
Peak Cheap Energy - Luke Gromen
What this covers
This is a conversation between host Max Gagliardi and returning guest Luke Gromen, a macro analyst, about the current macro environment. The argument runs from energy to debt to the dollar. Gromen treats peak cheap energy as the variable that economists leave out of their models. He illustrates the omission with the Assume a Can Opener (Metaphor)) joke, in which economists simply assume cheap oil will always be there. He also cites a 1997 anonymous monetary theorist who held that world debt markets depend on ever-cheaper oil. A recurring refrain is that Physics is Undefeated against academic projections.
The middle of the discussion is about money and debt. Gromen argues that interest and entitlements now exceed annual tax receipts. He describes the Federal Reserve as facing a choice between fighting inflation and keeping sovereign debt serviceable, and he frames the holder of all that debt as The Sucker at the Card Table (Metaphor)). He reads the spring banking turmoil as a symptom of a sovereign-debt and balance-of-payments problem rather than a banking problem in itself. Along the way he covers the 2020 suspension of leverage rules on Treasuries, commercial real estate markdowns, and the way the government crowds out banks when money funds pay more than banks do.
The geopolitical stretch is where the claims turn contentious. Gromen discusses de-dollarization and the shift of central bank reserves toward gold, and he argues the yuan will not become a reserve currency. He also says that de-dollarizing energy trade could support the dollar in the short term. He describes the US as financing China's military buildup through trade deficits, and he compares the energy postures of Russia and Saudi Arabia with Western retreat from nuclear power and new refineries. He sketches three exits: financial repression, a shift to gold-backed reserves, or military confrontation with commodity exporters. He thinks the second is most likely. The stock-to-flow ratio of oil versus gold helps explain why he expects the paper gold market to reconnect to physical supply.
Peak cheap energy, not monetary policy alone, is the fundamental constraint driving US fiscal insolvency, de-dollarization, and forced inflation; Western policymakers' failure to acknowledge this physical reality will lead to severe economic contraction within 6-9 months followed by sustained high inflation.
- US shale production requires 8-10% cost inflation minimum to stay flat; without energy growth, debt defaults cascade
- Central banks shifting from Treasury reserves to gold because peak cheap energy forces de-dollarization; this is driven by physics, not choice
- Fed faces binary choice: inflate debt away now (painful but manageable) or fight inflation and trigger collapse; Powell's delay makes eventual inflation worse
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An anonymous monetary theorist wrote in 1997 that 'world debt markets as we know them can only be maintained with cheap and cheaper oil. Without cheap oil, the entire system fails,' a statement that validates Gromen's current analysis of the peak cheap energy crisis.
“In central bank circles, it's well known that the world debt markets as we know them can only be maintained with cheap and cheaper oil. Without cheap oil, the entire system fails. So it's from an anonymous monetary theorist another 1997.”
Fed regulations in 2020 suspended Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) requirements for Treasury bonds, allowing banks to purchase Treasuries with infinite leverage and zero capital requirements; this was supposed to be temporary and expire after one year, but created systemic pressure forcing banks to hold depreciating assets when rates rose in 2022.
“banks were regulated into buying Treasuries. Um they were really regulated into buying Treasuries in 2020 where uh the Fed needed as many Treasury buyers as they could find and so they suspended SLR supplementary leverage ratio uh regulations that to basically exa- not basically, they explicitly exempted Treasury bonds.”
Oil has a stock-to-flow ratio of approximately 1.2, meaning that at any given time there is only about 1.2 years' worth of global oil production in inventory; this rapid turnover makes it impossible to separate physical oil prices from fundamentals via paper derivatives for extended periods, unlike gold with a 60x stock-to-flow ratio.
“In contrast, the stock-to-flow ratio of oil is like 1.2, right? Like when when it gets really high inventory, it's like 1.3, and when inventories get really low and tight, it's like 1.1. Because there's it's it's expensive to store, you don't store it, you use it, once you burn it up, it's gone.”
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other non-Western energy producers understand the importance of controlling energy resources and maximizing their value, whereas the Western world is taking steps backward in nuclear energy, refusing to build new refineries and pipelines, despite the fact that new energy infrastructure would be disinflationary.
