
Conclusion: Political, Social and Cultural Criticism and Theory
What this covers
This is the closing lecture in Michael Sugrue's survey of modern political, social and cultural criticism, and it works as a synthesis of the whole course. The lecturer starts from Friedrich Nietzsche and reads "God is dead" as the collapse of the entire metaphysical tradition running from Plato through René Descartes, not only the end of Christian theology. From there he follows two lines. In the first, ethics becomes aesthetics, and Nietzsche's heroism is judged by how something is done rather than what is done. In the second, the Freudian splitting of the self undermines the Cartesian cogito. The consequence the lecturer draws is a politics of will to power in place of rational discourse.
The middle of the lecture surveys how critics have treated technology and science. The Frankfurt School saw machines manipulating opinion and producing one-dimensional people. Habermas answers that technology can extend communicative rationality, with video cameras documenting police abuse as his example. Michel Foucault treats the penitentiary as a Trojan horse for elite coercion. Lyotard's argument about performativity is that wealth can effectively "buy truth" through research funding. The lecturer rejects it as taken "dangerously far," asking whether AIDS research should be funded by clinical trials or by Ouija boards. Roland Barthes appears as the figure who demythologizes until he demythologizes demythologizing itself, and who suggests making a home in the labyrinth of knowledge.
The most contentious turn applies Alvin Gouldner's idea of an intellectual class to postmodernism. On this view humanistic intellectuals, shut out of the funding that goes to technological ones, delegitimize rival authorities and then claim special sensitivity to what the differend excludes. The lecturer also notes that figures such as Desmond Tutu, Mother Teresa, Gorbachev and Lee Kuan Yew act from motives that are not postmodern, and he sets Gadamer's hermeneutics aside as a partial exception. He ends with biospheric limits that may make global economic equality materially impossible.
Post-WWII Western intellectual tradition, dominated by Nietzsche and Freud's legacy, has fractured moral and political discourse into aesthetic relativism and will-to-power competition; contemporary postmodernism represents a power grab by marginalized humanistic intellectuals using delegitimization of science and technology as ideological cover for state capture.
- Nietzsche's 'God is dead' collapses metaphysical grounding for universal ethics, reducing morality to aesthetics and arbitrary taste
- Freud's splitting of the subject and suspicious epistemology make transparent self-knowledge and communication impossible, fragmenting the self and knowledge itself
- Postmodernism functions as will-to-power by intellectuals excluded from technological/military funding, using critique of technology and science to delegitimize competing elites and justify state control
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Nietzsche's declaration that 'God is dead' means not merely the end of theology and Christianity, but the collapse of the entire metaphysical tradition from Plato through Descartes, eliminating any imaginary transcendent realm where religious entities or Platonic forms could exist.
“God is dead means more than the end of theology, more than the end of Christianity, more than the end of the inherited religious traditions of the West. It also means that metaphysics is over. The entire Platonic tradition, the entire metaphysical tradition that moves from Plato through scholasticism and into Descartes and the kind of modern rationalists...what he's saying is that God is dead means that there's no imaginary space, no imaginary realm where we can keep either religious entities like angels or God or things like the Platonic realm of the forms or Descartes's clear and distinct ideas.”
Foucault argues that technological advances like the penitentiary were not humanitarian reforms but Trojan horses disguising state coercion, because the bourgeoisie benefits from maintaining living labor forces that can be disciplined into passivity and obedience rather than killed off, making technology inevitably a tool for elite will-to-power.
“Foucault thinks that the increase in the power of science has been a Trojan horse for disguised state coercion. If you think, for example, of technological advances like the penitentiary, right? Previous to that, we didn't have the means for locking people up, so it was necessary to kill most of them, even for trivial crimes. Some people would describe the construction of the penitentiary as being a humane change, a kind of enlightened reform which decreases the total amount of human misery. In fact, Foucault would say that's not the case. It's a stalking horse for the separate political interests of the of the political and social elite which generated the penitentiary system, the bourgeoisie. And it is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie to keep a living labor force which can be in- which can be forced into docility and passivity and obedience.”
Habermas moderates Frankfurt School critiques by arguing that technology is potentially liberating if used to extend communicative rationality to enlarged speech communities, as when video cameras—tools of mass-produced technology—enabled citizens to document police abuse rather than serve state surveillance.
