Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (with Hillel Cohen)
What this covers
Historian Hillel Cohen of Hebrew University argues that 1929 marks the foundational pattern of the Arab-Israeli conflict—a pattern that repeats, essentially unchanged, through October 7th. In conversation with Russ Roberts, Cohen traces how that year's violence (the Hebron Massacre and a Jewish policeman's murders in Jaffa) established a durable structure: each side preserves the atrocities committed against it while erasing those it committed, then builds a complete moral justification for its own violence around that selective memory. The 1929 events collided over overlapping sacred claims to the Western Wall—a site holy to both Jews and Muslims—rather than representing simple aggression by one side. Cohen argues the only path beyond perpetual recurrence is for each side to genuinely understand the other's narrative, not out of equal concern but as a practical matter: understanding reality more completely, including one's enemy's perspective, is the most effective way to protect one's own people.
The conversation ranges across how Asymmetric Historical Memory takes root. Narratives form bottom-up through families and communities—children learn which deaths to mourn by watching their parents cry—rather than being imposed by states, which makes them emotionally durable and hard to revise. Cohen illustrates this through a study of Palestinian education students in both the West Bank and Israel: those living as Israeli citizens largely accepted a Jewish state and rejected armed struggle, while those under occupation from the same families rejected Jewish presence entirely, showing that lived conditions drive acceptance far more than rhetoric. The Iron Wall Doctrine, articulated by Ze'ev Jabotinsky, aimed at convincing Palestinians they could not expel Jews; instead, Israel's continuous expansion eastward—doubling settlers during peace talks, reaching roughly 480,000 in the West Bank—turned the wall into a constantly moving curtain that undermines the security it promised. Cohen emphasizes that both sides feel morally righteous, and that historians must confront disconfirming evidence about their own side to tell the whole story rather than a one-sided justification.
Cohen argues that 1929 is the 'Year Zero' of the Arab-Israeli conflict because its pattern—mutual atrocity, dueling self-justifying narratives, and selective memory—recurs intact through October 7th, and that the only path beyond perpetual war is for each side to genuinely understand the other's narrative rather than just its own moral high ground.
- The 1929 events (Hebron massacre; the Jaffa murders by a Jewish policeman) show each side preserves the story that flatters it and forgets the story that indicts it.
- Narratives are built bottom-up from emotion and kinship, not imposed top-down by states, which makes them durable and hard to revise.
- Palestinian non-acceptance tracks lived conditions (occupation, settlement expansion) far more than rhetoric or police-state repression.
Historians and ordinary people systematically credit sources confirming their own side and discount those indicting it, requiring deliberate confrontation with uncomfortable evidence.
- As a deliberate historical methodology, any document that makes the historian uneasy is precisely the one that must be used, because telling the whole story (rather than a one-sided narrative) requires confronting evidence that contradicts one's own side rather than ignoring it.
“every document who makes me uneasy, I know that I have to use it. I mean, this is a methodology.”
- People—including historians—tend to credit sources that confirm what they already want to believe and discount sources that indict their own side; the historian noticed he instinctively disbelieved Arab accounts of atrocity and believed Jewish accounts of the identical events, which is a universal cognitive tendency, not a defect unique to one group.
“when I read Arab source, I don't believe, and when I read it in the same material in a Jewish source, I do believe... The main reason I think, is that we tend to believe what we want to believe. This is who we are, and this is also who I am.”
- Even the original (more antisemitic) Hamas Charter, in Article 31, states that Jews and Christians can live peacefully under the rule of Islam, so the 'from the river to the sea' aim is framed by Hamas as Jews accepting Islamic sovereignty over the Holy Land rather than as the wholesale expulsion of Jews—and accurate quotation requires reading the charter's internal discrepancies in full rather than citing isolated passages.
“It says that under Islam, Jews and Christian and everybody can live peacefully under the rule of Islam. So, it's not about expelling the Jews. It's about Jews accepting the sovereignty of Islam in the Holy Land.”
