
Francis Fukuyama on Trump 47 | The Good Fight with Yascha Mounk
What this covers
This is a conversation recorded shortly after the 2024 election between Yasha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama. It starts from the result: Donald Trump won every swing state, and Republicans took the Senate, probably the House, and have the Supreme Court. Fukuyama says this makes the Biden years look like the fluke rather than 2016. The first half asks why. Fukuyama credits a backlash against neoliberalism and woke liberalism, pointing to Trump's gains among working-class Black and Hispanic voters. He also argues that gender now divides American politics more than race does, because the information economy and decades of women entering the workforce have eroded the position of working-class men. He treats Kamala Harris's abortion-centered strategy as a possible irritant for young men, a claim he makes in a contested exchange. They also note that similar class realignments have happened in Europe.
The second area is domestic institutions. Mounk argues that the main threat is to the rule of law. He cites Schedule F, which would let Trump replace career officials with loyalists, and he describes the prospect of IRS audits aimed at enemies and a Justice Department used for revenge. Both speakers ask whether democratic stability rests on institutions or on the restraint of officeholders, and they consider how much firmer Trump's grip on the Republican Party is this time.
Fukuyama then turns to foreign policy. He expects a Ukraine ceasefire that leaves Ukraine exposed, mixed signals on NATO's Article Five, and a possible deal over Taiwan. He also expects Trump to place no limits on Israel and to preside over a world where China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are aligned. He argues that democracies must rebuild munitions production, and he warns that Trump's tariff plans could cause serious economic damage. The conversation closes with immigration, where Mounk argues for employment verification and national ID cards over mass deportation, and with lessons for the Democratic Party.
Trump's 2024 victory represents a durable realignment of American politics driven by class inversion and cultural grievance rather than racial resentment, posing significant institutional threats through executive power consolidation and foreign policy unpredictability that may exceed his first-term dangers.
- Trump's electoral coalition is increasingly multiracial and working-class, undermining the 'white resentment' narrative and indicating a deeper class-based political realignment comparable to historical party switches
- Trump's second term poses greater institutional risks than his first due to Schedule F, greater executive experience, party control, and explicit revenge motivations, resembling Viktor Orbán's gradual erosion model rather than dramatic authoritarianism
- Trump's foreign policy unpredictability—particularly on Ukraine, NATO, and Taiwan—creates tail-risk scenarios where adversaries may test U.S. resolve, especially given the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea alliance that previous presidents did not face
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Schedule F eliminates for-cause dismissal protections for hundreds of critical policy positions throughout the government, allowing Trump to replace career civil servants with loyalists, particularly enabling IRS leadership replacement to facilitate tax audits of enemies including CEOs, journalists, and NGOs as a harassment tool.
“I think he understands that that was a weakness of his first term and I think he's going to put people in keep positions in the Justice Department that will enable them to open up uh investigation you know let me just give you one concrete example uh the head of the IRS uh is subject to what they call for cause dismissal meaning that he's got to commit some crime or some really overt you know offense before you can fire him and schedule F is going to get rid of that I mean and there there hundreds of these four cause positions throughout the government that occupy very important policy positions so if Trump can fire the head of the IRS put a loyalist in there then you could open up a tax audit against a CEO a journalist a head of an NGO or the NGO itself uh that will be incredibly um you know harassing and will tie the organization the individual up in all sorts of legal fees”
Trump is likely to negotiate a ceasefire with Putin that freezes the Ukraine war but deepens Ukraine's eventual demise because without NATO guarantees any ceasefire simply allows Russia to rebuild and resume fighting, making Trump's promised diplomatic victory morally catastrophic for Ukraine.
“Trump can probably get a short-term deal with Putin that will freeze the war that he can come away from you know saying look I sto I promise to stop the war and I did it but it will be deeply uh bad for Ukraine because really if they don't have uh some kind of a NATO guarantee uh any ceasefire is is really going to just lead to their eventual National demise because the Russians will simply start fighting again uh uh you know the moment they they feel that the balances tipped or they've rebuilt their forces sufficiently”
Democratic countries must invest more in defense to prepare for potential conflict with China, Russia, or other authoritarian actors, needing stockpiles of missiles, anti-tank weapons, aircraft, and industrial capacity to sustain prolonged conflict.
“the obvious answer to that is they have to invest more in defense um you know uh we are not ready for anything like a long War I mean our equipment has done very well technologically in the Ukraine war but uh we don't have enough we we simply don't have enough stockpiles of missiles of anti-tank weapons of aircraft all sorts of things uh and we don't have the industrial base to ramp up production uh if we actually do get into a conflict”
National ID cards are necessary to control illegal immigration, particularly visa overstays, which historically represented a large portion of undocumented immigration, making immigration status verification impossible without knowing who is in the country.
