What this covers

Alta Charo, a law professor and bioethicist, sits down to discuss how biological innovation intersects with law, medicine, and political philosophy. Rather than treating bioethical disputes as conflicts between technological capability and moral principle, Charo argues that policy questions turn on distinctions most people skip over: the gap between what is morally wrong and what should be illegal, the difference between a hazard and a risk, and the boundary between autonomous self-regarding choices and choices imposed on others. The conversation spans designer babies, abortion, contraception, birth control, stem cells, end-of-life care, religious exemptions, and the mechanics of how new genetic tools like CRISPR reshape what becomes possible to regulate.

Charo works outward from first principles. She shows how Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny and Publicly Accessible Reasoning structure what a pluralistic society can legally require. She challenges the "wisdom of repugnance"—the intuition that visceral disgust signals moral truth—by tracing how it has repeatedly justified slavery, anti-miscegenation laws, and persecution. She separates Enhancement vs Therapy into clearer cases and harder ones, and explains why germline editing provokes more resistance than somatic editing. On specific flash points, she argues that fetal-personhood amendments fail politically not from moral disagreement but because they would criminalize in vitro fertilization, and that religious conscience objections by doctors and pharmacists are better analyzed through Power Dynamics Framework—monopoly power creates obligations—than through competing rights. Throughout, she treats biology soberly, explaining why designer babies are biologically implausible and why CRISPR matters as an agent of Decentralization of Technology rather than a metaphysical rupture.

Sharpest takeaway

Charo argues that bioethical and legal disputes over new biological powers are driven less by the technologies themselves than by political philosophy, power dynamics, and intent—and that good policy requires distinguishing what is morally wrong from what should be illegal, hazard from risk, and autonomous self-regarding choices from choices imposed on others.

  • Government responses to technologies like cloning reflect each country's political philosophy and constitutional structure, not a shared moral analysis
  • Professional monopoly power obligates doctors and pharmacists to provide all legal services, limiting conscience exemptions
  • Moral status arguments about embryos collapse into questions of intent rather than biology

The argument · threads7 threads · 27 claims
0.72

Legal protections should attach to capacity to suffer and fundamental rights, not species membership or religious belief about ensoulment.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Autonomous competent adults may make self-regarding healthcare decisions including refusal of treatment, and parents may make decisions for their young children, but parental discretion is not unlimited: when faith-healing or similar choices put a child at high risk of permanent serious injury or death, the state steps in—paralleling how society removes children from abusive parents—because the irreconcilable belief now harms someone who could not consent.

    “most places have some kind of statute that tries to lay out a borderline where the parental decisions are now putting the child at high risk of having a permanent or serious injury or could lead to death, at which point the state takes over”

  • Legal protections can attach to the capacity to suffer rather than species membership: habeas corpus petitions have been filed for captive chimpanzees on the ground that their complex intellectual and emotional life makes them capable of suffering and thus entitled not to be forced to suffer—while not entitled to vote or attend college—mirroring how we forbid torturing a cat (it can suffer) yet allow euthanizing it (it has limited sense of future), so there is a right not to be miserable without a right to continued existence.

    “once you're capable of suffering, you have a right not to be forced to suffer. They may not have a right to go to college because they couldn't actually benefit from it”

  • When a liberty is merely ordinary, government can regulate or prohibit it with only a rational basis, but when something is a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right (like the right to marry), government must show a compelling need that cannot be met by any less onerous means—a very strict standard that struck down anti-miscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia.

    “when you have something that is specifically guaranteed in the Constitution... then the government can't stop you from doing it unless it can show, first of all, a compelling need, not just a rational basis, a compelling need that cannot be answered by anything that is less onerous”

  • Because physicians and pharmacists hold monopoly power over legally restricted services and take an oath to serve patients, the closed professional community has an obligation to make all legal services available; conscience objections are more defensible for low-power roles like a supermarket clerk where the customer can easily use another line, so the right analytic frame is power dynamics, not religious expression versus secular equality.

