
The Future of Saudi Arabia || Peter Zeihan
What this covers
This is a single-speaker, nine-minute talk in which Peter Zeihan works through why the US-Saudi relationship exists and why he thinks it is ending. He begins by reframing its origins. The US never took more than about 20% of its crude from the Middle East. The Gulf mattered because Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the European allies needed oil, and a security guarantee to keep them fueled drew them into the Cold War order and, later, globalization. The shale revolution then took US Gulf imports to zero.
The middle of the talk covers how the relationship frayed. Zeihan treats the 2003 Iraq War as the point when Riyadh stopped believing the US was a mercenary partner that would act on Saudi wishes. He also notes the withdrawal of carriers from the Gulf and Washington's indifference when Kuwait found an offshore field. He describes Saudi Arabia as more fragile than it looks. It relies on a large expatriate workforce to keep fields running, it exports through a few terminals, and it has no navy to protect them. Its standing also rests on a contested claim to speak for Islam.
The last section asks who could replace the US. Zeihan runs through the options: China lacks the range, Japan remains pacifist and tied to Pacific priorities, and Britain and France have the blue-water navy capacity but are unappealing to Riyadh. Turkey could march to Riyadh, though a defender with that reach could also conquer. He forecasts that the break will not be immediate, since the US still values its alliances for Ukraine and for semiconductor controls on China. He expects an intermediate phase of pressure on where Gulf states sell crude, ending in an embargo. In a US-China shooting war, he predicts one of the first moves would be ships at the Strait of Hormuz, collapsing the Gulf economy within three months. Several of these claims, especially the timing and the Japan assessment, are flagged as contested.
Zeihan argues that US energy independence has fundamentally severed the strategic rationale for America's 75-year alliance with Saudi Arabia, transforming the US-Persian Gulf relationship from security guarantor to potential regional disruptor, with no viable alternative security guarantor available to Saudi Arabia.
- US shale revolution eliminated US dependence on Middle Eastern oil, making the original deal that bound allies to the US order obsolete
- US strategic pivot inward and toward East Asia has reduced naval presence in Persian Gulf and eliminated security guarantees to regional states
- No credible alternative security guarantor exists for Saudi Arabia—China lacks naval range, Japan won't militarize, Europe is unpalatable, and Turkey would logically conquer rather than defend
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As the United States steps back from global engagement, Saudi Arabia will need to find a new security guarantor; this guarantor must be a power with a blue-water navy capable of deploying long distances or marching to Saudi Arabia, a requirement that narrows the viable options dramatically.
“As the United States steps back, the the uh the Saudis are going to need a different security guarantor. And there isn't a very long list of candidates. It's got to be somebody with a blue water navy who can deploy a long distance or march to Saudi Arabia.”
During globalization, the United States needed oil from the Persian Gulf not for itself, but for its allies—Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, France, Germany, Italy, and Britain—countries that lacked sufficient oil capacity and were induced to join the global order and Cold War against the Soviet Union by a US security guarantee to keep them fueled.
“During globalization, uh the United States needed oil from the Persian Gulf, not for itself, but for its allies, for everyone from Japan to including China, uh to Korea, to Taiwan, to France, to Germany, to the Italy, to Britain, all of them. These were countries that did not have sufficient uh oil capacity for themselves. And to induce them to join the global order and the Cold War against the Soviet Union, part of the deal was that we will keep you fueled.”
Saudi Arabia can barely operate some of its easier oil fields and requires a huge army of expatriate workers to maintain production; simply denying the Saudis access to this expatriate labor force would be sufficient to collapse oil production.
“uh the Saudis can barely operate some of their easier fields. They need a huge army of expats uh in order to keep it going. So, simply denying them the staff would be enough to production.”
The United States never got more than approximately 20% of its crude oil from the Middle East; instead, it obtained most of its oil from within North America and to a lesser degree from countries like Venezuela and Africa.
“the oil was yes for the United States, but not directly. Uh the United States has always gotten most of its oil from within North America and then to a lesser degree countries like Venezuela. Uh and then a little bit from Africa. Uh we never got more than maybe 20% of our crude from Middle East at all.”
As the shale revolution progressed, volumes of crude that the United States obtained from the Middle East dropped to zero, with Saudi Arabia parking supertankers off the coast of Louisiana that were eventually no longer needed and stopped altogether.
“as the shale revolution kicked in, the volumes of crude that the United States got from the Middle East basically dropped to zero. The Saudis got in the the habit of parking supertankers off the coast of Louisiana waiting for them to be needed. And after a while, when it turned out that they weren't needed anymore, those stopped it altogether.”