“Jürgen Habermas, who's one of the main extensions of the Frankfurt School, certainly the most important living exponent of that approach to the world, I think has moderated these claims into a much more reasonable and persuasive sort of a stance. Habermas points out that technology is potentially liberating if it is used in such a way as to extend the domain of communicative rationality to an enlarged speech community...The advent of something like the video camera, instead of having the government install them in all of our bedrooms so that Big Brother can watch us, the video camera has been an enormously liberating tool in the hands of individuals. You can actually go out and tape the Rodney King beating, and for the first time, you can convict police officers”
Nietzsche advocates a return to heroic commitment and action outside rational argument because he believes modern civilization has become passive, tame, and insipid; the aesthetic standard is how something is done, not what is done, so praiseworthy and unpraiseworthy heroism are equally valuable if aesthetically powerful.
“he thinks that we've become passive and tame and insipid and we can finally improve our lot when we begin to do things on a heroic scale again, back past the age of Plato, back to the age of Homer almost. Nietzsche calls for a Homeric commitment, the possibility of doing something heroic. Sometimes you get heroism we might find praiseworthy, sometimes we get unpraiseworthy heroism, but at least it's heroic. It doesn't matter so much what they do as how they do it.”
Alvin Gouldner argues that intellectuals form a separate class with distinct class interests, similar to the bourgeoisie; intellectuals own 'conceptual means of production' and compete with the wealthy elite for state control, making intellectual ideology a vehicle for class power rather than objective truth.
“Alvin Gouldner is the one he's our renegade Marxist...Alvin Gouldner makes the strikingly important argument that like the bourgeoisie, the intellectual class has certain class interests which distort its its speech and its thought and its ideology. And that intellectuals pursue their own separate narrow class interest at the expense of the public good just as much as the high bourgeoisie does. Alvin Gouldner says that there are only two in the modern or postmodern advanced capitalist world, there are only two possible ruling elites...The elite of wealth that owns capital, Marx has already talked about that quite a bit. Gouldner wants to add the idea of another elite that owns a different kind of capital, the intellectual elite that own the conceptual means of production.”
The pessimistic reading of cybernetic technology is 'much more typical of postmodern thinkers' who fear 'the tail is beginning to wag the dog'—that technology constrains human options and choices while eroding privacy and making social control more effective through information accumulation.
“The pessimistic reading of technology and in particular the technology of cybernetic information transfer is much more typical of postmodern thinkers. Since the end of the Second World War, we have become increasingly anxious about the status of technology in our society because we feel perhaps that the tail is beginning to wag the dog... We feel constrained. We feel as though our options and our choices are being increasingly limited as our privacy is eroded, as more people can know more about us with greater ease, as the mechanisms of social control become progressively more effective or performative if they have more information.”
Speaker rejects Lyotard's critique as taken 'too far' and 'dangerously far': funding AIDS research via clinical trials rather than Ouija boards is not ideological bias but necessary selection based on actual efficacy; abandoning performativity would mean people die from preventable disease.
“The difficulty is is that how will we get out from under this? Will we fund astrology and say the usual medical methods of inquiring into how to cure AIDS? Will we get say a we someone that wants to you do Ouija board research on AIDS? Will we fund that as well? Or are we forced into a situation not just because of our bias towards performativity, but by the nature of the external world itself that it would be irresponsible to fund an infinitude of differends who all want to look into the same practical problem from different perspectives...People will die if we fund Ouija board AIDS research. If we spend half our money on astrology and half our money on clinical trials, we will kill a lot of people with that sort of rejection of performativity. And I think that the idea of performativity and the critique of science has gone too far there, dangerously far, irresponsibly far.”
If biospheric limits on fossil fuels, ozone, and resource extraction prevent third-world development to first-world standards, then the modern political commitment to economic equality and equal wealth distribution becomes materially impossible, forcing a choice between abandoning equality or accepting massive first-world wealth reduction.
“Suppose for example, it's not possible to to develop the third world into something analogous to say Southern California. Suppose the simple limitations on the biosphere, on the atmosphere, and on the oceans won't allow for it...Does that mean we have to abandon the idea of equality, particularly in so far as it's connected with the equal distribution of wealth?...Well, suppose simple brute material reality prevents us from ever realizing that on a global scale. Does that mean that the redistribution of wealth, if that were to be a limitation intrinsically, does that mean then that we have to reevaluate all our values? Or does it mean that the first world is going to vote to redistribute its wealth and cut back its income 50, 75%?”
