What this covers

Megan McArdle and Russ Roberts examine how people become trapped by their own mistakes, especially when the cost of admitting them is psychologically unbearable. The conversation centers on the Oedipus Trap—McArdle's term for errors so morally catastrophic that those who made them, even innocently, become incapable of recognizing or acknowledging them. The primary case study is Walter Freeman, the physician who pioneered lobotomy in America and never abandoned the procedure despite mounting evidence of its destructiveness. Even in 1968, a few years before his death, Freeman insisted the operation was sound and due for revival. The episode explores how Freeman's inability to admit error was not a failure of intellect but a breakdown of self-perception—how admitting the procedure was wrong would have meant accepting that he had mutilated countless minds.

McArdle argues that medicine is uniquely vulnerable to this trap because bodies are complicated systems we understand poorly, outcomes vary wildly, and even worthless treatments produce some apparent improvements by chance and placebo effect. The discussion draws parallels to Ignaz Semmelweis, whose colleagues rejected handwashing because accepting germ theory would have meant admitting they were accidental mass murderers. A second theme emerges around the slogan "follow the science": McArdle contends it is unscientific because it obscures which scientist to follow, treats dissent as evidence of lunacy, and demands faith-based acceptance of authority rather than evidence-weighing. She argues that self-deception is strongest precisely where stakes are highest, making scientific consensus least trustworthy in high-consequence domains—where scientists have the most to lose from admitting error. The conversation also addresses how misaligned incentives corrupt medicine, how media amplification accelerated lobotomy's adoption, and why confirmation bias driven by psychological need can override careful observation.

Sharpest takeaway

McArdle argues that some mistakes are so morally unbearable that the people who make them—even innocently—become psychologically incapable of recognizing them (the 'Oedipus Trap'), which makes 'follow the science' most unreliable precisely where stakes are highest and self-deception strongest.

  • Walter Freeman never abandoned lobotomy because admitting it was wrong was unbearable, despite careful case histories
  • Semmelweis's colleagues rejected handwashing because accepting it meant accepting they were accidental mass murderers
  • Self-deception is strongest where reputation and moral stakes are highest, so scientific consensus should be trusted least there

The argument · threads10 threads · 48 claims
0.85

Admitting error becomes psychologically impossible when it means admitting you caused catastrophic harm; this 'Oedipus Trap' blocks self-recognition.

7 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Science advances 'one funeral at a time' because senior scientists with reputations staked on a theory will fight to block junior scientists who contradict them; the obstacles to changing minds are large even when only career and status are at stake, and far larger when admitting error means admitting you did something terrible.

    “There's a reason that the adage is that science proceeds one funeral at a time.”

  • The 'Oedipus Trap'—drawn from Oedipus unknowingly fulfilling the prophecy he tried to escape—is the principle that some mistakes are so morally unbearable that, even when made innocently, the person who made them will do everything in their psychological power to avoid recognizing it, because it is obviously better not to know you have done something you cannot live with; combined with ordinary confirmation bias, this makes self-recognition of catastrophic error nearly impossible.

    “what I drew from this was that there are some mistakes that no one can live with, even if they were made innocently. And, the trap is that, if you have made one of those mistakes, it is obviously much better not to know that you have done so.”

  • Semmelweis's colleagues rejected his findings not merely from stupidity but because accepting that washing hands would save patients meant accepting they had been accidental, completely innocent mass murderers—and the tragedy is that even though the requested change was tiny (just washing hands), conceding it was psychologically impossible because it implied catastrophic prior guilt; it took younger doctors who had not done the killing to adopt the practice.

    “Could you allow yourself, right? It had to be younger doctors who had not done that.”

  • You should trust and follow 'the science' least precisely where the stakes are highest—where a scientist or politician being wrong would yield horrific results—because that is exactly where they will be working hardest to fool themselves, so high-consequence scientific and political claims must be taken with the biggest grain of salt.

    “especially when you look at these questions where if a scientist or a politician has gone wrong--the results would be too horrific to contemplate, those are the parts where you should absolutely trust the science least, follow the science least.”

  • The people capable of seeing and voicing uncomfortable truths tend to be disagreeable, because resisting the social pull to fit in and telling colleagues they are wrong requires an antisocial willingness to make others unhappy; agreeable people simply do what everyone else does and cannot see the dissenting truth—which means the people who first perceive correct but socially costly insights are usually poor advocates for them, requiring a more diplomatic second person to actually sell the innovation.