    “as a physician or as a pharmacist, you basically are taking an oath to serve your patient, and you have more power than the patient. In fact, for doctors and pharmacists, there's a monopoly power.”

  • Using a human or animal purely as an instrument for one's own purposes—like enslavement—is recognized as a wrong under Immanuel Kant's principle that beings are ends in themselves and should not be turned into mere instruments of others' needs; applying that principle to animals would place a natural limit on how much we manipulate or edit them.

    “That's Immanuel Kant's notion of not turning people into simple instruments of your own needs and desires, that they are end in and of themselves. And if we were to think about animals that way too, it would put a natural limit on how much we manipulate them.”

0.71

Legal rules and moral rules serve different purposes; much regulation targets consequences and fairness, not wrongness.

9 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Public health law continually collides with libertarian autonomy objections: rules preventing one person from harming others (like polluting drinking water) are accepted, but rules limiting purely self-regarding risk are condemned as 'nanny state'—and the raw milk case shows the regulation actually targets the sale (the economy and profiting from a high-risk product), not the individual's right to consume.

    “if it's about why I can't drink raw milk, which has a objectively higher risk of giving me a really ugly condition... any laws that prohibit the sale of that to me are viewed as nanny state, because they are impinging on my autonomy”

  • The liberty language in contraception and abortion decisions logically extends to support an individual's right to be free of a state law criminalizing drugs that allow a comfortable death; bodily autonomy in common law already lets people refuse life-sustaining treatment since the 1970s, and the death-with-dignity debate concerns extending that from refusing intrusion to taking active steps to die peacefully.

    “the decisions around things like contraception and abortion included language about liberty that would comfortably encompass the right of the individual to be free of a state law that criminalizes the effort to take a drug that's going to allow you to die comfortably”

  • Cancer warnings fail by conflating hazard (the mere capacity of a substance to cause harm) with risk (hazard combined with the probability and dose of exposure); since substances like coffee or glyphosate require exposures many orders of magnitude beyond any human consumption to plausibly cause cancer, warning based on hazard alone would put nearly all foods on the list and renders warnings meaningless mush.

    “a hazard is something that has the capacity to cause some kind of harm, but the risk is the hazard and the probabilities. And so you have to ask what is the exposure that is needed?”

  • Much opposition to germline editing is consequentialist risk-aversion, which is sound: we shouldn't proceed without high confidence of benefit to the child and descendants—but editing to prevent a devastating, often lethal disease is the easiest case because it preserves Joel Feinberg's 'open future,' though multigenerational unintended effects may require multigenerational experiments that could make it impossible to satisfy ethical conditions.

    “We shouldn't be doing this until we have an incredibly high degree of confidence that the outcome is gonna be to the benefit of the child and any subsequent descendants, which is why germline editing to prevent a devastating often lethal disease, seems to me to be a far easier case to make. It expands the child's capacities in a way that guarantees the open future.”

  • As long as scientists and biologists keep advancing what they can do, lawyers and bioethicists will not run out of questions to address.

    “Not as long as the scientists and the biologists keep doing what they do.”

  • Bioethics arose in the 1960s-70s because medicine transitioned from being largely impotent to powerful (notably via antibiotics), and with each decade of growing power over our bodies and offspring came difficult choices, creating a crisis that demanded a global conversation about whether we should even have certain powers and which choices to make.

    “with each successive decade in the 20th century we have gained more power over our own physical bodies, over our physical fate, and over, therefore, the fate of our offspring”

  • Originalism arose, beginning with the Federalist Society, as a movement to put brakes on the 'living constitution' approach by limiting courts to what was actually written down in 1789, but many self-described originalists like Antonin Scalia abandoned the method whenever it led to outcomes they disliked, making its application inconsistent.