“I mean there's a stark difference too between these different countries and their approaches to energy. You've got uh Russia, you've got the Middle Eastern countries that seem to clearly understand the importance of, you know, control of their energy resources and maximizing the value there, building critical energy, you know, infrastructure for energy. And then you have kind of the Western world who really, I mean I know we can't print barrels, but there's a lot of, you know, barrels under the ground in federal leases. Um there's a lot of critical energy infrastructure that we could build that would be disin- you know, disinflationary in terms of new refineries, uh pipelines, things like that. We're basically doing the opposite in terms of even nuclear energy. Uh really we're not seeing a renaissance there either. In fact, we're seeing the opposite. We've taken a lot of steps backwards.”
US government interest and entitlement obligations have risen to 110-115% of annual tax receipts, meaning the US cannot pay interest and interest-like obligations (Social Security, Medicare) from tax receipts for a full year; this ratio has returned above 100% after briefly falling below it during the inflation/tax receipt bubble of 2021-2022.
“the current portion of the 100 trillion plus and off-balance sheet obligations, the entitlement paygo. So, you were you were that number by virtue of had had has risen to as high as about 110-115% of tax receipts. So, basically, the US government was not going to be able to pay interest and entitlements out of tax receipts for a full year”
The only factor preventing global sovereign debt from risk of nominal default was the very inflation that central banks are now fighting; by fighting inflation, central banks risk pushing the system into the precise scenario they claim to want to avoid.
“The problem is that the only thing keeping the West in particular, uh the US specifically, uh the world more broadly, the only thing that was keeping global sovereign debt from being at risk of nominal default was the very same inflation that these, uh, um, that these, uh, that these central bankers have been fighting”
There is no fundamental difference between $600 billion in direct stimulus checks and $600 billion in additional interest expense to the government—both are inflationary spending injected into the economy—except that interest goes primarily to wealthy bondholders (Cantillon effect) while stimulus reaches broader populations, making stimulus more immediately inflationary but interest payments still inflationary over time.
“There's no fundamental difference between um the government basically running, you know, $600 billion you know, stimulus, right? So, giving everybody a stimmy, you know, print up 600 billion. Uh and and having the Fed print up 600 billion, give it to Treasury, Treasury gives it to everybody $600 billion stimmy. Boom. Okay, we know how that works. We know that's inflationary. If the Fed raises rates and interest expense goes up $600 billion like they've done on a on a pro forma basis, that's There's really no difference between 600 billion in interest and 600 billion in um stimmy uh except who it goes to.”
Rate increases paradoxically shrink private sector productive capacity while simultaneously increasing government spending through higher interest costs, creating stagflationary conditions where supply contracts while demand (government spending) rises—the opposite of what monetary policy intends.
“you if you shrink capacity while increasing spending by raising rates, you're not fighting inflation anymore. You're increasing inflation, the inflationary impulse. You're increasing supply chain problems. You're increasing demand money out in the economy while shrinking the ability to you know produce output for that money.”
As de-dollarization of energy markets occurs, it paradoxically supports the dollar short-term because the oil market ($2+ trillion annually) has historically required large dollar flows; reducing the supply of dollars flowing to energy producers while maintaining constant debt-service demand for dollars creates upward pressure on the dollar.
“Paradoxically, as that begins, and this is something we wrote to clients in 2014, as the dollar loses its monopoly in global oil markets, it's actually paradoxically good for the dollar because you'll be talking about a slightly reduced supply of dollars in, you know, oil markets are what, two plus trillion a year? Um, you start losing a little bit of dollar flows out of that. Um, you're going to have a little bit less dollar flows against a very big dollar demand for oil, or excuse me, for uh uh to service debt, right?”
Federal Reserve economists and macroeconomic analysts systematically ignore energy as a variable in their interest rate and monetary policy models; academic papers on neutral rates, real interest rates, and economic theory rarely or never mention the word 'energy,' 'oil,' or 'gas,' despite energy being the base true money and foundation of economic growth.
“they're just assuming cheap and cheaper energy the cheap and cheaper energy regime that they have come of age in will continue. We don't need to think. However, we can see on the ground, you know, in the oil patch, the inflation rates of of energy.”
Physics is undefeated against happy thinking, magical thinking, and academic economist projections; policy makers are refusing to acknowledge physics (energy constraints), and the physics will assert themselves, though the timing is uncertain.
“And in the end, I don't know who said I don't know if it was Doomberg or somebody else, physics is undefeated. You know, physics is undefeated against happy thinking and and magical thinking and and academic economist projections of where our star should be. The physics are going to assert themselves. The physics are asserting themselves.”
The central banks and Western governments have three viable paths forward: (1) financial repression with negative real rates of 4.5-6.5% annually until living standards collapse politically; (2) currency devaluation and shift to gold-backed reserves instead of debt-backed reserves; or (3) military intervention against commodity exporters—with option 2 most likely but option 3 (Ukraine/Russia) partially in play.
