What this covers
Richard Robb and Russ Roberts explore the limits of the economic optimizing model in this wide-ranging conversation. Robb argues that human behavior splits into two kinds: Purposeful Choice, where we rank options and pick what satisfies us best, and For-Itself Behavior—self-justifying action like love, mercy, or sport that cannot be reduced to utility maximization without distorting what it is. The exchange moves from abstract economics into concrete cases: green beans sold in random-mix cartons, the Joseph story in Genesis, the 2008 financial crisis, and Robb's own months of unemployment despite leisure and abundance, when he went "nuts" until work gave him back authentic challenge.
Robb traces the insight that our purposes often remain obscure—we act spontaneously and invent justifications afterward—back to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hume. He distinguishes his view sharply from behavioral economics, which he argues remains locked in the same robotic framework as rational choice: both treat humans as agents pursuing inherited desires, whether optimally or through cognitive bias. Roberts pushes back on the degrading effect of treating rationality as equivalent to goodness, and both speakers challenge popular behavioral claims (Barry Schwartz's paradox of choice, for instance) while examining how incentives shape real behavior—the Peltzman effect in football and driving, the role of belief in the housing bubble, and how government bailouts reshape prudent investing regardless of explicit expectations. The conversation keeps returning to work, identity, time, and the difference between instrumentalizing human relations (modern "networking") and treating relationships as goods in themselves.
Robb argues that human behavior is two-fold: alongside purposeful (rational/behavioral) choice where we optimize among comparable options, there is 'for-itself' behavior—self-justifying action, belief, identity, and altruism that is not chosen because it is 'best' and cannot be reduced to utility maximization.
- Purposeful choice (rational choice plus behavioral bias) explains much but not all behavior, especially how we engage with time, beliefs, and altruism
- Much action is spontaneous and rationalized after the fact, as Nietzsche/Schopenhauer/Hume noted
- Acts like mercy and love-altruism are 'for itself' and resist being squeezed into the optimizing framework without 'one thought too many'
Standard economic models mechanistically misrepresent human decision-making and corrupt moral character when internalized.
- Studying economics accustoms one to a mechanistic understanding of life, which is not only an analytical mistake—because the 'as-if' optimizing description fails to capture what people are actually doing—but degrades us and tries to turn us into something robotic, so the extreme Benthamite felicific calculus is a miserable way to conceive of one's own actions and economics should be taught carefully, especially to the young.
“it actually degrades you a little bit, and takes away from what is our fundamental humanity, and tries to turn us into something more robotic.”
- Economists' conflation of 'rational' with 'good' is a terrible mistake: even where the utility-maximizing model can occasionally predict behavior, treating that mechanistic optimization as the way one ought to behave degrades us and tries to turn humans into something robotic.
“it actually degrades you a little bit, and takes away from what is our fundamental humanity, and tries to turn us into something more robotic.”
- In neoclassical models no one feels anguish over a decision unless they lack information, but real decision anguish comes from the fear that one's future self may regret the choice; that genuine weight on a human being has no place in the standard framework.
“in our models that we were taught as neoclassical economics, nobody has anguish over a decision... the real anguish of a decision is that future-you may not be happy with the decision.”
- A 42-year-old, wealthy Tom Brady continuing to play dangerous football despite injury risk looks irrational, and explaining it away as 'optimizing for the thrill' fails to fully capture what is going on—pointing instead to for-itself absorption in the sport.
“you could argue it's irrational that he wants to keep playing. And then you could subtly say, 'Oh no, it's not for the money...' But, I don't think that's capturing fully what's going on”
Incentive structures and social dynamics shape behavior in ways rational-choice models fail to capture or predict.
- Economists who deride coaches as irrational for punting on fourth down ignore the peculiar incentives: with only 32 NFL head-coaching slots and difficulty proving who is good, conservatism that mirrors what everyone else does is rational self-preservation against second-guessing by emotional owners—and the same groupthink-as-rational-choice dynamic operates in finance.
“there can a conservativism that is totally rational to preserve your job in the face of an expert's decision by an irrational or emotional owner”
- Even if the government profited fiscally on the bailouts, that is the wrong calculus: the disastrous effect is on the incentives for prudent investing, because a world in which the worst-case scenario gets bailed out can shape risk-taking behavior—just as the Peltzman effect shapes a football player or driver—even if the actors never explicitly said they were counting on a bailout.
“It's the incentive effect on prudent investing is disastrous.”
- A nurse conceded that having family present makes caregivers do a better job—not merely sustaining patient morale—illustrating Adam Smith's impartial spectator: humans rise to a higher level of performance when actually being watched, even though ideally one's motivation should be the same whether or not anyone is observing.
“He said, 'I think it makes us do a better job.' And I thought, of course, of Adam Smith's impartial spectator.”
Three distinct modes accomplish human goals: government, profit-seeking markets, and civil society motivated by care.
- We accomplish things together in three distinct ways—through government and the democratic/voting process, through profit-seeking markets where we work in teams to create products and services, and through civil society where we work for love, caring, and meaning without a bottom line—so the common 'business versus government' dichotomy, casting government as altruistic and business as grasping, is misleading.
“We do things for profit, for money... But we also do things for love, for caring, for meaning, for the sport of it, where we voluntarily--what is called 'civil society'”
Apparent market inefficiencies and exploitation often reflect rational responses to constraints or actual benefits to consumers.
- Potato chip bags aren't filled to the top not because companies are cheating consumers but because the air acts as a cushion protecting chips during long-distance shipping; consumers learn how much air to expect, competition disciplines the practice, and seeing this lets you realize many things that look like exploitation are actually beneficial.
“one of the reasons they don't fill to the top is that the air itself in the bag forms a form of cushion that protects potato chips and allows them to be shipped over long distances.”
- Because it's hard to do the right thing and humans tend to undervalue others' wellbeing, deliberately allowing yourself to 'irrationally' overweight visible desperation—the face of the person waiting, the person lying in the street—and acting on it makes you a better human being, and the non-comparability of that concrete person's need (a Hayekian knowledge point) means the utilitarian deadweight-loss calculus misleads.
“if you acculturate yourself to responding to desperation... you're going to be a better human being.”