- The Western Wall (Kotel) is a holy place not only for Jews but also for Muslims, who call it al-Buraq, the site where the prophet Muhammad tethered his holy horse during his ascent to heaven, and it sits on waqf (Muslim religious endowment) land—so the 1929 conflict over it was a collision of overlapping sacred claims, not a one-sided trespass.
“It's called in Arabic al-Buraq, meaning the place in which the prophet Muhammad put, or parked, his holy horse when he ascended to heaven. So, this is also holy to the Muslims. And, in addition to that, it is a waqf land.”
- During the 1929 riots, hundreds of Jews in Hebron were saved by Arabs, and including both the killers and the savers in each story produces a multi-dimensional narrative that resists the simple 'we are good, they are bad' framing—though Cohen notes these acts of rescue, however real, do not erase the larger national conflict.
“hundreds of Jews of Hebron were saved by Arabs in Hebron during the riots... in each story I bring also the savers and the killers... we have your multi-dimensional narrative of the events in general.”
- The Jewish community of Hebron had relations with local Arabs good enough that they refused Haganah protection, telling the defense forces that armed Jews would worsen the situation—yet 66 Jews were nonetheless killed in their homes, many by their own neighbors, during the August 1929 violence.
“the local Jewish community refused to receive members of the Haganah--of the Jewish Defense Forces who wanted to come to Hebron to protect them. They told them, 'No, there is no need. We are in good relation with the Arabs.'”
- Ze'ev Jabotinsky argued in his 1923 'Iron Wall' essays that native peoples never voluntarily accept foreign settlement among them, so Arab rejection of Zionism was natural and could not be bought off with material prosperity; only by building an 'iron wall' of overwhelming strength—convincing Arabs they cannot expel the Jews—would they eventually accept a Jewish presence.
“Ze'ev Jabotinsky published these famous articles, 'An Iron Wall,' in which he said that native people usually wouldn't accept foreign settlements among them... if we build an Iron Wall between them and us and they would understand that they cannot actually expel us... they would accept our presence.”
- In 1929 a Jewish policeman, enraged by what he had seen, entered a Muslim home in Jaffa and murdered a family (women, children, and an old man); this atrocity is well-known and central to the Palestinian narrative of 1929 while being almost entirely unknown to Jews, demonstrating how each side remembers the crimes committed against it and forgets those committed by it.
“one Jew who was also policemen in the British police entered the house of Muslims in Jaffa and he killed five people--two women, two kids and old person.”
Understanding the other side's narrative without justifying it is the most effective path to protecting one's own people from catastrophe.
- Palestinian failure to empathize with Zionism is driven by living under occupation, not by living in a police state; comparing Hamas to Knesset member Mansour Abbas—both from the Muslim Brotherhood, reading the same texts—shows that the difference in their acceptance of a Jewish state tracks whether one lives in relative equality (as an Israeli citizen) or under occupation.
“how come that from the same school of thought, you have such different... The main reason is the difference between if you live in a relative equality or you live under occupation. It's not the same.”
- Understanding the other side's narrative does not require justifying it or caring equally about both peoples; even if one cares only about one's own family and tribe, the most effective way to protect them is to widen one's understanding of reality and act on that wider picture, because ignoring the other side is precisely what produced October 7th.
“even if I care only about my kids and about my family and about my tribe, I think that the best way to protect them is to widen our understanding of the reality... Because ignoring others brings October 7th.”
- The October 7th attack was foreseeable and in fact foreseen—anyone who works on Israeli-Palestinian affairs had written pieces predicting such an eruption was a matter of months or years—but everyone collectively chose to close their eyes to it.
“We all knew. Actually, we all knew, and we tried to close our eyes... Every person who deals with Israeli-Palestinian affairs can show you a couple of pieces that he wrote... that in couple of... months or years that such eruption would happen. It was clear.”
- The only optimism available is that the unprecedented level of bloodshed reached after October 7th—possibly with help from the international community—may finally push both Israelis and Palestinians to seek another way to live together; it is a weak optimism grounded in exhaustion rather than goodwill.
