355 | Solo: Looking Quantum Mechanics in the Eyeball
What this covers
Sean Carroll presents a solo episode on the philosophical implications of taking Everettian quantum mechanics literally. The core claim is that if you accept the many-worlds interpretation at face value—if the wave function evolving in Hilbert space is all that truly exists—then familiar features of reality like space, position, and locality cannot be fundamental. Instead, they must be derived from the underlying quantum structure. Carroll frames this as an inversion of standard practice: physicists usually begin with classical intuitions about objects in space and then quantize them, but the realist Everettian must work backward, recovering the everyday world from a austere mathematical description. He uses Albert Einstein's lifelong confusion about coordinates versus physical reality as a cautionary parallel, arguing that physicists have habitually conflated the map with the territory.
The episode ranges across several distinct problems. Carroll explains why position and momentum are merely coordinate choices—different bases on Hilbert space, related by Fourier transform—and why macroscopic configuration space becomes absurdly high-dimensional, making a naive wave-function realism seem implausible. He then turns to quantum mereology, the technical effort to carve Hilbert space into subsystems that yield locality and spatially localized objects; he cites recent results showing that local subdivisions are nearly unique and thus likely emerge naturally when interactions are local. The deepest problem, however, is the absence of time in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation—the quantized form of general relativity—which threatens to make emergence impossible if time itself does not emerge from something more fundamental. Throughout, Carroll emphasizes that unresolved problems are not weaknesses to hide but research opportunities, and that understanding how the classical world fits into pure quantum mechanics remains a central open question.
Carroll argues that taking many-worlds quantum mechanics at face value means treating only the wave function (a vector evolving in Hilbert space) as fundamental, which demotes space, position, momentum, and locality to emergent features that must be derived rather than assumed — and that deriving them is the central open research problem for the theory.
- Position and momentum are merely choices of coordinates/bases on Hilbert space, not fundamental, just as coordinate systems are not the physical reality in general relativity.
- Space and locality emerge from a specific way of carving Hilbert space into subsystems (quantum mereology), and this carving appears to be nearly unique when interactions are local.
- All the tools for deriving emergent structure depend on time evolution/dynamics, so the absence of time in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (the problem of time) is the deepest threat to the program.
The wave function is a superposition over configuration space, not a field in ordinary space, and position and momentum are emergent coordinate choices.
- Quantum mechanics does not assign a separate wave function to each particle; instead a system of two particles has a single wave function defined over the joint configuration space of both particles' possible positions, which is what makes entanglement possible — correlations between measurement outcomes such that the particles are never found in the same box even though neither has a definite location.
“It says that there is a single wave function for the combination of the two electrons.”
- Under a realist reading of quantum mechanics, the wave function is what genuinely exists; when it assigns a superposition over an electron being in box A or box B, there is no fact of the matter about where the electron actually is — the wave function itself, not particle positions, constitutes reality.
“in my view, the wave function is the real thing. And if that wave function says the electron has some possibility of being in box A and some possibility of being in box B, then there's no such thing as where the electron is, really.”
- Specifying a wave function as a function of position fully determines it as a function of momentum and vice versa via the Fourier transform; you need only one description, not both, which is the deep origin of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle — position and momentum are two different angles on the same underlying quantum state, not independent quantities as in classical mechanics.
“You can actually calculate the probability of getting a momentum measurement outcome from psi of X... That's the origin of the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics.”
- Wave functions are not fields living in ordinary three-dimensional space but functions on configuration space, whose dimensionality is three times the number of particles — for a macroscopic object containing Avogadro's number of particles, configuration space has on the order of 6 times 10^23 dimensions — which is one reason people abandon realism about the wave function.
“the wave function is a function of what we call the configuration space of the two-particle system... that configuration space for two particles is a six-dimensional space. It's not the three-dimensional space in which we live.”
- Position and momentum are not fundamental features of reality but are merely choices of basis (coordinate system) on Hilbert space, analogous to choosing Cartesian versus spherical coordinates; what truly exists is the quantum state vector, and our ability to observe position and momentum conveniently does not grant them privileged ontological status.
“You can still imagine that position space and momentum space are real. They're just not fundamental. They're not there in the most austere, deepest-down way of talking about what reality is doing.”