“it is absolutely necessary if you're actually going to control um illegal immigration if you don't know actually the status of somebody uh you know back in the day um a large number of undocumented immigrants actually did not come across the border they were Visa overstays there were people that had come into the country uh uh legally uh with a Visa and then as a student or whatnot then it expired and they just stayed on uh and without a national ID there's no way of controlling you know that kind of illegal immigration”
Donald Trump won the 2024 presidential election decisively, defeating Kamala Harris in all swing states, securing the Senate and likely the House, with Republicans controlling the Supreme Court, representing consolidated conservative power that makes the Biden Administration appear to be the fluke rather than Trump's 2016 victory being the aberration.
“he defeated comma Harris in all of the Swing states that were you know up for grabs uh they got the Senate they're very likely as you said to get the house as well they already control the Supreme Court and so you know conservative power is Consolidated in a way that makes the Biden Administration look like the fluke you know that it was just the last gasp of a Dying order”
An employment verification system would be a more humane and workable solution to illegal immigration than mass deportation, with employer responsibility for verifying legal status reducing incentive to come to the country illegally, and such systems function successfully in most other countries and did work historically in the United States.
“what you really meant was um you know we should have an employment verification system in which people uh really are responsible for making sure that the people they hire have legal status um and then the incentive for coming into the country would be much lower and perhaps even some of the people who are undocumented who already are in the country might decide to go home to the countries of origin because they there would have trouble making a a living now you know I sort of find it strange there a couple of things where it's just like you know whenever that that's raised Americans are sort of say well that's not possible you know employers don't like it you know in every other country that happens I mean you know when I was a on an you know on a term as a visiting fellow at Oxford University I wasn't able to access my room until I proved that I was legally in the country”
This class-based political transformation has occurred in many countries besides the United States, with working-class people in Europe who previously voted for communist parties now voting for populist parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally and Giorgia Meloni's party, weakening the traditional left and forcing conservative parties to take different positions on economic issues.
“but you know it's going on in Europe as well I mean a lot of the people workingclass people that used to vote for communist parties in France and Italy are now voting for The populist parties for marine lepen or for Georgia Maloney and and that substitution you know has really weakened the traditional left in many ways”
American public opinion on immigration is nuanced: Americans value immigrants and increasing ethnic diversity (with only 15% opposing further diversity), simultaneously want illegal immigration drastically reduced and the southern border controlled, creating an impossible policy goal of no illegal immigration with no state-sanctioned cruelty.
“Americans value immigrants and value the things that immigrants have brought to America most of them believe not just that the present levels of ethnic diversity which obviously much increased from the past but further increasing ethnic ivity is a good thing only about 15% of Americans think that would be um a bad thing um at the same time Americans are for understandable reasons very very keen to get control of the Southern border and to make sure that um uh uh the level of illegal immigration is drastically reduced”
Presidents intending to reduce military involvement can be drawn into conflicts through happenstance (like 9/11) or through their own strategic blunders, making Trump's foreign policy intentions potentially irrelevant to actual outcomes, as demonstrated by George W. Bush's trajectory.
“George W bush came in as uh uh president who was much more skeptical about using a military force uh abroad uh who wanted America to be less involved in the world in uh various ways uh and that's not how things turned out right so there's a real question about how uh uh presidents who intend to be less involved uh on the world stage can end up getting drawn into conflicts um through uh happenstance uh through tragic circumstances in the case of 911 and then subsequently bad decision-making”
Trump does not want to use American military force and specifically wants to avoid war with China, making him averse to military commitment, though he may still make a deal with China at Taiwan's expense while claiming diplomatic victory.
“I think that one of the enduring characteristics of trump in foreign policy is he does not want to use American military force and he does not want to be a president that's going to get America involved in another uh war in particularly a war with China uh and you know right now Biden you know I don't know whether Americans in general will actually be willing to go to war with China to protect Taiwan including a lot of Democrats but you know Biden's been trying to do this dance where He suggests that yes we will be willing to do that and that'll be enough to deter uh China I think that a lot of foreign players can see that you know Trump does not really want to get into a war that uh he keeps talking about the danger of World War III and that you know he's not going to put us in a position to get into World War I”
European militaries are particularly unprepared because they have not invested in factories producing ammunition and missiles at scale, with democracies hoping technology alone would close material gaps with adversaries, but Ukraine proves that mass and manpower ultimately matter more.
