Tyler Cowen and Russ Roberts on Nation, Immigration, and Israel
What this covers
Russ Roberts and Tyler Cowen conduct a wide-ranging conversation about Israel, immigration, and the limits of economic thinking. Roberts, newly relocated to Israel, and Cowen, observing from afar, explore how nations make choices that economics alone cannot explain. The core thread running through their discussion is whether major decisions about identity, belonging, and place can be reduced to efficiency calculations or whether non-monetizable values—pride, connection to land, sense of meaning—legitimately override narrow self-interest.
The conversation spans several concrete cases. They examine Israel's military conscription and whether the country can survive without it; the politics of kosher certification monopoly and what deregulation might reveal about enforcement; and how nations like Israel might rationally choose higher prices or foregone efficiency to preserve cultural identity. Throughout, they challenge the Benthamite framework that treats utility as a single aggregate quantity. They argue that interpersonal utility comparison is incoherent, that cardinal and ordinal utility collapse under scrutiny, and that major life choices—marriage, children, exile—operate in a dimension where revealed preference cannot capture what people actually value. Cowen contends that the trade-peace thesis is overstated; Roberts uses transformative experience and the coin-flip heuristic to show how decisions expose rather than maximize preference. The pair also discuss Israeli television's unusual quality, the role of sense of place in Brexit, the Hebrew concept of freier, and why recency bias distorts present anxieties. A recurring theme is Micah Goodman's idea to manage rather than solve intractable conflicts.
Roberts argues that immigration, nationhood, and policy choices like military conscription or kosher deregulation cannot be reduced to economic efficiency or utilitarian calculation, because identity, pride, place, and meaning are non-monetizable values that legitimately override narrow self-interest.
- Utilitarian/Benthamite aggregation fails because pleasure-pain scales are person-relative and require external value judgments to compare
- Deregulating kosher certification may improve outcomes because government monopoly does not guarantee good enforcement
- Nations like Israel may rationally pay a higher price to preserve identity rather than import labor for efficiency
Israel-Palestinian conflict lacks fixable solution; incremental coexistence improvement is more realistic than American policy establishment's pursuit of resolution.
- Thirty years ago it was assumed Israel would struggle to remain a Jewish state because Jewish birth rates were low and Arab Israeli birth rates high, threatening a Jewish-minority Jewish state; the unforeseen fall of the Soviet Union and influx of millions of Russian Jews let Israel avoid an existential threat that would have demanded a very non-democratic response.
“30 years ago everybody knew that Israel was going to struggle to stay a Jewish state because birth rates were low among the Jewish population... People did not foresee the fall of the Soviet Union and the influx of millions of Russian Jews into Israel.”
- Arab Israelis born within Israel's borders are full citizens with healthcare, subsidized university access, and voting rights, but they do not serve in the army and do not want to, which is distinct from West Bank and Gaza Palestinians and from East Jerusalem residents.
“people who are born within the borders of the Jewish State right now... who are not Jewish--Arab Israelis--are full citizens. They get full healthcare, they get to go subsidized to the universities. They vote.”
- It is wrong to look for a solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict; the better approach—following Micah Goodman's Catch-67—is to find ways to live with it and improve life incrementally, because the American foreign-policy establishment's decades-long attempt to 'fix it' assumes a fixability that may not exist, especially when Israel lacks a negotiating partner that accepts its right to exist.
“Part of his insight is: it's wrong to look for a solution... Think about ways to move toward a improvement rather than fixing it.”
- Removing the rabbinic monopoly over kosher certification in Israel may produce more and cheaper genuinely-kosher food, not less, because the government monopoly is widely resented for collecting fees without real supervision; this disproves the naive assumption that laws and government monopolies are well-enforced, and competition could serve religious customers better.
“If you take away some monopoly power from the rabbinic authorities here, are you going to get less-kosher food? The answer is: You might get more-kosher food.”
- Newspapers remain far more important in Israel than in America, surviving in physical print with openly ideological flavors—more like American TV—whereas American newspapers historically pretended to objectivity, a pretense that has recently weakened.
“newspapers are much more important than they are in America. They haven't died out. They're not just online.”
- The United States is generally more religious than Europe despite—or because of—having no state religion, while most of Europe has state religion; the state does few things well and an alliance of state with religion has historically not led to good feelings about religion.
“United States is generally a more religious country than Europe. There's no state religion in America. Most of Europe has state religion.”
Utilitarian calculus fails to adjudicate choices involving identity, purpose, and the kind of person one wants to become.
- Big choices like marriage or career cannot be reduced to revealed preference for whichever option maximizes day-to-day enjoyment, because such choices involve pride, sense of purpose, and meaning that cannot be honestly traded off into a single scalar; with choices like having kids, you are choosing what kind of person you want to be, which is precisely what utilitarian calculus cannot adjudicate.
“There's a really a meaningful statement, if one job gives me a huge amount of pride and the other I'm kind of embarrassed about. And how do I--do I really think I can trade those off and put a number on those?”
- Following Piet Hein's poem, flipping a coin to make a hard decision works not by deciding for you but by revealing what you find yourself rooting for as the coin spins—exposing your gut's true hope and using that to make the decision.
“You flip the coin so that you'll know what to root for. And, that tells you what you really want.”
