What this covers

This discussion, the fourth in EconTalk's ongoing exploration of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, brings Dan Klein and host Russ Roberts into conversation about Part III of the text. The episode centers on Smith's account of the impartial spectator—the internal judge through which we regulate our own conduct and assess our moral character. Rather than treating this as a simple construct, Klein and Roberts unpack how Smith positions it as both derived from society and oriented toward something more universal, creating a self-referential system in which one's internal judge can itself be judged by deeper judges, all originating from within oneself.

The conversation moves across several distinct domains. Early on, Smith's argument about faction and fanaticism surfaces as perhaps the most damaging corruption of moral sentiment, with partisans so committed to their side that they impute prejudices even to God. The discussion extends to practical questions about solitude, friendship, and social conversation—Smith's claim that strangers improve our temper better than friends because they won't indulge our brooding. It touches on psychology, examining how people develop the ability to adopt the impartial spectator's view over time and whether they can truly recover from great losses, with Roberts questioning the empirical confidence of Smith's claims about adaptation. Klein brings in Kirzner's theory of entrepreneurial alertness to suggest people have an interest in adopting wider perspectives. The episode also treats Smith's sociology of religion, his account of justice in war, and his observation that when merit becomes vague—as with poetry or economics—communities splinter into factions fighting over standing. A recurring tension emerges: most people believe they live by their own principles independent of others' view, yet Smith insists happiness, pride, and self-worth all depend fundamentally on what others think of us. Throughout, the possibility of self-deception looms large, particularly for wrongdoers persuading themselves of their innocence.

Sharpest takeaway

Klein and Roberts argue that Smith's moral system rests on the 'impartial spectator' as a recursive, internalized judge derived from society yet pointing toward a universal standard, such that morality, happiness, and self-worth are all enshrouded in spectatorial sympathy rather than autonomous principle.

  • Moral judgment is always enshrouded in some kind of spectatorial sympathy (Smith's 'organon')
  • The impartial spectator is an internal judge derived from society yet orienting toward a universal standard, generating recursive self-judgment
  • What restrains self-interest is not benevolence but the desire to be praiseworthy and the love of one's own noble character

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0.81

Smith argues that in a nation distracted by faction, few preserve their judgment untainted by the general contagion, that a true party man hates and despises candor (which is selected out of politics), that the real impartial spectator is most distant amidst the violence and rage of contending parties, and that partisans impute their own prejudices even to God—concluding that faction and fanaticism have always been by far the greatest corrupters of moral sentiments.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“in a nation distracted by faction, few preserve their judgment untainted by the general contagion.”

0.73

Smith makes an evolutionary observation that the continuation and propagation of the species depends entirely on the affection of the parent for the child, not the child for the parent, which Roberts connects to the Ten Commandments commanding us to honor our parents but not to love our children—because the natural affection toward children need not be commanded.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“the continuous and propagation of the species depending altogether upon the affection of the parent to the child, but not the child to the parent. And that's he notices that while he points out the asymmetry, which is an evolutionary moment.”

0.73

Smith's organizing principle (organon) throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments is that moral judgment is always enshrouded in some kind of spectatorial sympathy, and he applies this consistently, even inventing a spectator to be sympathized with where necessary to provide that enshrouding.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“It's that moral judgment is always enshrouded in some kind of sympathy, some kind of spectatorial sympathy. That is the organon of Smith in this book.”

0.73

Klein interprets Smith's impartial spectator as ultimately a near-universal being emanating universalist wisdom—a single sun around which all orbit—while each individual possesses only their own imperfect internal representative ('man in the breast'); this generates infinite recursion, where any judge one creates can itself be judged by a deeper judge, all originating from oneself, opening the door to self-deception when one's created judge is not truly impartial.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“the impartial spectator in Smith actually ultimately is a almost universal being emanating a kind of universalist wisdom that is my impartial spectator is not different than your impartial spectator”

0.73

Smith holds that humans are implanted with a desire not merely to be praised but to be praiseworthy, and the love of praiseworthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise—proven introspectively by the fact that praise received for something undeserved does not feel as good as praise actually merited.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“he says the love of praiseworthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise.”

