Erik Hoel on Consciousness, Free Will, and the Limits of Science
What this covers
Erik Hoel, a neuroscientist, and Russ Roberts, an economist, discuss why consciousness and free will have resisted scientific explanation despite centuries of progress elsewhere. Hoel argues that science was never designed to explain subjective experience. Early scientists like Galileo deliberately narrowed science's scope to the measurable and mathematical—size, shape, location—while excluding experiential qualities. This move was extraordinarily productive, but it created a blind spot: neuroscience now confronts the hard problem of putting mind back into a system built to exclude it. The conversation traces how this foundational choice still constrains what neuroscience can do, and explores whether the constraint is merely practical or reflects something deeper about the nature of explanation itself.
The discussion centers on three converging lines of argument. First, self-reference generates trouble: an observer trying to explain itself from within the system it inhabits mirrors the paradoxes of self-referential mathematics and logic. Second, computational irreducibility means that some systems—including brains—cannot be predicted by simplification; the only way to know what they will do is to run them, which undermines the coherence of perfect free-will prediction. Third, Hayek and the Austrian Knowledge Problem suggest that knowledge embedded in human minds cannot be fully articulated or moved into equations, paralleling why neuroscience cannot map particular experiences to particular neural events. Along the way, the conversation draws on William James's wrestling with free will, Julian Jaynes's theory of bicameral consciousness, and the parallel emergence of science and literary sophistication across history. Roberts also brings economics into the frame, noting that the discipline focuses on the extrinsic perspective—material welfare and GDP—and cannot account for the intrinsic meaning and dignity that work provides.
Hoel argues that science was deliberately designed to study only the extrinsic (material) world while bracketing aside the intrinsic (subjective) world, so reconciling consciousness, free will, and mind with physical science is uniquely hard and may be fundamentally impossible due to self-referential paradoxes.
- Galileo and early scientists purposely excluded experiential qualities from science, so neuroscience now struggles to put the mind back in
- Self-reference (an observer explaining itself) reliably produces paradoxes and incompleteness, as in Gödel's proof and the liar's paradox
- Chaos theory and computational irreducibility undermine the idea that perfect prediction of brains/free will is even coherent
The neuroscience of consciousness faces an insurmountable self-referential logical problem analogous to Gödel incompleteness and set-theoretic paradoxes.
- Neuroscience may be the most difficult field in all of science because it is the one place where the bracketed-aside intrinsic perspective must be put back in and meet the extrinsic one; there is no law relating particular experiences to particular neural events, and even a perfect map of neural activity would not let a neuroscientist determine what a person is thinking or feeling.
“there's a strong claim that neuroscience is the most difficult field in all of science, because it's the field where you have to put back in the intrinsic perspective and it meets the extrinsic one.”
- It is already proven that some physical properties are undecidable—for example, the spectral gap of a material was shown in a Nature paper to have no scientific answer—and such incompleteness, like Gödel's proof and the liar's paradox, always arises from self-reference, so we should expect reality as a whole to contain paradoxical holes, especially regarding observers trying to explain themselves.
“it's just an undecidable property. There's just no actual scientific answer to this frameable physical question. Right? And it's due, by the way, to self-reference.”
- The neuroscience of consciousness is an observer's attempt to explain themselves from within the system they exist in, which looks like a self-referential problem; since self-reference reliably destroys the epistemic purity of systems (as Bertrand Russell discovered with the set-theoretic paradox), the field's persistent failure to explain why particular experiences map to particular neural firings is suspicious.
“the neuroscience of consciousness, it is an observer's attempt to explain themselves from within the system that they're existing. And, that looks a lot like some sort of self-referential--a problem.”
- Science may be fundamentally incomplete—some things truly cannot be known—and Hoel credits Hayek's 1952 The Sensory Order as possibly the first to argue this: any apparatus that classifies objects must be of greater complexity than what it classifies, so the mind, as a classifying machine, can never fully classify or explain another mind of equal complexity, and thus the mind must 'remain forever in a realm of its own.'
“maybe science really is fundamentally incomplete. Like, there really are some things that can't be known.”
When unanswerable questions paralyze us, choosing a stance and committing to it is a rational response, and humans developed rich concepts of mind through literature rather than acquiring them innately.
- William James suffered a deep multi-year existential depression rooted in finding free will inconceivable, then resolved it by deciding the question was unanswerable and choosing belief—writing 'My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will'—suggesting that when a question is provably unresolvable, choosing one's stance can itself be a path out of paralysis.
“he came to believe, 'Listen, this is just impossible. And so, if it's unanswerable, I'm just going to choose.' And, he wrote in his diary: 'My first act of free will be to believe in free will.'”
