deterrence
The strategy of preventing nuclear attack by maintaining the credible threat of devastating retaliation, premised on the belief no rational actor would start such a war.
As defined in Annie Jacobsen
Other definitions
Preventing an adversary's action by threatening unacceptable retaliatory consequences.
465 - More From Sam Iran Jihadism Conspiracism Ai Disruption The Manosphere And More
Where it comes up · 68
- 210 - The Logic Of Doomsday7 claims
- Russia: Threats, Deterrence, and the War of Numbers || Peter Zeihan7 claims
- Annie Jacobsen5 claims
- Richard Rhodes — The making of the atomic bomb5 claims
- How AI Is Changing Warfare | Palantir CTO5 claims
- Something Huge Just Shifted Between The U.s. And China - And It S Very Bad News For The West Henriet5 claims
- Is America Overstretched? A Conversation With General David Petraeus4 claims
- Victor Davis Hanson The Pro-ukraine Pro-europe Case For Trump S Foreign Policy4 claims
and 60 more
Most important claims · 10 of 140Search all claims for “deterrence” →
- A president seeing an incoming attack might rationally decline to launch a pointless retaliation that would only double the death toll and risk nuclear winter, but for deterrence to function each leader must adopt and maintain a credible, doubt-free posture that he will retaliate—even though in the actual moment any human would seriously consider not responding.210 - The Logic Of Doomsday
- The doctrines of nuclear arms control do not transfer to AI because deterrence and treaties depend on being able to count and describe each side's capabilities, but with dangerous software you cannot reveal what you know or what you can do — leaving no basis for negotiation, no shared language in diplomacy, no algorithms, and no doctrine for discussing dangerous software.280 - The Future Of Artificial Intelligence
- Researchers have long known that the probability of getting caught deters crime more than the length of the penalty, because many offenders cannot weigh whether a five-year or ten-year sentence will change their behavior, so they respond mainly to whether they will get caught at all.John Arnold - China, Energy Markets and Fixing America's Systems - [Invest Like the Best, EP.461]
- Nuclear deterrence had a dampening effect on great-power war but did not eliminate conflict—it pushed it elsewhere into proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, so while the Cold War was relatively peaceful for those living in the United States, it was brutally violent for the populations caught in those proxy conflicts; this is the stability-instability paradox in which nuclear stability enables conventional aggression below the nuclear level.330 - The Doomsday Machine
- A powerful but indescribable AI weapon is dynamically and doctrinally unstable: deterrence requires making the adversary's cost of aggression too high, but since AI's costs and capabilities cannot be described, an adversary who merely hears the US has built something powerful in a Los Alamos equivalent might decide to preemptively destroy it before it is even turned on.280 - The Future Of Artificial Intelligence
- The 1940 Frisch-Peierls memorandum (the report from two emigre physicists in Britain) concluded no physical structure could protect against such a bomb, and that the only defense was to possess a bomb of similar force to threaten retaliation—articulating the concept of deterrence before the Manhattan Project even began.Richard Rhodes — The making of the atomic bomb
- Countries are treated very differently once they have nuclear weapons—they tend not to be invaded—so it is rational for states like North Korea, Pakistan, India, or Iran to seek them, and deterrence only works between nations on the credible assumption that a country will actually use its weapons in response to aggression.210 - The Logic Of Doomsday
- Deterrence appears solid but depends on assumptions that can fail in a crisis: that all actors are rational and that everyone has accurate and complete information; when decisions are made on incomplete information, deterrence can fall apart.210 - The Logic Of Doomsday
- Instability and conflict often arise when two sides have different assessments of their likelihood of winning; if two AI powers each believe they have a 90% chance of winning a conflict, fighting becomes much more likely because they can't both be right but can both believe it—unlike the stable nuclear equilibrium grounded in mutual deterrence.Dwarkesh Patel Podcast - Dario Amodei — "We are near the end of the exponential"
- Land-based ICBMs are by definition first-strike weapons because their known, fixed locations make them targetable; in a warning scenario the president must choose within five to ten minutes between launching them (risking starting an accidental war from a false alarm) or losing them, so deterrence forces should be shifted to submarines and aircraft and the ICBM force phased out before it precipitates an accidental war.210 - The Logic Of Doomsday