Madhavan Ramanujam - How to Price Products - [Invest Like the Best, REPLAY]
What this covers
Patrick interviews Madhavan Ramanujam, author of Monetizing Innovations, about pricing as part of product design. The anchoring story is Porsche in the early 1990s, which tested demand and price for an SUV before any sketch existed; the Cayenne now brings in more than half its profit. Ramanujam reads Steve Jobs's remark about not asking customers as a point about who solves the problem, not a case against validating price with prototypes. He also says asking customers what to build produces garbage.
The middle of the conversation is practical technique. Customers are poor at naming prices but decent at judging them relative to a known reference, and he describes asking for acceptable, expensive, and prohibitively expensive prices after a benefits pitch. He separates features from benefits, citing SmugMug's revenue gain from rewriting its pricing page without changing the product. The wine-test anecdote shows price shaping perceived quality. He also covers psychological thresholds such as $49 versus $50, and a rule of thumb that companies should capture 20 to 25 percent of the value they create.
The range widens to strategy and failure. He sorts failure types with examples: Kodak's shelved digital IP, the Amazon Fire phone, Google Glass, and a chipmaker that underpriced. He credits Apple's iPhone range with segment-based price points, and the exchange on pay-as-you-go versus subscription turns on whether a shared, measurable value metric exists. The claim that fee structures always yield a clear customer preference is flagged as contested.
Ramanujam argues that companies should test willingness to pay alongside the product from the earliest stage, because product-market fit validation that omits price lets founders hear what they want to hear, and pricing should be designed around segments and value rather than set after the build.
- Porsche tested demand for an SUV with prototypes and pricing conversations before any production, and the resulting Cayenne became more than half of its profit
- Asking customers what to charge yields useless answers, so pricing must be elicited through relative and threshold-based questions
- Companies should productize to customer segments defined by needs, value, and willingness to pay, not position one product across segments
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Customers often read a higher price as a signal of higher quality, as in a blind wine test where people who judged a $100 wine better failed to distinguish it, so pricing shapes perceived quality and premium products should not be priced low.
“you would say the $100 wine is better because most people would probably say that with higher prices it's better quality, et cetera, but then on a blind test actually fail it completely.”
Features are what the company builds and benefits are what customers get; founders should pitch benefits and watch whether prospects' eyes light up and whether they will pay, because features alone do not reveal value.
“Features is what you build. Benefits is what customers get. And if you pitch the benefits, you're trying to see if their eyes light up.”
At scale, companies can identify psychological price thresholds where demand drops sharply, such as demand falling once a $49 monthly price crosses $50, so pricing just below a threshold can avoid losing large amounts of demand.
“Is there a, let's say, $49 per month that I need to be at because once I cross $50, the demand actually just drops.”
When customers are asked to choose between equivalent-looking fee structures (10 percent of a $100 item, or $5 plus 5 percent, or $10), they are never indifferent; across thousands of such experiments, a model that makes intuitive sense to customers always emerges.
“I've never seen the indifferent actually. There's always a model that just makes intuitive sense for your customers”
Apple's iPhone line spans roughly $299 to $1,499, which Ramanujam says productizes to price points and willingness-to-pay segments; a single-model strategy would not have produced Apple's scale of profitability.
“there is an iPhone from $299 all the way to $1,499. In a way, they have productized to a price point or a segment.”
Feature shock occurs when a product bundles too many features that resonate with no one; the Amazon Fire phone, launched at $179, fell to $0.99 within six months and was discontinued.
“the phone started at $179. In 6 months, it was $0.99. And they rolled off that entire business”
Hidden gems are products that conflict with company DNA or threaten existing revenue and get shelved; Kodak held digital photography IP from the 1970s without productizing it to protect its print business, while Autotrader and Cars.com emerged from newspapers as online marketplaces.
“Kodak, which had the IP for digital photographs back in the 1970s but never productized it because they're worried about cannibalizing their entire print business.”
Cost-plus pricing is suboptimal; price should align to the value customers ascribe to the product, and then cost structure should be controlled to maximize margin, since willingness to pay determines price and costs determine margins.
“So this is not a cost-plus-margin strategy. ... That is usually very suboptimal. You need to be more value-based pricing strategy”
Porsche in the early 1990s explored an SUV by testing market need and willingness to pay before producing any blueprint, sketch, or product; the resulting Cayenne now accounts for more than half of Porsche's profit.