- The concepts we use to talk fluently about minds (character development, emotionality, thoughts, feelings) were not innate but had to be built and introduced—largely through literature—just as science had to develop concepts like mathematics and causality; richer portrayals of minds in later literature reflect these acquired cognitive concepts.
“we now have concepts about ourselves--concepts of character development, concepts of emotionality--that allow us to so fluently talk about minds. And, it's not like a coincidence that we have those. Those were built.”
- Jaynes's clever defense against critics is that modern translations of ancient texts often read in more of the 'intrinsic perspective'—the richness of interior mind—that wasn't necessarily present, sometimes added to make translations more literary and modern, as shown by comparing two translations of a c. 1300 B.C. love poem where the later, more physical version reveals the analogy was materialistic rather than psychological.
“translation, particularly modern translation, often reads in more of what I call the intrinsic perspective, which is the view you can take of individuals that examines, like, the depth of their mind, the richness of their interiority.”
- Boethius, awaiting execution, argued in The Consolation of Philosophy that an omniscient God need not threaten free will because God is outside time and sees everything happening concurrently rather than jumping ahead to predict, so divine foreknowledge is not the same as predictive determination.
“God is outside of time. So, it's sort of a mistake to think that God is jumping ahead and seeing what happens...Because God has to see everything that happens all at once.”
- There is a recurring historical pattern in which the extrinsic (scientific) and intrinsic (literary) perspectives advance simultaneously in the same places—science and the first deeply drawn dramatic characters both emerged in ancient Greece, and Einstein's spacetime (1905) and Picasso's cubism (1907) both drew on Poincaré's Science and Hypothesis.
“Einstein introduces his sort of geometrical perspective of space/time in 1905, and Picasso generates cubism in 1907. And, both of them were supposedly influenced by this book by Henri Poincaré called Science and Hypothesis”
- Julian Jaynes argued that in very early texts like the Iliad, characters lack modern self-understanding and are driven by 'the will of the gods'; he interpreted this as one brain hemisphere literally commanding the other, with full human consciousness not yet established—a theory requiring that consciousness depends on language.
“essentially one side of the brain, one hemisphere of the brain is really communicating to the other. And, full human consciousness had not really been established at that time.”
Science was designed to study only extrinsic physical properties and deliberately bracketed away consciousness, so its failure to explain subjective experience reflects structural limitation rather than incompleteness.
- Cancer survival rates have been increasing slowly but gradually through incremental scientific progress without any single major breakthrough, in contrast to neuroscience, which shows no comparable cumulative incremental understanding of the brain.
“your chances of dying from cancer are much better than they were even 15 or 20 years ago.”
- Science focuses on the extrinsic because Galileo and early scientists decided to bracket aside experiential qualities (the soul, the redness of red, beauty) and restrict science to a small number of physical properties like size, shape, and location expressed in mathematics—a purposeful choice that was massively successful but means science was never originally designed to explain consciousness.
“science focuses primarily on the extrinsic because it was decided that would be the case. So, Galileo Galilei, he was one of the first people to really sort of officially say this.”
- After roughly 15 years in a top consciousness lab, Hoel concludes neuroscience is no closer to understanding consciousness than when he entered the field; it is a field of 'boom and bust' dead narratives (e.g., mirror neurons) where the main lesson of the last 20 years is merely that the brain is more complex than thought, while molecular-level knowledge of individual neurons—not what people actually want explained—has genuinely advanced.
“my conclusion from about 10, or about 15 years, in the field is that we're no closer today than sort of when I entered the field in terms of understanding it.”
Perfect prediction of deterministic systems requires infinite computational regress, so denying free will on grounds of predictability is logically indefensible.
- Arguments against free will assume a machine that perfectly models the world, but if such a machine must also model people's reactions to its own predictions, it needs a perfect copy of itself running in the background, generating an infinite regress of computation—so a perfectly predictive machine may not even be a logically definable thing, undermining confident denials of free will.
“the machine would need to have a perfect copy of itself also sort of running in the background, generating the future that the people it is simulating are seeing...So, you would immediately have this infinite regress of computation for such a machine.”
- Chaos theory shows some systems have no simplified model for prediction far into the future (weather is provably impossible to forecast exactly), and computational irreducibility means even with perfect information and rules, the only way to know what such a system—or program—will do is to run it; the brain is likely such a system, so 'prediction' would require building a perfect duplicate and watching it, which is observation-plus-time-travel, not prediction in any meaningful sense.
“there are some programs that the only way to figure out what the program is going to do is to run it. You can't, sort of, look at it and cogitate ahead of time”