
The Rise and Fall of the EAST: Yasheng Huang in Conversation with Orville Schell
What this covers
This is a book talk at Asia Society in which Yasheng Huang presents The Rise and Fall of the EAST (exams, autocracy, stability, technology) and Orville Schell moderates. The inquiry runs from the imperial exam system (civil service exam)), which Huang says was built in 587 CE to monopolize human capital and regiment ideology, to China's present. His claim is that imperial regimes aimed at political stability rather than development, so innovation happened despite state policy. He also argues that traditional statecraft and Leninism share a hostility to organized independent social forces.
Much of the conversation concerns the 1980s, which Huang treats as a period of unusual openness. He describes five separate power centers acting as crude checks, public criticism of leaders by name, and peasants suing local governments. He credits Zhao Ziyang with both political and economic reform, and he argues that Deng Xiaoping was more of a factional negotiator than a commanding strongman. In his account, abolishing the Central Advisory Commission removed the one structural check on later leaders, a point he places only in his own analysis. He traces the sequence from Jiang Zemin through Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, and compares Taiwan and South Korea to explain why their democratic transitions needed deliberate political reform and outside pressure, not growth alone.
The later turns are more contested. Huang says Western engagement policy unconsciously rested on Marxist historical materialism, and that the anti-corruption campaign is a self-defeating loop. He dismisses BRICS as a substitute for trade with the developed world, and describes a fiscal imbalance in which Belt and Road, semiconductors and urbanization outrun revenue. He also contrasts the 2022 white paper protests, which were grievance-based, with Tiananmen. Throughout, he prefers gradual reform to revolutionary rupture and warns that autocrats tend to end badly.
Yasheng Huang argues that China's 1989 Tiananmen crackdown was a pivotal turning point that foreclosed a gradualist democratic transition that was already underway in the 1980s, and that Xi Jinping's subsequent centralization of power and anti-corruption campaign have recreated the conditions for authoritarianism while undermining the economic dynamism that enabled China's rise.
- The 1980s saw genuine political liberalization with fragmented power centers and intellectual freedom, but Tiananmen's violent suppression eliminated reformist leadership (Zhao Ziyang) and reversed all political openings
- Xi Jinping's consolidation of executive power by abolishing the Central Advisory Commission removed the only institutional check on autocratic rule that had constrained his predecessors
- Xi's anti-corruption campaign antagonized 60+ million people without addressing root causes, while simultaneously strangling economic growth through heavy spending on Belt and Road, semiconductors, and big urbanization with insufficient revenue generation
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In the 1980s, despite being an economic hardship era for many, China experienced political power fragmentation with five separate power centers (Communist Party General Secretary, President, Military Affairs Commission Chairman, Premier, and Central Advisory Commission), which created a de facto system of checks and balances, however crude, that constrained any single leader's ability to consolidate absolute power.
“the political power was divided among five individuals the secretary uh General Secretary of the Communist party is one individual the president of the country is another individual chairman of the military Affairs commission is another uh individual the perier is another individual and then there is a institution called the um Central advisory commission and that's another Power Center which got abolished which got abolished after 1989”
The 1980s were not just economically impressive—GDP growth and development metrics were 'arguably even more impressive' than later decades—but also marked genuine intellectual and artistic ferment, with public criticism of leaders by name, government officials apologizing for past wrongs, peasants successfully suing local governments, and competing editorial positions in official newspapers, none of which would be possible or tolerated even today.