“with the Europeans it's even worse because they've not been investing in the factories that would actually make the ammunition and the missiles and whatnot you know to uh to be really competitive we've been kind of hoping that technology by itself would be sufficient to close that material Gap but in the end you know I think as Ukraine is proving technology can slow things down uh uh with an enemy like Russia but ultimately it's the mass and bulk and Manpower that's going to be really uh you know that's going to be really decisive”
Trump's first presidency was characterized by an inability to turn his Justice Department against political enemies like Hillary Clinton, which he views as a weakness he will correct in his second term through Schedule F.
“he couldn't get his own justice department you know to go after Hillary Clinton even though he wanted them to but uh you know he understands that that was a weakness of his first term and I think he's going to put people in keep positions in the Justice Department that will enable them to open up uh investigation”
Kamala Harris's campaign strategy focused entirely on mobilizing women around abortion, an issue that most young men—especially young working-class men—do not care about, which may have stoked resentment and contributed to Trump's gains among young male voters.
“kamla Harris spent all of her time trying to mobilize women around abortion I would say that that's an issue that most especially young men really don't care about and I think you know that may have played some role in stoking this kind of uh this kind of resentment”
Trump's perceived unwillingness to use military force will appear increasingly like a 'paper tiger' to foreign players, tempting adversaries to test American resolve and making Taiwan vulnerable to Chinese pressure as diplomacy over military commitment undermines deterrence.
“you know in a way uh this paper tiger uh dimension of him uh will be you know increasingly apparent to people uh so he'll talk tough about uh China but you know if he can pull off a deal with them I think that he would uh do it at at taiwan's expense um so I think you know that's the most likely course that he's going to follow”
Trump will not raise objections to Israeli actions in the Middle East, removing American inhibitions on Israeli policy and potentially leading to direct U.S. involvement if Israel-Iran conflict escalates into a full-scale war.
“I suspect he will not raise any objections to anything that Benjamin Netanyahu wants to do in you know the Middle East and that's going to take away you know whatever inhibitions uh were put on that and that's actually something that Trump's got to be careful about because they're were much more likely to get directly involved if the fight between Israel and Iran you know escalates into a uh into a full-scale war”
The current geopolitical situation is uniquely dangerous because China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have formed an overt alliance with mutual military support backed by formal understandings, creating systemic escalation risks that exceed anything previous presidents faced, requiring actual military capacity and credible willingness to use it.
“I actually think that we're in a pretty serious situation that is very different from the one that um uh any previous president uh you know has faced because you now have this very overt Alliance uh between uh China Russia North Korea and Iran they're providing Mutual Military Support backed by you know pretty formal understandings of the their desire to cooperate with one another uh and you know the risk of uh some major um incursion or use of force on the part of any of these actors I think is much um you know much bigger than anything that George Bush faced”
Trump will not overtly pull out of NATO but will send signals that he won't guarantee Article Five security commitments, sufficiently weakening NATO's credibility as a mutual defense alliance because NATO's power rests entirely on the credibility of commitments.
“I think that um he also is probably not going to overtly try to pull out of NATO but he doesn't have to all he has to do is send signals that he's actually not going to carry through on an article five guarantee uh and that's enough to basically W weaken the credibility of the alliance which is really what NATO is all about”
The assumption that minority groups would be attracted to identity politics has been decisively refuted by the 2024 election, as working-class Black and Hispanic voters rejected this coalition model and did not prioritize identity-based appeals.
“the assumption that you know a lot of people on the left made that minority groups would U be attracted to Identity politics you know I think that's been pretty decisively uh refuted”
Trump's proposed economic policies, particularly replacing income tax with tariffs without understanding the economic damage, could lead to one of the biggest economic disasters in U.S. history, with tariff declarations against major trading partners triggering retaliation, restoring inflation to levels unseen since the post-COVID period, potentially leading to global recession or depression.
“if you just play out in your mind his economic policies uh they could lead to one of the biggest economic disasters that this country has ever experienced you know he's talked about replacing uh the income tax with tariffs uh and uh doesn't seem to have any concept of how economically damaging that's going to be I suspect that the way this will play out is that the moment that he declares you know a certain level of tariffs against German cars or you know French wines or whatever a there's going to be a huge this time around there's going to be big retaliation uh but more importantly it's going to Resto inflation so inflation is going to go back up to levels that we didn't even see during you know the postco uh period and and that's then you know he's very attuned to not doing things that make him look bad”
Gender has become more important than race as a primary dividing line in American politics and polarization, driven by a massive social change resulting from the transition to an information economy and the entry of hundreds of millions of women into the labor force over 40 years, which has undermined the economic status and cultural position of working-class men of all races.