The collapse of moral universality caused by aestheticized ethics generates centrifugal social forces that separate people and undermine social cohesion, transforming politics from rational discourse into contests of will-to-power where political projects are pursued because they gratify individual or group power drives.
“what that means then is our entire tradition of moral discourse has come to an end because all our moralities presuppose some set of beliefs about the world and all of those are contingent, all of those are dubious, and all of those are arbitrary...This causes a collapse of our conception of moral universality and it tends to generate anomie, to separate people, and to contribute to those centrifugal forces in society. Corresponding to this collapse of moral universality is a collapse of the universality of political discourse. Politics is transformed into an exclusive domain of the will to power.”
The advent of cybernetic and information technology since WWII has created new political and moral problems unaddressed by traditional theory, such as environmental responsibility and the contradiction between global technological capacity and planetary biospheric limits.
“there's a new set of problems that this generation of thinker has been forced to confront, which has had very great significance for political and moral theory, particularly political theory. And that's the advent of the machine. Of course, the machine age has been around for several centuries now, but here what I'm talking about is the cybernetic calculating machine, the mechanisms of information storage and retrieval.”
The Frankfurt School (Marcuse, Adorno, Horkheimer) extended the critique of technology to show how machines ideologically manipulate public opinion through mass communication, reducing people to one-dimensionality where machines control humans rather than humans controlling machines.
“The Frankfurt School, think of Marcuse or Adorno or Horkheimer or any of those social critics extended the criticism of technology to its ideological manipulation of public opinion through the media of mass communications. So, when Marcuse writes One-Dimensional Man, what he is saying to the world is that you people have been made one-dimensional by the fact that machines run you, you do not run machines. The tail has started wagging the dog”
Post-structuralism (Barthes) practices reflexive demythologizing: it demythologizes everything until it demythologizes demythologizing itself, leaving only 'meta-myth' or 'mega-myth,' a self-consuming process that exemplifies the reflexivity theme central to postmodernism.
“This theme of reflexivity, of turning our intellectual guns back on our own lines, is part and parcel of the whole post-modernist tradition. Remember that Barthes demythologizes everything until he decides let's demythologize demythologizing and see what we end up with. Meta-myth, mega-myth, that's all that's left.”
Foucault and post-structuralist thinkers follow Nietzsche in treating power as the fundamental 'marrow' or essential material of social and intellectual life, making power analysis rather than rational discourse central to understanding society.
“It is so clear, for example, that people like Foucault have taken taken a a leaf from the book of Nietzsche here and they are almost obsessive uh analysis of power as being somehow the marrow, the the ur-stuff of social and intellectual life.”
The problem of managing the fragmentary labyrinth of contemporary knowledge and selfhood may be unsolvable; postmodernists like Barthes suggest making a virtue of necessity—accepting the labyrinth as home rather than attempting escape.
“Naturally enough, we find this difficult to cope with, and naturally we are trying to find a way out of this labyrinth. One of the difficulties that post-modernist offers post-modernism offers us is the proposition that it may be impossible. The As Barthes said, this may not be a labyrinth, this may be home. So, get used to it, make the best you can of it.”
Postmodernism's claim that there can be no overarching legitimizing meta-narrative is not merely an epistemological claim but a gesture at the fact that we are no longer whole selves but fragments; we cannot achieve the Cartesian cogito because we lack the Delphic self-knowledge Socrates sought.
“the post-modern idea that there can be no overarching, legitimizing meta-narrative is a way of gesturing at the fact that we are no longer whole selves. We are fractions of interiority. We are the debris of parts of a self. We cannot form a fully transparent Cartesian cogito because we cannot get that Delphic self-knowledge ultimately that Socrates was searching for.”
Lyotard argues that modern capitalism's demand for performativity in science skews truth and justice toward wealth; funding requirements force scientists to justify research via efficiency, meaning rich actors can 'buy truth' by funding desired research programs, making science ideologically tainted.