0.73

Smith's system contains a deep, ineradicable knowledge problem extending beyond the economy: an unknowability of the self (people don't know what they are capable of or whether they have truly done good), an unknowability of others' moral worth, and even an unknowability of the good itself, which connects to morality being loose, vague, and indeterminate.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“It's not only the unknowability of the economy, like in the wealth of nations, but there's actually an unknowability of the self, and there's even an unknowability really of the good”

0.73

Smith argues it is the wisdom of nature that we cannot fully compensate ourselves internally for unjust external blame, because if we could fully self-compensate we would not take the extra care to ensure nothing bad happens for which we would be blamed—so the inability to fully console ourselves keeps people vigilant.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“it's This is actually the wisdom of nature because we want to make people vigilant not to do things wrong cuz if they could fully you know, if they could sort of fully compensate themselves, they wouldn't take all that extra care”

0.73

Smith issues practical imperatives that solitude leads us to brood and overweight our own problems, so when down we should go into the world; conversation with a friend improves our temper, but conversation with a stranger improves it still more because a friend may indulge our brooding while a stranger will not, lifting us toward a wider, more impartial perspective—and conversely, when we feel like a big shot we should seek out people independent of us who will not flatter us.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“He says conversation of a friend brings us to a better um temper and that of a stranger to a still better temper. Because a a friend might indulge our brooding. Whereas a stranger won't.”

0.73

Klein connects Smith's idea that people gradually come to the impartial spectator's view over time to Kirzner's theory of entrepreneurial alertness—that people tend to notice what it is in their interest to notice—implying that just as Robinson Crusoe comes to notice he could make a net, people have an interest in coming to the more impartial view of their own life.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“the idea that we all come to it over time reminds me actually of Kirzner on entrepreneurship, where we tend to notice what is in our interest to notice.”

0.72

Smith's China-earthquake passage, contrary to its common citation as evidence of pure selfishness, argues that what restrains a man from sacrificing a hundred million strangers to save his own little finger is not the feeble spark of benevolence but a stronger force—reason, principle, conscience, the man within the breast—and that what prompts genuinely noble acts is not love of mankind but love of what is honorable and noble in our own character, a deliberate inversion of the Wealth of Nations' butcher-baker passage.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“It is not the soft power of humanity. It is not that feeble spark of benevolence which nature has lighted up in the human heart... It is reason principle conscience the inhabitant of the breast the man within”

0.68

Smith allows for independence from external actual spectators, but it is an independence founded on dependence on an internal spectator which is itself derived from society, producing a constant bouncing back and forth between the 'man within' (how I view myself) and the 'man without' (how I view others viewing me), each affecting the other.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“it's an independence founded on a dependence of a kind of internal spectator, right? Which itself is sort of derived from society.”

0.68

Smith holds that the laws of justice are very seldom observed in war and negotiation, that ordinary wholesome virtues which earn esteem in private transactions are laughed at as folly in public transactions, and that in unjust wars it is the sovereign or rulers who are guilty while subjects are almost always perfectly innocent yet are punished as though guilty out of nationalism—an anti-nationalist, anti-governmentalization theme.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“the laws of justice are very seldom observed there... a man who is in private transaction would be beloved and most esteemed, in public transactions is like laughed at as a fool and an idiot.”

0.68

Smith embraces stoicism with a small 's' for private, selfish misfortunes—approving self-command in bearing one's own losses such as a lost limb—but holds that stoicism can be overdone and improper in cases like a parent's grief over a dead child, where seeming insensible is off-putting; the most admirable person joins both the amiable virtues (compassion, entering into others' feelings) and the respectable virtues (self-command, containing one's own concerns), which are complementary because being humane requires repressing one's own pressing needs.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“In private misfortunes where it's not kind of when it's more just strictly private and selfish, then he's like all for stoicism.”

0.68

Smith claims that over time a man who suffers a great misfortune such as losing a leg gradually comes to adopt the view of the impartial spectator and recovers his natural tranquility, with the man who struggles least and most readily acquiesces recovering soonest—paralleling the phenomenon of lottery winners and quadriplegics returning to baseline—but Roberts pushes back that this is a huge leap of empirical faith for tragedies like losing a child, and that Smith, who had no children, may exhibit hubris here.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“The man who struggles the least, who most easily and readily acquiesces acquiesces in the fortune which has fallen to him very soon recovers his usual and natural tranquility.”

