
A History of Philosophy | 17 Greek and Roman Skepticism
What this covers
This is a lecture from a college history-of-philosophy course, delivered mainly by an instructor, with a few passages credited to other voices. It starts from the Greek and Roman skeptics. Pyrrho asked what things are like, what attitude we should take toward them, and what that attitude is worth. His answer was suspension of judgment (epoché)), meant to bring quietude. The lecture treats this as a mental attitude, not a theory, and so not a self-refuting claim to know that nothing is known. It follows the skeptic's reasoning through equipolence, in which arguments for and against a position cancel each other, and through the five modes of Skeptical Argument) catalogued by Sextus Empiricus. These include conflicting views, regress, relativity, and circularity.
The lecture then looks at where skepticism comes from and how it was answered. Plato and Aristotle had already seen that proof needs first premises, and the regress problem) follows from that. The Stoic claim to irresistible impressions meets the reply that the skeptics simply don't find them irresistible. Academic skepticism is set against the Pyrrhonian kind: it allows probable belief to guide action, though it denies certainty. The lecture also examines whether the law of non-contradiction can be proved, and argues that Aristotle's defense shows only that denying it is self-defeating.
The later stretch is more contested. It follows skepticism's revival in the Renaissance, once the Reformation and the new science had weakened church authority. It then traces how Augustine's "if I am wrong, I am" anticipates Descartes' cogito, how foundationalism arose in answer to doubt, and how post-Kantian thought moved to fallibilism. Along the way the instructor takes on Hegel's march toward final truth and Francis Schaeffer's picture of philosophy as a string of mistakes. In their place the instructor argues for a coherent, interrelated account of philosophy's development. The lecture also takes up whether a distinctly Christian philosophy can exist, drawing on Gilson and Wolterstorff.
Hellenistic skepticism, particularly Pyrrhonian skepticism, represents a coherent epistemological position that suspends judgment to achieve peace of mind, and its revival during the Renaissance shaped the entire modern epistemological project as philosophers developed responses to skeptical challenges.
- Pyrrhonian skepticism is not self-contradictory dogmatism but a methodological attitude that withholds judgment on all matters including whether judgment can be withheld
- Skepticism recurs at historical junctures when systematic philosophical approaches break down, making it a structural feature of intellectual history rather than mere error
- Modern epistemology from Descartes onward developed foundationalism specifically as a response to skepticism, demonstrating skepticism's generative role in philosophy
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Descartes's 'Cogito, ergo sum' (I think, therefore I am) derives from Augustine's earlier 'Si fallor, sum' (If I am wrong, I am), with Descartes replacing Augustine's 'I am wrong' with 'I think' as the foundational certainty.
“What does that remind you of? Decart kajto. first version of it was dubito where go some I doubt therefore I exist where did daycart get it stole it from Augustine you see”
Skepticism, particularly through the work of Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrho's framework, played a decisive role during the Renaissance by filling the epistemological vacuum created by the loss of church authority due to the Protestant Reformation and the rise of modern science.
“in the vacuum, epistemological vacuum created by the Protestant Reformation and the rise of modern science together, that is to say, the loss of church authority in um matters other than religious matters. uh in that epistemological vacuum um sextus empiricus and the skepticism of the hellists loomed very very large”
The Church fathers taught that Christians should gather fragments of truth wherever they are found and reunite them to the whole body from which they have been separated, implying that non-Christian philosophers may possess genuine truth despite their non-Christian commitments.
“the guy who first talked about all truth is God's truth back among the church fathers said that um task of the Christian is to gather the fragments of truth wherever they are found wherever they're found and to reunite them to the body of the hole from which they've been taken. You see you can find them in all sorts of places. Just because Plato said it doesn't make it wrong, does it? Just because Aristotle wasn't a Christian doesn't make everything he said false, does it?”
Aristotle's negative proof of the law of non-contradiction—challenging anyone to deny it without assuming it—does not actually prove the law but only demonstrates that its negation is self-defeating, leaving the law itself unproven.