“you basically you have to either financially repress investors dramatically. In other words, you have to force, regulate, etc. people into holding uh debt that falls in price against energy, which means against food, against economic a collapse in living standards by the tune of you know, like I said, 8 to 10% is probably minimum in terms of keeping production okay. Um it's probably more than that, but just say 8 to 10% with a 3 and 1/2% coupon on the 10 year, uh you need that's 8 to 10 minus 3.5% is whatever 4.5% to to 6.5% per year. Negative real rates against energy. Financial repression.”
The banking crisis was not fundamentally a banking crisis but a balance-of-payments/sovereign debt crisis symptom, revealing that the regulatory framework of the last 10 years was built on the assumption that inflation would never appear, and when it did, the entire structure collapsed.
“I I for me the banking issues are not a banking crisis per se put it this way. They didn't start out as a banking crisis. Uh this was this was a US balance of payments sovereign debt crisis symptom, which is to say go go back to 2014, banks were regulated into buying Treasuries.”
Central bank gold reserves have increased by 400-500 billion dollars over the last 10 years while FX reserves have declined by 300-400 billion dollars, reflecting a strategic shift away from Treasury holdings as countries face peak cheap energy constraints and must de-dollarize.
“over the last 10 years central bank gold reserves are up four or 500 billion dollars. Central bank treasury reserves, FX reserves, foreign exchange reserves are down three 400 billion dollars”
Yuan will not become a reserve currency because China does not want to run the large deficits necessary to issue reserve-currency volumes (Triffin's dilemma), which would hollow out their manufacturing base; instead, central banks will store yuan in Chinese goods and net-settle in gold.
“the this is not the um the re- the rebuttal that a lot of people think it is. Uh they will s- they're storing it in Chinese goods and net settling in gold. And you can see Chinese it's at a floating price and you want. And because the Chinese you know people say well the Chinese aren't going to run the deficits again. No They don't want to. Um they don't want to to to run the deficits because that requires them to hollow out their manufacturing the way we did. It requires them to bankrupt themselves. They run you know the Triffin's dilemma the way we have done. They're not going to do that. The Europeans aren't going to do that and the Japanese can't do that and the British can't do that.”
The 'assume a can opener' joke (from an old economics joke about a desert island) is the perfect metaphor for Fed policy: economists assume cheap oil will always be available (the 'can opener'), so they never consider what happens if energy becomes expensive or scarce.
“It's in in in reference to the old um uh economic um joke where they right there's there's a physicist and a chemist and an economist stuck on a desert you know, desert isle out in the middle of the ocean and they have a can of food. And they're trying to figure out how to open this can of food that's washed ashore. Um and the physicist and the chemist come up with all these mechanical and and and chemical reaction brilliant ways of getting the can opener. And the economist says, 'No, no, no. Let's just assume a can opener.'”
US shale production is estimated to represent 90% of global oil production growth over the last 10 years; therefore, maintaining flat shale production requires minimum 8-10% annual cost inflation, and production growth requires higher inflation, yet global debt markets cannot support 8-10% coupon rates on sovereign debt.
“US shale production is estimated to have been 90% of global oil production growth over the last 10 years. So, 90% of your production growth over the last 10 years needs 8 to 10% inflation minimum just to stay in the same place, let alone grow production in a real way.”
When oil suppliers and importers begin storing physical gold instead of paper as reserves (especially after the US froze Russian FX reserves), and oil market participants demand physical gold rather than paper, the oil market reconnects to the gold market, ending decades of paper price manipulation in gold because you cannot print physical gold to suppress price.
“As foreign oil suppliers begin storing more reserving more gold, as foreign oil importers begin reserving more gold, given the dynamics we talked about a little bit ago, they're not going to take paper. They're going to want the physical. Uh particularly because storing it somewhere else is risky, as we now know after what the US did to FX Uh, check FX reserves. So, basically, it's going to shift the oil market, the commodity market more broadly, and start reconnecting it to gold, right? So, if you have oil that has a stock-to-flow ratio of 1.2, and gold with a stock-to-flow ratio of 60, but oil, as it's transacted, wants gold, what you're going to start doing is bringing the stock-to-flow of ratio the stock-to-flow ratio of oil toward the stock-to-flow ratio of gold. Paper will not settle this. You can't just sell more paper. Whatever. Hit the price, great. I'll just buy more gold. Uh-oh.”
