Will DOGE and Musk Make a Difference? (with Michael Munger)
What this covers
Michael Munger of Duke University and Russ Roberts of EconTalk examine whether Elon Musk and DOGE—the Department of Government Efficiency—can actually shrink the federal bureaucracy. Munger argues the answer is no: bureaucratic reform is theater because agency budgets and statutes originate in Congress, which members will not voluntarily relinquish. The deeper issue is structural. Government agencies exist in a political equilibrium where beneficiaries will fight elimination and the entire legal apparatus must be dismantled, not trimmed. Munger further contends that expanding executive power to cut government is dangerous; the foundational principle of governance is never building a sword for your enemy—a power you would not want your worst political opponent wielding after the next election. Roberts, however, suspects that eroding political norms might enable more change than Munger expects, and that gradually, then suddenly, large shifts become possible when institutional restraint decays.
The conversation ranges across why the Base Realignment and Closure Commission succeeded where DOGE likely will not, the inconsistency between eliminating the Department of Education and imposing national goals, and whether abolishing the IRS matters if the tax code remains complex. Munger argues that agencies like Commerce and Education are the low-hanging fruit any serious reformer would target, yet predicts DOGE will never attempt it. The speakers also explore why traditional economic concerns have been supplanted by cultural and identity issues, why tariffs and immigration control appeal despite their costs, and how fusionism between libertarians and conservatives has fractured. Roberts notes that in 2024, free-market advocates had no political home in either major party. The discussion engages fundamental questions about constitutional design, the limits of executive authority, and whether government size and scope can meaningfully change without broader shifts in what citizens consider legitimate state action.
Munger argues that DOGE is largely theater: bureaucratic reform is impossible without eliminating entire agencies and their underlying statutes, because the structure of government reflects a stable political equilibrium that no powerful 'sword' can cut without itself becoming dangerous; Roberts suspects eroding norms might make more change possible than Munger expects.
- Agency budgets and statutes are set by Congress, so no bureaucrat (even Musk) can unilaterally cut them
- The most important political principle is to never create a power you wouldn't want wielded by your worst enemy after the next election
- Real change in the deficit and culture may happen 'gradually, then suddenly' as norms decay
Cultural and identity concerns now dominate electoral politics over traditional economic pocketbook issues.
- Over the last 10-15 years, traditional economic 'pocketbook' issues have been subsumed by cultural and identity issues worldwide; the rise of Trump reflects this shift, where concerns like immigration are driven less by job competition than by fears about changing the culture, fabric, and sense of belonging in national life.
“traditional economic issues have been subsumed by other kinds of issues. The rise of Trump within the Republican Party is a tribute to this phenomenon that cultural issues are dwarfing so-called pocketbook issues.”
- In the 2024 election, advocates of economic freedom and free markets had no political home in either party, as both Democrats and Republicans opposed immigration, favored tariffs, and Trump amputated the libertarian wing of the Republican Party, leaving candidates who champion markets with little electoral traction.
“fans of economic freedom--what might be called free market economics--had no home in 2024, or for quite a while before that--not in the Democratic Party, not in the Republican Party.”
Constitutional limits on executive power erode through practice and changing social attitudes rather than formal amendment.
- Political norms—checks and balances, the role of Congress and the courts, the limits on the executive—decay over time in the face of temptation, so that much constitutional change comes not from changing the letter of the law but from changing how the law is enforced and how people feel about it, exemplified by the steady growth of presidential executive power.
“norms decay over time in the face of temptation.”
Policy proposals contain internal contradictions, such as eliminating Education Department while imposing national education goals.
- It is inconsistent to both eliminate the federal Department of Education and impose national education goals, because the 50-state, multi-million-municipality public education system cannot be made to adopt federal directives without a federal organization to impose them.
“it's going to be difficult to get the 50-state, 3 million municipality-level public education system to do x, whatever x is, if you don't have a Federal organization to impose it.”
- The name 'Department of Government Efficiency' is Orwellian because it will only get rid of inefficient things while the efficient things might receive more spending, so by its own logic it could expand rather than shrink government—it should arguably be the Department of Government Inefficiency.
“which is a really Orwellian name by the way: you really couldn't name it any better because it's only going to get rid of inefficient things--the efficient things we might even spend more on, by definition”
Material well-being has improved for much of the population despite government expansion over recent decades.
- Despite the rising size of government over the speakers' lifetimes, material well-being in America is pretty good for a large portion of the population.
“despite the rising size of government over our lifetime, things are pretty good in America, at least in terms of material well-being and so on for a large portion of the population.”