“there's been this massive social change that hasn't really been talked about sufficiently I think that as a result of the transition to an information economy you've had this massive move of hundreds of millions of women uh into the labor force you know over the last uh 40 years uh which has completely changed the Dynamics within families where especially with working class families there are a lot of uh families that are supported primarily by the the wife's income or the girlfriend's income uh and that's led to this you know real sense of anxiety”
Trump's second presidency poses a more extreme test of whether democratic stability depends on institutional strength or on the public spiritedness of elected officials, with Trump having greater executive experience, more loyalists to place in positions, much stronger party control, more awareness of power limits, greater anger, and explicit revenge motivation than in 2016.
“I believe that this time around the natural experiment is going to be um a lot more extreme um for two reasons one and you've uh referred to a number of these things uh is that Trump is going to pose a much more significant danger than in 2016 um he has much more executive experience than he did at that time he has a much uh bigger set of loyalists who he's able to put first of all into about roughly 3,000 positions that uh new American Presidents appoint in general and secondly uh potentially into those additional positions that he may liberate uh through uh schedule f um uh another important point is that he has much more control of the Republican party than he did in 2016 when much of the uh uh Congressional Delegation uh uh not so secretly disliked or even hated him um now you know most uh new members of the House of Representatives are people who won their primaries by claiming to be trumpier than their competitors”
The primary threat Trump poses to American democracy is to the rule of law through his explicit intention to seek revenge on people he believes have prosecuted or persecuted him by placing loyalists in Justice Department positions.
“I think the primary threat is really to the rule of law uh that uh he's been very clear in the last few months and weeks that uh he's really out for Revenge he wants to take revenge on all the people that he believes have been Prosecuting him uh and or persecuting him”
Trump will maintain control of the Republican Party for at least another four years and will have major influence on the 2028 succession, preventing the party from reverting to pre-Trump structures.
“now it is quite clear that Trump owns the party for another four years and very likely that he'll be able to have major say in who becomes his successor uh in 2028 so that makes a huge difference as well”
Trump's 2024 victory was driven primarily by a repudiation of neoliberalism (the Milton Friedman worship of pure market efficiency) and woke liberalism (identity politics), with working-class voters of all races rejecting identity politics in favor of class-based concerns, as evidenced by Trump's significant gains among Black and Hispanic working-class voters.
“both of those things I think played an important role in uh the Trump Victory the repudiation of both of those forms of liberalism and in a strange way the fact that Trump got so many uh Black and Hispanic voters uh on his side was a return to class or it's a it was a case where class was trumping identity politics um because you know what the the people that voted for him were um uh were basically workingclass blacks and workingclass Hispanics”
Public opinion on immigration centers on the impossible goal of no illegal immigration enforced with no state-sanctioned cruelty, meaning any actual enforcement creates backlash when people confront the moral reality of deportations, family separations, and removals of long-term community members.
“I have a kind of background theory of um uh uh public opinion on immigration which is that what people want is no illegal immigration uh enforced with no State sanctioned cruelty and the problem of course is that that is impossible and so when you have very LAX policies and high levels of illegal immigration people say clamp down we want to close the border the moment you start doing the things you actually need to do to clamp down they start to say well hang on a second I didn't want this kid to die I didn't want um those kids to be separated from the parents I didn't want this particular member of a community who's been with for 25 years and who seems like a very good and reasonable person uh to suddenly be taken out of a community and sent back”
Europe wasted the 2016 Trump election as a warning signal by treating it as an aberration and waiting for a Democrat to restore normal transatlanticism under Biden, rather than building strategic independence and capacity, leaving Europe vulnerable again in 2024 with worse geopolitical conditions.
“of course if 2016 was again you know slightly um uh uh churlishly put a gift to Europe Europe wasted it um it effectively I think uh waited um uh for the nightmare to pass uh thinking that this must turn out to be an aberration of History um uh that you know some decent Democrat would come back and uh reestablish friendly transatlantic relationsships and of course uh Joe Biden's victory in 2020 uh Biden perhaps will turn out to be the last genuine trans atlanticist to be president of the United States by formation and by Instinct um provided exactly that and so Europe went back asleep well now uh uh uh Europe is in the same dilemma it was in in 2016 except that the geopolitical situation has become a lot more scary”
A major historical class inversion is occurring in American politics comparable to the shift of African-American voters from the Republican to the Democratic party during the Civil Rights era, with Democrats becoming the party of the highly educated and Republicans attempting to build a multiracial working-class coalition, which may be recognized in retrospect as an obvious structural realignment.