“There's nothing drawn in terms of a blueprint, sketch, or even a product. But they just went in and tried to identify whether there is a need for a Porsche SUV.”
Steve Jobs is best understood as a pricing genius: Apple launched the iPhone at a high price with a skimming strategy, then lowered prices across generations and productized to multiple price points, rather than selling one cheap model.
“I consider Steve Jobs as a pricing genius, not just as a product genius.”
Asking prospects for the acceptable, expensive, and prohibitively expensive price after pitching benefits reveals the range: acceptable is where customers love both product and price, expensive is roughly the value price, and prohibitively expensive is the ceiling.
“what I call as the acceptable expensive and prohibitively expensive question”
As a rule of thumb, companies should capture at least 20 to 25 percent of the economic value they create for customers; around 50 percent leaves room for disruption, and under 20 percent means under-monetizing.
“you should be able to capture at least 20% to 25% of the economic value that you are actually bringing to the table.”
The lazy reading of Steve Jobs's statement that he did not ask customers is that testing is unnecessary, but Jobs meant that entrepreneurs must solve problems themselves while still validating willingness to pay with prototypes.
“the lazy approach is to say, Steve Jobs didn't test with customers, and I don't need to”
Entrepreneurs have no choice about whether they will have a pricing conversation with customers; the only thing in their control is when it happens, so they should have it early to design the product around what customers value and will pay for.
“you actually don't have a choice whether you'll have a pricing conversation with a customer. The only thing in your control is when you will have it.”
Product-market fit validation that excludes price is insufficient because people answer hypothetical product questions differently once a price is attached; for example, liking a headset changes when you ask whether you like it at $200, so teams hear what they want to hear.
“if you didn't put pricing as part of your product market fit validation, often you are hearing what you want to hear.”
Asking prospects to value a product relative to a known reference, such as 'if Salesforce is indexed at $100, what do we bring to the table?', yields answers people can make sensibly, because people are relatively rational though absolutely poor at naming prices.
“people are absolutely meaningless but relatively super smart.”
SmugMug changed no product features but reframed its pricing page from a long feature list to benefits such as selling photos online and personalization, which produced double-digit revenue improvements.
“It was double-digit improvements in revenue, no changes in products, just the way you talk about the product and the value.”
Minivation is building the right product but lacking the courage to charge the right price; a semiconductor firm cut its chip price from $0.65 to $0.85 to undo Moore's law, yet the chip carried roughly $50 of end-product premium and could have sold for about $5.
“And most of them laughed, saying you could have gone all the way to $5, and it would have been just fine.”
Undead products are either the wrong answer to the right question or an answer to a question no one cares about; Google Glass, priced at $1,500 and dead within two months, should have been productized first for paid B2B and professional segments such as surgeons and technicians.
“The Google Glass initiative was a complete dead on arrival in two months”
Transparency and fairness are linked to usage and delivered value, not predictability; a subscription is not automatically fair, and charging for months when a customer did not use the product raises a fairness question.
“transparency and fairness has nothing to do with being predictable. Most people confuse this.”
Segmentation should be based on customer needs, value, and willingness to pay, and companies should build a distinct product for each cluster; positioning one product across segments after building it has already lost the battle.
“You need to be able to productize to segments. And then when you find these clusters of customers who need something”
Pay-as-you-go pricing requires a metric that both company and customer clearly agree on, plus the ability to measure it and show value delivered; many SaaS products lack this attribution, and without it a subscription is the better choice.
“you need to have a metric that you and your customers clearly agreed to and there is attribution”
Of the companies that monetize innovation successfully, two criteria matter: pricing before product and C-level involvement in monetization, growth, or innovation; companies with that involvement performed 35 percent better on KPIs than those without it.
“companies that had this involvement were 35% better than companies that did not in all kinds of KPS.”
Asking customers what solution to build or how to build a product produces garbage; entrepreneurs should identify customer problems and unmet needs and then develop solutions themselves.
“If you just go and ask them what is the solution or how should I build a product, you'll probably get garbage back.”
A major pricing mistake is focusing on how much to charge rather than how to charge; the pricing or monetization model is often more important than the price level.