    “people who are telling you, 'You are wrong,' are actually--they tend to be disagreeable people... The agreeable people just do what the other people are doing.”

  • Sometimes you must make high-stakes decisions—as in foreign policy—where both action and inaction could go terribly wrong, such that you could not live with yourself under either outcome; in such cases you cannot avoid the risk, so you must build in safeguards to ensure you can still recognize a mistake afterward.

    “sometimes you have to make those decisions because you also couldn't live with yourself if you didn't do it... Maybe both things are things that you couldn't live with if they went too terribly wrong.”

  • Ignaz Semmelweis, an early pioneer of germ theory, observed that the doctor-attended maternity ward had a higher mortality rate than the midwife ward because doctors went straight from dissecting corpses (a bloody jacket being a badge of honor) to deliveries, transferring sepsis into the open wound of the postpartum womb; he found that dousing hands in carbolic acid dramatically reduced mortality.

    “what he noticed was that the mortality rate on the midwife side was better. And, what he eventually decided was that what was happening was the doctors are working on corpses.”

0.76

Freeman's late-life campaign was driven by vanity and desperation to rescue his slipping reputation after lobotomy fell from favor.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Walter Freeman's late-life 'head-hunting' road trips to collect patient case histories were not merely social or data-gathering but a salvage mission: a vain man who wanted to be a pioneering medical hero, watching his reputation slip away after 1954, was desperately seeking evidence that lobotomy was a good operation in order to rescue his legacy.

    “he sees this reputation that he has accumulated--he sees it slipping away... he wants to prove to people, 'No, this was a good operation. It is a good operation.'”

  • Freeman was looking so hard for the procedure to work that he saw what he wanted to see—registering the evidence that lobotomy was good while not attending to the evidence that it was bad—a classic case of confirmation bias driven by his need to believe.

    “he was looking for it to work, right? And, he was looking so hard that he saw what he wanted to see. You saw the evidence that it was good, and you didn't pay attention to the evidence that it was bad.”

  • Walter Freeman never gave up on lobotomy; as late as 1968, just a few years before his death, he was telling people the operation was great and due for a revival once surgeons made up their minds about it—asserting it was still a good operation, not merely that it had been the best available option at an earlier time.

    “In 1968, just a few years before he died, he is telling people, 'I think this is a great operation, and it's due for revival when surgeons make their mind to it.'”

  • Freeman's fate may have been sealed early: he and his partner set a goal of doing 20 lobotomies in four months and hit it, killing at least one patient and scarring 19 more—and once you have done that, every additional lobotomy you perform increases your psychological need to believe in the procedure, making reversal ever harder.

    “Every time, every lobotomy you do increases your need to believe in the lobotomy.”

  • Egas Moniz, the Portuguese doctor who invented the lobotomy procedure, received the Nobel Prize for it in 1949—an award never rescinded—which is tragic because he actually deserved recognition for his pioneering work on angiograms rather than for the horrific operation.

    “That honor goes to a Portuguese doctor named Egas Moniz, who received the Nobel Prize for it in 1949... Never rescinded--which is sort of tragic because, in fact, he deserved the Nobel Prize for his work on angiograms. But, what he got it for was this horrific operation”

0.76

Lobotomy outcomes were mixed but median impact was severely damaging; Freeman saw confirming evidence while overlooking contradictory evidence.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Contrary to the popular 'zombie vegetable' stereotype derived from One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, lobotomy outcomes were a genuinely mixed bag—a minority of patients went on to high-powered careers (including a woman who completed a math PhD), many were satisfied and even recommended the procedure to others, while most were severely damaged; though the median outcome was an extremely damaging operation.

    “our understanding of lobotomy is this thing where you just end up with this zombie vegetable who does what they're told is not correct... There were lawyers and doctors and important people with important jobs who had lobotomies. This is, by far, not the majority.”

  • Lobotomy frequently left patients apathetic, which when treating an anxiety disorder could deceptively resemble a cure—the apparent calming of an anxious patient looked like therapeutic success when it was actually brain damage.