- The term 'wave function' is a bad and misleading name because it invites people to picture the quantum state as a field living in ordinary space (the way the picture starts going wrong), whereas the more accurate conception is a superposition over every possible measurement outcome.
“this is a very bad name, the wave function. It's not nearly evocative enough for such a centrally important concept”
Many-worlds eliminates measurement collapse and special status by evolving only the Schrödinger equation with observer included in the system.
- Contrary to the common claim that Everettian quantum mechanics violates Occam's razor by multiplying worlds, the theory's formalism is in fact extremely austere and simple — so austere that the everyday world is not recognizable in it — and the real puzzle is recovering ordinary reality from that minimal formalism.
“But if you know what the theory actually says, it's a very, very austere, simple, pretty formalism. So austere that you really don't recognize the real world in it when you look.”
- Everettian quantum mechanics is simpler by the standard of having no extra postulates — no measurement, no collapse, no separate Born rule axiom, only Hilbert space and Schrödinger evolution — but it pays for this with far heavier philosophical lifting, namely the non-trivial work of correctly identifying who the observer is within the wave function of the universe.
“But if you know what the theory actually says, it's a very, very austere, simple, pretty formalism. So austere that you really don't recognize the real world in it when you look.”
- The Copenhagen interpretation as commonly stated — a wave function that collapses to one state when measured — is not merely possibly wrong but is not even a well-defined scientific theory, because it never specifies what counts as a measurement or when and why collapse occurs.
“It's not a good scientific theory. It's not even a scientific theory. Not because it's wrong there are plenty of scientific theories that are wrong but are still scientific theories it's just not defined.”
- Many-worlds is fundamentally about denying wave function collapse and the special status of measurement: there is only the Schrödinger equation evolving the wave function, and Everett's insight was that if you include the observer as part of the quantum system, measurement naturally produces a superposition of observer-plus-system states (branches) rather than a single collapsed outcome.
“what many-worlds is really about is saying there's no such thing as collapse. There's no such thing as a special cordoned-off concept of measurement in quantum mechanics. There's just the Schrödinger equation, letting the wave function evolve as it will.”
- Under Mad Dog Everettianism, a quantum mechanical theory is fully specified by just a vector in Hilbert space evolving through time (its dynamics, given by the Hamiltonian/Schrödinger equation); observables like position, momentum, and spin are not part of the fundamental definition but emerge from this minimal structure.
“What defines your quantum mechanical theory is just the vector in Hilbert space evolving through time. That's all that exists.”
Locality and space emerge as rare, special subdivisions of Hilbert space, not fundamental features of reality.
- The quantum mereology program seeks to reverse-engineer subsystems out of a single undivided Hilbert space — carving Hilbert space 'at its joints' as Plato described butchering — rather than building large systems from given subsystems as standard quantum mechanics does; among the infinite ways to divide Hilbert space, only some yield useful structures resembling space and objects.
“So we're basically asking, how do you carve Hilbert space at the joints? That's what we're trying to do.”
- Among all the ways to subdivide a large Hilbert space into subsystems, almost all yield non-local dynamics where every subsystem interacts directly with every other; local subdivisions — where poking a region affects only its nearest neighbors — are extremely special and, when they exist, essentially unique, as shown in the Kotler-Pennington-Ranard 'Locality from the Spectrum' result.
“almost all of them would have the property that every little subsystem interacts directly with every other subsystem.”
- Space, position space, and momentum space can all be real and useful — indispensable for getting through life — while still not being fundamental; they are emergent rather than part of the most austere description of reality, in the same way that free will and human choices are real and action-guiding even though they are nowhere to be found in the fundamental laws of physics.
“You can still imagine that position space and momentum space are real. They're just not fundamental. They're not there in the most austere, deepest-down way of talking about what reality is doing.”
- Locality — the idea that things exist at and interact through locations in space — is not a fundamental feature of reality but an emergent one, and this conclusion follows from undergraduate quantum mechanics alone, without invoking quantum gravity, string theory, or emergent spacetime; staring quantum mechanics in the face shows that locality is simply not that important at the deepest level.
“if you stare quantum mechanics in the face and ask what it's trying to tell you, it's telling you locality is just not fundamental. It's not that important.”
