What this covers

Tyler Cowen and Sean Carroll explore the ethical and practical case for maximizing economic growth as a moral imperative for the present generation. Cowen's argument begins with a provocative premise: future people, once they exist, deserve equal moral weight to those alive today, which means welfare should not be discounted simply for temporal distance. From this foundation, he builds toward a claim that [compounding returns](jargon:compounding returns) in economic growth is the most powerful lever for improving human welfare across generations, far outweighing other policy targets. Growth must be paired with two absolutes—sustainability and inviolable human rights—to avoid catastrophe or injustice. The conversation moves fluidly between economics and philosophy, touching on how societies should organize themselves, why past infrastructure projects moved faster than today's, and what growth actually measures beyond GDP.

The discussion covers considerable ground. Cowen critiques the standard discount rate applied to future welfare, arguing it conflates corporate budgeting with societal ethics and could justify trading thousands of future deaths for present pleasure. He addresses existential risk head-on, noting that rare catastrophic threats—weapons of mass destruction, climate collapse, asteroid impact—become collectively significant over centuries. He examines how compounding returns apply not only to economies but to personal knowledge and education. The conversation turns to specific puzzles in behavioral economics, including the winner's curse and the endowment effect, before Carroll redirects into quantum mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation, and anthropic questions about our place in time. Throughout, Cowen emphasizes that thinking like an economist means applying cost-benefit reasoning to any domain of human choice—not merely money, but marriage, freedom, and moral obligation across generations.

Sharpest takeaway

Cowen argues that because future generations count just as much as the present (a zero discount rate), the most moral course is to maximize sustainable economic growth now—constrained by inviolable human rights—since compounding growth makes virtually everyone better off over time.

  • Future people, once they exist, are no less real, so their welfare should not be discounted for time (only for risk).
  • Compounding economic growth raises real incomes, health, education, and freedoms for virtually everyone over the long run.
  • Growth must be paired with sustainability and absolute human rights to avoid catastrophic or unjust outcomes.

The argument · threads13 threads · 46 claims
0.85

Compounding economic growth is the most powerful utilitarian lever for expanding human freedom and wellbeing.

7 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Wealth Plus is a refined version of GDP that corrects for two things GDP fails to capture—the value of the environment and the value of leisure time—giving a finer measure of true societal wellbeing; over time a much richer society on this measure is happier, more creative, and more rewarding than a poorer one, as evidenced by the direction people choose to migrate.

    “Wealth Plus is similar to what we today call GDP, but there's some problems in GDP. It doesn't properly account for the value of the environment and it doesn't properly account for the value of leisure time. So I just want to adjust GDP a bit to make it a finer measure.”

  • The practical core of the book is that if you can achieve compounding returns you are probably doing the right thing—this applies not only to societal growth but to personal education and knowledge: if you aren't learning in a compounding way over time, you're probably not getting very far.

    “If you can get compounding returns, you're probably doing the right thing. I'd say that's the core point of the book on the practical issues. And also with your own education, your own knowledge, like are you learning in some kind of compounding way over time?”

  • Economic growth expands personal freedom such as choice of marriage partner: a poor, immobile agricultural village forces you to marry locally and, if gay, likely into an intolerant opposite-gender match, whereas capitalism and the mobility and tolerance that come with prosperity ease these constraints—a cosmopolitan liberalization of values accompanying prosperity.

    “you have an agricultural society. It's poor, everyone lives in a small village, you're not very mobile... odds are you'll marry someone right in your village. If you're gay, probably there's less toleration... And capitalism has eased a lot of those constraints.”

  • Society should be stubbornly attached to two things: economic growth with compounding returns—more powerful than any other utilitarian factor in boosting human wellbeing—and human rights, which in some cases are absolute and should never be violated; if everyone holds to these two 'blades,' macro outcomes turn out wonderful without pursuing many other values.

    “I argue we should be stubbornly attached to the idea of economic growth with compounding returns. It is more powerful than any other utilitarian factor in boosting human wellbeing. And the other thing we should be stubbornly attached to is Human Rights, which in some instances are absolute.”