Someone must be 'the sucker at the card table' willing to hold $120 trillion in global dollar-denominated debt at ~3% yields while energy inflation runs 8-10% annually, absorbing 5-7% real losses per year; no such entity exists except the Fed, whose solution (printing to maintain the debt) would only accelerate inflation to 12-15% or higher.
“Somebody needs to be the sucker at the card table who has the balance sheet able to take those types of losses, those types of declines in living standards relative to energy? And the answer is nobody. It's just the Fed. The only person who has the balance sheet is the Fed and the other Western central banks, which of course if they have to print the money, they're only going to make that 8 to 10% 12 to 15% 15 to”
Commercial real estate is experiencing eye-watering markdowns (e.g., San Francisco office down 80% in three years, Wall Street Journal examples down 60-70%), and if too much of a bank's loan portfolio is down 60-70%, the bank enters systemic distress; office real estate is a large category, and retail spending data suggest similar distress across retail properties.
“So commercial real estate, we are seeing markdowns in commercial real estate that are just eye-watering, just face peeling, you know, one in San Francisco down 80% in three years. Uh couple more in the Wall Street Journal today down 60 to 70%. If you're down 60 to 70%, like across too much of your loan portfolio, now you start to get into some very systemic issues and commercial real estate office is a really big category.”
The US government is crowding out its own banking system; the yield curve inversion makes it possible for individuals to earn 5% on money market funds while borrowing at 2.7% on mortgages, creating better risk-adjusted returns than traditional banking, reducing bank net interest margins and lending capacity.
“You know what bank is doing great? The Bank of Luke Gromen is doing awesome. Yeah. Because right now I've got a 2.7% 30-year fixed mortgage that I'm going to pay every last payment. And I'm cash collateralized in my life insurance policy tax-free and I'm making five. My my net interest margin the Bank of Luke Gromen is awesome.”
The US is pursuing an unsustainable Cold War strategy with China by borrowing money from China to build weapons against China using Chinese components, while simultaneously funding Chinese military expansion through trade deficits—a strategy fundamentally different from and inferior to the original Cold War with the USSR, where the US was not financing Soviet military expansion.
“we're borrowing money from China to build weapons to face down China, and this is not a sustainable strategy. And uh I would add we're now doing it, you know, we're we're we're doing it with Chinese components in no small part.”
The US is at the first time in at least 70 years where, in a top 20 drawdown for stocks, the Treasury market sold off more than equities, indicating structural shift in capital flows and risk perception.
“we had the first time in at least 70 years where uh in a top 20 drawdown for stocks, the US Treasury market sold off more than stocks did.”
Gold is 'nature's discount rate' or energy's discount rate, meaning gold's ability to maintain purchasing power relative to energy is the fundamental constraint on how much debt can be issued and at what interest rates; without gold maintaining value relative to energy, debt markets collapse.
“you said it I believe on our last episode, which is you can print money, but you can't print barrels. I don't know if I've seen that before and then it recently I saw you either tweet or I heard it on a podcast you did where you mentioned you know, energy is kind of like the discount rate. It's like nature's discount rate and that's just like it's critical”
To win great power competition with China, the US must undergo massive reshoring of manufacturing and currency system restructuring, both of which are extraordinarily inflationary on a secular basis; the alternative is accepting Chinese dominance or military withdrawal from global affairs.
“if the US wants to win the great power competition against China, the bond market must die on a real basis. That's it. You've got to reshore all these reshoring and changing the structure of the currency, all of that is extraordinarily inflationary.”
Russia chose to sell oil to countries like China in yuan rather than dollars not primarily for geopolitical reasons but because Russia and other commodity exporters are running out of dollars due to rising oil prices combined with economic growth; de-dollarization is being forced by resource economics, not political choice.
“Russia is selling out in yuan. Russia is selling uh in in uh uh well, it's primarily in yuan. They have sold some in other currencies, but primarily in yuan. Uh others are as well.”
The US government is bankrupt at 8-10% interest rates (the rate needed to remain whole against energy inflation), and every other government except possibly Russia is also bankrupt at that rate, making the fiscal problem unsolvable within the current debt/interest paradigm.
“I mean, you look at 8 to 10%, you're going to need just to keep yourself whole on a real basis relative to what your energy's doing, your debt needs to have an 8 to 10% coupon on it. US government can't afford 8 to 10%. It is It is bankrupt at 8 to 10%. Every government except for maybe the Russians are bankrupt at 8 to 10%.”