“might we be living through a similar kind of substit ution on the class front um you know historically it was uh for to a lesser extent of a working class attended to vote for Democrats Democrats tended to be the party of those with lesser incomes with less high level of skill who wanted more redistribution um and now it's starting to look increasingly like the Democrats are the party of of of Highly Educated and Republicans are making these small stumbling efforts to actually build a multiracial working-class Coalition do you think in retrospect we will think of this as just a sort of obvious class inversion”
Elon Musk poses a unique threat because he holds something extremely valuable to the country (SpaceX, Starlink, and other capabilities), making it impossible to remove his security clearance despite documented secret conversations with Vladimir Putin, giving him unprecedented leverage over presidential decision-making.
“musk is a different kettle of fish because he holds some something extremely valuable not just to a president but to the country as a whole which is why you know among other things you couldn't take away his security clearance for having had all these secret conversations with Vladimir Putin uh you know he's just too valuable in what he does for other reasons uh and so I think that kind of makes him a a sort of unique threat”
Kamala Harris had an opportunity when her candidacy elevated to ask supporters not to organize by race and gender, demonstrating she would not govern through identity politics, without alienating anyone, as a clean break from Democratic coalition organizing practices.
“when her candidacy was uh very quickly uh uh you know elevated it became clear within 24 hours that uh she would in fact be the the Democratic party nominee uh without a real uh uh you know primary process and all of her supporter started organizing uh following the instincts and the practices in their uh political professional mure uh by race and gender um you know culminating in the C of white dudes for Cela which I sat through and it was a little bit more self-ironic and a little bit uh less grating than I imagined it to be but what a wonderful opportunity this would have been for Kam har to go and say I'm so excited so much support for me thank you everybody who organizing I really would rather that my followers do not organize themselves by race and gender let's have courts where everybody does this together”
Americans have pathological opposition to national ID cards rooted in exceptionalism, with both conservatives fearing government tracking and left-wing Americans distrusting government power to target their favored groups, making employment verification through ID nearly impossible to implement despite its international normality.
“the opposition to a national IDE card is actually pretty deep and it's an aspect of American exceptionalism uh a sort of pathological aspect of American uh exceptionalism uh you know I've heard conservatives say a national ID card will allow the government to keep track of me and uh attack my freedom of speech because I can identify you know if they I say something critical uh they're going to be able to go after me more easily I think that people on the left also believe that uh it's a way of you know keeping track of their you know their favorite groups by a government that they basically don't trust”
American institutions are more resilient than those of Hungary because of specific institutional rules like lifetime federal judiciary appointments that cannot be easily changed, decentralized electoral systems with 10,000 different bodies making electoral rules, large and independent business sectors, and independent media with subscriber bases that insulate from government financial pressure.
“it's much easier to capture power in a small country with unified political power than a large country with uh a deeply federally distributed political power it's much easier to do so in a relatively small economy in which most businesses and media Enterprises are reliant on government spending funding uh and so on when it is in in in a large wealthy country in which Enterprises are more independent in which media companies like the New York Times have millions of subscribers that um uh you know allow them to uh uh work somewhat independently of financial pressures put upon them by the uh uh federal government”
Nixon's unpredictability worked as a foreign policy tool because he had credibility that he would escalate military force, but Trump's unpredictability creates danger because he is averse to military escalation, meaning adversaries may test him believing he won't actually use force.
“I think that you know people have suggested that his unpredictability might actually be an asset the way uh Richard Nixon deliberately used unpredictability as a way of you know getting to a settlement in the Vietnam War I don't think it works that way with Trump because Nixon actually had the credibility that he was willing to escalate and he did escalate you know in the in the last few years before the collapse of South Vietnam you know bombing targets and so forth uh the risk of the the uncertainty about Trump is whether he will actually do anything uh and you could see people actually being tempted by a belief that he is so averse to using military force that you know they can actually get away with stuff”
Cultural and identity issues have become more important than economic redistribution in determining working-class votes, driven by prosperity making primary voter concerns less about healthcare and benefits and more about cultural identity and media consumption preferences, particularly around issues like migration.
“it's not just an economic issue I mean I think that your social class does determine a lot about how you uh vote but a lot of that is cultural uh you know it may be that we are at a point uh where we have a sufficiently prosperous society that the primary issue for a workingclass voter is not necessarily you know do I have healthc care do I have benefits and the like it it's it's really you know what kind of TV do I watch or what kind of you know uh cultural points of reference uh you know are are important to me”
Democrats believed young Black men and young Latino men would identify with their status as non-white victims rather than as the suspect category of being male, but many of those men felt the discourse and culture sent negative messages about them based on maleness and did not see themselves as natural parts of the Democratic coalition.