“Lyotard says that the performativity demanded by modern capitalism and by advanced industrial society...skews truth and justice towards wealth. Think about it this way. Lyotard looks into the pragmatics of modern science. And what he sees is that, hmm, if you're going to conduct high-level science nowadays, you've got to have funding because there's a lot of expense that comes with building a lab. And if you're going to have funding, you have to get the funding from people that have the money. And the only way you can get the money is from either private individuals or from the state. And the only way you can persuade them to give you money is by justifying your project on the basis of performativity. It's the most efficient way of finding this out. The result is that what emerges is a sort of correspondence between power in the form of economic wealth and the ability to conduct research programs and the truth that comes out of it. So what leads to what Lyotard is saying is that if you're rich enough, you can buy reality. You can buy truth.”
Gadamer's hermeneutics is one of the few contemporary approaches not fitting into postmodern paradigm; it offers possibility of real knowledge of external world and cultural tradition independent of feelings, avoiding solipsism while avoiding false universalism through asymptotic approach to understanding.
“of all the contemporary sets of new approaches to knowledge, the only one which doesn't really fit into this postmodern paradigm, or one of the few that doesn't really fit in, is Gadamer's hermeneutics. The idea here is that we can achieve transparency or clarity of interpretation. It's an endless cycle, so we get we we never get to that Hegelian finality, but at least there's the possibility of really knowing a real external world which exists a real cultural tradition which exists independent of our feelings about it. It doesn't make us collapse back into solipsism. It rather gives us a sort of asymptotic job of continually renewing our connection to the cultural tradition.”
Important contemporary historical agents (Gorbachev instituting Russian reforms, Lee Kuan Yew building Singapore as technological city-state) have motivations and orientations that are not postmodern, suggesting postmodern intellectuals are irrelevant to historical change.
“when the contemporary world talks about important historical changes, important historical agents. They're always talking about people whose motivations and whose orientations are not postmodern, are not post-structuralist. Think of something like Oh, I don't know, Gorbachev and the changes that he instituted in Russia. I'll bet he hasn't read anything that's postmodern. Think about Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore putting together the first technological city-state. I bet he is antagonistic to the whole tendency of postmodernism. These are real important political agents.”
Sociology of knowledge provides better explanation of intellectual constructs than theoretical demythologizing; postmodern projects should be understood through their social function (serving intellectual class interests) rather than epistemological merit.
“When we analyze the tradition, we try and incorporate the tradition, and we try and figure out not just in theory, but in practice, what these intellectual trends amount to. I think that the sociology of knowledge tells us much more about this sort of intellectual construct than any sort of theological theoretical demythologizing.”
If both intellectuals and high bourgeoisie pursue self-interest through will-to-power, what grounds the assumption that 'only intellectuals are being public spirited and not selfish'? The answer is: there are no such grounds—intellectuals are equally selfish but disguise this as moral concern.
“Here's the problem with this. If both intellectuals and the high bourgeoisie have different and antagonistic interests in the political realm, what makes us think, what gives us good ground to think that only intellectuals are being public spirited and not selfish and are willing to do what's good for the masses of society? What is it that makes us so much more moral than other people? Gouldner points out that we're not more moral than other people. In fact, we're exercising our will to power.”
Once all alternative authorities are delegitimized, the differend (marginal, excluded discourses) 'demands that it be taken just as seriously as all these other alternatives,' creating opening for intellectuals to claim superiority through their special sensitivity to otherness.
“And once we've delegitimized all other alternatives, then we have room for the differend. And the differend demands that it be taken just as seriously as all these other alternatives.”
Despite their avant-garde posturing, intellectuals have become 'incredibly provincial and incredibly conventional' occupying 'an amazingly small and truncated spectrum of political and moral thought'.
“the result of the postmodern project is that A, intellectuals have become incre- for all their avant-garde posturing, intellectuals have become incredibly provincial and incredibly conventional. The political ground occupied by most professional intellectuals is an amazingly small and truncated spectrum of political and moral thought.”
Technological intellectuals are connected to natural sciences and get funding from NSF and the state, so they get respect, are listened to, and receive adequate funding for producing profitable results, whereas humanistic intellectuals in soft sciences lack such access and funding.
“Intellectuals may be broken down into technological intellectuals, those who are connected to the natural sciences, and what I would call humanistic intellectuals, those who are the with the soft sciences... Technological intellectuals, they get the National Science Science Foundation and they get lots of money from the state. And so they're not nearly so angry as humanistic intellectuals cuz technological intellectuals get respect. They matter. People listen to them. People take them seriously. And they get more than adequate funding so long as they construct things that explode.”