US shale production productivity is declining across major basins (Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara) with even the largest (Permian) showing waning productivity numbers; these productivity declines should trigger emergency-level policy response but instead are being ignored by policymakers.
“you talk to people in the oil patch and you go, okay, like hey guys, 90% of production growth over last 10 years from shale and we can see what shale production is doing. We can see the productivity numbers. Um I mean, you've seen it in in the Bakken, you've seen it in Eagle Ford, you've seen it in Niobrara. Even now the Permian of the the monstrous Permian, the productivity numbers are starting to wane, which should be red flag sirens, emergency, and instead, you know, we're hearing, you know, them pontificate about, you know, the the stuff they've been pontificating about.”
The current situation combines an unprecedented mixture of debt, derivatives, geopolitical tensions, technology deflation, and peak cheap energy; no one alive has experienced this combination before, so short-term predictions (3-6-12 months) are inherently unreliable, even if long-term direction (sustained inflation) is highly predictable.
“if somebody tells you they know what's going to happen over the next 3 months, 6 months, 12 months, run. Run in the other direction. Nobody has a clue. Nobody alive has ever seen this combination of debt, derivatives, geopolitics, technology deflation, and peak cheap energy all rolled into the one.”
In a combined dollar-up, inflation-down, everything-else-down scenario with rates eventually rising in recession, gold would paradoxically rise with the dollar, creating the 'mother of all bad scenarios' economically.
“when that happens that gets you into what we saw in 2022 on steroids which is dollar up inflation down uh everything else down rates will probably tick down for a second and then begin to rise even in a US recession. Um it's it's it's the mother of all bad scenarios and my guess is you'll see gold rise in that scenario along with the dollar.”
If the Fed had taken the inflationary path in 2021 (allowing 15-20% inflation for two years to reduce debt-to-GDP back to 90% or below), it would be in a much better position now; by waiting and reversing course, the Fed has ensured that 20-30-40% inflation for multiple years will now be necessary, creating more dangerous political and economic consequences.
“if he would have let inflation run hot enough to get debt to GDP low enough such that allowing markets to set interest rates did not bankrupt the United States government, he would be in a much better position. By virtue of him reversing course last year, that 15 to 20% is no longer going to cut it. It's going to have to be a more compressed period of time at a much higher rate of inflation, and that gets you into much more dangerous territory”
If the Fed continues fighting inflation (tightening), Powell's legacy will be remembered alongside Herbert Hoover and Benjamin Strong (the Federal Reserve chief blamed for the Great Depression), as a cautionary tale of not being brave enough to tell the political and public truth about the situation.
“Powell's going to be um his legacy is going to be remembered with Herbert Hoover and with Benjamin Strong and all of the goats and that by that I don't mean greatest of all time by the by that I mean the guy's blamed for the Great Depression.”
A severe economic downturn is forecast to occur within 6-9 months due to the convergence of declining tax receipts, rising interest costs, reduced private lending, commercial real estate markdowns, venture capital markdowns, and the US government's accelerating crowding-out of private credit markets.
“this has now pushed the US into a situation where it can't pay these interest and interest-like obligations out of receipts for a full year. Uh which means US government's going to acceleratingly crowd out um global dollar markets. So, what this sets up for is basically sometime in the next I don't know, 6 to 9 months, uh a very severe downdraft in the economy. You're starting to see whispers of it. The banks the bank issues earlier this year was the first tremor.”
Gromen's personal portfolio strategy is a barbell: heavily overweight cash and short-term Treasury bonds on one end (to capture high yields while maintaining liquidity), with a 30-year fixed mortgage at 2.75% (as effective short duration), while overweight gold, Bitcoin, energy equities, commodity-related companies (copper), and electrical infrastructure—a bifurcated low-leverage strategy acknowledging both near-term volatility and high conviction in eventual inflation.
“I am managing my own you know, my own funds in barbell strategy is what we refer to. I am overweight cash. I am overweight short-term Treasury bonds. I own very few of any other bonds. In fact, the I'm effectively short of 30-year mortgages, right? By virtue of borrowing at 2.75% for 30 years.”
Winston Churchill's quote 'Americans always do the right thing after exhausting all the alternatives' will likely hold for US energy policy, but it is unclear how severe the economic situation must become before Western leaders pivot toward serious energy infrastructure investment (refineries, pipelines, nuclear) comparable to Russia and Saudi Arabia's approaches.
“I think at some point, you know, the old the Americans always do the right thing after they've exhausted all the alternatives quote from from Winston Churchill, uh, will hold once again. Um, I don't know how bad the economic situation has to get to get there”