  • The best way to help future generations is to maximize the current sustainable rate of economic growth and to hand down high-quality institutions that let them maximize their own growth; sustainability matters (which is why the environment is important, since a bad environment threatens it), and a society growing at 3% over 100–200 years becomes vastly wealthier than one growing at 2% due to compounding.

    “if you have a society growing... say at 3% over time, over a 100, 200 years that will be much, much wealthier than a society growing at 2%.”

  • Economic growth is the process of figuring out which goods and services other people want and producing them; over time it raises real incomes and wages, creates better, safer, more rewarding jobs, gives more choice in marriage, improves health care and education, and lowers infant mortality—so virtually everyone is better off, even though in any given year many people are thrown out of work and upset.

    “Over time, virtually everyone benefits. In the first year, not everyone benefits. A lot of people are thrown out of work, all kinds of problems which you can see on the evening news any night.”

  • The imperfections in measuring Wealth Plus (especially the environment) are not the main obstacle, since leisure is fairly easy to value and wealth and environmental quality largely move together except for carbon; the real problem is getting people to want to adopt this measure and goal.

    “the imperfections of measurements, I'm not sure they're actually the main problem. It's getting people to want to do it.”

0.81

Future generations deserve equal moral weight as present people, demanding zero-discount intergenerational ethics and existential risk mitigation.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • When aggregating utility across society over the distant future, we should discount future generations' wellbeing at a rate of zero—because once they arrive they are no less real—adjusting only for risk (whether something will actually happen), not for mere temporal distance; the Cleopatra thought experiment shows that discounting could in principle justify trading 3,000 future deaths for a present dessert, which is indefensible.

    “Once they arrive, they are no less real. So imagine that Cleopatra several thousand years ago, had decided she would take an extra helping of dessert, knowing that this would lead to the death of 3000 people today. Discounting could, in principle, justify a decision like that, but I think that's indefensible.”

  • The case for heavy discounting mostly rests on confusing the corporate perspective with society's: discount rates are appropriate for corporate budgeting in monetary terms, but when evaluating happiness or wellbeing across all of society for the distant future—affecting entire lives—a zero rate of discount should apply.

    “people sometimes confuse the perspective of a corporation with that of all of society... if you're talking about happiness or wellbeing and all of society for the distant future, affecting entire lives, that's when we should apply this zero rate of discount.”

  • Because civilization's end would erase the entire compounding future, his philosophy demands working hard to avoid catastrophic risks—taking truly disastrous climate change seriously and spending more on asteroid defense or at least developing those capabilities—since these existential threats, though individually rare, are collectively very worth taking into account.

    “we should spend more, say, on asteroid defense or at least developing those capabilities.”

  • Cowen's stance is the temporal analogue of Peter Singer's spatial cosmopolitanism: just as Singer argues we should value a distant stranger as much as a person drowning before us, Cowen argues we should value future generations as much as people alive today—and he faults Singer for focusing on redistributing wealth now rather than increasing the size of the pie and the human race over time.

    “I once interviewed Singer... and I found him very shortsighted. It's all about redistributing wealth now rather than increasing the size of the pie and the human race over time.”

  • There is a good chance humanity won't last another 800 years and that we will eventually destroy ourselves, because even though the probability that weapons of mass destruction are used catastrophically in any given year is small, letting enough years tick off makes it eventually happen; the rational response is to make things much better in the next 300-400 years and to diversify against risk, including by creating more conscious observers and possibly settling other planets.

    “If you think of weapons of mass destruction, the chance they're used in a major way in any year is quite small, but just let enough years tick off and at some point it will happen.”

  • Creating self-replicating von Neumann machines powered by different stars and seeding the galaxy with biological material and terraforming probes would diversify against existential risk; Cowen favors trying this and wants private philanthropy involved, but argues the near-term path to it is simply investing much more heavily in basic science now rather than pursuing the goal directly.

    “Self-replicating "von Neumann machine" powered by different stars around the galaxy, let it rip, send biological material around with more advanced technologies... But like in the short run, we've so many problems to solve that just mean making better science now.”