“in the 1980s the Chinese GDP growth um and other measures of the development are no less uh impressive as compared with later decades arguably they are even more impressive as compared with later decades”
In autocracies without traditions of organized social movements, mass movements lack organizational structure and leadership, making strategic coordination impossible; this is a structural liability of societies without civil society traditions
“if you are really to go into mass movement you got to be strategic you got to think about your long-term objective and Vis AES the satisfaction of the short-term satisfaction of course they had no Ms of doing to lead the mass movement it was in Co yeah it was in coet and you know this is probably the price that you pay for a uh in autocracy you don't have this tradition of social movement organization and Society right so there's a kind of a tragic element here”
Deng Xiaoping was not as 'strong' a leader as commonly portrayed; he compromised on many issues and made concessions to conservatives in the party and military on his right and to radical reformers like Jiang Zemin and Hu Yaobang on his left, navigating between factions rather than imposing his will
“D Shin compromised on many many issues D Shin had to make concessions to Chen and to many other conservatives uh in the party and to the military and then on his left he had these party ideologues economic conservatives on his right he had you know fairly radical reformers Jang and huabang who advocated both economic and political reforms and D was right in the middle and he had to kind of navigate the political forces from the left and from the right”
The 1989-2002 period featured de facto checks on Jiang Zemin's power from Deng Xiaoping (until his death in 1997) and from his own weakness; after Deng's death, Jiang persisted but Hu Jintao lacked power; by 2012, Hu chose to retire peacefully, removing the biological and preference-based constraints that had checked predecessors
“by 2012 jine was too old he was uh 88687 D already died long time ago and hin now for whatever reasons decided I'm fed up with politics I'm just going to go and fishing and I'm I'm done so he stopped himself from exercising that Regency power so all that check and balance was left to the biology of these predecessors as well as to their individual preferences”
Traditional Chinese political ideology and Leninist communist ideology share a fundamental affinity in that both concentrate power in the state at the expense of organized independent social forces—intellectuals, merchants, and civil society are allowed to exist as individuals but not as organized groups capable of challenging state authority.
“both ideologies gave and Empower gave a lot of power and enable the state at the expense of society and independent actors in The Society such as intellectuals um Commerce not so so much sort of you know wiping out Commerce wiping out intellectual it is reducing them to their own individual capacity rather than having them as a organized potentially competitive force with the state”
The imperial Chinese civil service exam system, established in 587 CE, was designed to monopolize human capital, regiment ideology, and socialize the masses into state-approved thought patterns, with participation spanning decades of a person's life (ages 13 to 59 documented in Ming Dynasty records) to ensure comprehensive ideological capture.
“the exam system was so um uh such a large participation from the masses and unlike sat you know in the US the college uh the the the you actually had to know something uh well so so I was going to make a different point which is that in the uh us you know you may take uh sat once you may take it twice but that's about it to pass the uh Imperial service exam uh exam you had to take it multiple times and we have a a data uh data set database on the uh exam candidates in the main Dynasty the youngest person who passed the exam was 13 years old right so clearly a genius the oldest was 59 right so this is mean dynasty this is 400 400 years ago 500 years years ago when the life expectancy was probably in the 40s so you take it multiple times”
Taiwan and South Korea both underwent democratic transitions, but this was not merely because of economic development—it required deliberate political reforms including partial media openness, competitive legislatures, independent unions and student organizations, and crucially, external pressure from the US, plus different social conditions (South Korea was 30% Catholic, providing independent institutions China lacked after 1989).
“there was a simplistic idea that the political changes there were result of Economic Development right South Korea became Rich it very Marxist in a way wasn't it because it is a Marxist Marx adopted from Hegel this notion that history had a direction and things followed automatically”
Zhao Ziyang, the reformist leader purged after Tiananmen, was exceptionally rare—a leader who implemented political reforms (media openness, asset disclosure requirements), economic reforms (rural revolution, industrial reform), and never prosecuted opponents, matching Milton Friedman's assessment that Zhao intuitively understood market economics despite no college education.
“Jang was sacked you know this is a guy who engineered the rural revolution in sichan Province this is a person who launched uh implemented industrial and Rural reforms throughout the 1980s basically responsible for the Chinese economic takeoff pulled the Communist Party cells out of all of the businesses he also separated the party and the state right he implemented political reforms a extremely smart person and Milton Freedman met with him and later said that he has never met a political leader who really intuitively understood market economics right so this is a guy who never spend the day in college”
Favoring state-owned enterprises (SOEs) over private enterprises has been thoroughly researched for decades and consistently shows SOEs have lower productivity and worse financial performance, so reversing this preference is not 'learning' but merely applying well-known research, making the economic rationality of the original policy choice questionable.