    “it frequently left people quite apathetic, which if you're treating an anxiety disorder, it looks sort of confusingly like a cure”

  • Lobotomy was a horrific procedure with terrible side effects: it produced apathy, could cause incontinence, could produce seizures, and a stunning number of patients died on the table or shortly thereafter.

    “It did, it produced apathy. It could produce incontinence. It could produce seizures. I mean, a stunning number of his patients died on the table or shortly thereafter.”

  • Richard Feynman's first principle of science is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool—a principle Walter Freeman violated by sincerely believing he was accumulating evidence of lobotomy's success while being unable to see the truth.

    “he was looking for it to work, right? And, he was looking so hard that he saw what he wanted to see. You saw the evidence that it was good, and you didn't pay attention to the evidence that it was bad.”

  • The transorbital lobotomy involved forcing a pick-like instrument through the thin bone at the back of the eye socket into the prefrontal lobe and wiggling it, producing variable effects because practitioners had no understanding of what the lobes did and no ability to see where they were cutting—effects depended on where they happened to hit and how much damage they did.

    “he would insert it next to your eye through the eye socket, and the bone is very thin at the back of the eye socket. And, he would just tap force it through the bone into the prefrontal lobe. And then he would just wiggle it around”

0.67

Lobotomy was comprehensible as a desperate measure in an era with no effective alternatives to asylums and pseudoscience.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Lobotomy began falling out of favor with the medical establishment almost as soon as the first antipsychotic drugs—Lithium, Thorazine, and others—were developed in 1954, because even sedating drugs were preferable to physically destroying brain tissue.

    “it went out of favor, basically, as soon as the first antipsychotics were developed in 1954. And, as you started to get Lithium and Thorazine and all of these other drugs... they're definitely better than just hacking around on someone's brain”

  • Lobotomy is comprehensible only in the context of an early-20th-century world with no effective treatments for severe mental illness, where the alternatives were ineffective Freudian pseudoscience and equally villainous physical treatments, leaving desperate doctors to attempt desperate measures.

    “you can kind of understand how lobotomy happened in the context of a world where there were just no good treatments at all for mental illness... the alternatives were Freudian pseudoscience that didn't work. And, doctors were desperate, and they did a bunch of desperate things”

  • It is easy to pass moral judgment on barbaric historical treatments precisely because we now have better alternatives; the doctors of that era were dealing with barbaric asylums and genuinely did not know what else to do with suffering patients.

    “they were also dealing with these incredibly barbaric asylums, and they didn't know what else to do with people. And, we have better alternatives, and we should remember that it is easy to pass judgment when we have alternatives.”

  • Before penicillin, defensible-in-context treatments for syphilis included an arsenic-based therapy with crippling side effects and deliberately giving patients malaria, because the extremely high fevers of malaria killed the syphilis spirochetes—better than untreated syphilis though far worse than penicillin—illustrating treatments doctors can honestly say were the best available at the time and are glad to no longer need.

    “another was literally giving patients malaria because the incredibly high fevers of malaria kill the syphilis spirochetes. Well, that's probably better than having syphilis, but it's not as good as penicillin.”

  • The standards for approving a drug to treat cancer patients are much lower than for almost any other condition, precisely because the alternative for the patient is to go home and die, illustrating that sometimes you must make high-stakes decisions despite the risk of being terribly wrong.

    “the standards for a drug to treat cancer patients are so much lower than a drug to treat almost anything else, precisely because doctors, like, 'Well, what's the alternative? Just go home and die.'”

  • Electroconvulsive therapy, once one of many barbaric convulsive treatments and used so crudely that patients broke their legs, is still used today—performed far more humanely—for extremely refractory severe depression where drugs have failed and the patient has no quality of life, and it does appear to work.

    “the electric shock is still done for extremely refractory depression. If you are severely depressed, and you cannot get over it, and you basically have no quality of life, and drugs don't work, they will try electric shock. And, it actually does seem to work. We do it much more humanely.”

0.63

Medical science is especially vulnerable to self-deception because it involves complex systems poorly understood and difficult-to-isolate outcomes.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Medicine is especially vulnerable to self-deception because it deals with incredibly complicated systems we don't understand well, it is ethically hard to experiment on humans the way we do on animals, and outcomes vary enormously—the human body acts as a black box where you pump something in and something comes out, making it harder to isolate causes than in physics where systems like a particle collider have predictable ranges of outcomes.

