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Political scientist Terry Moe discusses his research on educational reform with host Russ Roberts, using New Orleans's transformation after Hurricane Katrina as a lens to examine why institutional change so rarely happens. Moe's central claim concerns the hidden mechanics of power: beyond the visible competitions over policy, a deeper force operates when would-be reformers, anticipating defeat, abandon reform efforts before they are even attempted—what he calls the Second Face of Power. The conversation traces how this dynamic operated in New Orleans, where before Katrina the school system was deeply corrupt and failing (only about a quarter of students met basic proficiency standards), yet meaningful reform never materialized. The storm destroyed not just buildings but the power structure itself: with no schools and no dues-paying members, the teachers' union and school board lost their capacity to block change, creating an unprecedented opening.

Once that power was removed, the same decision-makers—Governor Kathleen Blanco, advisors Leslie Jacobs and Paul Pastorek, and others—shifted from incrementalism to radical reform, building an all-charter schools system that by 2010 had roughly doubled the share of students scoring Basic or above. Moe argues this was not ideological but pragmatic: vested interests are universal across institutions and protect the status quo regardless of performance, so catastrophic events may be necessary to enable reform elsewhere. The discussion enters contested terrain here, exploring whether charter schools can scale, why seniority rights resist accountability, and whether the New Orleans result is replicable. Moe and Roberts also examine how Incentives Drive Behavior and whether social science methodology itself obscures phenomena like the Second Face of Power that are invisible by nature.

Sharpest takeaway

Moe argues that entrenched vested interests (chiefly teachers' unions and school boards) block educational reform not mainly by winning political fights but by silently deterring reform from ever being attempted (the 'Second Face of Power'), and that Katrina's destruction of those interests in New Orleans revealed how dramatically pragmatic insiders will transform a failing system once that power is removed.

  • Vested interests are universal across all institutions and protect the status quo regardless of performance
  • The 'Second Face of Power' suppresses reform efforts before they are even attempted, so its main consequence is that nothing happens
  • After Katrina removed union and school board power, the same pragmatic decision-makers became radicals and built an all-charter system that doubled student proficiency

The argument · threads6 threads · 31 claims
0.85

Vested interests structurally block education reform by preventing experiments that threaten their power and jobs.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Despite decades of reform efforts since A Nation at Risk in 1983, US education reform has achieved very little because of huge resistance from teachers' unions and school boards: only about 6% of kids are in charter schools, less than 1% use vouchers or tax credits, and accountability has been gutted by being handed to state and local governments.

    “How many kids are in charter schools? About 6% nationwide. How many kids have vouchers or use tax credits? Less than 1% nationwide.”

  • There are no silver bullets in education reform; the key to progress is being able to try things, experiment, and make adjustments over time toward something better, but a political system structured by entrenched power prevents this iterative problem-solving because experiments threaten vested interests who block them.

    “the key to progress is being able to try things and experiment and make adjustments over time. And then you move toward something that is better and better and better.”

  • Beyond the observable 'First Face of Power' (winning open political conflicts), there is a 'Second Face of Power': when one side knows it has superior power, would-be reformers, anticipating defeat and its costs, voluntarily do nothing, so the great consequence of power is not winning fights but that nothing happens at all—an effect that is invisible because its principal product is the absence of action.

    “the great consequence of power is not that the power holders win in conflict situations. The great consequence is that nothing happens--that the reformers voluntarily, based on anticipated reactions, decide to do nothing.”

  • Teachers' unions exist to protect teachers' jobs, wages, benefits, and seniority rights, and many of these demands are either irrelevant to or come at the expense of what is best for children; they will oppose reforms threatening to those job interests regardless of how badly the system is performing.

    “teachers don't join unions in order to promote the best interests of children. Teachers join unions to protect their jobs. That's what unions do. In any industry, that's what unions are for, right?”

  • Every institution in every policy area and every country generates vested interests—people who derive jobs, contracts, or profits from the institution—and these interests have a stake in protecting their institution from change even when it performs badly, because their benefits are often unrelated to whether the institution works well.

    “All institutions generate vested interests, and those vested interests have a stake in protecting their institutions from change because those institutions are the source of their benefits.”