Great moral agents (Desmond Tutu, Mother Teresa) exemplifying spiritual pioneering are locked into premodern ideology called religion that postmodernists view as outdated; their entire orientation is irrelevant to postmodern intellectual theory, yet they are most conspicuous and influential moral agents.
“think about our great moral agents, the people who I guess someone like Henri Bergson would have described as spiritual pioneers, someone like say I know, Desmond Tutu or Mother Teresa. These people are locked into some to into an ideology which postmoderns would be inclined to call religion, which is not even modern. It's premodern. And the problem is that not only are they the most conspicuous and influential and impressive and inspiring of moral agents, their entire orientation is, if not antagonistic to, irrelevant to what cutting-edge intellectual theory, what cutting-edge moral and political philosophy tells us is the real status of knowledge.”
Marxism survives in universities as intellectual shelter for ideas that have collapsed everywhere else in the world; universities function as 'game parks' protecting endangered intellectual species like Marxists from real-world Darwinian competition.
“it's fascinating to see that Marxism is still alive and well in high cultural in in the best universities in the advanced industrial world, considering the fact that Marxism has collapsed every place else in the world. Universities become something like a modern analog of Jurassic Park, where you can go and look at the intellectual dinosaurs while they're still with us. Right? And we keep them safe so that the rest of the world doesn't get in get in their way because obviously it can't make it in that Darwinian external world of real rough-and-tumble politics.”
Freud's splitting of the subject into id, ego, and superego, combined with mechanisms of repression, deprivileges introspection as a source of self-knowledge because the subject cannot be transparent to itself; the manifest content of communication systematically disguises latent unconscious content.
“What's important about Freud is first of all, the splitting of the subject. Splitting of the subject into its component parts, the id, the ego, the superego...the result of this, the splitting of the subject, is that introspection is deprivileged. Back in the time of Descartes, you knew what was going on in your head, you just looked inside and you told people. With Freud, another of the masters of distrust, a master of suspicion, like Nietzsche, he said, 'Are you so sure that you know yourself? Are you really so transparent? Perhaps you've been creating illusions for yourself at the same time you were creating illusions for other people.'”
Without ultimate moral grounding ('at night all cows are black'), contemporary thought generates individual and unique philosophies of resistance, protest, and negation that are merely rhetorical clothing for intellectual resentment and ambition.
“As Hegel said, at night all cows are black. And that's what we have here, this aesthetic or this transformation of politics and ethics into aesthetics. We are all the children of Nietzsche, and the result of that is Lyotard's idea that we are all talking past each other, that we're all speaking our own separate languages, and that that may not be a bad thing because after all you can't divide it. We're making a virtue of necessity.”
In existentialism, only commitment/emotional force legitimizes politics or morality, replacing rational consensus, making existentialism romantic notion of 'emotional power' as the only possible legitimizing ground for ethics.
“The key thing is that you have to be committed. This is a romantic notion of of emotional uh force or emotional power as being the only possible legitimizing ground for a a politics or a morality which has forsaken the possibility of rational consensus.”
Universities help legitimize and make more 'socially coherent' the intellectual 'stance of defiance towards the world and the and society at large,' reinforcing oppositional posture.
“And this helps legitimize and it helps make more powerful and more socially coherent their sta- their stance of defiance towards the world and the and society at large.”
The class of people who manage the welfare state are intellectuals with college degrees who run large bureaucracies, so Rawls's theory legitimizing welfare state 'serves the interest of that class' at that time in that place.
“Ask yourself what class of people manage the welfare state. Ask yourself what class of people would be interested in legitimizing the welfare state. It's intellectuals, people that have college degrees and go out and run large bureaucracies. Why is it then that we have a theory being generated at this place at this time by an element of this particular class? Because it serves the interest of that class.”
Utilitarianism and efficiency arguments represent Anglo-American philosophical tradition friendly to capitalism and rational calculation of input-output; pragmatism represents muddle-through approach to the failure of positivism's reductive program.
