Yossi Klein Halevi on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict
What this covers
Yossi Klein Halevi, author of Letters to My Palestinian Neighbor, speaks with Russ Roberts about how dialogue across the Israeli-Palestinian divide might actually function. Klein Halevi argues that productive conversation requires both sides to stand uncompromisingly in their own narratives while granting the other's legitimacy—not as moral equivalence, but as recognition that two indigenous peoples hold genuinely competing claims to the same land. The conversation traces how this framework emerged from his 2018 book project and how it has weathered the shock of October 7th, when Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis in a single day, a toll that exceeded even the five-year death toll of the Second Intifada.
The discussion moves through the historical architecture of both narratives: the centrality of the land in Jewish religious practice and the Zionist movement's repeated acceptance of partition offers, set against Palestinian rejection of statehood and the displacement of roughly 750,000 Palestinians in 1948. Klein Halevi argues that Irreconcilable Narratives as Dialogue Premise need not prevent coexistence—the conflict itself boils down to the question of who started, and that answer determines everything else about legitimacy and self-defense. He addresses why Israelis feel limited guilt for Palestinian refugee suffering, the role of the Separation Doctrine that Yitzhak Rabin championed, and the practical impossibility of a near-term two-state solution in Israel's current political mood. Klein Halevi also distinguishes between Right in Principle vs Compromise in Practice when discussing settlements, and offers his reading of how October 7th transformed Israeli disunity into unity while making withdrawal from the West Bank politically unthinkable.
Klein Halevi argues that genuine Israeli-Palestinian dialogue is possible only when both sides stand firmly in their own irreconcilable narratives and accept the premise that two indigenous peoples have legitimate competing claims to the same land—a premise that makes partition the only alternative to endless war, even though October 7th has made any near-term two-state solution politically inconceivable in Israel.
- The conflict reduces to one question—'who started?'—and the two narratives are irreconcilable on facts but can coexist if both accept the other's in-principle legitimacy
- Israel's borders expanded in response to Arab attempts to destroy it, so Israelis feel limited guilt for the Palestinian refugee tragedy
- October 7th transformed Israeli disunity into unity and made a West Bank withdrawal seem like inviting a 'second Gaza' minutes from Tel Aviv
Narratives and historical claims about land and sovereignty are central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- At the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the narratives each side tells itself about itself and the other, because the conflict is not just about grabbing land but about how each people thinks about that land and its place in it.
“your book is a recognition that at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are those narratives. It's not just about grabbing land: it's about how we think about that land and our place in it.”
- Although there was no country called Palestine—it was a geographic term—around the 1920s a burgeoning nationalist sentiment arose among the non-Jewish Arabs who lived there, who wanted sovereignty over the land they inhabited; the British encouraged this aspiration for World War I cooperation just as they encouraged Jewish national aspirations, and the Jews ultimately got a country while the Arabs rejected the one they were offered.
“although there was no Palestine as a country, and even though the Palestinians did not have a national identity of their own akin to the Jews, they did have a national aspiration. And, the British encouraged it in hopes of getting their cooperation during World War I.”
Israel is uniquely held to a higher moral standard than other nations in judging its defensive military actions.
- Israel is held to a special standard not applied to other nations: historically, nations that lose territory in wars they started accept the consequences, but Israel uniquely is expected to feel guilt and is treated as the aggressor for territorial gains made in defensive wars.
“Historically, nations that lose territory in war, it's who started it, you say too bad. That's right. We have a special standard here at Israel that we are held to that it seems to me unfair”
Israeli civil society compensated for government failure by organizing dramatically to meet urgent needs.
- The conversation was recorded on November 13, 2023, roughly five weeks after the October 7th Hamas attack.
“Today is November 13th, 2023.”
- After October 7th, where government failed in both cultural and military response to the crisis, Israeli civil society stepped up so dramatically that it inverted the economic phenomenon of crowding out into 'crowding in'—when the government did not do things people expected, Israelis did them as individuals, collectives, and organizations.
“Economists like to talk about crowding out--how government activity often will cause private activity to contract. But, this was crowding in. The government didn't do certain things that most people expected it to do, and Israelis said, 'Oh, then I'll do them.'”
October 7th attack exploited Israel's maximal vulnerability created by internal division and regional isolation.
- On October 6th Israel was at a point of maximal vulnerability—near civil war over judicial reform with air force pilots refusing to train, riots on Yom Kippur, and a US ally that appeared not to have its back—making it, as one observer predicted, a perfect time for Israel's enemies to attack; Iran likely gave the green light to Hamas to prevent an Israeli-Saudi rapprochement.
“this would be a perfect time for Israel's enemies to attack. Why? Well, there's near civil war on the street, to the point where pilots are refusing to train in this elite air force”