
David Brady on the Electorate and the Elections of 2010 and 2012 08/15/2011
What this covers
David Brady of Stanford joins Russ Roberts to discuss the 2010 and 2012 elections as a window into how modern American politics actually works. Rather than treating these contests as ideological realignments, Brady argues they were responses by a growing independent electorate to specific policy choices. The core puzzle he addresses: why do elected officials so often vote against their constituents' preferences, and why does the electorate reward and punish them in ways that standard political forecasting models fail to capture? The conversation draws on survey research, historical comparison, and structural analysis of how candidates, primaries, donors, and voters interact.
Brady traces the divergence between campaign incentives and constituent preferences to two overlapping features of the American system. First, the rise of the personal vote—the ability of individual candidates to build name recognition and fundraising independent of party label, enabled by scientific polling and television advertising in geographically compact media markets. Second, and more centrally, the two-election structure: a primary election dominated by activist donors and interest groups, followed by a general election where independent voters decide outcomes, yet those independents take no part in selecting candidates. This creates what Brady calls the April electorate versus the November electorate—primary activists pulling candidates toward ideological extremes while the centrist, swing-voting independents who actually decide elections remain unrepresented. He applies this framework specifically to Democratic losses in 2010, arguing they stemmed not from a rightward shift in the country but from moderate Democrats voting for health care and cap-and-trade against districts that opposed them. The discussion also covers the 2008 primary structure, the viability of third parties under first-past-the-post rules, and how both parties systematically misinterpret electoral mandates, leading to overreach.
Brady argues that recent US elections (2008, 2010) were not ideological realignments but reactions by a growing independent electorate, and that the structural feature of intra-party primary competition pulls candidates to the extremes even as the decisive voters demand centrist, functional governance.
- Democrats' 2010 losses were driven by moderate-district members voting for health care and cap-and-trade against their constituents, not a leftward shift in the country
- The US uniquely runs two elections (primary + general) so an 'April electorate' of activists pulls members to extremes while the 'November electorate' of independents goes unrepresented
- Independents, not partisans, have decided every major recent electoral swing and they want government to 'work' rather than any ideological outcome
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Modern realignments no longer occur because members of Congress learned to cultivate a 'personal vote' independent of party (a phenomenon that did not exist before the mid-1960s): pre-1964 a 6% swing to a party brought it the presidency and House together, but post-1964 huge presidential victories (Nixon 1972, Reagan 1980/1984) produced no comparable congressional coattails because members run as individuals.
“prior to 64 a six percent swing to one party brings that party the president the house on the seven post 64 it doesn't do anything like that”
The personal vote arose from two exogenous innovations: scientific polling (emerging in the 1940s, reliable by 1956) which told members their district's true leanings independent of presidential coattails, and television advertising which let candidates portray themselves vividly and independently of party label—and research shows the personal vote is higher in geographically compact districts where TV coverage is efficient (e.g., Peoria covering 96% of a district vs. New York covering 14 districts).
“one of them is polling... by 1956 my view was there's no democratic congressman... who did not know that Dwight Eisenhower was gonna kick a by Stephenson's Fanny”
The Hotelling median-voter model predicts candidates converge to the center, but US politics defies this because the United States uniquely has 'democracy within the party'—candidates must win a primary, build their own team, money and constituency, creating a primary constituency that pulls them to the extremes regardless of November popularity.
“the United States is the only country that has democracy within the party”
An ideological 'sorting' occurred since the 1960s: previously there were liberal Republicans (e.g., Rockefeller) and conservative Democrats (e.g., Scoop Jackson, Southern Democrats), but now liberals are all in the Democratic camp and conservatives all in the Republican camp, making politics somewhat more partisan—though less than the press claims.
“now all the liberals are in the Democratic camp and all the conservatives are in the Republican camp and that makes things a little more partisan and... not as partisan as people actually the press claims”
A viable centrist third party is extremely unlikely because the US first-past-the-post system makes 20% in a district worthless, building a grassroots party from the House level up requires generating and funding candidates against two entrenched parties, and it is far easier to take over an existing party (as the Tea Party did with Republicans) than to start a new one—even though popular third-party presidential candidates (Perot, Wallace, Anderson, Teddy Roosevelt) are relatively easy to run.
