
The Next Great War Is Already Taking Shape. What Happens Next Decides Everything | Jack Watling
What this covers
This is a 34-minute interview in which Dominik Presl of Decoding Geopolitics talks with Jack Watling, a RUSI defence analyst and the author of Statecraft. It begins with the current war between the United States and Iran and uses it to open onto Taiwan, Ukraine and the condition of Western governments. Watling's recurring diagnosis is that thirty years of stability bred two habits: a belief in a linear rules-based system, and a belief that disruption comes from weak rogue actors who can be handled as discrete crises with overwhelming multilateralism. His argument is that neither habit fits a world in which powerful states move and everyone else feels it at once.
The Iran discussion is the most concrete. The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of global oil along with fertilizer, gas and refined fuel. Iran does not need to sink ships, only to threaten enough of them that insurers and owners stay away. The host argues that the US attack turned this theoretical leverage into a practical one. Watling adds that any military answer, whether degrading launch sites, seizing islands or escorting convoys, is costly and temporary, so the problem is closer to a negotiation. He also expects lasting damage to Gulf energy infrastructure to push buyers toward alternatives and longer fixed contracts.
On Taiwan, Watling is darker than most. He calls a war there World War III, stresses the need to keep up deterrence while talking to China, and describes a commitment that was cheap to make in the 1990s and is expensive now. He also raises the possibility that the US might decline to fight if local conditions are bad, which would erode allied confidence. The rest of the conversation turns to resilience: Ukraine's doubled grid transmission capacity set against a single substation failure affecting Heathrow), privatization's cost to resilience, China's hold on rare earths and magnets, and net zero policy working against defence supply chain security. His prescription is to map dependencies, then diversify, onshore or ally.
Western governments have lost the survival instincts and strategic foresight necessary to compete in great power competition because they operate on false assumptions of linear continuity and rules-based order, causing them to be persistently caught unprepared for predictable crises and unable to maintain coherent long-term strategies in an unstable multipolar environment.
- Western policy-makers consistently know medium-term challenges are coming but fail to prepare until crisis forces reactive management with bad options
- The post-Cold War belief in linear progress and rules-based systems is incompatible with dealing simultaneously with powerful state competitors and unstable dynamics
- Governments pursue contradictory policies (e.g., net-zero conflicting with defense supply chain security) because they lack unified strategic objectives and willingness to make hard trade-offs
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Thirty years of fundamental stability and security in the post-Cold War era drove Western governments toward privatization, which maximizes profit-to-investment ratio and therefore creates systems with very limited resilience, leaving states vulnerable to shocks when the stable era ends.
“the fact that we've had a a fundamentally pretty stable and secure world for the last 30 years has driven us towards uh privatization. And privatization drives efficiency, right? And cost-making or yeah, profit-making enterprises want to maximize the volume of profit relative to investment. Um and so, in an efficient system, you have very limited resilience, ultimately.”
A military conflict over Taiwan would be World War III (peer-level conflict between nuclear powers) with extreme risk of ending very badly for everybody, making it important to maintain deterrence while also engaging diplomatically with China to lower tensions, balancing multiple lines of effort simultaneously.
“Ultimately, this would be World War III if they fight over this. Yeah, that's a which is an issue that goes much wider than Taiwan. So, there this is a peer-level conflict between nuclear powers and the risk is that that ends very badly for everybody. Um and so while you want to maintain deterrence, you also need to try and uh engage with the Chinese to lower tensions.”
Weak states can use geographic leverage (like controlling the Strait of Hormuz) to compensate for military inferiority against much stronger opponents, creating disproportionate strategic effect.
“how weaker states can use leverage to compete with much stronger ones. And the case that you write quite a lot about is Iran and its competition with the United States and specifically the Hormuz Strait and the leverage that it gives to Iran.”
Iran has an aggressive revolutionary agenda toward its neighbors and uses proxies and other subversion means to undermine adversaries, while simultaneously maintaining a strong deterrence posture through ballistic missiles and ability to strike infrastructure.
“Iran has a fairly aggressive agenda towards its neighbors, a revolutionary one, uh and it uses proxies and other means to try and subvert and undermine its adversaries. Um at the same time it has a very strong deterrence posture. In the first instance, it's ballistic missiles and its ability to strike infrastructure.”