“how you charge is way more important than how much you charge”
Price should be understood as a measure of value, the way a liter measures volume, so a price expresses how much customers want the product and how badly they want it rather than being just a dollar figure.
“For instance, liter is a measure of volume, price is a measure of value.”
In bundling, leader products draw customers (the burger), filler products are added to bundles to increase uptake (fries and soda), and killer products should be excluded from bundles because including them depresses the bundle price for everyone, so they should be sold as stand-alone add-ons.
“Killer products are the ones that you need to be careful about because if you put it in a bundle, it will kill the bundle.”
Monetizing Innovation identifies four failure types (feature shock, minivation, hidden gems, and undead products), and the goal is to build the fifth category, breakthrough products, which requires early pricing conversations.
“The idea is to build the fifth category, which is called the breakthrough category.”
Subscription models make sense when customers demand predictable bills, when usage is similar month to month, when usage is highly variable (to avoid fluctuating bills), when usage is intermittent but value is ongoing (identity protection), or when simplifying the conversation is an advantage.
“It totally makes sense when customers, let's say, demand predictable bills”
Asking a customer what you should charge produces useless answers, because pricing strategy is the seller's job and must be elicited through indirect, structured questions.
“If you go and ask a customer, what should I charge for this product? You will get garbage back. That's your job.”
Simon-Kucher's largest pricing study, run every other year, found that 72 percent of innovations failed to monetize, and only 28 percent succeeded.
“What we found is that 72% of innovations failed to monetize.”
Pricing and monetization are a CEO-level topic because they are a growth issue; the CEO's role is to set the culture and ask the right questions for profitable growth, not to set price books.
“to me, pricing, monetization growth, especially when you think of it as a growth, as a topic is a 100% CEO topic.”
Subscription models make sense when simplifying the customer conversation helps, as Netflix did against Blockbuster's confusing fees, or when customers want to commit less, as AWS's pay-in-chunks model lets buyers avoid large upfront infrastructure spend.
“if you look at the famous example of Netflix versus Blockbuster, they simplified the conversation that was to their advantage.”
Across most industry verticals, customer needs are always heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, so companies must identify distinct clusters of customers with different needs and willingness to pay.
“I have not seen a single situation where customer needs are homogeneous. It's always heterogeneous, whether we like to accept it or not.”
Pay-as-you-go pricing makes sense when usage and value delivery are episodic rather than ongoing, and when underlying costs scale with usage, because a subscription could leave heavy users as negative-margin customers.
“Also helps in the underlying costs with scale with usage. ... someone might actually be a negative margin customer for you.”
It is the company's job to educate customers on the value it delivers regardless of price level, and to defend its pricing and price integrity, rather than assuming low prices need no explanation and high prices always do.
“I wouldn't oversimplify it to saying that if your pricing is low, you don't need to educate”
A founder found his price ceiling by repeatedly doubling the price in deals until a prospect laughed him out of the room, then stabilized just below that threshold.
“he kept doubling the price in every deal till someone laughed him out of the room”
The same water sells for free from a fountain, $2 bottled, $2.50 with gas, and $5 from a minibar because different needs (convenience, price sensitivity, preference) are served by different packaging, so basic products can reveal segmentation logic.
“if you put water in a fountain, it's free. You put it in a bottle, it's $2. You put gas in it, it's $2.50. Throw it in a minibar, it's $5.”
Sellers should place buyers in the state of mind they would have if they already had the product, so they evaluate tangible benefits and how much of that benefit they would give back to the seller.
“you need to put the buyer in the same state of mind that you would if they had the product in front of them”
Low-priced products that bring customers into an ecosystem should use a land-and-expand approach, acquiring users cheaply and upselling more as their needs grow, with pricing that feels like an obvious no-brainer.
“If it is a low-priced product, often you probably need to have land and expand”
Willingness-to-pay testing is repeated over time; if a prospect refuses to pay for a prototype pitched with benefits, they will not pay for a nicer-looking version, so weak signals should be caught early.
“if someone actually says they won't pay for it, chances are they're not going to pay for it when you build a nicer-looking version, and that's the point.”
Advanced willingness-to-pay methods put prospects through simulated purchase decisions and vary the scenario, revealing the mental models and decision rules customers use to infer value.