“Aristotle's famous negative proof for the law of non-contradiction. He calls it a negative proof because he can't prove it positively. The negative proof is um simply to um uh challenge anybody to um deny the law of non-contradiction without assuming it. You say they can't do it. You have to assume it in order to make any statement. Well, that's not proving the law of non-contradiction. It's simply uh proving the negation is false.”
Pyrrho's answer to whether we should make judgments about reality is to suspend judgment through epoché—the Greek term for suspension of judgment that later becomes central to phenomenology and hermeneutical theory.
“suspend judgment. After all, why do you have to make your mind up? Withhold judgment. And the Greek term epoch was um the term used for that suspense of judgment. Um you'll find that it's a term that continues to be used even in the 20th century in the phenomenological movement”
Similarly, the development of competing Greek philosophical systems (democratic materialism, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Epicureanism) generated skepticism in response to the multiplicity of disagreement, as observers questioned which system, if any, could be trusted.
“The development of Greek philosophical systems, democrat materialism, Platoninism, Aristotilianism, Stoicism, Epicuranism is a kind of democrat materialism. Uh, you see, um, likewise led to an attitude. Now, how am I going to know what's right if these guys don't know? You see, skepticism.”
The standard response to skepticism beyond Augustine involves searching for evasive first premises: Platonists attempt this through dialectic, Aristotelians through abstracting universal first principles from experience, and Descartes through mathematical axioms.
“the other response that perhaps is most traditional is to uh try and find that evasive first premise. Yes. where the Plleonists go at it with dialectic, the Aristotilians go at it with their attempt to abstract universal first principles from their experience of an entire species. You see, and that's the way it went on through the Middle Ages. And when the Platonic and Aristotilian views were called into question in the Renaissance, Daycart, what did he do? Well, he tried to find a first premise the way mathematics tries to find a first premise. Axioms on which mathematical systems are built.”
Pyrrho of Elis posed three fundamental questions: (1) What is the nature of things?, (2) What should be our attitude to things?, and (3) What is the value of that attitude?, establishing the core structure of Pyrrhonian skepticism.
“Piro of Ellis uh who posed three questions. Uh one, what is the nature of things? Which was of course the question with which Greek philosophy began. What's the basic nature of everything? The basic stuff. What's the nature of things?”
The self-referential objection claiming the skeptic knows that he doesn't know is flawed because Pyrrhonian skeptics avoid this by saying 'we do not know whether we know or we don't know,' refusing even to claim knowledge of their own ignorance.
“the skeptic knows that he doesn't know. You see, and that sort of self-referentiality argument has um become one of the standard objections to some forms of skepticism. Um no, the pyonic skeptic piro would not say that he knows he doesn't know. We don't know whether we know or we don't know. That's where the ambiguity is. We just don't know. And we don't know that we don't know.”
Academic skepticism, represented by Carneades and traced to Plato's Academy in Athens, differs from Pyrrhonian skepticism by holding that while indubitable knowledge is impossible, probable belief is possible and should guide action.
“But there's enough of the Platonic Academy in Carneades to be able to say knowledge isn't possible, but opinion is. Belief is. And in um talking about opinion and belief, Carneades introduces the uh the notion of uh probability.”
Skeptics who must choose between 'we know or we don't know' already implicitly accept the law of non-contradiction (that A or not A is true), forcing them to acknowledge at least one logical truth even while denying knowledge.
“Augustine um gets into this he tries to to argue that the uh uh the skeptics who will admit that um either we know or we don't know and knowing that either they know or they don't know even They can't make up their mind which it is. No in that the truth of the law of non-contradiction either A or not A you see. So he he tries to find logical truths which um even the skeptic has to admit.”
When Sextus speaks of belief, the skeptic 'believes in belief' in an epistemological sense (holding provisional opinions) not in a religious sense of total commitment or interpersonal trust, a distinction crucial to understanding skeptical positions.