0.63

Thinking economically means applying incentive and preference analysis to any domain, treating economics as a general lens on human behavior.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Economics is not primarily about money; money is only one thing people value alongside respect, recognition, love, and friendship, and the economic mode of reasoning applies to any of these (e.g., the sunk-cost logic of leaving a boring movie).

    “Money is only one thing that people value. We also value respect, recognition, love, friendship.”

  • Thinking like an economist means treating it as a lens for the entire world: when you see a situation you ask why it came about, whether it reflects a generalizable model, and what the preferences, constraints, and incentives facing individuals are.

    “When you see a situation, you try to ask why did this come about? Is this the result of some kind of more generalizable model? You ask, what, here are the preferences and the constraints, what are the incentives facing the individuals?”

  • People behave closer to the naive economic model of rational maximizing when they have real money on the line; John List's study of baseball-card trading found amateurs overvalue a card once it is theirs (endowment effect) while professional traders buy and sell more ruthlessly at the best price, a result replicated multiple times.

    “There's a Chicago economist named John List, and he did a study of people trading baseball cards... once they own the card, they value it as much more just because it's theirs... but professional traders are in a sense, more ruthless... this kind of result has been replicated a number of other times.”

  • Chess players learn to calculate and think things through many steps ahead and learn early that many of their decisions are wrong—good training for many endeavors and not unlike thinking like an economist.

    “chess players, they learn how to calculate or think things through many steps. They also learn very early on a lot of their decisions are wrong. That's good training for doing many things.”

  • When you win a competitive auction (such as bidding on a house), under some assumptions you should be sad rather than happy, because winning means you were the highest bidder and thus the one who most overestimated the item's worth—the winner's curse.

    “you should be sad when you win the house, because that means you have winner's curse. You were the highest bidder. You are the one who overestimated what it's worth more than any of the other people.”

0.54

Growth and human rights should move together, but when they diverge wealth enables rights abuses warranting systemic reform.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Although growth and human rights mostly move together, they don't always: despite great wealth the US has a disgracefully high incarceration rate (wealth even helps afford it), making the penal system the biggest human-rights violation in the country—warranting limiting or ending the war on drugs and changing prosecutorial incentives that push for ever-higher sentences—even though many of the incarcerated are genuinely guilty they don't deserve the treatment they get.

    “In the United States, our rate of incarceration is disgracefully high and even though we're much wealthier that doesn't seem to have stopped it in some ways, it helps us afford it.”

  • There is a common East Asian pattern (Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Japan) where at a certain level of wealth people demand democracy and are given it; China is now arriving at that point but it is not guaranteed it will democratize, and Cowen credits the Communist Party with a remarkable job while arguing the regime is tyrannical and somewhat inefficient and must reform to survive.

    “There's a common pattern in other East Asian economies: You see it in Taiwan, you see it somewhat in Singapore, you see it in South Korea, also Japan, that at some point of wealth, people demand democracy, and it's given to them. Now China is about arriving at that point, it's not clear they will actually democratize.”

  • China's growing surveillance and centralization of power—including the idea of giving everyone a social credit score to secure complete cooperation—will prove destabilizing rather than a strength, because they won't be able to make that system work; in the competition of systems Cowen favors and would bet on the capitalist democracies, which have remained stable.

    “All that ability to have surveillance, I think will prove destabilizing rather than a good thing for them. The idea is you give everyone a social credit score and get complete cooperation, I don't think they'll be able to make that work.”

0.54

Redistributive policy should target capability and wealth enhancement for the poor rather than equality itself as the metric.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Inequality is an ex-post measure of distribution; rather than focusing on the distribution itself, one should look at concrete barriers against opportunity for today's poor and remove them, and if rich people get richer while the poor are no worse off, that outcome is fine.

    “Inequality is an ex-post measure of the big distribution. I would just say look at concrete barriers against opportunity... if rich people get richer and the poor people are no worse off, to me, that's fine.”

  • Cowen dislikes universal basic income because he doesn't like paying people not to work and the incentive on both sides is to work and create less; redistribution should instead target the disabled, very old, and orphaned, and otherwise take the form of wealth-enhancing transfers—educating poor children, fixing their health, ending malnutrition—because following the lodestar of boosting wealth steers you toward the better rather than worse redistributions.