“whether we, both Palestinian and Israeli, is with maybe the help of the international community, which feels that we reached the level of bloodshed that we can now try to find another way to live together. So, this is the kind of optimism--not the best optimism, but yeah.”
Israeli settlement policy deliberately prevented Palestinian statehood and repeatedly violated peace commitments, betraying Palestinian acceptance of compromise.
- Zionism turned Jabotinsky's fixed Iron Wall into a constantly-moving curtain: instead of holding the 1948 borders that Palestinians could accept, Israel kept expanding eastward to take more land, and a curtain that keeps shifting cannot withstand attacks the way a fixed wall could—undermining the very security the doctrine promised.
“this is not Iron Wall, this is curtain that you move everywhere to where you want. And, if it's curtain, it cannot stand attacks... We made our Iron Wall into a curtain.”
- Palestinians judge Israel by actions rather than words: during the seven years of the Oslo peace process the number of West Bank settlers doubled from 100,000 to 200,000 (and now reaches roughly 480,000), so peace rhetoric and a vibrant Israeli protest movement count for nothing against the visible expansion of settlements on the ground.
“During the seven year of Oslo process, before the eruption of the Second Intifada, there were 200,000 Jews settling in the West Bank. Meaning, the number of settlers doubled... 'We don't care about what you say, we care about what you do.'”
- Israeli settlement in the West Bank was not a result of the 1967 war but a deliberate policy to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, as Ariel Sharon repeatedly stated when he urged Israelis to go live in the West Bank so that no Palestinian state could form there.
“Israeli settlement in the West Bank was not a result of a war. It was... in order to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. When Ariel Sharon was the Minister of Agriculture... he said it so many times: Go to the West Bank, live there so that there will not be a Palestinian state.”
Each side constructs a complete internally-consistent moral case where its own violence is always defensive and righteous.
- Both sides in a violent conflict are certain they are acting morally—not merely exercising power—because the need to feel moral is a basic human need; only figures like Gaddafi or regimes like North Korea act on naked power alone, while most nations and groups insist their violence is righteous, which is part of being human.
“I think this is a very basic human need--I mean, to feel moral... most nations and groups and people, they would say, 'No, we are moral.' People want to feel moral because this is to be human.”
- Both Israelis and Palestinians construct their entire moral case as self-defense—Zionists frame their settlement as peaceful and the 1929 attacks as unprovoked aggression, while Palestinians frame Zionism as an attempt to seize their land and all their resistance as defensive—so each side possesses a complete internally-consistent moral justification for its own violence.
“we have our two nations that believe that everything that they do is self-defense. When we bomb Gaza it's self-defense; and when they attack it's self-defense. Okay, so everybody has moral justification for what they do.”
Historical narratives are built bottom-up through emotional transmission in families and communities, not top-down, making them resistant to change.
- Collective historical narratives are not imposed top-down by states or ministries of education but emerge bottom-up from emotional transmission within families and communities—children learn which deaths to mourn and which to ignore by watching their parents and friends cry or not cry—so the narrative becomes part of one's emotional self rather than a taught fact.
“narratives are not built from up down. It's not that the Ministry of Education tells us how to think about 1929. Not at all. It is our friends. It's ourselves, it's our kids, it's our parents--when we see them cry about one thing and they don't cry about other.”
- In a questionnaire study of hundreds of Palestinian education students in both the West Bank and inside Israel, there was no disagreement about the historical narrative (the land is ours, the Jews tried to take it), but sharp divergence on what should be done: Israeli-Palestinians largely rejected armed struggle and wanted partnership, while West Bank Palestinians—often from the same families—said Jews have no right and must leave.
“I gave questionnaires to hundreds of Palestinian students for education, both in the West Bank and in inside Israel... about the historical narrative... there was no debate... But, when it came to what should be done, the Palestinian-Israel, most of them were... against the armed struggle.”