The current head of Pentagon policy, Elbridge Colby, wrote a book addressing the Taiwan commitment dilemma before taking office, laying out the issues that the US does not have a treaty commitment to protect Taiwan but rather a domestic legal commitment, making the question whether the executive will follow US law, which is a very unusual situation.
“the current head of policy in the Pentagon literally wrote a book about this question, right? Elbridge Colby wrote The Strategy of Denial um before he came into office. And he lays out a lot of the issues there, right? Which is that actually the US doesn't have a commitment to protect Taiwan. Uh what it has is a domestic legal commitment to do so. And so the question is whether the executive will follow US law.”
Iran does not need to destroy all ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz to achieve strategic effect; it only needs to threaten to destroy or damage a sufficient number that insurance markets and ship owners take the risk seriously and become unwilling to send vessels through the strait.
“they don't need to destroy all ships. They need to threaten to destroy or damage a sufficient number of ships that insurance markets and ship owners take the risk seriously and don't want to put their ships at risk. Um and if they can do that, then they they hold the global uh economy hostage.”
In navigating an unstable geopolitical environment with multiple powerful actors, governments cannot control wind and sea (external conditions) but can make predictions about normal currents and wind patterns for a season, then must be prepared for deviations.
“if I'm sailing, I don't control the wind, and I don't control the sea. All right? I can make some predictions about currents uh and about the normal range of wind direction and intensity for a given season. But if it's any kind of medium to long-distance voyage, uh there are likely to be patches where wind and sea deviate from the norm. Potentially quite significantly.”
Ukraine demonstrates the importance of redundancy in critical infrastructure by maintaining double the transmission capacity in their electric grid relative to production capacity, allowing them to lose huge amounts of transmission capacity and still transmit energy throughout the country, whereas most European countries lack such redundancy—illustrated by a single transformer substation knockout at London to Heathrow causing complete grid collapse.
“So, if we look at Ukraine, for example, people have found it remarkable how resilient the Ukrainian energy grid has been. Well, the Ukrainians had double the transmission capacity in their grid to their production capacity, yeah? And so, they could lose huge amounts of transmission capacity in the system and still be able to transmit energy all over the country. Um obviously, damage has accumulated over 4 years of war such that that's not where they are today. But, they were in a very strong starting position. If we look at most European countries, um look at what happened when one transformer substation was knocked out in London to Heathrow, right? Complete collapse.”
Although Iran's adversaries overmatch it in conventional military capability, Iran is a very large country (larger than Iraq), and invading it would require enormous resource investment with huge opportunity cost for the US in terms of deterring China and maintaining alliance leadership.
“most of Iran's adversaries overmatch it in terms of capability. If you were looking at a conventional military confrontation, of military against military, you could predict the outcome quite easily. Um but it is a big country, right? It's significantly larger than Iraq. Um and so if you want to achieve a total victory and invade it, that is a huge investment of resources. It's not that the US couldn't do it. It's that the opportunity cost for the US of doing that relative to wanting to deter China, uh wanting to maintain its leadership of alliances, it is signi- enormous, right?”
The Strait of Hormuz sees approximately 20% of global oil, plus significant amounts of fertilizer, natural gas, and refined fuel flow through it daily, making it a critical global economic chokepoint.
“it sees around 20% of global oil, a very significant proportion of things like fertilizer, uh and natural gases, uh and refined fuel flow through that strait every day.”
Damage accumulated to oil refining and extraction infrastructure in the Gulf will become permanent rather than reversible because wells take damage, production capacity declines, and returning to full capacity would require significant time after the immediate conflict ceases, meaning businesses will view this as a sustained period of disruption, not a temporary crisis, and will therefore invest in alternatives and lock in longer-term contracts at fixed rates, leading to structural changes in global energy sourcing.
“We are getting to a point just on the timeline where damage accumulated to oil refining and extraction in the Gulf is going to be permanent. It's not you can't just restart it on day one of the straits open because the wells themselves are taking damage, capacity to produce is going down, and it would take time to spin back up. Um and so from businesses around the world, they're looking at this and they're seeing not a situation that just resolves overnight, but instead a sustained period of disruption. Now, what do you do in that context? Um you start to invest in alternatives, right?”
In an unstable environment, if you don't know where you're trying to get to (i.e., don't have clear, consistent objectives), then changes in conditions completely change where you're likely to end up, and you become a passive recipient of outcomes rather than someone actively shaping events.