  • The core obstacle to spreading successful charter models is the structure of power: unions and others do not want models like KIPP to spread because they would take students away from the regular public schools where unionized teachers work, making it very difficult to scale what works.

    “our whole system, the structure of power, makes it very difficult to do that because the unions and others don't want KIPP and other models to spread, because they're going to take students away from the regular public schools where the unionized teachers work.”

0.70

Katrina destroyed union power in New Orleans, enabling decision-makers to become radicals and build an all-charter system.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Power shapes incentives: before Katrina the New Orleans decision-makers were incrementalists responding to a context where reform invited reprisals from power holders, and when that power was removed their incentives changed entirely, freeing them to pursue 'whatever works,' which is inherently revolutionary because it disregards traditional practice.

    “Power shapes incentives, right? And so before Katrina, these people, they were incrementalists. They were responding to their context, responding to the incentives of that context. And when the power was taken away, their incentives were completely different.”

  • The same decision-makers who before Katrina were pragmatic incrementalists making almost no change (Governor Kathleen Blanco, advisors Leslie Jacobs and Paul Pastorek, and Superintendent Cecil Picard) became radicals after the storm, choosing not to rebuild the failed traditional system because they knew it was bad, even though rebuilding was the path of least resistance.

    “Right after Katrina hit, these decision makers looked at one another and said, 'This is the opportunity of a lifetime.' They became radicals.”

  • Hurricane Katrina destroyed not only New Orleans' school buildings but the power of the vested interests: with no schools, no enrollments, and no money, the school board had to lay off all teachers, which left the union with virtually no members, no dues, and no power—creating, for the first time in modern American history, a reform process with the power of vested interests gone.

    “Katrina not only destroyed the schools, it destroyed the power of the vested interests. And for the first time in modern American history, it made it possible for us to observe a reform process... in which the power was gone.”

0.61

New Orleans charter schools dramatically improved student performance by forcing schools to attract and serve parents.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • After New Orleans shifted to a nearly all-charter system (about 95% of children), student performance improved dramatically: the share of students scoring Basic or above on state tests rose from 25% in 2006 to 48% in 2010, roughly doubling, despite a very difficult-to-educate, disadvantaged population.

    “I said that in 2006, 25% of the kids were scoring Basic or above on state tests... And in 2010, 48% were. So there was a huge increase in school quality here.”

  • Because every New Orleans charter school is a school of choice that floats on its own bottom—no one is assigned to it and eventually all children had to choose—each school must be good and responsive enough to attract parents and students, which forces a focus on student performance that the corrupt, low-turnout, union-influenced school board never had.

    “each school floats on its own bottom. Nobody has to go to these schools. They're all schools of choice. And so these schools have to be good enough, and responsive enough to parents to attract parents and kids.”

  • To the extent a new culture emerged in New Orleans, it was created by the proliferation of charter schools and the emergence of choice rather than being an independent cause of improvement; about 90% of parents are very positive about choosing their kids' schools, and schools now actively recruit parents, making parents the target of attention they never previously received.

    “to the extent that there is any new culture that's been created, it's been created because of the proliferation of charter schools and the emergence of choice as the means of getting kids into schools.”

  • After dramatic gains, New Orleans test scores stalled in recent years, partly because around 2014-2016 the state began changing tests and standards toward tougher ones, creating uncertainty about curriculum, but unlike before, the charter operators and reformist board are now focused on and alarmed by stalling performance—a fundamental difference from the old board for whom performance was never a priority.

    “in recent years test scores have stalled in New Orleans. So, they made dramatic progress, but since then that dramatic progress has sort of stalled out.”

0.56

Charter schools succeed because they escape union contracts, enabling staffing flexibility and focus on student performance.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • A crucial advantage of charter schools is that they are not covered by the district-wide collective bargaining contract full of constraints like seniority rules; they need not be unionized, can be staffed with teachers who agree with the school's mission and work as an organic team, and can let go people who don't fit—flexibility that the regular public schools lack because the contract prevents moving people out.