“building a party where you start at the grassroots level House level dah dah dah dah you that is much harder to do”
Independents—now a steadily rising plurality of the electorate—are the decisive voters who determined every major recent swing (Clinton 1992, GOP House 1994, Clinton 1996, Bush 2000/2004, Obama 2008, GOP 2010); they want government to 'work' rather than any particular ideological outcome, they split tickets, and they do not vote in primaries, so their centrist preferences go unrepresented in candidate selection.
“what they want is for the government to work they don't... they want things to work and they were responsible for Clinton's victory in 92... and the major congressional shift has been determined by which way the independence move”
Single-interest-group scoring of legislators proliferated beginning in the 1970s (ADA dated to 1946, then League of Conservation Voters, National Taxpayers Union, etc.) and simultaneously Congress opened up its processes—eliminating quiet unrecorded votes—so members can no longer hide moderate positions, which pushes them toward the extremes.
“beginning in the 70s all of a sudden the League of Conservation Voters National Taxpayers Union all these vents at the month same time the Congress opened up the process they decided on open boats”
Because Democratic primaries allocate delegates proportionally while Republicans historically used winner-take-all, the 2008 Democratic race stayed unresolved—on Super Tuesday Clinton won ~600-800k more votes than Obama yet they ended dead even in delegates, while Obama gained in caucus states he organized better—whereas Republicans more easily produced a winner.
“Hillary Curran ended up with I think six eight hundred thousand more votes than Barack Obama but in terms of electoral college ballots they were dead even the reason is it's proportional”
The 2008 election was not a watershed realignment; genuine realignments (the last clear one being 1932) are rare and occur only when a majority of Americans switch party affiliation on the central issue of the day and the new majority party governs durably—after 1932 Democrats held Congress and presidency for 14 years and defined themselves as the party of 'more' versus Republican 'less.'
“what happened in 32 is the run that's a CTE run a majority of Americans switched their party affiliation from Republican to Democrat”
The best economic-and-political-science forecasting models of presidential elections (Fair's economic model plus Hibbs's 'guns and butter' model adding US troops abroad) work well back to 1888 except for 1968 and 1972 (distorted by Korea/Vietnam), and currently project Obama at only ~46.6% of the vote—yet Brady doubts this because the economy may not have deteriorated enough, combined with the maxim 'you can't beat somebody with nobody.'
“the combination of the Ray Fair was an economist at Yale model and Doug Hibbs political scientist who added the bottle guns and butter... that model says at this point Barack Obama could expect forty six point six percent of the vote”
The debt ceiling fight is more painful in the US than a parliamentary system because divided government plus 24/7 media coverage exposes every negotiating movement in the open, whereas in Japan or Britain the same disputes would be resolved internally within one governing party.
“imagine if you are in a parliamentary system you'd have be having the same disputes... but it'd be worked out within one party... in the United States because you got a divided government because of the nature of our system it's all in the open”
The 1990 budget deal is the precedent for the current standoff: George H.W. Bush broke his 'read my lips' pledge and agreed to tax increases, a coalition of Gingrich Republicans (against taxes) and Dellums Democrats (against cuts) tried to defeat the inside-out compromise, the Senate's higher-tax version prevailed, and Bush became a one-term president—a cautionary template politicians remember.
“in 1991 George Herbert Walker Bush had made the promise of read my lips no new taxes but then in 1990 he agreed to tax increases... Newt Gingrich didn't like the tax increases so he led the Republicans in the house against it this is Ron Dellums and the Democrats who didn't like... the cuts”
There is an 'April electorate' of primary activists distinct from a 'November electorate' of general-election voters; the April electorate is unrepresentative and dominates the feedback loop, so the more centrist November electorate goes unrepresented in candidates' incentives.
“there's an April electorate and there's a November electorate and the November electorate is what's not getting represented”
Schumpeter argued that after an election there should be a period during which no one can lobby Congress, because interest groups distort the information flow—a concern that was less of a problem in the US historically but has become a real problem now.