The 2003 Iraq War served as a pivotal moment that violently disabused Saudi Arabia of its mercenary model of the US alliance, demonstrating that the US would act in its own interests even when the Saudis opposed the action.
“And uh they didn't think the Iraq War was a good idea and it happened anyway and they were violently disabused of their position in the world.”
Saudi Arabia's geopolitical influence has been based on its control of Islam's holy sites and its claim to speak for Islam globally, a claim that is hotly contested within the region, and on its possession of the world's single biggest proven crude oil reserves.
“uh the Saudis are a little cocky because they control the holy sites and they claim to control the religion of Islam or at least speak for it. Uh that is of course a hotly contested topic in the region.”
The United States has bent over backwards for 75 years to keep Saudi Arabia happy because Saudi Arabia was the single biggest play in Persian Gulf crude oil; getting the Saudis on board would guarantee that Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar would also align, providing the US with comprehensive regional control.
“But the United States has bent over backwards over the course of the last 75 years to keep the Saudis happy because that was the single biggest play in the region for crude. If you could get the Saudis on board, you could pretty much guarantee that the Kuwaitis and the Emiratis and the Qataris would would join as well.”
China does not have the naval range to reach Saudi Arabia, Japan has not moved sufficiently past its pacifist position to invest in a military capable of defending Saudi Arabia, and the US-Japan alliance is oriented toward co-dominion over the Pacific with energy security for Japan, making Japan unavailable as a Saudi guarantor.
“The problem is that there's really only four. China doesn't have the range. Japan does, but they haven't moved far enough uh past their pacifist position to actually invest in an army. And it looks like the United States and Japan are basically going to settle for co-dominion over the Pacifics and that will include, for example, energy security for Japan. So, that probably doesn't work.”
The United States plus Canada is now pretty much self-sufficient in energy production, with some rounding errors and caveats, fundamentally eliminating the original strategic rationale for US involvement in Persian Gulf security.
“And now the United States uh plus Canada is pretty much self-sufficient. There's a lot of rounding errors and caveats in that statement, but that's kind of the core position.”
Through the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the United States became far more disengaged from the world and withdrew carrier presence from the Persian Gulf, moving from maintaining one or two carriers at a time there to rarely having any present unless there is an immediate crisis.
“In the shift through Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the United States became far more disengaged from the world. And we went from having a carrier, maybe two carriers at a time in the Persian Gulf, to now really never having one there unless there's something flaring up at the moment.”
Once the United States no longer perceives global energy supplies as strategically necessary, the US transitions from being the world's greatest security guarantor to something closer to the opposite, and the relationship with Saudi Arabia will absolutely collapse.
“Now, once that happened, the United States goes from the greatest guarantor of security the world has ever known to something closer to the opposite. And when that happens, the relationship with Saudi Arabia will absolutely tank.”
Turkey represents the only realistic alternative security guarantor for Saudi Arabia because it can march directly through Iraq to Riyadh without needing a blue-water navy, but this creates a fundamental strategic problem: if Turkey possesses the military capacity and proximity to defend Saudi Arabia, it also possesses the capacity to conquer and occupy Saudi Arabia instead.
“The only other option is Turkey. Now, Turkey wouldn't need a naval force to sail around the Arabian Peninsula to get to the Persian Gulf. They would just have to march through Iraq directly to Riyadh. But that would generate the one thing that Saudi Arabia does not want, a superior military power with easy access to everything that's Saudi because if you're Turkey in that scenario, why in the world would you defend Saudi Arabia and not just take it over? Again.”
Saudi Arabia's crude oil is exported exclusively through a few export terminals and the Saudis do not possess a navy capable of protecting those terminals; if the United States chose to embargo Saudi oil, it could destroy offshore loading facilities and seize tankers as they leave, options that are militarily feasible against a desert power with minimal military capability.
“all of the stuff is exported just through a few export terminals and the Saudis don't have a navy that's worthy of the name. So, take the world's greatest naval power against a desert power that doesn't really have military. I mean, you do the math. Uh I'm not saying the US is going to conquer Saudi Arabia. There's no point in that. But embargo, destroy some offshore loading facilities, grab the tankers as they leave. These are all options for the future.”
The United States is now far more concerned with domestic priorities and, to a lesser degree, with geopolitical competition in East Asia, representing a fundamental shift in strategic priorities away from Middle Eastern engagement.
“Uh this is reflecting the shift of his strategic priorities. Uh the United States is far more concerned with things at home at the moment and then to a lesser degree what's going on in East Asia.”