    “many of these people who call themselves originalist, including Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the most famous ones, failed completely to be originalist when it led to an outcome they didn't like”

  • National policies on human cloning did not reflect societies' moral views about cloning but rather the structure and power of their governments: European countries with public healthcare could simply decline to offer the service, while the US, lacking that lever and constrained by constitutional individual rights and procreative liberty, ended up with a general absence of law rather than a prohibition.

    “So we wound up with different policies that didn't reflect our views about cloning. Everybody might have thought it's a terrible idea or a good idea, it doesn't matter. What it reflected was the power of the government.”

  • There is a world of difference between what is morally right or wrong and what should be legal or illegal: we criminalize things that are not wrong because of unacceptable consequences (insider trading uses information and makes money, neither wrong, but it creates unfair advantage and undermines market integrity), and the law neither does nor should correspond point-by-point with anyone's morality.

    “there is a world of difference between the things that are right and wrong, and the things that should be legal and illegal. We make laws about things that are not wrong, they're actually fine, but they have consequences that we can't accept.”

0.65

Visceral repugnance and religious conviction are poor guides to law in pluralistic societies; public justification must be accessible to all.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Because the Constitution is an incomplete starting point, courts over time filled gaps by recognizing a right to privacy—not merely informational privacy but a sphere of personal action and relationships free from government intrusion—which grounded decisions protecting contraception for married couples, then single women, then bodily autonomy during pregnancy in Roe v. Wade, and later extension of the right to marry beyond heterosexual couples.

    “the courts have recognized that the Constitution is not a complete document, it's a starting point, and they have tried to fill in the gaps over time, and one of those gaps was the right to privacy”

  • The 'wisdom of repugnance' (or 'yuck factor')—the idea that widely shared visceral disgust signals something deep even when unarticulated—is not crazy and may flag things worth examining, but it has repeatedly led to catastrophe, having underpinned anti-miscegenation laws, slavery, and persecution of homosexual and transgender people; with familiarity, undifferentiated yuck typically differentiates into reasoned support or principled opposition.

    “it was the repugnance with intermarriage between people of different races that led to the anti-miscegenation laws. It was the repugnance of people who are darker that led white people to enslave dark people. There are many examples in which this repugnance has been really catastrophically damaging”

  • In a pluralistic society (more a stew than a melting pot), shared moral and legal rules should rest on publicly accessible reasoning—justifications that people from different cultures can converge on without accepting one another's faith premises—so a rule defensible only by reference to a particular religion, with no non-faith-based argument, cannot comfortably become law because it only makes sense to a subset of the population.

    “if where you're coming from is one where there's no way for you to explain it except by reference to your particular religion, there's no non-faith-based argument at all that could work for somebody who doesn't share your faith, then we have a problem. And that would not comfortably fit in our laws”

0.55

Designer-baby fears and species-integrity objections rest on biological illiteracy and outdated romanticism about genetic purity.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Objections that we shouldn't tinker with the human species rest on an outdated, overly romanticized notion of species as a closed vertical universe of genes passed parent-to-child; in reality evolution is a chaotic mishmash with horizontal gene transfer—we carry genes from wildly different species in our cells—so the integrity of the concept of homo sapiens cannot be undermined because it was never as pure as imagined.

    “evolution is not a tree with branches and twigs ever separating further out, it's this chaotic mishmash of things that are constantly crossing back and forth. We have genes within us that come from wildly different species that we've incorporated into our very cells.”

  • Public reaction to Dolly the cloned sheep revealed widespread biological illiteracy, with people imagining cloning produces an identical adult copy and even copies personality—wanting to clone Mother Teresa as if to get a selfless nun rather than someone prone to scoliosis—rather than understanding it copies body type, not the person.

    “people continued to imagine that cloning meant xeroxing yourself and having an adult who's identical to you”

  • Humans already influence the trait probabilities of their offspring through assortative mating—choosing partners from a limited range of height, build, and other traits—so trying to change the probabilities of outcomes is not fundamentally alien, since with genetics it is all about probabilities anyway.