“one is that on on gender you know there is a real way in which um Democrats counted on you know young black men young Latino men identifying by their quote unquote victim status as non-white people um rather than as the kind of let's say suspect uh category of being male um uh that they would say you know I'm going to vote for the candidate who uh promises uh to stand up for this intersectional Coalition and I trust that I'm going to be on the right side of that Coalition by virtue of my skin color when probably a lot of those men felt that a lot of a discourse a lot of a culture is sending very negative messages about them on the basis of their maless”
Young women are more likely to have completed high school and college education than young men, are more likely to have skills adapted to currently in-demand jobs, and thus have more reason to be optimistic about future prospects, meaning they may have identified more strongly with the Democratic Party's professional managerial class coalition regardless of gender-specific appeals.
“if uh young women uh have much more reason to be optimistic because they're more likely to have completed a high school a college education uh they are more likely to have skills that adapted to the kind of jobs that are currently in demand um they may simply have seen themselves as part of the kind of you know they may have seen themselves more in in in in that part of a coalition so perhaps it's not you know the question is is a gender in itself or is gender a mediating variable here of a general kind of Outlook toward success”
Trump's threat to democracy resembles Viktor Orbán's model of steady, slow erosion of checks and balances rather than dramatic fascist action at scale, with the distinction that Trump will not implement concentration camps but will gradually expand executive power against individuals and organizations through administrative tools.
“I think it'll be like you know the the whole discussion about fascism I thought was a little bit misplaced because that conjures up you know pictures of concentration camps and and you know sort of action on a scale uh that I don't think we're going to ever see but in terms of replicating Victor orban's behavior in Hungary over the past you know 15 years I think that's extremely extremely uh predictable uh actually and I think that's what the Trump Administration is going to look like this kind of steady slow erosion of one check and balance against you know executive power after another”
Trump's unpredictability in foreign policy creates tail-risk scenarios where 90% of the time his decisions turn out reasonably well but 10% of the time they go catastrophically wrong, with the uncertainty itself becoming the primary risk.
“I have to say that I'm a little bit concerned that uh Democrats will uh basically rerun the script of 2016 to 2020 um that they will uh bring out the hashtag resistance again um that they will uh you know cast not just Donald Trump as a dangerous politician uh but uh all of his supporters as uh terrible people um uh that they uh will fail to introspect about the reasons uh why they have uh not been able to build much broader electoral uh Coalition um all of that might suffice for a few years for the reasons you outlined earlier Trump might very well overstep and perhaps uh uh that's enough for Democrats to you know win back the house in uh uh 2020 uh six perhaps even to win back the senate for that might be a harder uh uh uh uh win um it's not clear to me that it is at all enough to uh put a lasting end to the Trump era which has dawned”
Democrats should rebuild coalition by breaking with identity politics, tightening border control enforcement, and building actual infrastructure and solving policy problems, as opposed to hoping Trump overreaches and then winning back power through opposition.
“one other thing I think that could be done is this area that I've been focusing on a lot in the last few years which is building things uh because you know one of the things that the left in the United States is famous for is believing that you get legitimacy by adding procedures and regulations uh that get in the way of actually accomplishing anything you know it takes us almost 10 years to get the permitting done for transmission lines to get electricity alternative electricity from Texas and Oklahoma to California uh and if you want to solve the house housing crisis especially here in California you just got to cut through all of the ridiculous uh r tape that exists before you can do anything the way Josh Shapiro did in uh Pennsylvania when he rebuilt you know I95 after it had had that big accident uh a year or so ago uh and you know if a Democrat stood up and said we have way too many environmental regulations we really need in the interest of environment you know we need to cut through all this nonsense and really get things done and go back to building things uh again I think that would also be a very positive message”
Trump's 2024 victory represents a sustained Trump era in American politics rather than a brief historical footnote, with his control of the Republican Party and likely succession planning giving him durable political power for years.