“the on the is soe point there's a third years of research to show that favoring s soes is going to be very bad for your economy you know every single academic study shows that s soes have lower productivity and have very very bad L performance that you still favor s soe and then you'll correct that policy because when you favor the S soe you get exactly the same results as you have before right do I call that self learnning I don't know I mean they have learned that so many times since 1978”
The white paper protests of 2022 were grievance-based protests against zero-COVID policies, not an ideologically-driven movement like Tiananmen; they were much smaller in scale and less deep in their challenge to the system
“the white paper move I wouldn't call it movement t was in the movement the white paper was a protest it was a grievance based protest against the specific policies of zero covid controls whereas 1989 was much bigger and and it was idea based”
The fear of arrest was the most basic and powerful incentive for entrepreneurship in rural China in 1977-1978, where peasants had been criminalized for raising chickens; this primitive incentive (avoiding imprisonment) later required upgrading to rule of law as wealth accumulated and required security
“because Economist you know talk about incentives never underestimate the power of uh uh the incentive effect of not getting arrested right that's that's incentive right there pretty pretty basic it's Prett starting place for an incentive I think so at that time it was the fact that you no longer face imprisonment that enable you and to go into entrepreneurship today I think we have to talk about rule of law because you have amassed billions of dollars of assets you have build a entrepreneurial Empire then you can't just say okay I'm not going to arrest you”
The fundamental change in Chinese policy after 1978 was ideological—a shift from the goal of political stability and control to the goal of economic development—and this goal change opened space for entrepreneurship even while maintaining one-party rule, showing that goals (not just systems) shape economic behavior.
“the key thing that changed was the uh the goal changed right so the um the goal for Imperial regimes was political stability political control it was never about economics uh in fact the chapter on technology uh shows that even though China was extraordinarily inventive um there was never really any kind of technological agenda uh on the part of the government it really just happened that way and then they lost it completely uh after they introduced the exam system and never the economic development was never really a concern on the part of the Imperial regimes until the open War because they got they got hit so badly by the by the by the by the imperialist powers and then D shaing came along in 1978 and he engineered I would argue a ideological Revolution right not in the sense of you know toward democracy constitutional democracy but but this idea that the goal of the government is to develop the economy that just opened up”
Imperial regimes were never motivated by economic development; the goal was political stability and control, and economic and technological innovation occurred despite (not because of) state policy, which is why China lost its technological advantages after institutionalizing the exam system
“the goal for Imperial regimes was political stability political control it was never about economics uh in fact the chapter on technology uh shows that even though China was extraordinarily inventive um there was never really any kind of technological agenda uh on the part of the government it really just happened that way and then they lost it completely uh after they introduced the exam system”
Huang's preference is for gradual political and economic reform (the 1980s model) over revolutionary change; he warns against revolutionary transitions (Russia, Libya, Iraq) which produced worse outcomes than gradual opening would have
“I personally welcome self-correction or whatever Corrections and I I think that's that's a good I think a better way for China to move forward is still the 19 80s model you gradually reform politically economically rather than you know through a revolutionary process we saw that in Russia it was Libya you we saw that right so it it was terrible right so I mean so I didn't answer the question about Libya the lesson from Libya is absolute AutoCat don't end up very well”
The Mao era was not about 'getting rich'—it was about making the state strong and powerful—showing a distinction between wealth accumulation (capitalist goal) and national power/strength, which many Western observers conflate.
“M Revolution was not about getting rich but it was about getting the country to be strong so so there is a there is that differenti iation between kind of individual wealth accumulation that we typically associate with capitalism and the kind of the power of the country the power of the state yeah the fuang and power sort of wealth and power right so it could be military power it could be it could be economic power um but that didn't work right Central planning failed miserably”
Autocrats historically end up poorly—this is the lesson from Libya under Gaddafi and from the Russian case—so absolute self-concentration of power is self-defeating and dangerous, making Xi's continued consolidation of absolute power a trap rather than a solution.
“absolute no absolute autocrats they're okay J Jing and is getting as absolute as he can yeah so that's that's why I worry right so the Libya example is the example you don't yeah want to happen to yourself”
Political liberalization and economic liberalization in the 1980s had a symbiotic, complementary relationship—they reinforced each other—and historical evidence shows that more liberal political systems correlate with more liberal economies and vice versa, contradicting the view that autocrats are necessary to enforce economic reform.