“I could run into a stall, right? Uh now, how do I deal with that? Because my ability to steer is constrained by those factors. I have to work with that. Well, I need to know where I'm trying to get to. And if I knew where I'm trying to get to and the wind reverses, I can make a sensible judgment about which way to navigate, right, relative to my performance of my boat versus the wind. If I don't know where I'm trying to get to, then the the change in weather completely changes where I'm likely to end up, yeah?”
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Western governments have been pervaded by two beliefs: that there is a consistent international rules-based system functioning on a linear trajectory that can be built upon, and that disruption comes from unpredictable rogue states and minor actors that can be managed as discrete crises with overwhelming multilateral resources, leading to a decision-making process fundamentally misaligned with the current multipolar unstable environment.
“since the fall of the Soviet Union, uh two things have sort of pervaded government in the West. One is a belief that there is a consistent international rules-based system. And this system functions and continues along a pretty linear trajectory. And because of that, we can build on it. So, we can invest resources year by year towards long-term goals, and we will eventually resource achieving an outcome.”
Western states must map their supply chains, dependencies, and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, then execute one of three strategies: (1) diversify to create multiple sourcing options, (2) onshore to achieve sovereign control, or (3) build alliances to secure reliable short access, because current exposure to high-risk countries (particularly China) for critical defense inputs creates unacceptable vulnerability.
“I think we're moving into a situation where states need to very carefully understand and map their supply chains, their dependencies, and then work out either how they diversify so that they have more options uh or how they onshore so that they are they have sovereign control or that they can build alliances so they have they have a short access.”
Western governments pursue contradictory policies where different parts of government undermine each other's objectives—exemplified by net-zero environmental policies preventing rare earth mineral extraction in Europe while simultaneously building defense strategies that depend on those same minerals, and by outsourcing the environmental damage to China without reducing overall demand or achieving either climate or security goals.
“the second lesson is you need to appreciate that you have to make trade-offs. Um and very often what I see is one side of government making decisions which completely undermine the objectives of another side of government. So I'll give you an example. Um net zero. The idea you know trying to reduce our carbon emissions and improve our environment. Very very sensible thing to be looking at on a multilateral basis. Now if you try and conduct rare earth mineral extraction and refinement in Europe I guarantee you you are going to run into an awful lot of red tape that is aimed at protecting European environments, right?”
If the localized tactical situation in a Taiwan conflict is extremely unfavorable to the US, the US's national interests might be not to fight there, which is operationally sensible for the US but unpicks the confidence of US regional partners (non-treaty allies) that the US will come to their aid, causing that confidence to erode and the US to lose assurance that it can call on others to assist, making the strategic equation rapidly less favorable.
“the question that Elbridge Colby raises is that if the localized tactical situation is extremely unfavorable to the US. The US's national interests may be not to fight there. Um which of course is potentially a a operationally sensible decision for the US, but it starts to unpick the confidence that its partners who are not treaty allies have in the region that the US will come and fight on their behalf. And so as that confidence erodes, suddenly the US starts to lose assurance that it can call upon others to assist and the equation actually gets rapidly less favorable.”
The shift from a stable multipolar environment with weak disruptors to one with powerful state actors means that when any participant moves, all others feel the movement immediately, making the previous crisis-management approach of overwhelming force and multilateral coordination ineffective because preparation time is compressed and you cannot achieve knockout punches.
“But in a context where you are dealing with the breakdown of multilateralism, uh unpredictable state actors who are powerful and can change the dynamics at play at will. If they insert themselves, things are shifted simply by It's like It's like being on a trampoline with a group of adults is a very different experience to being on a trampoline with a group of children, right? Because everyone is actually quite heavy. And so if somebody moves, everybody else feels the movement.”
The United States made a commitment to defend Taiwan when it was easy to keep (when the Chinese military was very weak in the 1990s), but the cost of that commitment has dramatically increased as Chinese naval capability has grown, creating a dilemma where the US must either accept the painful cost of honoring the commitment or pay a different painful cost by abandoning it, a pattern applicable to many Western commitments.
“the United States committed to defending Taiwan when it was pretty easy to do as a commitment when the Chinese military was very weak and so it was an easy commitment to make. But today we're in a situation when the Chinese navy is actually bigger than the US navy, but basically a war with China is a much more painful choice than what it looked like in the '90s. And so the United States has this dilemma of whether to stick with the commitment that it made when the price was much lower and accept that the price will be pretty painful or to abandon the commitment but pay also a painful price but in a different way.”