“Beyond uh Marxism, we have various kinds of efficiency arguments. Uh these are usually very rather friendly to capitalism and these are usually found in the Anglo-American tradition. You find people like uh uh wherever you can find utilitarianism...Luhmann with his idea of performativity and the maximum output for the minimum input. The idea is that there should be some sort of calculus, rational cal- rational calculation of the co- of the connection between effort that goes in and output.”
The speaker suspects 'that 50 years from now post-modernism will be a cul-de-sac, something no one reads anymore' and is 'not so sure that's a bad idea,' suggesting postmodernism's intellectual bankruptcy will become evident.
“I suspect that 50 years from now post-modernism will be a cul-de-sac, something no one reads anymore and I'm not so sure that's a bad idea.”
Science and technology, understood as unitary things with one true description of external nature, create 'terroristic silencing' of other discourses about science through exclusion of alternative approaches.
“because of that, it means that our science and our technology is intrinsically bound up with this constricting coercive project of imposing the will to power of an elite on the masses. That is why he thinks that technology and science, if it is understood to be a unitary thing, that there's one true description of the world, a scientific mimesis of external nature, that the result is terroristic silencing of other discourses about science.”
The aesthetic/transformation of politics and ethics into aesthetics means 'We are all the children of Nietzsche,' resulting in Lyotard's idea that 'we are all talking past each other, that we're all speaking our own separate languages,' potentially not a bad thing since 'you can't divide it'—'making a virtue of necessity'.
“this aesthetic or this transformation of politics and ethics into aesthetics. We are all the children of Nietzsche, and the result of that is Lyotard's idea that we are all talking past each other, that we're all speaking our own separate languages, and that that may not be a bad thing because after all you can't divide it. We're making a virtue of necessity.”
Heidegger's critique of technology holds that gadgets are distractions that pull people away from authentic lives and authentic being, preventing genuine meaning; this represents technophobia rooted in resentment against postmodern technology's effects.
“Martin Heidegger is known for his critique of technological man. He says that technology is a distraction, that gadgets pull us away from authentic lives. We are as T.S. Eliot put it distracted by distract from distraction by distraction. We are constantly being pulled from one sensation and novelty to another, but it prevents us from achieving authentic being and authentic meaning in our lives. There is a powerful element of technophobia here and there is also a powerful element of resentment against the advent of of postmodern technology”
The great critic of contemporary utilitarianism is Rawls, who argues utilitarianism has 'inadequate or insufficient conception of equality' and tries to legitimize the welfare state through theory oriented toward managing inequality.
“the great critic of contemporary utilitarianism is Rawls. Rawls is the one who makes the argument that utilitarianism has an inadequate or insufficient conception of equality and he tries to legitimize and justify the welfare state.”
Structuralism is 'one of those machines that destroys itself, like some of the great Dadaists put together'—self-refuting through its own logic.
“It's one of those machines that destroys itself, like some of the great Dadaists put together.”
Left-wing pragmatists like Rorty are 'syrupy and sentimental' and 'kind of saccharine' while right-wing pragmatists like Quine (Reagan Republican) both 'are pragmatists in good standing,' showing pragmatism accommodates opposite political positions like existentialism.
“You can have left-wing pragmatists like Richard Rorty, who's really kind of syrupy and sentimental and he's a nice fellow. He's a nice man, but it's kind of saccharine. On the other hand, you can have real tough guys who have adopt the same sort of intellectual outlook. Someone like Willard Quine, who's a Reagan Republican as far as I know. Well, both Professor Rorty, who's at the kind of liberal end of the Democratic Party, and Professor Quine, who's at what I would describe as the right wing of the Republican Party, both are pragmatists in good standing”
Every pragmatist is 'a positivist with a broken heart'—they wanted to reduce world to nature (like Carnap) and failed, so they settled on muddling through as 'the best we're going to get,' making pragmatism the second-choice philosophy that no one genuinely wants.
“scratch a pragmatist and in every case you will find a positivist with a broken heart. They wanted to reduce the world to nature and they failed. And they wanted one big set of rules which allowed them to be all so logical like Carnap. The problem is it didn't work. And so they said, all right, let's cash it in and just kind of muddle through, that's the best we're going to get. Think of someone like Richard Rorty, who was one of Carnap's students...every pragmatist is a positivist with a broken heart. They don't quite get what they want. I would say that no one likes pragmatism by itself. Pragmatism is many people many is the second choice philosophy of many people. Pragmatism would make a great candidate for vice president. But nobody gets quite the candidate they want.”