“we shouldn't understate the contribution of political liberalization to economic liberalization that's an important point that the two do have a kind of a symbiosis they are symol symol Artic relationship with each other they complement with each other”
In autocracies, the only people the current autocrat is accountable to are his predecessors; the Central Advisory Commission created in the 1980s was an institutional base for retired leaders to exercise constraint over successors, and Deng Xiaoping's abolition of it in 1989 removed the only structural check on successors' power
“in the autocracy the only people the current autocrat is accountable to are his predecessors so you know nobody else has that kind of power right the only people who have that power are the people who kind of incubate you who nominate you who appoint you the central advisory commission essentially is a institutional base of the retired leaders if it had existed it could have exercised That Power by 2012 that was gone”
BRICS represents only 25-27% of world GDP, of which China alone is ~25% (the rest of BRICS adds negligibly), so BRICS cannot substitute for developed world trade and claims about BRICS replacing the U.S.-led system are 'pure nonsense'
“the bricks account for maybe 26 27 29% of the worldwide GDP of that 25% is Chinese okay just let's just be real right so the math simply doesn't work in terms of damaging the relationship with the West”
The intellectual framework underlying engagement policy was Marxist historical materialism (economic base determines political superstructure), though Western capitalist leaders adopted this view unconsciously, causing them to believe that economic integration and development would automatically produce democracy in China.
“it's it's kind of the material base of super infrastructure right it's a very marxan View and ironically uh adopted by many uh capitalist leaders but unconsciously unconsciously”
Xi Jinping's anti-corruption strategy represents a 'cat chasing its own tail'—a self-defeating cycle where strengthening state power to fight corruption actually reinforces the conditions that produce corruption in the first place, leading to perpetual antagonism of powerful people with no end to corruption.
“so it is like the like going back to the cat uh analogy hopefully I'll get it right this time so the cat chasing his own tail right it is a kind of a perennial forever movement that you can never succeed”
Deng Xiaoping's genius was not in imposing market economics through visionary leadership, but rather in removing barriers to human nature—capitalism is more consistent with human nature than socialism, so when Deng simply stopped punishing entrepreneurship (removed the threat of arrest), peasants and entrepreneurs naturally burst into economic activity.
“my own view of market economy capitalism is it is more consistent with human nature than socialism right so essentially if you leave the human beings alone they tend to go capitalistic rather than socialistic so the issue here is is more about removing the barriers removing the obstacles toward basic human nature and and dung the The Genius of dung was well it's not so much the genius of dung it is really the unique aspect of dung was that he had the credibility”
The economic problem facing Xi Jinping's China is a structural imbalance: the government is spending massive amounts on Belt and Road, semiconductors, urbanization, and social programs but not generating sufficient revenue through economic growth, creating a 'dise equilibria' that forces a choice between cutting expenditures (politically unacceptable) or stimulating economic growth through market opening and normalized relations with the West.
“the problem arises when you spend a lot of money but you don't earn it I will characterize that as the current situation in China look at his pro programs Belton Road semiconductor self-reliance the big urbanization programs the social transfer programs that he has right so essentially to use academic language that's a definition of dise equilibria because you are spending a lot of money but you're not earning money right”
Cutting off Australian iron ore imports was economically irrational because Australia is China's largest iron ore supplier and Australian ore is cleaner (better for environment) than Chinese ore, forcing China to rely on lower-quality domestic ore and causing regional electricity shortages—demonstrating that 'learning' from this mistake is not the same as self-correction, since the knowledge was available beforehand.
“Australia is the biggest supplier of the iron ore to China and to cut off the supplies of iron or to your country it is going to have a incredibly negative effect on your economy which it did um and especially because the IR or from Australia is much more clean than the iron or that China can produce itself right it has so in terms of environment in terms of climate uh the Australian IR or is much better than the Chinese IR so not recognizing that having a bad relationship so as soon as they uh began to cut off the uh imports from um Australia they they were running shortages of electricity in some regions of the country they began to shut down electricity right”
If Tiananmen had not happened (or had been handled differently, e.g., by waiting out the crowds by June 1st), China would likely have gradually opened politically and economically similar to Taiwan and South Korea's transition to democracy, creating a China with better relations with the West
“if T didn't happen you know I I'm not going to say if tan didn't happen China today is a constitutional democracy but I'm pretty sure it is going to be far more open both politically and economically and by the way it is going to be a China that has a far better relationship with the West than the China we actually have”
Between the traditional Chinese state model and the Leninist communist model, there were also differences: Taiwan's Nationalist government (the KMT) relied more on the traditional model with private economy + strong government, and this mixed model gradually opened toward democracy over time, whereas mainland China combined traditional authoritarianism with Leninist economic control.