    “I don't like the idea of paying people not to work... The best kinds of redistributions are those that, say, educate poor children or fix up their health or end malnutrition. And those also boost wealth.”

  • Society should aim for institutions that encourage people to have more children—subsidizing education, keeping major cities like London affordable—and the fact that such policies can sustainably support more people is itself a reason to do them, but the goal is people who want to raise children properly (which boosts growth), not boosting numbers for their own sake into a teeming slum.

    “I do think we should aim for institutions that encourage people to have more children... You want people to want to have the children to raise them properly, that's more likely to boost economic growth, then trying to make the whole world, like some kind of teaming slum.”

0.50

Government should actively supply underinvested public goods like science and infrastructure while deregulating most markets and tightening environmental rules.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Cowen describes himself as a small-l libertarian consequentialist who does not see taxation as intrinsically evil: governments should actively supply public goods like infrastructure and subsidized science (we currently underinvest), even though governments do many things badly (e.g., the NYC subway), and the goal is to find policies that boost government and market simultaneously rather than treating them as substitutes.

    “You could say I'm a small L libertarian, but I don't think taxation is intrinsically evil. I think there are a lot of public goods, which governments should actively supply.”

  • The US should deregulate most of its economy while regulating parts of the environment more tightly, subsidize science more, and build more infrastructure, but it also needs a cultural shift: we once built the Golden Gate Bridge in three years, the Empire State Building quickly, and put a man on the moon in about seven years from scratch, yet now it can take decades to extend a single Manhattan subway line because of overlapping authorities.

    “build the Golden Gate Bridge in three years as we once did, to build the Empire State Building as quickly as we did, to put a man on the moon in basically seven years starting from scratch. We've lost a lot of those capabilities. It can take us decades just to extend one subway line in Manhattan.”

0.40

Productivity and scientific progress have slowed outside tech, reflecting lost cultural will and policy failures that must reverse.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Rates of productivity growth and scientific progress (outside of tech and Moore's law) were much higher earlier in the 20th century, and there are visible retrogressions—airplanes advanced far more in their first 60 years than in the last 40-50 (we still fly planes designed in the late 1960s), nuclear power has regressed despite being green, and traffic is worse—reflecting partly policy problems and partly a lost cultural willingness to do things quickly and well.

    “rates of productivity growth... were much higher than they are right now. Scientific progress other than like tech and Moore's law, it was mostly much more rapid.”

  • US life expectancy fell in 2015 and 2016 (per a CDC report), a tiny but real reversal that earlier in the 20th century would have been impossible and intolerable—prompting a national campaign—yet today even well-educated people are unaware of it, reflecting a cultural failure rooted in poor self-care, opioids, and science not advancing fast enough.

    “in 2015, in 2016, in this country life expectancy fell. That's awful... It's a public health issue. We're not taking good care of ourselves, there are opioids and science is not advancing fast enough to undo those problems.”

  • The US differs from peer liberal democracies on incarceration and violence because of a more violent history in which firearms were intimately connected to settling and taming the nation, combined with great diversity, large size, and weak pressures for social conformity—which yields both more creativity and more destructive behavior, with no obvious big-picture fix.

    “I think we have a much more violent history, where firearms were intimately connected to settling and taming this nation... we're just very diverse and we're a very large country, and we don't have always very strong pressures for social conformity. So the upside is, we have more creativity but also a lot more people behaving in crazy destructive ways”

0.40

Intellectual humility, exposure to disagreement, and multi-disciplinary reading guard against the conformity and authority bias inherent in expertise.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Being a professor is a 'dangerous poison' because the role accustoms you to telling people things and being an authority, and there are many incentives toward thinking you're right but few toward realizing you're often wrong, so one must cultivate obstreperous friends and family who will tell you you're full of crap.

    “there are so many incentives towards thinking you're right, and not so many towards realizing you're wrong a lot.”

  • There is far too much conformity bias in the social sciences: scholars assume they agree with each other, don't carefully examine their views, fail to integrate them with what they know about economics, don't read much outside their fields, and effectively sleep-walk through intellectual life.