- The economist's utilitarian framework monetizes pleasure and pain to create a common scale, but that scale depends on how much money each person has, so it is not a real scale of pleasure and pain but only a scale for one individual, making interpersonal comparison of costs and benefits effectively impossible—and the desire to aggregate net gains into a single policy verdict is therefore a fool's game.
“the problem with that scale, of course, as every good economist know and many bad ones don't, is that the scale depends on how much money you have. It's not a real scale of pleasure and pain. It's a scale for me.”
People rationally accept economic costs to preserve identity, dignity, belonging, and connection to place over financial efficiency.
- Decisions like Brexit reflect a widely-held and enduring view that there are things more important than money—identity, connection to land and country, sense of place and belonging—so populations may rationally accept higher prices to preserve those values; a good economist understands this while a bad one focuses only on the efficient financial solution.
“Brexit and other decisions that populations are making in the modern world are a view that there are things more important than money... A good economist understands that; a bad economist focuses on it.”
- The claim that without imported workers certain jobs won't get done is a fallacy: in a market economy, if low-wage immigrant labor is restricted, wages rise until native workers find the jobs attractive, or—if prices rise too high—those services simply won't be demanded, so nations can legitimately choose to pay more to preserve identity rather than import labor for efficiency.
“What'll happen is, if you have something of a market economy, the wages rise. And they become more attractive to the native population. Immigrants aren't needed.”
- In Middle Eastern culture, pride, face, and dignity play a much greater role in negotiation than narrowly-defined self-interest, so gestures Americans read as generous or harsh may be perceived entirely differently, and American negotiators and Jews alike often fail to understand this.
“The role that pride, face, dignity plays, as opposed to, say, quote, "narrow self-interest," narrowly defined. I think it's much greater for those other intangible things.”
Israeli society exhibits distinctive national character: self-reliance, shared external threat cohesion, universal military socialization, and physical safety for children.
- Israelis are characterized by a distinctive self-reliant 'we'll get it done, it'll work out' mentality, exemplified by El Al pilots (drawn from the Air Force) deciding to fly through a blizzard as long as the airport stays open—reflecting a vitality and national pride Roberts finds largely missing in contemporary America.
“That's the Israeli mentality: 'We'll get it done. We'll take care of it. It'll work out.'”
- Despite Israel's fractious parliamentary politics, many parties, no constitution, and frequent yelling in the Knesset, there is substantial social cohesion, which Roberts attributes largely to the shared external threat rather than to the army alone.
“despite all that, because of, I think, the external threat, there's a lot of cohesion here, whether there's an army or not.”
- Despite visiting Israel a dozen times and living there as a teenager, Roberts was surprised by how much national pride and emotional identity he felt as a new immigrant—becoming less interested in American sports and politics—mirroring the emotion of immigrants passing citizenship tests.
“I've been surprised at how much national pride I have, how I'm not quite as interested in what's going on in America.”
- Israel is an excellent place to raise children who can run free as American children once did, with very little street crime, theft, or burglary, though the threat of terrorism means one is more likely to be stabbed in Jerusalem than in New York City—even if such events remain uncommon.
“There's very little crime on the streets, very little street crime, very little theft, very little burglary... But, there is threat of terrorism. So, you're much more likely to get stabbed in Jerusalem than you are in New York City.”
- Israel's universal draft functions as an enormous, often physically difficult socializing experience that permeates life and creates powerful lifelong bonds based on one's unit, analogous to but stronger than American college or private-school networks.
“It's an enormous socializing experience here, for the young people to go through that: it's challenging, difficult, often physically difficult. And, it permeates a lot of life here.”
Hebrew concept of 'freier' and Middle Eastern negotiation norms reveal emotional and cultural drivers that economic theory overlooks.
- The Hebrew slang 'freier' (sucker) captures an important aspect of human nature that economics says little about: the emotional fear of being taken advantage of drives a lot of bad behavior on both sides of transactions when trust is absent.
“The fear that you're being taken advantage of drives a lot of bad behavior on both sides of various transactions if you don't have a good level of trust.”
- In Israel many announced prices are merely invitations to negotiate rather than fixed amounts, and the cab driver's anger at being told to use the meter reflects not greed but disappointment that the customer refuses to play the expected negotiation game that is part of the fabric of daily life.
“a lot of times the price they announce is just like a hint or a suggestion. And, it's very hard for Americans to respond to that.”
Israel's regulatory constraints and entrenched institutional advantages make founding competitive universities structurally difficult.
- In Israel, unlike the United States, refusing government money does not earn a college lighter regulation; the Council of Higher Education remains extremely detail-oriented (regulating even toilets per student, syllabi, faculty, and committee approvals), so starting a new university is a major regulatory enterprise.
“In America, if you don't take money from the government, you usually get less regulation, in turn. That is not the case here. The Council of Higher Education is extremely vigilant”
- Shalem College operates on a model of losing money on every student, taking no government funds and covering students' tuition and much of their living expenses through private donations because it competes for Israel's best students who are often offered scholarships elsewhere.
“We lose money on every student and we make it up by volume. We give all of our students a stipend that covers their tuition and a good chunk of their living expenses.”
- Very few new colleges in America reach the highest level because brand name and emotional ties to existing institutions are extremely important, so a startup university must compete against entrenched incumbents on accreditation and reputation—a hard task even for ventures like the University of Austin.
“in the case of college, brand name is extremely important in America, obviously. People have emotional ties to colleges. I think there are very, very, very few new colleges that are at the highest level.”