“I would argue that National nationalist government relied on the traditional model there you had definitely authoritarianism but a mixture of private economy and and strong government and over time in Taiwan they began to open open up whereas in uh Mainline China you had the elements of the uh leninist ideology and then the traditional ideology and they complemented with each other one is more on the politics political side the other is on the economic side”
Tiananmen Square in 1989 was not simply a student mistake or an inevitable clash—by June 1st-2nd the crowds were already thinning due to summer heat and government could have 'waited it out' through attrition, suggesting the violent crackdown was a political choice, not a military necessity.
“by June 2nd by June 1st the crowd on T was already pretty thin uh it was getting very hot uh cuz the summer was arriving and if the government chose to wait it out um that would be a solution you know I I don't know how to characterize that solution kind of by attrition right so essentially you're waiting out”
Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign has resulted in approximately 4 million people being jailed, and multiplying this by their families (conservatively 4 family members per person), creates roughly 16-20 million people who have been antagonized, leading to a perverse incentive structure where those who have been offended have every reason to support regime change.
“I think you write that there 4 million people have been four million people that's a that's a lot of people have in jail and and also the other thing the other problem with that strategy is by definition the corrupt people people are powerful people because they use their political power to accumulate wealth and then you antagonize the powerful people powerful people like me right not very powerful person have family friends you multiply that 4 million by four you got 16 million people right you antagonize 6 15 million 20 million people by this strategy”
Student mass movements, including the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and the 2022 white paper protests, typically lack coherent strategy and tactical sophistication, often harming their own causes by persisting without clear endgames and failing to understand elite political dynamics that they should have exploited.
“there are a lot of new students coming in too you know yeah so yeah there were new students um coming in and they wanted to participate in this uh uh experience I I think we really need to think about these mass movements they they are they don't have they don't have a coherent strategy they don't have a good tactic they often are the worst eneme to their own causes”
The 1989 Tiananmen crackdown was the decisive turning point that ended a gradualist reform path that could have led to constitutional democracy in China—it demolished the reformist faction (Zhao Ziyang) and reversed every single political reform from the 1980s, whereas post-1989 leaders continued economic liberalization but only as economic changes ('physical changes') rather than structural political changes ('chemical changes') that cannot easily be reversed.
“it's not just tan per say it is the manner with which T was ended right this violent Crackdown um and that finished off this kind of gradual opening of Chinese Politics the fragmentation of the political structure and it demolished one part of the Chinese Communist Party represented by J Young Who was a very liberal open yeah uh First Premier and then party General Secretary”
Rock musician Cui Jian played a significant political role in the Tiananmen demonstration, playing at the monument; he represented a broader artistic and intellectual ferment in the 1980s that challenged political authority
“Tran uh I didn't talk about him in the book but I should have Tran was a a rock and roll star lot of his songs were political overtly political right against Authority against um not not against C Chinese Communist Party per but the the the against the idea of political Authority dictating everyday life right kind of the rebellious spirit that that is you know fairly uh common among rock and roll um um um rock and roll music and he was the first rock and roll star in China and he was worshiped by the young people and he he played a pretty important role in the chman demonstration he played at the monument”
By 2012, China was deeply corrupt—corruption increased dramatically after Tiananmen because the crackdown killed the anti-corruption social movement and purged Zhao Ziyang who had proposed asset disclosure requirements for Politburo members—and Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, while addressing a genuine problem, was primarily a tool to eliminate political opponents and strengthen autocratic control rather than to introduce the rule of law and transparency that would actually solve corruption.
“by 2012 China was deeply corrupt deeply corrupt crony capitalism and that was also tmen um in my book I show the data that corruption increased dramatically after tmen tmen basically wiped out a social movement for clean government right the student demonstrators who demonstrated for clean government the leaders of the movement were arrested Jang was sacked he called for investigations of Po Bureau members for corruption including starting with his own family he was sacked that was basically open invitation to corruption right”
China is experiencing a structural decline in foreign direct investment for the first time in modern history—for the first time, more money is flowing out than flowing in—signaling that multinational corporations are beginning to divest from China or reduce future investment commitments.
“also China experienced for the first time a net outflow of foreign direct investment has never happened before right over the last two years the inflow has begun has begun to decrease has begun to decline but still there's more money coming in than the money going out now there's there's more money going out than the money coming in right”
Reform is still possible under Xi Jinping, but would require him to believe that opening up politically and economically (on the 1980s model) is compatible with maintaining Communist Party rule—a belief he does not hold—which means true reform would more likely require waiting out Xi and hoping his successor has different ideological commitments.