- If locality is emergent rather than fundamental, then like all emergent descriptions it should break down at some scale (as treating air as a fluid fails near a single atom), which suggests there could in principle be experimental signatures of locality being only approximate; physics has not searched for such breakdown because all our successful theories build in exact locality from the start.
“the thing about emergent things is that those emergent descriptions break down at some level... Maybe locality breaks down. Maybe it's just a good approximation. How would you know experimentally?”
- The unmeasured (unitary) dynamics of quantum field theory are strictly local in space and time: poking the electromagnetic field at one point does not instantly affect the whole universe but only directly influences nearest-neighbor regions, with effects propagating no faster than light, which is what particle physicists actually spend their effort calculating while treating measurement as trivial.
“as much as quantum measurement seems to involve some kind of non-locality, quantum field theory, when it's not being measured, seems to be very, very local.”
The genuine unsolved frontier is deriving macroscopic structure and the origin of time from the bare formalism.
- There are only two big looming open questions in Everettian quantum mechanics — the nature of probability and the origin of structure — and while probability (deriving the Born rule) is largely understood with plausible and even persuasive arguments, the origin of structure such as space and the objects in it is much less understood and constitutes the real frontier.
“there are only two real big looming questions in Everettian quantum mechanics. One is the nature of probability... The origin of structure space, things in it, things like that is much less understood.”
- The usual practice of starting from a classical manifest description and then quantizing it amounts to cheating, because it helps itself to a huge amount of structure (space, locality, objects) that is not actually fundamental and should instead be derived; confronting this forces physicists to ask new questions that may bear on fine-tuning, the cosmological constant, the Big Bang, the arrow of time, and even possible experimental signatures.
“The suggestion from Everettian quantum mechanics is that that's cheating, that you're helping yourself to something that isn't there and you should find it, you should realize how it emerges.”
- The genuine challenge to Everettian quantum mechanics is not that emerging space and structure from the bare wave function cannot be done, but that it has not yet been done at full scale — the existing locality and system-environment results are tiny examples compared to the full world, and the finite-versus-infinite dimensionality issue remains a serious unresolved problem.
“the challenge is not "This can't be done." The challenge is "This hasn't been done yet."”
- The single best reason the structure-emergence program might fail is the problem of time: quantizing general relativity yields the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, in which the Hamiltonian implies the wave function does not evolve with time at all, and since every method for deriving emergent structure (locality, system-environment splits) relies on dynamics, a fundamentally timeless universe would make the whole program impossible unless time itself can be shown to emerge.
“in the case of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, what it says is the Hamiltonian says the wave function does not evolve with time. There's no time in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.”
Decoherence explains why superposed macroscopic systems appear to have definite outcomes through entanglement with the environment.
- Correctly dividing the world into a system and an environment requires two criteria: a localized macroscopic system must remain localized over time (Ehrenfest's theorem ensuring classical-looking trajectories), and once a system has decohered into a single pointer state it must remain unentangled with its environment because it then interacts with environmental degrees of freedom in the same way regardless of internal detail.
“We want the system, if it's localized, to remain localized, and if it's unentangled, to remain unentangled once it's in what we call the pointer state”
- Decoherence is simply a quantum system in a superposition of distinct outcomes becoming entangled with its environment: environmental degrees of freedom (photons, air atoms) interact differently with the different branches of a macroscopic superposition, rapidly entangling and causing the wave function to branch, which is why opening Schrödinger's box reveals a definite outcome rather than a superposition.
“Becoming entangled with the environment is decoherence. And that's when the wave function branches into two different branches.”
Quantum mechanics requires radically different formalism from classical physics because entanglement forbids independent subsystem wave functions.
- If the quantum state did not evolve in time but sat statically as a single fixed vector, then the vast size of Hilbert space would be irrelevant — effectively it would be one-dimensional and nothing could happen, which is the kind of degenerate situation that would arise if, as Daniel Harlow suggests, Hilbert space is fundamentally one-dimensional; a useful theory needs Hilbert space to be both very big and dynamically explored.
“If Hilbert space is big, but we only live in a single vector of it, then effectively it's just one-dimensional. Nothing can happen.”