    “There's way too much conformity bias in the social sciences, at least. People who just kind of show up at the lunch table... they more or less assume they agree with each other.”

  • Economics is part science and part art with limited predictive power—most people didn't predict the financial crisis or the Great Depression—so it should be approached with epistemic humility; it helps you see patterns rather than forecast, and it is not the only way to see patterns.

    “Economics is part science, but it's also part art... you need to approach it with epistemic humility. And you know most people did not predict the financial crisis or the Great Depression”

0.32

Policy should rely on federalism and state-level competition when effects on growth are uncertain, especially for arts and humanities.

1 pointcentrality 3/5
  • Because it isn't always clear how the arts and humanities contribute to wealth creation (unlike science), when we don't know the best policy it is preferable to rely on federalism and competing state-level experiments—so public universities and arts/humanities funding should be done by states rather than the federal government.

    “when we're not sure what's exactly the best thing to do, then I'm keener to have federalism in these competing experiments. So I like the idea that our universities, if they're public sector, they're done by the states and not by the federal government”

0.22

Practical wisdom in eating and social settings requires reading people's incentives and building credibility rather than naive deference.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Eating well in a restaurant is as much sociology as economics: the key skill is figuring out whom to ask for the best dish and establishing credibility with them, because if you naively ask a Chinese restaurant for the best dish they may serve you the worst one, whereas demonstrating knowledge of regional cuisines earns their genuine help.

    “If you just walk into a Chinese restaurant and say what's the best dish, they'll actually serve you the worst one... But if you tell them you've been to regional Chinese cities and talk about different regional cuisines, get their attention, they're more willing to help.”

  • On average you should initially shy away from menu specials and boxed/pushed dishes, because a special often signals a dish the kitchen isn't used to making, an item they're trying to clear from stock, or an experiment in which you are the guinea pig—rather than one of their reliably best dishes, which would simply be on the regular menu.

    “If they have a special, often it's something that they're not used to making, if it's one of their best dishes, you wonder why isn't it just on the menu? Sometimes they're just trying to get rid of the stock left in the kitchen.”

0.22

Personal altruism should be practiced through specific high-conviction bets on individuals rather than diffuse effective altruism approaches.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Cowen pledged all royalties from the book to a single Ethiopian guide he calls Yonas and his family of ten, framing it not as effective-altruism-style wide spreading of wealth but as a venture-capital bet on a specific person he judged smart and stable—living out his argument that we should be more altruistic at the margin while practicing what he preaches.

    “I view it as myself as venture capitalist, you know who will steward the funds most effectively? And I'm making a bet on Yonas because of the time I spent with him.”

  • Cowen's main intention in writing any book is selfish: to provoke himself to figure out what he thinks by working out unsolved problems in his mind, rather than to be didactic toward readers.

    “the main intention in any book I write is to provoke myself to figure out what I think at all. So they're like unsolved problems in my mind and I only work them out by writing about them.”

0.04

Moral consideration should extend to simulations and nonhuman animals based on consciousness and capacity for goals.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • If sentient simulations or uploaded minds are conscious, intelligent beings with emotions, complex lives, goals, and plans, they should count morally—indeed in a computational sense we may already be simulations, so the distinction between 'real' people and simulations may not be well defined, and many nonhuman animals probably deserve more moral weight than we currently give them.

    “in a computational sense, arguably we're simulations now. So I'm not sure that the distinction between we real people and the simulations is well defined. So if they're conscious, intelligent sentient beings with emotions and complex lives and goals and plans, they should count.”

0.04

Rawls failed to account for growth across generations in his theory of justice.

1 pointcentrality 1/5
  • Rawls' big mistake was being overly enamored of John Stuart Mill's stationary steady state and worrying that growth might be unjust because the first generation—the worst-off—is asked to save and grow the economy; this neglect of growth across generations is the weak spot in Rawls that most people don't discuss, and Rawls' original position arguably should have admitted it doesn't work across generations.

    “He was overly enamored of steady state stationary state of John Stuart Mill. And he thought, growth was possibly unjust because the first generation, they were the worst off people... that, I think, is the weak spot in Rawls that most people don't talk about.”