reduction
In metaphysics, the claim that one kind of thing is nothing over and above (is identical to or fully explained by) another, more basic kind; non-naturalists deny morality reduces to natural features.
As defined in 107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality
Where it comes up · 2
- Husserl: Phenomenology and the Life World5 claims
- 107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality2 claims
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- Husserl's method of free imaginative variation for finding essences involves attributing predicates to a thing, then adding and subtracting them in imagination to determine which predicates are contingent (can be dispensed with) and which are essential (cannot be dispensed with).Husserl: Phenomenology and the Life World
- The problem with Husserl's free imaginative variation method is that there are an infinite number of possible predicates that could be attributed to any object, and we will never finish reducing the first predicate, much less complete all the reductions necessary for the entire project.Husserl: Phenomenology and the Life World
- Reduction (from Latin 'to lead back') is the process of being led back to primal consciousness, or alternatively, boiling consciousness down to what is essential and structural, leaving behind all irrelevant material.Husserl: Phenomenology and the Life World
- When Husserl repeatedly introspects to confirm an essential predicate (like saying 'I intuited this yesterday, and I will do it now to confirm'), he is like someone buying another copy of the same newspaper to verify the truth of a story on page one—the repetition doesn't validate the claim because the validation itself comes from the same source as the original claim.Husserl: Phenomenology and the Life World
- Moral features supervene on natural/non-moral features—two situations identical in all non-moral respects must be morally identical—and a thing has a moral feature in virtue of its natural features, yet morality is an additional, irreducible layer that sits on top of the natural and cannot be reduced to it.107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality
- Morality's status resembles chemistry: one can be a realist about chemical kinds (we discovered, not invented, hydrogen) while holding chemical facts are realized by, and in principle traceable to, subatomic arrangements; similarly, every particular moral fact is physically realized, yet what it is to be morally admirable or required is not itself a physical feature, marking an ontological division between moral and natural features.107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality
- Through phenomenological reduction, we will discover the shape of the ego's transparent cage—the necessary limitations of our experience—and Husserl believes this disclosure will be permanent and valid for all time, in the manner of any mathematician.Husserl: Phenomenology and the Life World