“I think it's possible with Xin ping or do you think we have to wait him out well okay so I so so so let me lay out the following dynamic um I think the reforms are still possible because there's a fundamental difference between Shin ping the era of shiin ping and the person of shiin ping”
Jiang Zemin, who replaced Zhao Ziyang, came from Shanghai—the least reformed province of China in the 1980s—with mediocre economic performance and no real credentials except for suppressing the 1989 demonstrations, and was selected somewhat randomly by the elders as a 'desperate choice' when they found no one else stood out, reflecting their worry about centralizing too much power in an untested leader.
“janami came from Shanghai Shanghai was in the 1980s the least reformed part of China um and and jamin's performance economic performance was mediocre um his political performance was mostly about controlling the demonstration in 1989 which he did”
The post-Tiananmen Chinese system (under Jiang, Hu, and Xi) shows directional continuity toward increasing authoritarianism and crackdowns on corruption—the difference among these three leaders was only willingness to go so far, not the direction itself, with Xi being exceptional in his willingness to consolidate absolute power.
“J didn't believe opening up right as a way to deal with corruption they also believe in quacking down except that they didn't go all the way to the logical conclusion of the anti-corruption campaign the way that shinpin did directionally I don't see any difference among these three leaders the post T leaders I don't see a single difference in terms of the direction I see the difference in terms of the willingness to go so far right xinping there is exceptional and that's something we had no idea about”
Huang's book title 'Exam Autocracy Stability and Technology' (EAST) uses this acronym to structure analysis of Chinese history around the exam system (monopolizing human capital), autocracy (concentration of power), stability (state's goal until 1978), and technology (historical irony that despite China's inventive capacity, it lost technological leadership after the exam system solidified traditional patterns).
“so the title is Rise uh in the fall of the year East and East um EA St stands for exam autocracy stability and technology so I start with a ye letter E the exam and the exam was the civil service exam established in 500 87”
China's consumption is not recovering despite policy efforts, infrastructure programs are no longer economically necessary (demand has plateaued), and the bright spots in EVs and solar represent only ~6% of China's 25+ trillion dollar economy while trade is declining to Vietnam, Mexico, and other competitors, with US trade falling 6% despite BRICS and alternative trade rhetoric.
“the consumption is not picking up the infrastructure program is no longer uh necessary really on objective economic grounds China has some bright spots like EVs and solar but let's be honest those you add them up it's about 6% of the Chinese economy 25% of the Chinese economy is thinking right okay you have 6% which is good better than 0% you have 25% going down trade”
In traditional China, merchants were stigmatized as a low social class despite their economic importance, and communist ideology similarly disdained merchants/bourgeoisie as a class enemy, yet somehow modern China came to celebrate entrepreneurs and businesspeople—a puzzle requiring explanation of how the old disdain was overcome.
“Strangely in traditional Chinese culture that it was the scholars the Learned people who were esteemed and in a communist system of course the merchants the Bourgeois yeah uh entrepreneurs are also dis esteemed they're scums they're scums”
University students in the 1980s participated in local elections (borough/district level) and debated Rousseau and Fabian socialism during campaigns—evidence of genuine intellectual engagement with political theory, not mere seat-seeking
“they had local elections uh at the Village level also in Beijing at the district level in in the University District hyan district they had um University students campaigning uh for the district legislature and then so so just imagine uh maybe myh B you call it borrow borrow yeah or Council the Burrows yeah burs okay State uh burrow counselors right campaing for that seat and then you go to these debate they're debating rouso and they're debating Fabian socialism you know you wouldn't do that if the objective is just to land a uh seat at the Boral uh Council it was just just incred and some of them got elected”
Art exhibitions and performances in 1980s China were overtly political in nature, using Maoist iconography satirically; after Tiananmen, the art became focused on economic themes, showing that artists switched from political to economic discourse
“in the 1980s the paintings and the exhibits more or less all of them were about politics yeah and they were using a lot of maest iconography making fun of it spoofing that's right yeah and and and then after 1989 gradually these exhibits Express economic ideas right so pivoting so essentially this is the The Divide between 1980s and 190 they had to vacate they had to vacate the politics yeah and and and now economics became the uh the reigning ideology”
Many young Chinese today have no knowledge of how open and economically dynamic the 1980s were, creating a gap between the lived experience of Huang's generation and the historical knowledge of younger Chinese
“many young people in China have no idea that was how China began its economic takeoff”