Robert Lerman on Apprenticeships
What this covers
Note: The title indicates this is about apprenticeships, but the thesis, description, statements, and vocabulary all concern American healthcare reform. The material provided discusses healthcare payment models and incentive structures, not apprenticeship training. The prose below describes the healthcare content actually present in the supplied material.
Vivian Lee, a physician and health system leader, joins Russ Roberts on EconTalk to diagnose dysfunction in American healthcare and propose structural remedies. The conversation centers on how fee-for-service payment—rewarding the volume of procedures rather than patient health outcomes—creates perverse incentives throughout the system. Lee develops this argument by examining concrete instances: how hospitals set prices by marking up last year's charges, how Chargemaster lists create the illusion of transparency while remaining incomparable across institutions, and how physicians lacking cost information make equally sound clinical choices at wildly different expenses. The core dysfunction, he contends, is that patients no longer function as customers with skin in the game, severing the market feedback loops that elsewhere reward efficiency and punish waste.
Lee contrasts this against alternatives already showing results. Capitation models like Medicare Advantage, which pay medical groups a fixed amount per patient and hold them accountable for keeping patients healthy, have prompted reinvention of primary care—longer visits, transportation assistance, onsite pharmacies—that reduces hospitalizations despite higher upfront spending. Lee argues that transparency requires standardization to work, that personalized digital tools like virtual diabetes clinics can deliver care conventional medicine cannot, and that telehealth, throttled for twenty years by licensing and reimbursement barriers, should become permanent post-COVID. He calls for a national pivot: declaring health the priority and setting firm deadlines to shift away from fee-for-service entirely, allowing capitalism's incentives to finally push toward better outcomes at lower cost rather than against them.
Lee argues that American healthcare's core dysfunction is a fee-for-service payment model that incentivizes doing things to patients rather than improving health, and that shifting to value-based payment, price standardization/transparency, and personalized digital technology can produce better outcomes at lower cost.
- Fee-for-service rewards volume of procedures regardless of health outcomes, generating waste, over-treatment, and harm
- Capitated models like Medicare Advantage realign physician incentives toward keeping patients healthy and out of the hospital
- Transparency without standardization (e.g. the Chargemaster) is meaningless; standardization is needed for markets to function
Third-party payment breaks market feedback, making payers the real customers while patients become inputs in a revenue process.
- Because most patients pay via a third party (insurer or government) rather than with their own money, the normal market feedback loops that reward good performance and punish bad performance are severed, so the real customer becomes the payer and the patient functions like an input into a revenue process.
“we've cut all the feedback loops that normally encourage good performance, where people have skin in the game.”
The system incentivizes medical activity and volume over wisdom, generating costs hidden from patients and hospitals alike.
- The current healthcare system is not incentivized to be wise but to be active: hospitals create programs and protocols that generate revenue (e.g. physicians earn more administering chemotherapy than referring it out), and because these costs are hidden from patients and even the hospital cannot state them, the system produces dysfunction without anything nefarious occurring.
“the current system is really not incentivized to be wise. It's incentivized to be active.”
Certificate of Need laws restrict competition by requiring new hospitals to obtain incumbent permission, enabling pricing control.
- Certificate of Need laws, required in roughly 36 states, force a new hospital to obtain the permission of existing hospitals in the area, limiting competition and allowing incumbents to price and discount accordingly.
“Certificate of Need, which is a requirement in I think 36 states, that if you're opening a hospital, you have to get the permission of other hospitals in the area.”
American hospitals deliver world-class care for the insured, though high list prices create perverse incentives in federal reimbursement formulas.
- For those who are covered—elderly Medicare patients or those with good corporate insurance—the healthcare received in an American hospital is extraordinary and the gold standard, with marvelous technology and drugs, as long as no mistake is made.
“the healthcare that most people in the United States receive is extraordinary... if you are covered, if you're an old person, or if you have a good corporate insurance... this is the gold standard.”
- If Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) compensation for uncompensated care is calculated relative to a hospital's discounted list price, hospitals would have a perverse incentive to post high list prices to appear to be losing more money and collect more federal reimbursement.
“it would be a unfortunate thing if it turned out that the larger your list price, the easier it was to collect money from the Federal Government for care that you provided with no compensation.”