“Joseph Schumpeter... has this great argument about democracy that his view is you should have an election and then for the next four years no one can talk to Congress because they should just go back to the electorate because his view is the interest groups will distort the sort of information”
The dominant feedback loop in modern politics comes from donors and idea-providers—the Tea Party on the right and figures like Soros on the left—which is noisy, biased and non-representative, pulling each party further toward the extremes than median-voter logic would predict.
“the strongest feedback comes from the people who provide the juice ie the donors and the ideas so if you actually asked where the juice came from in the 2010 election it came from the Tea Party”
Political over-reaching persists because Congress lacks the strong feedback loops and residual claimant of private enterprise: 435 representatives, 100 senators, donors and infrastructure don't coordinate well, so individuals have incentives to overreach even though the group as a whole would not benefit, combining human hubris with weak corrective mechanisms.
“it's 435 representatives a hundred senator as a president a bunch of infrastructure and powerful people donors they don't coordinate very well there are no the usual feedback loops are not as strong as they might be”
The 2010 election was likewise not a mandate for Republicans or the Tea Party but a message to Democrats to slow down on spending and health care; Republicans have in turn misinterpreted it as an ideological band-aid, repeating the recurring pattern where winners over-interpret elections and overreach (Clinton in 1992, Republicans in 1994, Bush in 2004, Obama in 2008).
“I think the 2010 election wasn't a mandate for Republicans or the Tea Party it said it said to the Democrats and the president enough of that we don't want any more spending”
Republicans changed their 2012 rules so that states holding primaries in March allocate delegates proportionally (only April-and-later contests remain winner-take-all), which could prolong the nomination fight by preventing decisive early wins and forcing candidates to take each other on longer.
“if you move your primary into March its proportional... that would change the campaign... it wouldn't be decisive so it could extend the”
The US presidential nominating process front-loads four small 'retail' contests (Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, South Carolina) that require personal candidate contact and serve to winnow the field to two contenders; their function is winnowing, not delegate accumulation, because they are too small to be decisive.
“the first four primaries are retail that is candidates have to go out and actually meet you know every voter... the first floor is you get down to the... you get down to two”
South Carolina is the decisive early primary—whoever wins it has won the Republican nomination for some time (e.g., Bush in 2000 after losing New Hampshire)—because it is a Republican-only, combined economic-and-social-conservative state, while Iowa favors social conservatives (Bachmann/Pawlenty), New Hampshire favors Romney as an open-primary state, and Nevada is a Tea Party stronghold.
“for some time now whoever won the South Carolina primary won the Republican nomination”
Experiments show that 10 to 15 percent of voters say they will not vote for a Mormon president, making religion a real (non-disappearing) electoral liability for Romney.
“when we run our experiments we show 10 to 15 percent of people who say they won't vote for a Mormon president that's an issue say I'm not going away”
In California 74% of Republican Party identifiers are pro-choice, yet few California Republicans in Congress are pro-choice, because voting pro-choice would generate a pro-life primary opponent—illustrating how primary-constituency pressure overrides the median party member's preferences.
“in California seventy-four percent of Republican Party identifiers are pro-choice why are so few California Republicans in Congress pro-choice and the answer is because they know that if they vote pro-choice... they will Jen up a pro-life opponent in the primary”
A systematic analysis (with Fiorina and Rivers) estimates that pushing health care and cap-and-trade cost Democrats roughly 23 to 25 seats—precisely the gap between the model predictions and the actual outcome—because in moderate districts (45-50% Obama) a YES vote on health care yielded about 41% of the vote while a NO vote yielded about 50%.
“our best bet is that it's about 23 to 25 seats which is the difference between the model”
The 2008 election was not a leftward shift of the country but a rejection of the Bush presidency; independents disliked Bush, the war, and the economy and swung Democratic without becoming liberal, which is why Democrats misread it as a mandate and overreached.
“I read the 2008 election as not that the country shifted to the left simply that the country had not liked the Bush presidency”
Academic models of the 2010 midterm elections systematically underestimated Democratic losses because they assumed members of Congress acted rationally—voting in line with constituents to maximize reelection—but many Democrats instead voted for health care and cap-and-trade against the preferences of their moderate districts.
“those models failed because they essentially build into them dot congressmen and congresswomen acted rationally that is that the members voted in line with what their constituents wanted and with the idea that they wanted to be reelected”
Many of the 'cuts' in the 2011 negotiations are not real cuts but reductions from a baseline that assumes growth and spending increases that won't happen, and they ignore Medicare issues—so the headline cut figures are illusory.