“So you're tapping into the mental models and rules that they're using to make decisions”
Pricing conversations should break high-level value (time or money savings) into specific sources such as inventory reduction, service level, and customer economic gains, so the economic value can be quantified and a share captured.
“For instance, if I'm saving money, where is that coming from? Is it inventory reduction, for instance?”
Entrepreneurs treat pricing as art driven by gut feeling, but there is a science to measuring willingness to pay, which is a revelation to many founders and the reason Ramanujam wrote the book.
“they all approach this as an art. It's often an afterthought, but it's also driven based on gut feeling.”
Latin has a single word, pretium, for both price and value, which Ramanujam cites as evidence that price and value are two reflections of the same coin.
“in Latin, there's only one word for price and value. It's called pretium.”
Positive reactions to a feature or product are not the same as willingness to pay, so founders should separately verify whether customers would actually buy at a stated price.
“Do you like it at $200? The whole conversation is different.”
The main pricing models are subscription (predictable recurring pricing), pay-as-you-go or usage-based, dynamic pricing (equilibrium between supply and demand), freemium, and hybrids combining subscription and usage; companies should pick the model that fits their situation rather than copy competitors.
“not to gravitate to one or the other just because someone else is doing it”
Porsche built full-scale prototypes for 'car clinics' where potential customers rode in the vehicle, and used these sessions to test needs and willingness to pay before any unit was manufactured.
“They even did what we call as car clinics, where they would build a prototype, full-scale prototype, where they would actually bring in people and let them ride the car around.”
When a prospect says they will not pay, the most important follow-up is to ask why, because the answers reveal which needs, values, and objections should shape the product design.
“if someone says, no, they won't pay for it, the most important question is to ask why.”
When the iPhone X was priced at $1,000, the author declined it but bought a cheaper phone without the premium retina features at $799, showing that a lower-priced version was needed to capture him; without that product he would not have bought a phone.
“I was not willing to pay this, but there was another phone without all those retina features for like '$799.' I'm like, I'm paying for that.”
Porsche kept unconventional features such as a large cupholder, which engineers disliked, because customers said they needed and valued them and were willing to pay; a 6-speed manual was dropped because no one needed it in an SUV.
“a big cupholder, probably which goes against the grain of most engineers, doesn't look very aesthetically appealing, is in the car because people said they need it”
The single question every leader should ask is how they know their customers would pay for this innovation, which leads to a productive discussion about how one truly knows.
“How do you know that our customers would pay for this innovation?”
Plotting businesses on three axes (frequency of usage, frequency of value delivery, and cost of value delivery) can reveal which pricing model fits, and usage-based models stand out for high-cost businesses like Twilio and AWS with lower gross margins.
“I love 3-dimensional plotting of a business of frequency of usage, frequency of value delivery, and the cost of value delivery.”
A product built as one size fits all actually fits no one well, because a single product forces either overpricing for some customers or underpricing for others.
“if you have one price, you're either going to be overpriced for some or underpriced for others.”
Porsche's CEO framed the Taycan as not one of the most affordable electric vehicles, emphasizing that it is first and foremost a Porsche, a value message that resonates with the target segments.
“Taycan is not one of the most affordable electric vehicles you can buy. That was never Porsche's goal. First and foremost, it is a Porsche.”
Rahul Vohra of Superhuman used Ramanujam's willingness-to-pay method after reading Monetizing Innovation to set Superhuman's price, according to a podcast interview.
“Rahul Vohra from Superhuman actually used this method after he read Monetizing Innovation.”
Ramanujam originally wanted to title chapter 2 of Monetizing Innovation 'You Are Not Steve Jobs' but the editor found it too provocative, so it became 'Why Good People Get It Wrong.'
“the editor thought it was too provocative. So we actually toned it down to Why Good People Get It Wrong.”
Pricing is intimidating, but Monetizing Innovation is approachable; it requires work and actual customer testing, though strategies exist.
“It requires a lot of work. You have to go do it.”
Duncan Robertson, CFO of OpenTable, introduced Ramanujam to board member Bill Gurley after being impressed by his pricing work, a kindness that Ramanujam credits as pivotal to his career.
“he introduced me to Bill, and Bill was on the Board of OpenTable back then”