of actually performing phenomenological investigation; instead, he spends most of his time figuring out what the phenomenological method is and refining it, creating a circularity where one must use phenomenology on itself to discover what a phenomenon is.
“there are very few examples in historical's work of actually doing this one of the problems with phenomenology the nebulous bag equality about it is that he says that the first thing we have to do is figure out what the phenomenological method is and the way we develop the phenomenological method is to use phenomenology on itself to inspect yourself so there's something kind of fishy going on here in order to find out what a phenomenon is remember in greek phenomenon is that which is disclosed that which is apparent and directly known well in order to find out what a phenomenon is one of the things we're going to do is reduce the idea of the phenomenon to find out what that essentially is and from there we'll be able to move directly on so it's a method that hopes to pull itself up by its bootstraps and i have some problems logically with this activity”
Like singing where pitch precision costs something and loosening pitch allows hitting high notes, philosophical precision in articulation costs something—gaining range to discuss beauty, morality, and important psychological truths requires sacrificing technical exactitude.
“think of another way another analogy that we can bring to this is that it's like singing the precision of addiction costs something the precision of our thinking and speech costs something we can loosen up the diction so it's not so precise what we're saying but we can gain in range we can hit the high notes intellectually and i think that talking about right and wrong and talking about beauty and talking about the really important things psychically those are the high notes of philosophy”
Husserl's project, while failing to complete itself and probably impossible to do, is still admirable because it attempts to unify all knowledge—a quest for the holy grail—and there is something excellent about the quest itself even if the grail is never found.
“i think that the project well not only does it not complete itself it nearly never completely gets started and it's probably impossible to do but i sort of admire the idea of unifying all of knowledge it is a sort of quest for the holy grail and even if we never find it there is something excellent about the quest”
Like changing one's body to fit a suit of clothes rather than changing the suit to fit one's body, we should not truncate our experience of causation, morality, beauty, and emotion to fit philosophical theories that cannot talk about them precisely; instead, when theory fails to match experience, the theory is wrong, not the experience.
“do we change our body to suit our jacket or we change our jacket to suit our body now let me suggest that our body is the set of our experiences and that the jacket is the philosophical theory with which we account for them you really want to cut off your experience of cause and effect of good and evil of lust and rage and hatred and beauty um because you can't talk about them precisely or is this demand for philosophical precision taken to an unreasonable extreme in other words when uh when aj air force is it air that has the view that say more moral theory is non-cognitive right well i experience morals at least sometimes as being real and right and wrong if these anglo-american guys these real hard shell and piercers tell me that my experience is wrong it's like the tailor telling me my body's wrong don't tell me that i'm experiencing the world wrong no your theory is wrong and if it doesn't correspond to my experience then fix the theory don't tell me to fix my experience my experience comes first”
To understand Husserl's work, one should connect it to Plato, the Cartesian tradition, and the tradition of Western rationalism and idealism, as these provide the right interpretive framework.
“when you read his philosophy when you think about husserl's work if you were to connect it and think of it in terms of plato and the cartesian tradition the tradition of western rationalism and idealism you will be on the right track”
Husserl's effort to stand against Western cultural collapse is comparable to Ajax in the Iliad preventing the Trojans from burning the Greek ships—heroic even if fighting phantom battles, essential to cultural defense even if ultimately unsuccessful.
“what he's trying to do is sort of like ajax i don't know if you know the the iliad but ajax preventing the trojans from burning the greek ships he stands there and will not move and there is something tremendously heroic about it even though he may be fighting phantom battles all right he thinks at least that what he's doing is absolutely essential to the project of our culture”
The Anglo-American tradition concentrates on the external public world, making it relatively easy to refer directly to things and say what one is talking about, but the advantage of this is also its disadvantage: by insisting on precision, it must abolish the internal world.
“the advantage of the anglo-american tradition is that by concentrating on external stuff on the public world it's relatively easy to say what you're talking about to refer directly to things in the world because they're public they're external here's the difficulty the temptation that the anglo-american tradition has is to just abolish the internal world”
The Platonic and Aristotelian tradition holds that knowledge demands both rationality and communicability—logos demands that knowledge be communicable. Husserl encounters the limits of language (what Wittgenstein calls the limits of what can be said) and would like to step over them but never quite manages.
“that's a betrayal of the platonic and aristotelian tradition the idea of logos demands that knowledge not just be rational but that it be communicable that's one of the canons of rationality and husserl comes up to the barriers of language which what wittenstein calls the limits of what can be said and he'd like to step over but he never quite manages to do it right”
One should cut continental philosophers some slack because the project they have undertaken—talking about the internal facts of psychic states—is probably impossible or so difficult that it must be conducted with cloudiness and nebulousness, which is built into the problem itself, not a particular failure of any philosopher.
“so what i'm asking for in some respects is that you cut the continental philosophers a little bit of slack because of the fact that the project they have undertaken is probably impossible i mean it may well be just impossible to talk about the internal facts of my psychic states or it is so with a great deal of difficulty and a great deal of cloudiness it is not any particular problem with hussurl or this or any specific philosopher it is built into that kind of project of making a bridging this gap between what's inside and what's outside”
The empiricist view of the psyche as an empty box (tabula rasa) receiving impressions that are then associated is an impoverished view of human experience; nobody actually experiences the world as a bundle of sensations, yet this is what empiricism is forced to claim.