“they're not using belief in your religious sense of a total commitment. You see, that's a different sense of belief. uh distinguish the sense of belief in epistemology from the sense of belief in talking of religious trust or interpersonal trust. You see more like opinion. Yeah. Yeah. More like opinion.”
Skepticism is not a theoretical position but rather a mental attitude and ability: an attitude which opposes appearances to judgments, resulting in mental suspense and quietude rather than doctrinal knowledge claims.
“Skepticism is an ability, a mental attitude. You see, it's not a theoretical position. It's rather an attitude to knowing at all. It's an attitude which opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever... conflicts with the result that owing to the equipolence of objects and reasons thus opposed we are brought first to a state of mental suspense suspend judgment next to a state of unperturbedness or quietude.”
Etienne Gilson's book The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, based on his 1930s Gifford Lectures, addresses the question of whether Christian philosophy exists and argues that Christian philosophy is philosophy done with Christian intention and sense of direction.
“Gilson's book uh was um the Gford lectures that he gave in the 1930s in Scotland... before it came out there burst on the scene in Europe. A debate over the question is there a Christian philosophy... Jillan uh had just done the gifted lectures and was getting them ready for publication. So he added a couple of chapters at the beginning... he said, 'Is there a Christian philosophy?' Sure. lots of them. Look at the Middle Ages. In effect, he's saying that Christian philosophy is philosophy is that is done with Christian intention, a Christian sense of direction.”
A European philosophical debate was triggered by a French philosopher (Gilson implies Gabriel Marcel or a similar figure) arguing in the journal Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale that if something is philosophy, it cannot be Christian (since philosophy is neutral but Christianity is committed), and vice versa.
“a debate triggered by a French philosopher amier who in the uh French journal the review to metaphysica de moral u had published an article in which he argued in effect if it's philosophy it's not Christian because philosophy is neutral and Christian is committed and if it's Christian it's not philosophy”
History of philosophy should not be taught as a cafeteria of disconnected errors but should demonstrate that there is a coherent process at work in philosophical development, requiring a framework that explains why ideas develop as they do.
“I think that's the psychological appeal of skepticism, I think, which is one reason why I try not to teach history of philosophy like a cafeteria. You see, I try to show that there is some process going on.”
Recent epistemological development since Kant, and especially in the second half of the 20th century, has involved rejecting foundationalism while simultaneously rejecting skepticism, developing instead a fallibilist position that defines knowledge as justified true belief.
“the thing that's been happening in epistemology increasingly since Kant and much more increasingly in the last half century, second half of 20th century is a rejection of foundationalism along with a rejection of skepticism and the defining of some sort of a third position. a sort of fallibilist position that speaks of knowledge as justified true belief”
Nicholas Wolterstorff's 'Reason Within the Bounds of Religion' inverts Kant's 'Religion Within the Bounds of Reason,' arguing that theories are accountable to data but also to 'control beliefs' (worldview commitments) that shape which theories are possible.
“Nicholas Walderstof, Reason Within the Bounds of Religion. Okay. The title for the book is a parody on Kant's book, Religion Within the Bounds of Reason. Walderstof reason within the bounds of religion. Okay. Inverted.”
Pyrrho's concept of equipolence means that arguments for a position carry equal weight as arguments against it, resulting in the cancellation of competing claims so that neither position can claim epistemological superiority.
“equipent positions. Equipolent means uh things of equal weight. So equipolent arguments are such that the case for a position is of no more weight than the case against it. Or the case for position A is canceled out with the case for position B. Equal weight, equal arguments.”
Roman skeptics including Sextus Empiricus classified skeptical arguments into five types called 'modes' or 'tropes': arguments from conflicting views, infinite regress of premises, relativity of appearances, excessive dogmatism about opinions, and circularity or begging the question.
