loose, vague, and indeterminate
Smith's characterization of the rules of propriety and beneficence (as opposed to the precise rules of justice)—standards that resist exact specification and require careful judgment.
As defined in Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 4--A Discussion of Part III 04/29/2009
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- Smith's system contains a deep, ineradicable knowledge problem extending beyond the economy: an unknowability of the self (people don't know what they are capable of or whether they have truly done good), an unknowability of others' moral worth, and even an unknowability of the good itself, which connects to morality being loose, vague, and indeterminate.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 4--A Discussion of Part III 04/29/2009
- Smith argues mathematicians and natural philosophers experience little acrimony because the merit of their work is objectively clear to all, whereas poets, whose merit is loose, vague, and indeterminate, form cabals, cliques, and factions over disputed standing—and Roberts extends this to economics, where the absence of clear merit criteria leads the profession to rely on mathematical ability as a proxy and to fracture into factions over who is a good economist.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 4--A Discussion of Part III 04/29/2009
- Smith's universalism is not draconian or one-size-fits-all; what the universal impartial spectator deems proper depends heavily on context, tradition, constraints, and scarcities—exemplified by his strong condemnation of infanticide that nonetheless allows it pardonable when a fleeing parent could not save both themselves and the child—and because what is fit and just is 'loose, vague, and indeterminate,' it must be examined carefully, which opens the door to self-deception.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 4--A Discussion of Part III 04/29/2009