    “I think this is especially true in medicine... you're dealing with, first of all, incredibly complicated systems that we don't understand very well. Second of all, it's extremely hard to experiment.”

  • Apparent cures often reflect merely the passage of time and random fluctuations in a person's condition—John Nash's schizophrenia receded in late middle age as happens with some schizophrenics—and a doctor who happened to apply a treatment right before such a natural improvement could wrongly conclude they had discovered a wonderful new treatment.

    “there are some schizophrenics who just--their schizophrenia recedes in late middle-age. And John Nash was among them.”

  • Because the human body is so complicated—cancers sometimes spontaneously heal and depression sometimes lifts on its own—even the stupidest treatment imaginable, like stroking caterpillar fur at midnight or coffee enemas, will produce at least some apparent improvements if administered to enough people, which combined with the placebo effect makes it dangerously easy to credit a worthless intervention.

    “the stupidest treatment you can imagine, whatever--stroking caterpillar fur at midnight, or coffee enemas... will, if you pump it into enough people, produce at least some apparent improvements in any condition that you're trying to treat.”

  • Ivermectin probably does not work against COVID; its apparent efficacy was likely an artifact of small studies and the possibility that in countries with high parasite loads it improved health by killing intestinal worms (which can be immunosuppressive) rather than by acting on COVID itself.

    “the reason that it kind of looked like it worked was, a). artifact of small studies, and b). possibly that in countries with a high parasite load, it actually helps by killing your intestinal worms... but not by doing anything to COVID.”

  • The decades of denial following Iraq and Afghanistan—insisting things were going much better than they were when they were not—illustrates that everyone, not just scientists, sees what they want to see especially when reputation is on the line; the speed with which Afghanistan fell to the Taliban after withdrawal showed that little of what was claimed to be accomplished had actually been achieved.

    “things weren't going well, and they kept not going well. And, we kept being like, 'No, they're going much better than we think.' And, no, they weren't... As soon as we left, Afghanistan fell to the Taliban with incredible speed.”

0.53

High-stakes decisions require epistemic humility: pre-commit to checking for error, avoid staking reputation on outcomes, and distinguish belief from identity.

6 pointscentrality 3/5
  • To avoid Oedipus traps when stakes are high: go in super-cautiously and follow up for years because moving fast risks rushing past the point of no return; pre-commit to repeatedly checking whether the decision was wrong and to act on bad news even when it is shattering; and avoid staking your reputation on the decision, which is exactly the mistake Freeman made by becoming the public face of lobotomy.

    “if the stakes are really high, you go in super-cautiously... the faster that you move, the more likely you are to just rush past the point of no return.”

  • Most of what anyone believes in a complex society is accepted on faith out of necessity (we trust that planes fly and evolution is true without understanding the mechanisms), but you get no bonus virtue points for having accepted the correct theory on faith—that's more of an accident—so epistemic humility requires remaining open to the possibility that something has gone hideously wrong rather than treating belief in science as an identity.

    “you need to be epistemically humble and understand that you can't get bonus points for having accepted the correct theory on faith... That's not a virtue. It's more of almost an accident.”

  • Having been an advocate for lockdowns, masks, and vaccine mandates, McArdle now believes the COVID vaccines do not inhibit transmission enough to justify a general mandate as a public health intervention, though she still supports mandates for healthcare workers and military personnel and continues to believe in vaccines and properly used masks—distinguishing belief that masks work from belief that mask mandates work.

    “I think, now, that the vaccines do not seem to have enough impact on transmissibility for me to be willing to impose a mandate, except on maybe healthcare workers, and military personnel”

  • The slogan 'follow the science' is unscientific because it obscures the question 'which scientist?'—scientific consensus is a reasonable Bayesian prior but not infallible, and treating dissent as prima facie evidence of lunacy contradicts the scientific method; the proper response to an open question is a careful evidence-weighing deep dive, not demanding that society accept claims on faith because of scientific credentials.

    “One of my questions often is, which scientist?... My prior is that normally the scientific consensus is more likely to be right than some random person... That said, I think we should be... especially conscious of--in areas where the stakes are high, I am less likely to follow the science.”