“the Roman skeptics themselves like Sexus Empiricus and some others of his uh general period uh tended to classify the arguments for skepticism into various types of arguments. types of arguments that are called modes of argument or tropes...five kinds of arguments...One, an argument from conflicting views...The second, an argument from infinite regress of premises...Third, an argument from the relativity of appearances...Fourth is an argument from the overd dogmatism...And fifth, the argument that points out the circularity”
The Stoics claimed to have intuitive, irresistible concepts (kataleptic impressions) that provide certain knowledge, but skeptics simply replied that they do not find these impressions irresistible, pointing out that disagreement about what is obvious is better explained by personal difference than by discovery of objective truth.
“the Stoics had talk of intuition of irresistible concepts to which the skeptics replied in effect sorry we don't find them irresistible after all if somebody says well it's obvious to me the simplest reputation is to say I'm sorry it isn't to me so But it may be more a commentary on you than what it is that you think is obvious.”
Plato had identified the problem that reasoning processes require first premises, and Aristotle recognized the additional danger that seeking a first premise leads either to infinite regress (each premise requires a prior premise without end) or circular reasoning (using a conclusion as its own justification), problems that undermine the attempt to ground knowledge in logical proof.
“Sure Plato had told us that reasoning processes have to have first premises. As Aristotle had pointed out, the danger is that if we're trying to find a first premise, we might go all the way in some infinite regress of premises or else end up in a circular argument. The problem that Aristotle had indicated.”
Hegel's 19th-century view that history evolves unilinearly toward truth, with his philosophy as the final truth to which all subsequent philosophy is mere footnotes, represents excessive optimism about human intellectual progress that underestimates the complexity of knowledge development.
“there's an overly optimistic view of history that sees everything emerging in one direction, a uniinear evolution until the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth emerges. And that's the sort of optimism that you get in 19th century Hegel who saw his philosophy as the philosophy to end all philosophies. So that all subsequent philosophy would just be a series of footnotes to Hegel. Um and I think that's far too optimistic a view of history and of human intellect.”
Francis Schaeffer's interpretation of philosophy as a series of disconnected mistakes ('here's Plato, wrong; here's Aristotle, wrong; here's Stoicism, wrong') represents an atomistic, pessimistic, and misleading reading that fails to recognize interrelationships, common ground, and what is preserved versus lost across systems.
“uh here's Plato developing his system along comes Aristotle says he's wrong this is what's right along come the Stoics that's wrong this is what's right...I think that's a misreading they don't see the inter relationships at all. They don't see what's in common, what is preserved in what is lost. You see, that's an atomistic reading of the history of philosophy. I think it's very misleading. It's a pessimistic view.”
The cumulative impact of skeptical arguments is to undermine not only knowledge of forms and unchanging realities, but also knowledge of causes, mathematical truths, relationships, and even the laws of logic itself.
“the some total impact for the skeptic is to undermine the possibility of injubitable knowledge altogether. Um not only knowledge of forms and unchanging realities, knowledge of causes as well. All four kinds of causes. knowledge of mathematical truths and relationships, knowledge of the laws of logic”
Religious belief, in the sense of Christian commitment, involves not merely assent to propositions but rather living on the basis of those commitments, as expressed in the creedal formula 'I believe in God the father almighty.'
“the interpersonal kind of belief, you know, um uh when when I talk about believing in my wife. I mean, I trust her to be the sort of person I've come to believe she is... when we say in the apostles creed I believe in God the father almighty maker of heaven and earth you know archbishop of Canterbury back in the 40s William Temple said when we confess the creed we don't say I give a scent to this that it is my opinion that's not what we mean at all what we mean is I commit myself to living on this basis”
God's providence in history should be understood through the lens of common grace: God causes light to shine in people's minds regardless of their faith, as John's Gospel indicates ('the logos is the light that lightens everyone that comes into the world').
“think of the providence of God in history in relationship to the whole notion of common grace and the goodness of God that makes the sun to shine on the just and the unjust. He makes the light to shine in people's minds. As John says in his first gospel, first chapter, you know, the logos is the light that lightens everyone that comes into the world perhaps in different degrees, different regards.”