Western governments should not approach crises with the objective of returning to the status quo ante; instead, they should ask: what are our stockpiles, what is our infrastructure for absorbing shocks, and how do we diversify access to critical resources so that we can position ourselves advantageously in the future world rather than the past one.
“governments shouldn't be thinking about this just in terms of how do we return to the status quo ante. Um they need to be thinking about this of okay what are our stockpiles? What's our infrastructure infrastructure for stockpiling? Um so that we can absorb shocks, and then how do we diversify access to energy?”
The US attack on Iran during the current war (likely referring to recent strikes) actually increased Iran's leverage by turning the Hormuz leverage from theoretical and psychological into practical, giving Iran immediate opportunity to close the strait, which Iran probably would not have done before the war, thus making the US military action counterproductive to its stated objectives.
“Iran had the leverage because of what it could do to Hormuz Strait or in Hormuz Strait, but it was more theoretical and psychological. But since the war began and since the United States attacked Iran in in and because of the way it did so, it actually turned it from a theoretical to a practical one, and it gave Iran an opportunity to actually close it, which it probably wouldn't have done before.”
Western governments tend to make decisions late, and by making them late, lack the time to implement preparations necessary to have good options when eventualities emerge, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of unpreparedness.
“I think we tend to take decisions late, and by virtue of taking them late, we just don't have the time to implement the preparations necessary to have good options when an eventuality emerges.”
China has dominant capacity for refining and producing rare earth minerals and magnets, which are critical inputs for defense applications like brushless motors in drones, creating a structural vulnerability where China can unilaterally control the availability of these materials to Western defenses as Europe shifts toward drone-based warfare demonstrated by Ukraine.
“Look at the dependency on Chinese manufacturing for example but even really critical things that underpin defense. Um like rare earth minerals and magnets and that kind of thing. Um you know if you want to build a drone um you're going to need magnets for the brushless motors. Who has the capacity to refine and produce those? China. So when we talk about European military shifting into a more drone based way of fighting as Ukraine has shown unless we start doing rare earth mineral extraction and refinements somewhere where we have a short access to it then China can turn on or off the tap for our defenses”
The US cannot achieve a decisive military solution to Iranian straits closure because: (1) military operations to degrade launch sites, seize islands, or escort vessels are all expensive and temporary, and (2) as soon as any of these activities stop, the Iranian threat emerges again immediately, meaning the US would need permanent expensive commitment with no clear victory condition, making this fundamentally a negotiation, not a military problem.
“the US will be able, if it really wants to go for it, to degrade Iran's ability to strike shipping by attacking the launch sites and so on. Uh they may be able to seize some of the islands militarily um in the Straits of Hormuz, although that will come at the cost of lives of US service personnel, which is politically challenging in the US. And if they decide to escort using the Navy the the civilian vessels, they will be able to get a proportion of vessels through the strait safely. Um but as soon as they stop any of those activities, and all of those activities are expensive, the threat emerges again immediately, right?”
The Strait of Hormuz has been wargamed more extensively by militaries than almost any scenario except possibly Taiwan invasion and Russian attack on the Baltics, with most variables understood and known, yet the strategic situation remains fundamentally about leveraging civilian shipping vulnerability rather than military-to-military confrontation.
“There are very few uh, scenarios that have been more war gamed by militaries than the closure of the Straits of Hormuz. Um maybe invasion of Taiwan, uh maybe a Russian attack on the Baltics come close. But this one has been a an exercise in training in professional military education for a very long time. And so most of the variables are understood and known.”
Western governments have consistently misunderstood Moscow's behavior and thinking regarding Ukraine, with costs to Western strategy accumulating from this misunderstanding.
“We talk about Russia and Ukraine and what the West has consistently misunderstood about Moscow's behavior and thinking”
2026 is identified as the inflection point of the Russia-Ukraine war, with implications for where the conflict goes from that point onward.
“why 2026 is the inflection point of the war and where will we go from here”
Jack Watling's assessment of what is coming in Taiwan is much darker than what is usually heard in mainstream discourse.
“We talk about Taiwan and why Jack's assessment of what's coming there is much darker than what you usually hear.”
The transcript ends before Watling responds to the host's question about whether the US is moving toward abandoning Taiwan; the conversation continues in the paid Patreon section.
“Thank you for listening to the free part of this interview. The conversation is not over yet, but the next part is only for the paid members on my Patreon or Substack.”