    “There is something called assortative mating. We tend to marry or otherwise have children with people from a limited range, and so that changes the probabilities that our children are going to be tall or short”

  • We cannot design our children because traits are multigenic rather than controlled by a single gene, genes operate against context and background, epigenetics governs how strongly genes express (like piano pedals altering the same notes), and the microbiome further shapes gene expression—so the designer-baby fear is biologically untenable.

    “it's very hard to control traits. There are very, very few things that are going to be controlled by a single trait. Things are multigenic.”

0.51

Somatic editing of living persons is far less controversial than germline editing because it affects only the treated individual, not descendants.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Enhancing a born child or adult is far more efficient and targeted than editing an embryo—parents already give non-deficient short boys human growth hormone for social advantage—because embryonic editing is like firing a pellet gun into parkland hoping it lands right without untoward effects elsewhere, whereas a post-birth intervention can be far more precise and confident of the desired outcome.

    “Doing it at the embryonic stage is like taking a pellet gun and shooting it out into a park land hoping that something lands in the right place and that it doesn't have all these untoward effects because of other places it had an effect. Once the kid is born, or once you do it to yourself when you're an adult, you can be far more targeted”

  • Somatic editing changes any cell except eggs, sperm, and embryos, affecting only the treated person and so is far less controversial and largely accepted (already used for cancer and blindness), whereas germline editing alters eggs, sperm, or embryos so the change propagates to all descendants until it mutates, making it the far more controversial case.

    “Germline means eggs and sperm and embryos, where if you make a change, it's not only gonna affect the person who comes from that embryo... but their own eggs and sperm will have been affected. So the grandchildren, great grandchildren, all the way down the line will also be affected”

  • The enhancement debate over editing to boost an already-healthy trait (like making average muscles unusually strong) is driven more by concerns about societal equity, meritocracy, and unfair advantage than by the transformation itself—since we already enhance via nutrition and training and some people are simply born lucky—except where editing pushes beyond known human capacities (like infrared vision), which raises genuinely different questions about altering the parameters of homo sapiens.

    “that is the so-called enhancement debate. And in many ways, it's more about this concern about society and equity, than it is about the actual phenomenon of the transformation”

0.48

Abortion and reproductive restrictions are actually driven by intent and practical consequences, not by fetal sanctity claims.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Fetal-personhood amendments granting an embryo full legal status from fertilization have failed at the ballot even in highly conservative states with anti-abortion majorities, because such a law would effectively criminalize in vitro fertilization—and there are too many would-be grandmothers whose grandchildren exist only because IVF was available.

    “those personhood amendments have failed every single time, even in highly conservative states with a majority of the population opposed to most abortions. Why? Because it would have the effect of basically criminalizing in vitro fertilization.”

  • Despite framing abortion in terms of the sanctity and right-to-life of the fetus, the operative concept is actually intent: a woman who loses a fertilized egg naturally is innocent while one who intentionally does the same is deemed evil—revealed by the fact that the vast majority of fertilized eggs fail to implant and that abortion opponents make rape and incest exceptions even though the fetus's sanctity would be identical.

    “the woman who loses the fertilized egg through no action of her own is innocent, but the woman who makes the decision to do exactly the same thing, which is lose that fertilized egg is now evil”

0.17

CRISPR democratizes genetic engineering by making powerful science accessible to more people with less training and resources.

1 pointcentrality 2/5
  • CRISPR is a continuation of existing genetic engineering but far more precise, efficient, and accessible—doable by people with less training and less sophisticated facilities—so, like YouTube did for movie making, it decentralizes a key area of science and gives more power to more people to do more things, with more predictive confidence.

    “it is much more precise, much more efficient, and interestingly can be done by people with less training and facilities that are less sophisticated. So, the way YouTube decentralized movie making and really transformed a lot of things. This decentralizes a key area of science”