Between atomistic rejection and Hegelian finality lies a 'multilinear development' model: a plurality of philosophical trends (idealism, naturalism/materialism, and theism) develop in parallel, each a pluralistic tradition with internal diversity, informed by changing scientific models over history.
“In between...is um what I I I call a picture of multi-linear development. that is to say, a plurality of philosophical trends um in parallel with each other. And you can cut the cake various ways, but let's um say what we have is some kinds of idealism, metaphysical idealism, some kinds of materialism or naturalism, and some kinds of theism.”
As a Christian theist believing in divine providence in history, it would be inconsistent to view the history of philosophy as having no point, direction, or outcome that makes sense.
“as a theist believing in divine providence in history um it would be grossly inconsistent for me to um think of the history of philosophy as having no point to it, no direction to it, no outcome at all that makes any sense.”
The history of ideas resembles the parable of wheat and tares: they grow together, intermixed, and pulling out too many weeds risks destroying wheat, suggesting philosophical traditions contain both error and truth that must be carefully distinguished rather than rejected wholesale.
“the history of ideas is like the story of the wheat and the tears. They grow up together. You see, they grow up together, they get intermingled. If you try pulling too many weeds out, you pull out the wheat. You see? Now I I I think that's the basic um analogy”
Understanding the role of Christianity in the history of thought and philosophical tradition is centrally important for Christian higher education, more important than mastering historical details.
“Unless you get a sense of the role of Christianity in the history of thought or the history of anything in the history of our day, uh what's the point of a Christian higher education? And uh I think the history of philosophy is what demonstrates this pattern”
Skepticism has roots in both the cynical attitudes toward institutional and traditional authority and in the relativism and skepticism of the sophists, making it a philosophical tradition with deep ancient precedents.
“skepticism uh had its roots in a combination of cynical attitudes towards the authority of institutions and traditions, but also in the relativism and skepticism of some of the sophists”
Oliver Cromwell's maxim 'I beseech you, sir, by the bowels of Christ, consider that you may be wrong' exemplifies the fallibilist recognition that human judgment is inherently fallible and that this fallibility should inform intellectual humility.
“There's a note of fallibilism in Oliver Cromwell's famous statement to some dogmatist around him. I beseech you, sir, by the bowels of Christ. Consider that you may be wrong. You see, and what Oliver Cromwell was doing was, I take it simply recognizing the fallibility of human judgment”
Hellenistic skepticism of the period is the third major philosophical movement alongside Epicureanism and Stoicism that emerged during the Hellenistic era.
“this is the third philosophical movement of the period that we've been talking about, the Epicurans and the Stoics being the other two”
St. Augustine's book 'Against the Academicians' specifically targets academic skeptics (not academic institutions) and attempts to prove that even the most complete skeptic must know that he exists in order to think he may be wrong about something.
“One of his first philosophical writings was a book called Against the Academicians. Now, keep in mind academy. When you read Against the Academicians, don't think he's against all college teachers and such like. uh he's against the academic skeptics, you see. And what uh what he does is to try and argue uh for instance that um even the most complete skeptic must know that he exists in order to think he may be wrong about something.”
The value of skepticism according to Pyrrho is the achievement of quietude or peace of mind: the less one knows, the less one has to worry about, making ignorance preferable to false certainty.
“the value of it, as far as he is concerned, the value of skepticism, if you like, is a kind of uh quietude. At least that's the word that's often used in the translation. I I I think the best better idiom would be simply peace of mind. The less you know, the less you have to worry about. Peace of mind. If ignorance is bliss, is folly to be wise.”
According to Pyrrho, the nature of things is unknown because all purported human knowledge is inadequate: the senses yield only changeable opinions as Plato noted, and reasoning is loaded with subjective prejudice.
“his answer was that um it's unknown and it's unknown by virtue of the inadequacy of all purported human knowledge. The senses, as Plato and others before and after have said, yield nothing but changeable opinion. And reasoning, as nowadays the um political correctness movement tells us, is always loaded with subjective prejudice”