“I think until the day of the election it was still possible to hope that Trump would enter the history books as a kind of strange footnote um uh you know there was this uh strange operation of an election in 2016 in which sort of these various things went wrong suddenly you had this figure that really cleaved the political system for 10 years um but you know he lost the midterms in 2018 he lost his bit for re-election 2020 um the Republican Party didn't do very well in 2022 and then lo and behold uh he managed to win the Republican Prime again in 2024 but dudy was punished by the voters and that was the end of it um uh instead um I think uh he has earned a much more lasting place in history books always difficult to make was predictions but it certainly feels like that uh today uh and he is going going to dominate not just a brief moment but a political era”
Trump's second presidency will involve a change in the tone and cultural message of American society beyond specific policies, though the positive ideas guiding this change are unclear beyond resentment at educated elites.
“I think that there's going to be a change in the tone of a lot of American society uh that will go deeper than just whatever policies uh Trump tries to enact but this time around I I'm not quite sure what the leading ideas that guide this are you know other than kind of resentment at you know the educated Elites and and this sort of thing but that doesn't really Define a positive set of ideas towards which we are uh moving”
The MAGA Republican economic agenda has dovetailed with the agenda of the left in terms of controlling corporate America, reducing corporate power to outsource jobs, and protecting workers from exploitation, representing a convergence of populist left and right on economic issues.
“it's interesting how uh a lot of the Maga Republican economic agenda has actually kind of dovetailed now with the agenda on the left in terms of wanting to control Corporate America and uh you know reduce the power of American corporations to Outsource jobs and to you know exploit workers and and that sort of thing”
Both Democrats and Republicans are far outside the American cultural mainstream, and Trump runs the risk of overreaching in ways that cost him electorally, just as Democrats have been punished for overreaching, particularly on immigration and cultural issues where American opinion is more nuanced than partisan positions.
“I think my fundamental model of Aman politics at the moment and this election hasn't really changed that is that both Democrats and Republicans are way out of the American cultural mainstream they're both way off from where most voters are and that means that uh Democrats are in danger of overreaching in ways that they get punished for but so is Donald Trump and so are Republicans and now that uh Trump is coming in with a lot of power and a big mandate um he is going to run the risk in purely electoral terms are falling into that trap”
Democrats risk repeating the 2016-2020 'resistance' script by opposing Trump, branding supporters as terrible people, and failing to introspect about their own electoral coalition failures, which may win 2026 midterms or even 2024 Senate seats but is insufficient to end the Trump era.
“I have to say that I'm a little bit concerned that uh Democrats will uh basically rerun the script of 2016 to 2020 um that they will uh bring out the hashtag resistance again um that they will uh you know cast not just Donald Trump as a dangerous politician uh but uh all of his supporters as uh terrible people um uh that they uh will fail to introspect about the reasons uh why they have uh not been able to build much broader electoral uh Coalition um all of that might suffice for a few years for the reasons you outlined earlier Trump might very well overstep and perhaps uh uh that's enough for Democrats to you know win back the house in uh uh 2020 uh six perhaps even to win back the senate for that might be a harder uh uh uh uh win um it's not clear to me that it is at all enough to uh put a lasting end to the Trump era”
Internal American polarization and uncertainty about whether the U.S. would actually use military capabilities has weakened American deterrent power, with Trump's role at the core of this uncertainty by making credible commitment impossible.
“I thought for some time that the single thing that has weakened us uh militarily is uh is actually our internal polarization and this uncertainty whether we would actually be willing to use the capabilities we you know we ly possess and you know Trump has been at the core of that uncertainty U so I don't think that unpredictability is going to be a useful asset that will scare people it may actually be a liability that will tempt uh foreign you know powers to try to test Us in ways that you know perhaps didn't exist with previous presidents”
The two issues that drove people away from the Democratic Party were the border and identity politics, particularly gender identity and transgender issues, where Democrats could take a clear 'sister soldier' moment by rejecting gender transitions for adolescents without parental oversight.
“part of it you know is what KLA Harris should have done during her brief campaign uh and it actually should have started under Biden you know the two big issues uh really that drove people away from the Democratic party were the border and identity politics and um especially with the identity politics that's something that didn't cost any money you know you had the sister Soldier moment where you say definitely that I'm not in favor of you know uh gender transitions you know just at the say so of a 12-year-old you know adolescent uh and make the case about why that's wrong and dangerous and then actually uh admit that it was a big mistake for Biden not to have tightened uh control over the board”
The federal judiciary was the strongest institution in Trump's first term due to lifetime appointments making it difficult to change, with judges largely resisting election denialism in 2020, whereas authoritarian regimes can replace entire courts through retirement mechanisms within a year.