    “in the district, prior to Katrina, there was one collective bargaining contract--filled with rules, like seniority rules--that heavily constrained what principals and others can do to set up a team of people within the school that actually care about kids”

  • Decision-makers chose autonomous charter schools because they knew they could not return control to the corrupt school board, which had a tradition of failure and would revert to it; charters, being individual self-running units, could also be stood up quickly to handle returning students while the bumbling board struggled to reopen a few traditional schools.

    “they knew that they could not put control back in the hands of the School Board because the School Board had a tradition of failure, and it would just revert to that.”

  • Because returning students outnumbered available charter seats, the Recovery School District initially ran most schools directly, but leaders Paul Pastorek and Paul Vallas found they could not run those direct-run schools well, so as pragmatists they progressively moved more kids into charter schools, and that is how the all-charter system evolved—not from ideology.

    “what Pastorek and Vallas found out, in trying to run these schools and run them well, was: they couldn't run them well. It just wasn't working out. And so as pragmatists, they said, 'Look, we just got to start putting more kids into charter schools.'”

0.47

New Orleans corruption and union influence over school boards prevented reform despite low turnout and bad outcomes.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • School board elections do not correct for corruption because they have phenomenally low turnout, allowing the local union—through supporting candidates and mobilizing members, neighbors, and friends—to have a huge impact on who sits on the board, so that the board's allies are usually elected and the board is not fundamentally concerned with what is best for kids.

    “what you get in a school board election is phenomenally low turnout. And the unions... plays a huge role in supporting candidates and getting their own members and neighbors and friends out to vote.”

  • Before Katrina the New Orleans school system was abysmal and corrupt: only about a quarter of students scored Basic or above on state tests, contracts and jobs went to friends and relatives, the FBI opened a unit inside the district and ultimately imprisoned 30 people including the school board president, only 6 of 10 high schoolers graduated, and one high school valedictorian failed the graduation exam five times.

    “The district was so corrupt that the FBI actually opened up a unit within the district's own school buildings, and they ultimately put 30 people in the district in prison, including the President of the School Board.”

  • Opposition to the reforms was inflamed by race: the reformers and incoming Teach For America teachers were largely white while the teachers and central office staff who lost jobs were largely black, and the school system had long been a major avenue for African-Americans into the middle class and a means of black control over the schools, so the board and union fanned this discontent to bring the old culture against the new reforms.

    “almost all of the teachers who lost their jobs after Katrina were black, and same with the central office there. And this school system had always been perhaps the major avenue for blacks into the middle class.”

  • Philanthropists like Bill Gates and Eli Broad had long known New Orleans was a basket case but would not invest because the corrupt power structure would waste the money; once the power was gone, they came in and funded the new charter schools, which was a second crucial part of the reform's success.

    “in the past, philanthropists like Gates and Eli Broad and others knew that New Orleans was a basket case; but they wouldn't come in and really try to help these schools because the power structure was so corrupt that the money would be wasted.”

0.29

Schools can improve disadvantaged students dramatically, but scaling successful models faces structural power opposition.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Probably half or more of student performance is due to student background characteristics—poverty and one-parent households—with schools contributing the rest, so urban districts with many disadvantaged minority students find it very difficult to achieve high test scores, which must be kept in mind when evaluating New Orleans.

    “probably half or more of student performance is due to student background characteristics--to poverty and one-parent households and all the rest. And the schools contribute the rest.”

  • Many players who appear to be mere incrementalists and pragmatists who accept and tinker with the system actually have the potential to be radicals who would upend the traditional system, if only they get the chance to do so by having the power of vested interests removed.

    “a lot of the players who seem like they're just incrementalists and pragmatists who are operating within the system and who 'accept the system'... those people have the potential, many of them, to be radicals, and to upend the traditional system if they just have half a chance”

  • Some charter school systems such as KIPP and Doug Lemov's Northeastern network have shown they can take disadvantaged kids facing the same poverty and home-life challenges and get them to perform at very high levels, demonstrating it can be done, even though only a tiny percentage of kids attend such schools.

    “KIPP and a number of other charter school systems have been able to show that they can take these disadvantaged kids and really teach them and get them to perform at very high levels.”