0.68

When external accusation conflicts with our internal sense of innocence, an appeal lies from the verdict of real spectators to a higher tribunal—the man within the breast, the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator—and where even that internal judge cannot fully compensate for unjust external blame, the only judge who can know our real circumstances and motives perfectly is God, who solves the moral knowledge problem.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“an appeal lies from his sentence to a much higher tribunal. To the tribunal of their own conscient consciences... To that of the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator. To that of the man within the breast”

0.68

Smith offers a sociology of religion in which men, having no other model of intelligent beings than themselves, necessarily ascribe their own sentiments and passions to the mysterious beings they imagine but cannot see, effectively creating gods in man's own image (inverting the Judeo-Christian creation story), and moral judgments then become locked up with and enshrouded in those personified deities.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“those unknown intelligences which they imagine but see not must necessarily be formed with some sort of resemblance to those intelligences of which they have experience namely people.”

0.68

Roberts notes that the tension of a person harboring a secret good or bad deed that no one knows about—creating an unbearable urge to have the world know and reward or punish it in full measure—is what generates much of the world's great art, citing Crime and Punishment, Dickens, and Sydney Carton.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“It's the person who harbors the secret act that they did that no one knows about, whether it's good or bad. That tension is what creates a lot of the world's art.”

0.68

The potential for self-deception by the wrongdoers of the world (the 'Raskolnikovs') is probably immense; because people want to go on with their lives, even a guilty person such as a hypothetical guilty O.J. Simpson would likely persuade himself of his innocence, so people vary enormously in regret, remorse, and the ability to put wrongdoing behind them—it is not as simple as either Dostoevsky's torment or Woody Allen's serene escape.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the power for self-deception is so large. I can imagine he'd he's probably decided he wasn't even if he was guilty, he's innocent.”

0.66

Smith argues mathematicians and natural philosophers experience little acrimony because the merit of their work is objectively clear to all, whereas poets, whose merit is loose, vague, and indeterminate, form cabals, cliques, and factions over disputed standing—and Roberts extends this to economics, where the absence of clear merit criteria leads the profession to rely on mathematical ability as a proxy and to fracture into factions over who is a good economist.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“they know so darn well the merit of their own work, of their colleagues' work, and in relation to each other that there's very little acrimony between them... Poets, on the other hand, loose vague and indeterminate.”

0.66

Smith critiques the 'whining and melancholy moralists' who urge us to grieve over distant calamities we can neither serve nor hurt, arguing we should not expend emotional energy on such cases; but Klein defends them, noting that because of unknowability we often misjudge whom we can serve or hurt, so figures like Peter Singer who raise such issues may be doing us a favor by alerting us to connections we had dismissed.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“Smith says that um we don't really we don't really need to spend expend a lot of emotional energy on those whom we can neither serve nor hurt.”

0.66

Not only morality but happiness, pride, self-esteem, self-worth, and feelings of attractiveness derive from what other people think of us, which Roberts finds a deeply disturbing view because most people believe they live by their own principles independent of others' perceptions.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“It's also happiness. And our pride, self-esteem, self-worth, s- uh feelings of attractiveness, beauty, uh whole range of things comes from what people think of us. And that's a very disturbing view in many ways”

0.66

Klein reframes Smithian virtue not as whether one acts in self-interest but as what one makes one's self-interest: beneficence and virtue reside in constructing a utility function—a character and identity—from which one derives pleasure in doing the right thing, and this constructed self-interest is itself subject to ongoing recursive judgment that pushes the moral circle ever wider (from self to family to community).

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“it's what does one make into their self-interest. We can create our own utility functions to put it into modern economic language right? We can decide what we get our pleasure from. We can get our pleasure from doing the right thing.”

0.63

Smith writes as the ultimate armchair theorizer, laying down claims about how all people respond to moral, emotional, and economic situations with great self-confidence as if they were laws of human nature, never hedging with 'it seems to me' or 'in my experience,' despite having access to only one brain—his own.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“He lays it down as if he's getting it from Sinai, that these are the laws of human nature, the laws of morality.”

0.61

Smith's universalism is not draconian or one-size-fits-all; what the universal impartial spectator deems proper depends heavily on context, tradition, constraints, and scarcities—exemplified by his strong condemnation of infanticide that nonetheless allows it pardonable when a fleeing parent could not save both themselves and the child—and because what is fit and just is 'loose, vague, and indeterminate,' it must be examined carefully, which opens the door to self-deception.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“he brings up infanticide, right? And and he condemns it strongly, but he does have a sign in there, a line in there about, well, in these circumstances when someone's fleeing and they know that if they try to save their baby as well, neither of them are going to be saved, it's pardonable.”