“I think that the strongest institution was actually the Judiciary uh in Trump's first term and the reason for that is that we have lifetime appointments of judges and you know it's very difficult to change the federal Judiciary he did it in some cases you know with retirements and deaths and so forth but that's something that you can't do whereas I think in um I forget exactly which populist authoritarian countries you basically could retire the entire court you know within a year they did that in El Salvador for example I mean they just got rid of all of the judges you know in one fell who Buel did”
Hollywood culture is completely dominated by images of strong women, including literal physical strength (e.g., female action heroes defeating multiple male opponents), while it is rare to see working-class white men portrayed as heroes in contemporary media, creating a cultural dynamic that undermines male identity and security.
“this cultural change has taken place that then uh you know would make a lot of men very insecure that that women are always being celebrated uh in you know in in the culture uh and not them uh so you know what's the last uh you know movie you saw where there was a kind of workingclass white guy as the you know as the hero”
Trump may respond to negative inflation and unemployment data by firing the head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to prevent government reporting of economic deterioration rather than addressing the underlying policy failures.
“he's very attuned to not doing things that make him look bad and so that means he's either going to have to you know drop that uh uh that particular issue or you know what what I would uh can imagine seeing is that he'll fire the head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics because you don't want the government reporting on the way that inflation uh and unemployment have gone up”
Silicon Valley oligarchs who understand how economies work stomach Trump's extreme economic proposals because they either don't take him seriously or believe that radical policy experimentation followed by disaster will eventually wake people up to the failures of such approaches.
“what I don't get is like these Silicon Valley oligarchs that kind of understand the way economies work you know how they can stomach a guy that is promising you know that kind of economic U uh strategy and I think it's they first of all I I suspect they don't take it seriously they don't think that Trump is actually going to carry through uh on any of this stuff but maybe you have to actually go through a learning process where you try some of these radical ideas and they really lead to disaster”
Trump's proposed immigration enforcement policy—rounding up 11 million undocumented people, placing them in camps, and sending them to other countries like Rwanda—is far more extreme than reasonable border enforcement and lacks any administrative capacity or moral legitimacy, with such enforcement easily causing public backlash when voters confront the reality of arresting long-term residents and separating American-born children from parents.
“the policy that Trump has been laying out in this election cycle is so much more extreme than what you just described I mean better border enforcement is something that I and many other Trump critics you know would be very happy with uh uh but you know he's talking about rounding up 11 million people putting them in camps taking them out of their neighborhoods and then sending them I don't know to Rwanda I mean that's what you know that's what the British conservatives wanted to do but I mean what it it's it's so far beyond any kind of reasonable expectation administratively we simply don't have the capacity to do anything remotely on that scale morally the idea that you'd go into a neighborhood and basically arrest people that had been in the country for 15 20 years whose children were All American citizens and put them in a camp somewhere”
Adam Smith is a serious political theory writer who gained intellectual legitimacy after Reagan's election through the association of his work with market economics, despite being equally serious before Reagan's era when he was dismissed by academics.
“I remember when I was a student uh Adam Smith was not considered a serious writer and very few you know political Theory people actually tried to study Adam Smith and read his books seriously after Reagan was elected all the academics actually you know got on board with that and they I mean Smith is a very serious writer but it gave a legitimacy to you know a to market economics that really had not existed”
Reagan's election changed American cultural tone such that business school attendance became respectable after the 1970s when it was socially stigmatized as greedy, demonstrating how electoral realignments reshape cultural values.
“when I was in college in the early ' 7s if you said I want to go to business school you know most of my friends would look down on that person and say you know you're just greedy and so forth and then after his election it was okay to go to business school and in fact you know people went to business school and drov”
RFK Jr.'s appointment to lead health policy is scary because of his anti-vaccine and heterodox medical views, though Trump may ultimately abandon him as politically expendable rather than actually giving him substantial authority.
“I'm particularly intrigued to see um uh uh whether Donald Trump has any genuine regard for RFK Jr or whether RFK Jr is the useful idiot uh who served him to uh make inroads among independent voters and build a slightly broader electoral Coalition and now that be electoral Victory is in Trump says you're never going to go and uh run um uh Health in the United States uh uh what are you on about um uh I hope in this particular case that Trump uh proves to be his usually unsentimental and ruthless self because the idea of uh AFK Jr being uh in charge of a very important health authority is uh uh Prett scary to me”
Trump was elected in 2024 as the 47th president, becoming only the second president since Grover Cleveland to serve two non-consecutive terms, and is the first Republican to win the popular vote in 20 years.
“Donald Trump has been elected the 47th president of the United States he's the second president since uh Glo Cleveland um to uh uh be elected two non-consecutive terms and uh uh uh take double real estate in the strange numbering of American presidents he's the first Republican presidential candidate to win the popular vote um in 20 years”