“remember i mean think of the uh of the idea that we get with locke and hume that the psyche is a kind of an empty box a tabula rasa and all these impressions get sent in and then we associate them you get that association of psychology and that's what the mind is it's a bundle of sensations that is an impoverished view of human experience i mean if you stop and think about it nobody nobody views the world and experiences the world as a bundle of sensations”
If one starts with the external world and its contingency, messiness, and lack of certainty, all subsequent intellectual activities and self-knowledge will reflect that same contingency and uncertainty; but if one builds on internal certainty, external knowledge gains stable ground.
“if we start with the external world and its contingency and its messiness and its lack of certainty all our other intellectual activities including our knowledge of ourself is going to reflect that same contingency and uncertainty”
Husserl might be understood as German Romanticism given mathematical-Cartesian formulation: the lonely ego of Schiller or Goethe, insisting on its own consciousness and the indubitability of its self-awareness as the foundation of everything.
“in many respects you may want to think that of husserl as being german romanticism cartesianized the lonely german the lonely ego of schiller or goethe right given a sort of mathematical cartesian formulation”
Husserl is against historicism, relativism, psychologism, and scientism—tendencies of thought since the Enlightenment that move away from theological and metaphysical structures toward emphasis on the empirical external world, which Husserl argues has misled us and caused us to misunderstand the world, putting philosophy on the wrong footing and impoverishing our culture.
“what he's against are things like historicism relativism psychologism scientism and what he's gesturing at here is the whole tendency of thought since the enlightenment which tends to move away from theological or more precisely metaphysical structures towards an emphasis on the empirical external world perhaps this is a homage to the rise of modern natural science but hussurl says that the rise of modern natural science has misled us has caused us to misunderstand the world around us and has put philosophy on the wrong footing the result of this has been an impoverishment of our culture”
Concrete human time (the time we actually experience) differs from abstract time (t₁, t₂... tₙ going on forever) as described by science. Human time has a limited span; abstract time goes on indefinitely. Science abstracts and to that extent falsifies the reality of human experience.
“science tells us for example the time goes on indefinitely human beings don't experience time like that they have a very limited span in the world right that's one of the big differences concrete time is human time my life abstract time is just t sub one t sub two t sub n goes on forever in other words science abstracts and to that extent somewhat falsifies the reality of human experience right”
At some indefinite future point, phenomenology will discover the precise mathematical method; then at another indefinite point it will apply that method; then at a further indefinite point it will collect the essences discovered and know what to do with them. The entire project is built on faith and deferred application.
“the best understanding i could come away with is this that at some point in the end in the indefinite future we will find out precisely what this method is and i mean precisely mathematically cartesian in that sense and then after we find out precisely what the method is at some point in the indefinite future we will then actually be able to apply it to something and get some results at some indefinite point beyond that and then after that at some indefinite point after we've gotten all these essences and assembled them all in a lovely array then we'll have some idea of what exactly we can do with this”
Husserl claims we find out about other minds through empathy, which is phenomenologically present to us, but he does not provide a satisfactory phenomenological analysis of empathy; he merely insists that yes, there are other minds, yes we can know them, and yes we do so through empathy.
“hosuro is doing something very much like that he says among among other things that we find out about human minds through something that is phenomenologically present to us empathy alas he doesn't have a satisfactory phenomenological analysis of empathy he kind of pounds the desk and insists that yes there are other minds yes we can know them and yes we do so through empathy”
Following the scientistic Anglo-American path leads to behavioral psychology (Pavlov, Watson, Skinner) where there is no mind to talk about—an elegant and precise set of verbal canons that describe the external world but do very little to tell us about ourselves.
“if you follow that sort of scientistic anglo-american path what you're going to get is a very elegant and precise set of verbal canons which account for the world around us but don't do a very good job of telling you about yourself...now here's the difficulty if you follow that sort of scientistic anglo-american path what you're going to get is something like behavioral psychology pavlov and watson and skinner where there is no mind to talk about”
Whether one chooses the continental or Anglo-American tradition, one is forced either to talk to oneself (solipsism) or to construct arbitrary common-sensical bridges from philosophical solipsism into the everyday world—this is built into the nature of the philosophical project itself.
“i can see how you might have a certain desire to do that my problem is that we're always going to end up either talking to ourselves or constructing arbitrary commonsensical bridges from our philosophical solidism into the regular world of everyday praxis all right and that's built into the idea of this project that all the continental thinkers are involved with”
Through phenomenological reduction, we will discover the shape of the ego's transparent cage—the necessary limitations of our experience—and Husserl believes this disclosure will be permanent and valid for all time, in the manner of any mathematician.
“in the process of developing this presuppositionless philosophy what we're going to find out is something like the shape of the ego's transparent cage like kant he's going to tell us what the necessary limitations of our experience are and once he's done that he will think that he has done it permanently for all of time in the way that any mathematician would”