0.61

Smith proposes a divine plan of decentralized self-regulation in which the author of nature has made each man the immediate judge of mankind and his vicegerent (deputy) on earth to superintend his brethren's behavior, so that because we desire others' respect we are motivated to behave well, and we must judge others to motivate them in turn—a bottom-up, diffuse moral policing among equals.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“He has made man if I may say so the immediate judge of mankind... the author of nature appointed him man his vicegerent... Upon earth to superintend the behavior of his brethren.”

0.61

Smith holds a dual and seemingly contradictory view of humanity—on one hand deprecating the 'mob of mankind' as coarse clay, weak, and in a present depraved state with wisdom being rare (a distinction-based, aristocratic-of-judgment view), and on the other hand an egalitarian view that everyone shares the same basic moral faculties, any stranger can pull you toward universal wisdom, and no one is really better than another (as with the porter and the philosopher differing only by circumstance).

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“he speaks of the mob of humankind. He speaks of the present depraved state of mankind. He speaks of so weak and imperfect a creature as man.”

0.59

Roberts and Klein argue that being passionate in one's political views is distinct from being factional, since they advocate an anti-factional society in which contested matters like creationism-versus-evolution in schools would be removed from collective decision—just as there is no Republican or Democrat bundle of groceries at the supermarket, schooling could be de-governmentalized so neighbors respect each other's choices rather than fighting over a single 'ring of power.'

normativehigh valuefringenovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“There's no Republican bundle of groceries and Democrat bundle of groceries at Safeway. Yeah. Just buy what you like.”

0.55

Smith's observation that our passive feelings are sordid and selfish while our active principles are generous and noble can be read as a political argument for de-governmentalizing and de-politicizing society, because schooling, welfare, retirement, and care of one's family should be active matters of personal choice rather than passive arrangements decided from above through taxation, regulation, and government schooling—we are more virtuous the more active we are.

normativehigh valuefringenovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Dan Klein

“it's in our active faculties that we are best. That suggests that schooling and welfare and jobs and taking care of your life, your retirement, your family... should be more an active matter of your own choice as opposed to something that basically has sort of been decided for you from above”

0.52

There is an apparent paradox in Smith that one seeks grandeur, dignity, and superiority of character by answering the impartial spectator's call which insists we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other; Roberts proposes resolving this dual tension via the Jewish exhortation to keep two notes—'from dust I was created' and 'the universe was created for me'—and to hold both pride and humility simultaneously rather than seeking a middle, since pure distinction makes a monster and pure self-abnegation makes one suicidal.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“a person should have in his pocket a piece of paper that says from dust I was created and to dust I shall return... And in the other pocket should be a piece of paper that says the universe was created for me.”

0.29

Smith criticizes women who wear makeup as a form of vanity, arguing it gains them admiration for a beauty they do not really possess, which Roberts suggests means Smith would not be a fan of plastic surgery either.

normativecontestednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Dan Klein

“he critiques women who wear makeup because he says, 'Hey, it's fake. They're not really beautiful, they're just made up.'”

0.25

Roberts and Klein observe that Smith's grammatical gendering is inconsistent—the impartial spectator is referred to as 'he' while the author of nature is sometimes 'she' yet elsewhere 'he' (creating man 'after his own image')—and that Smith largely wrote about and observed a world of men, with female sensibilities only occasionally referenced.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Dan Klein

“The impartial spectator, by the way, seems to be a he, whereas the author of nature and or natures a she.”

0.21

Klein interprets Smith's phrase 'the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct' as meaning an 'idea' (not actual/real) spectator, while Roberts reads 'ideal' normatively as the desirable man in the breast one ought to have—a sleeping or would-be better spectator that often requires being awakened and put in mind of his duty by the presence of a real spectator.

definitionspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“where he says ideal there... I propose that that means an idea, like not real, like not actual.”

0.18

Roberts reports that reading Smith and imagining oneself observed by spectators is affecting and uncomfortable but makes one feel like a better person, while Klein adds that thinking about virtues is itself virtuous.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Russ Roberts

“I find I I'm I'm I feel like I'm actually a better person. I hope it sticks.”