Existentialists (Sartre, Heidegger) converted ethics into aesthetics by subjectivizing morality, making moral judgment impossible to ground; playing tennis with the net down means everything is 'in,' so neither figure can be morally wrong, only committed—allowing Sartre to fight for resistance while Heidegger collaborated with Nazis.
“In the case of the existentialists like Heidegger or Sartre, what we get is free play. There is no way of legitimizing moral judgment or political judgment. You can go either way. So, Sartre fights on the side of the resistance in the Second World War and Heidegger fights on the side of the Well, he doesn't fight, but he he sides with the Nazis. He's a Nazi collaborator. He gives the Nazi salute before every lecture. The point here is that existentialism by subjectivizing and in a Nietzschean sense aestheticizing ethics means that we're playing tennis with the net down, that everything's in and that there's no possibility of being morally mistaken or morally wrong.”
The 'irrelevancy and sterility of academic debate' becomes most prominent when considered 'in the context of contemporary affairs,' showing disconnect between theoretical sophistication and practical relevance.
“the irrelevancy and sterility of academic debate that become that becomes most prominent when you think about it in the context of contemporary affairs.”
Intellectual alienation from culture is self-fulfilling prophecy: humanistic intellectuals created narcissistic self-indulgence pursuing hobbyhorse interests at expense of cultural continuity and logical coherence, making alienation an end in itself.
“It may be then that the reason why intellectuals rage so powerfully, the reason why they beat their heads against the institutional cages of the ivory tower is because they have created a self-fulfilling prophecy. They have made alienation an end in itself. They have pursued a sort of narcissistic self-indulgence, which allows them to ride their own favorite hobbyhorse at the expense of continuity with the domain of culture as a whole, and at the expense of logical coherence itself.”
Using concern with 'differends' and diversity as stalking horse, humanistic intellectuals pursue state control; this is genuine will-to-power dressed as ethical concern, and if Foucault-like intellectuals had the nerve to admit this openly (as Foucault himself did), at least we'd have honesty instead of disguise.
“They use as a stalking horse their interest in the differend and diversity. They are using that as a means to take control of the state. That is the real Nietzschean reading. And if they had the Nietzschean nerve of Foucault to say, 'I don't want to hear anything about this altruism. It really is about the will to power. I want to take control of the state. Power is its own end, well then at least we would have people being honest about what postmodernism really is. It's a power play by the intellectual class.”
Alvin Gouldner, as 'renegade Marxist' and 'Socratic Marxist,' represents the exception: rather than using Marxist apparatus to critique only society, he turns it on Marxism itself, applying Marxian class analysis to intellectuals rather than just bourgeoisie, exemplifying reflexivity.
“The great Socratic differ- uh exception to this Marxist rule is Alvin Gouldner himself. Alvin Gouldner calls himself a renegade Marxist, which is the kind I like. Alvin Gouldner says he is a Socratic Marxist who says, 'I have some very interesting questions to ask not just about the society which is full of lies and full of hypocrisy.' He doesn't doubt that, but I want to turn our critical apparatus on us and see if we could be honest for a moment. And that's what this argument about the intellectual about intellectuals being a separate social class amounts to. It is using the Marxist apparatus against the apparatus of Marxism Marxism itself.”
Humanistic intellectuals construct an ideology delegitimizing science, treating technology as oppressive, and declaring the state illegitimate—precisely because control of those institutions by the high bourgeoisie excludes them; postmodernism is resentment-driven ideology disguised as liberation.
“they construct an ideology which serves to delegitimize all other alternatives. And once we've delegitimized all other alternatives, then we have room for the differend. And the differend demands that it be taken just as seriously as all these other alternatives. Now, you want to ask yourself, who gains from this delegitimizing of science? Who gains from treating technology as oppressive and the state as illegitimate? Those who want to take control of the state. Those who are the alternative ruling elite. Postmodernism is the ideology of intellectuals, humanistic intellectuals, who are saturated in their own ressentiment and who are frustrated by their inability to take political power. That's what postmodernism is.”
Richard Rorty was one of Carnap's students, exemplifying the pragmatist who inherited the positivist project but abandoned its dream.
“Think of someone like Richard Rorty, who was one of Carnap's students.”