  • Refusing to engage open questions (like Ivermectin and COVID) on the grounds that doing so 'gives credibility to conspiracy theorists' is fundamentally anti-scientific; even though you will never convince some people who merely want to be angry, you must still make the evidence-based argument, because demanding faith-based acceptance of scientific authority depletes rather than enhances trust in science.

    “he was chided because this is giving credibility--you're giving credibility--to the conspiracy theorists. And, I think that this is a fundamentally anti-scientific attitude.”

  • Slogans like 'In this house we believe in science' turn science into an identity, which is the exact opposite of science—saying you believe in science implies nothing about policy any more than saying you believe in trees; the phrase functions as tribal signaling rather than as the practice of evidence-based inquiry.

    “'In this house, we believe in science'--science is--what do you mean, you believe in science? This is like: 'I believe in trees.' I've seen them, right?”

0.36

Freeman was a complicated figure: careful physician who segregated medical society and cared for patients, yet vain and ambitious.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Freeman defies the stereotype of a pseudo-scientific barbarian: he took more careful and thorough patient histories than most 20th-century physicians, genuinely cared about his patients, and even led the charge to desegregate the DC Medical Society—making him a more complicated figure than the lobotomist caricature suggests, even though he was vain and over-ambitious.

    “He, as the head of the DC Medical Society, led the charge to desegregate it. And, I think this goes... to the ways in which my expectations of what a lobotomist would be like we're not met by Dr. Freeman. He was a more complicated figure than that.”

  • Because Freeman was a neurologist, not a surgeon, who invented an outpatient procedure requiring no surgical training, the surgeons who opposed him were correct that the operation was bad but their objections came across as professional jealousy ('How dare you do surgery?') rather than the more fundamental point that the operation simply didn't work regardless of who performed it.

    “The surgeons are right that it's a bad operation, but it comes off as, like, professional jealousy: 'How dare you be doing surgery?' rather than, 'This whole operation doesn't work'”

0.36

Caregivers' incentives to manage difficult patients can lead to self-deception that sedation serves the patient rather than caregiver convenience.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Caregivers and treaters have their own incentives—it is easier to manage a quiet, apathetic, sedated patient than an anxious or noisy one—and it is dangerously easy to convince yourself that what is good for you as the caregiver is also good for the patient, a problem evident in the historical use of lobotomy and persisting today in the sedation of dementia patients and difficult schoolchildren.

    “we need to be conscious of the fact that the caregivers and the treaters have their own incentives... it is easy to convince yourself that the thing that's good for you is good for the patient, too.”

  • A common phenomenon in medicine is that once a treatment exists, it gets recommended for more and more conditions—lobotomy exhibited this mission creep, being applied to an ever-widening range of problems beyond its original indications.

    “you just start recommending it for more and more things. This is a really common phenomenon in medicine.”

0.32

Media uncritically amplified Freeman's work into 'miracle medicine' stories, creating social support and patient demand for lobotomy.

1 pointcentrality 3/5
  • Walter Freeman was extraordinarily effective at generating press coverage, and the media played a large and disturbing role in creating the social support that allowed lobotomy to catch on, with uncritical reporters producing 'miracle medicine' stories that generated demand for the procedure.

    “He was also fantastic at getting press, in a kind of gross way, and to see how big a role the media played in creating the social support for a lobotomy was pretty disturbing.”

0.22

Informed consent requires that adults' medical decisions cannot rest solely on caregiver preference; families often weighed genuinely terrible alternatives thoughtfully.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Our evolved conception of informed consent exists precisely because we recognize that decisions cannot rest solely on what the family or caregiver wants—unlike children who cannot picture the future or grasp trade-offs and so need surrogate decision-makers, adults' treatment cannot be decided merely because a caregiver is tired of the patient being noisy.

    “why we have evolved our conception of informed consent to say, 'No, it can't just be that the family thinks.'... with adults, it can't just be that your caregiver is tired of having you be noisy.”

  • The assumption that lobotomy patients had no informed consent is wrong—patients and families often thought deeply and thoughtfully about the decision, weighing genuinely terrible alternatives such as a violently disabled child spending life in a straitjacket; though convenience for caregivers was also sometimes a factor.

    “we assume that there was no informed consent. No: these patients were often thinking deeply and thoughtfully about it”