- The classical solar-system picture of the atom must be wrong because orbiting electrons would radiate light, lose energy, and spiral into the nucleus, yet atoms are demonstrably stable — a fact whose explanation required quantum mechanics, beginning with Bohr's ad hoc discrete orbits and culminating in the Schrödinger wave equation.
“those electrons would give off light, lose energy, and spiral into the center of the nucleus. But they don't. In fact, atoms are pretty stable.”
- Unlike pre-quantum physics where extending a theory from one object to two introduces no special difficulty, quantum mechanics radically changes when going from one to two particles because the two can become entangled, requiring a single joint wave function rather than two independent ones.
“It says that there is a single wave function for the combination of the two electrons.”
Popular objections to many-worlds about extra worlds or energy are easily dismissed; the real difficulties are philosophical.
- Open questions in a scientific theory are not defects to be hidden but opportunities to learn; the proponent of a promising theory should be the person most forthright about its unresolved problems, because confronting them can advance understanding and even solve pre-existing puzzles.
“if you think the theory is promising, you should be the person who is most upfront about the open questions, the things we don't know in this theory.”
- The most common popular objections to many-worlds — that it posits too many unobservable worlds (a philosophical objection) or that it requires extra energy to create new worlds (a physical objection) — are easily answered and should not be taken seriously, whereas the genuinely difficult open questions lie elsewhere.
“There are philosophically bad objections like, "Oh, that's just too many worlds and you can't observe them." There are also physically bad objections like, "Where does the energy come from to make all these different worlds?"”
Emergence is selective and structured, not arbitrary, yielding autonomous higher-level theories only when coarse-graining captures real patterns.
- Science does not work by demanding a single clean experiment that decisively rules a theory in or out; it is a complicated interplay of theoretical proposals, experimental probes, serendipitous discoveries, and gradual fitting-together, so the legitimate path forward for Everettian quantum mechanics is continued research that may yield new ideas or may eventually reveal insurmountable obstacles.
“I know that people want to have a single simple experiment we could do that would rule out the theory cleanly and once and for all. But that's just not how science works.”
- Emergence is not arbitrary: although there are infinitely many ways to coarse-grain a microscopic system, only specific ones — like averaging over regions of space to get temperature, pressure, and density — yield a self-contained, autonomous higher-level theory (such as fluid mechanics) that captures real patterns, while others (like averaging over momentum space) give no useful emergent description.
“that way is one of an infinite number of ways that I could possibly coarse-grain, but it's certainly the useful one.”
- Setting up a competition between the best arguments for and against a theory (steelmanning) is the wrong methodology; rather than artificially strengthening or weakening arguments, one should seek the correct version of every argument, aiming to get things right rather than stage a rhetorical prize fight.
“I want to come up with the correct version, the best version of every argument. I'm not gonna try to make an argument sound stronger than it is or weaker than it is.”
Copenhagen interpretation lacks precise definition of measurement and collapse, whereas physicists' actual work treats measurement as trivial.
- In the recent American Physical Society-backed survey of physicists on unsettled questions, the Copenhagen interpretation received more votes than any other interpretation of quantum mechanics — about a third of respondents — with many-worlds in second place and the remainder split among other options.
“among physicists, the Copenhagen interpretation gets more votes than any other interpretation. It doesn't get the most votes. It's about a third of the people surveyed”
- Even Einstein, despite formulating general relativity, repeatedly failed to fully internalize that coordinates are not physical reality — going to his grave confused about whether black holes and gravitational waves were real, because distinguishing genuine physics from mere coordinate artifacts proved extremely difficult; this same lesson applies to quantum mechanics, where position and momentum are coordinate-like choices.
“Einstein died... in the 1950s. He went to his grave not really understanding that there were these things called black holes and being very confused about whether or not there were these things called gravitational waves.”
All electrons are vibrations in a single electron field, making them identical rather than mysteriously the same particle.
- All electrons are identical not because they are secretly the same single electron (Wheeler's idea, which Carroll says is wrong and does not work) but because every electron is a vibration in one underlying electron field, just as all photons are vibrations in the single electromagnetic field.
“There's that famous idea by Wheeler that all electrons are the same because they're really the same electron. That is wrong. It doesn't work.”