“some aren't cuts as Keith pointed out... some of our cuts from a baseline that includes assumes a lot of stuff that isn't gonna happen really this is not really a cut”
Within a month of taking office Obama's Republican approval dropped from roughly even to traditional opposition numbers, and as he focused on health care and the environment around six-seven months in, the public—especially independents—began perceiving him as more liberal than moderate and more partisan than non-partisan, causing independents to swing away.
“about six seven months into Obama presidency as they began to focus on the health care issue... the public began to perceive the president as a more liberal than moderate and be more partisan than non partisan”
Pete Wilson's reelection as California governor with a 33% approval rating, winning by ~10% over the perfectly capable Kathleen Brown, demonstrates the 'you can't beat somebody with nobody' maxim—a weak or poorly-campaigning opponent can lose even to an unpopular incumbent.
“Pete Wilson... his run for reelection he had a 33 percent approval rating looks like a lost cause and he won by approximately ten percent over Kathleen Brown who... did not run a good campaign”
Switching votes mattered measurably: of the seven members who voted YES on the first health care bill then NO on the second, six were reelected; of the six who voted NO first then YES on the second, five lost—and of the large 2006-2008 Democratic class, about 80% voted for health care and roughly 87% lost in 2010.
“so of the seven people who voted YES on the first health care and then switch to no six of those got reelected of the six who switched and went the other way no on the first yes on the second in the house five of those lost”
The probability of a serious primary challenge to Obama in 2012 has risen from essentially zero (in August 2010) to a non-trivial level (~0.3 and rising) because the recovery has stalled and unemployment is stubbornly high; the more likely Obama is to draw a reputable Democratic opponent, the more likely he is to be beaten—analogous to George H.W. Bush's vulnerability becoming evident when Pat Buchanan challenged him in 1992.
“now it's non-trivial I mean it's like 0.3 it's growing not it's not going down”
No strong Republican challenger has emerged who can attack Obama on his most vulnerable point (spending and the economy): Romney has health-care baggage and no economic-success story to sell, Bachmann is too inexperienced and extreme for independents, Daniels and Christie declined (Christie reportedly believing he doesn't know enough to be president), leaving the GOP without a 'knight in shining armor.'
“it's surprising to me that no Republican candidate has stepped forward who can hit the president where he's most vulnerable which is on spending in the economy”
A deal on the 2011 debt ceiling will be reached because the consequences of default—falling stock markets, banks warning of severe effects, and a downgrade from the AAA rating that would make future budgets harder—are unacceptable to leadership, who would bear serious blame, and both sides believe they have a 2012 advantage but neither is prepared for the fallout of actual default.
“my view is there will be a car they're not going to let it go there it'll bankrupt the stock markets fall in five straight days the big banks everybody is saying if you don't do this there's such consequence”
Obama's only viable 2012 strategy is to run against the Republicans as extremists (Bachmann's positions, Romney's flip-flopping, the Ryan plan on Social Security) rather than on a positive economic turnaround, because the economy has not improved and the inherited-from-Bush argument is a bad sell.
“they can't run on are the positives that the economy is turned around so they're gonna have to run against Republicans yeah that's their only strategy”
The elimination in 1995 of the practice of writing off Social Security trust-fund debt to raise the debt cap removed an accounting maneuver that previously made debt-ceiling increases easier, so the numbers now confront members more directly.
“in 1995 they eliminated that prospect... that makes it a lot harder it makes it in some sense real numbers or real members by Washington”
John Boehner's debt-ceiling proposal is a political compromise that pairs 1.2 trillion in cuts with a six-month committee to find ~1.8 trillion more, plus a second vote that lets members vote 'no' on increased expenditures while the President can still raise the ceiling—differing from the Reid plan mainly in details (the Reid plan also has no new taxes but counts war savings).
“there's 1.2 trillion in cuts but there's a promise within six months they'll put a committee together to make 1.8 trillion or so more in cuts but... at the end of six months there'll be another boat”
We're living in fascinating political times, taping four days before the debt ceiling deadline.
“we're living in fascinating political times”