The US-Saudi relationship will break in time, but this timing is not immediate; the US still perceives value in its alliance structure for achieving strategic objectives such as prosecuting the Ukraine war and containing China through semiconductor restrictions.
“so, that relationship in time is going to break, but in time is the keyword. We are not there yet. As the Biden administration has vividly shown over the last two, three years, there is still need for an alliance structure to achieve certain things, most notably in the Ukraine war. Uh also in terms of boxing China in when it comes to semiconductors. And as long as the United States does perceive a value in its alliance structure, then there is a value in crude continuing to flow unimpeded out of the Persian Gulf.”
In a post-globalized world where the United States is energy self-sufficient and has surplus energy to export to select allies, the US transforms from the greatest guarantor of global security into something closer to a regional disruptor, no longer perceiving reliable global energy supplies as strategically necessary.
“In a post-globalized world where the United States is self-sufficient in energy and actually has a sufficient exports to supply a handful of choice allies, uh the United States actually enters into the role of disruptor. Where having a reliable energy supplies on a global scale is no longer perceived as a strategic necessity.”
The Saudi government historically believed that the United States was fundamentally a mercenary power willing to provide military equipment and services in exchange for payment and only expected the US to defend Saudi interests when called upon to do so, until the 2003 Iraq War.
“Um We have to do this from the Saudi point of view. Uh the Saudi position is that since they sit on the world's largest exploitable deposit of oil, that they should just be able to pay people to defend them. And their belief right up until the Iraq War 2003 that the was the United States was basically a bunch of mercenaries. So, we'll buy a bunch of their equipment, we'll shrink wrap it, we'll put it in air-conditioned warehouses, and when we want them to fight our wars for us, we'll call up the American president and they'll do it.”
When Kuwait discovered a major offshore oil field, the United States responded with indifference, indicating that the security guarantee traditionally offered by America to Persian Gulf states has been withdrawn, as Kuwait lacks offshore development capability and cannot count on US security support.
“when the Kuwaitis discovered a big oil field offshore last month, uh the Americans were like, 'Whatever. Uh you're can't develop that yourself. Uh Kuwait has no offshore capability. Um yeah, maybe some of our firms will be involved, but the security guarantee's gone.'”
The United States should prepare for a transitional period between fully cutting loose Saudi Arabia and tolerating the status quo; in this middle ground, the US will force the Persian Gulf region to be more selective about where it sells crude oil, as an intermediate step toward outright embargo.
“But we should be preparing for a middle ground between that completely cutting them loose and kind of tolerating them. In the middle is where we force this region by hook or crook to be a little bit more selective to where they sell their crude.”
If a shooting conflict between the United States and China materializes, one of the first US actions will be to deploy ships to the Strait of Hormuz to embargo crude oil exports to China, which would collapse the entire Persian Gulf region economically within 3 months.
“should things with the Chinese ever get to the point of shooting, which I don't anticipate, but can't rule it out, one of the first things the United States is going to do is put a few ships in the Strait of Hormuz and make sure that crude cannot get to China at all and that'll shut the entire place down within 3 months.”
Once the US decides it no longer wants Saudi oil for itself and does not want rival powers to have access to it, all that remains is a country in the desert with a propensity for domestic violence that the US dislikes, essentially a failed state, making future conflict with Saudi Arabia likely if energy resources are no longer strategically valuable.
“and because, you know, at that point when we decide we don't want the oil and we don't want someone else to have the oil, all this is is a country that lives in the desert. I mean, have you guys seen Syriana? It kind of summed it up. How did Matt Damon put it? Um The view of the business community is that the people in your country were living in tents in the desert a century ago beheading one another and you're going to be doing that again in this century. Uh that's pretty much where we are when it comes to American views of this region. Uh cuz if you take away the oil, all that's left is a pension for domestic violence that we don't really like either.”
Britain and France possess the blue-water naval capacity to serve as Saudi security guarantors, with the United Arab Emirates having already begun military cooperation with France including a French military base in the UAE, but Saudi Arabia would prefer not to align with a European power.
“Uh next up are the Brits and the French. Um the United Arab Emirates has already decided to get into bed with the French and there's already a military cooperation and a base in the UAE. But the Saudis would really rather not go with a European.”
The US-Saudi relationship represents a fundamentally different strategic architecture than US-China conflict scenarios; the Gulf relationship will be characterized by coercion and embargo, whereas containing China will operate through different mechanisms.
“Um and that's a very different relationship. Now, we're not there yet, but it's something to think about.”