What this covers
Andrew McAfee of MIT's Sloan School of Management joins Russ Roberts to examine how wealthy economies have begun producing more goods and services while consuming fewer raw materials overall—a phenomenon McAfee terms dematerialization. The conversation traces how the United States has decoupled economic growth from resource consumption since roughly 1970, with aggregate use of metals, fertilizer, timber, and energy leveling off or declining even as GDP expands. McAfee argues this shift results not from sacrifice or self-denial but from the combined pressure of technological innovation and competitive capitalism, which incentivize firms to economize on materials to cut costs and win market share. The exchange weighs whether these same forces offer the most promising route to address climate change and global poverty.
The discussion spans the historical arc from the Malthusian Trap—which Gregory Clark's data show did confine prosperity for centuries—through the Industrial Revolution's escape via agricultural productivity gains, to the present moment. McAfee examines where the early environmental movement succeeded (controlling pollution and species extinction) and where it erred (population and resource exhaustion), noting that the CRIB strategies of the 1970s were largely abandoned yet dematerialization occurred anyway. A critical tension emerges around distribution: even where markets generate broad prosperity, the geographic concentration of economic activity leaves rural and former industrial communities stranded, fueling the populist backlash. McAfee also distinguishes capitalism itself from crony capitalism, and emphasizes underdeployed policy tools like Pigouvian Taxation and nuclear power as complements to market forces in tackling climate risk.
McAfee argues that rich economies have begun 'dematerializing'—producing more economic output while using fewer total physical resources—driven not by environmentalist self-denial but by the twin forces of technological progress and competitive capitalism, which also offer the best path for addressing climate change and global poverty.
- US total resource use (metals, fertilizer, energy, timber) has decoupled from and in many cases absolutely declined relative to GDP since around 1970
- The Earth Day 'CRIB' strategies (consume less, recycle, impose limits, go back to land) were largely not followed, so they cannot explain dematerialization—tech progress plus capitalism can
- Climate change is real and serious, but carbon pricing and nuclear power are underused tools that capitalism and technology could deploy
Wealthy nations achieve absolute dematerialization as economies grow while material consumption declines.
- The United States is achieving absolute dematerialization: its economy keeps growing exponentially while its total consumption of most important materials (metals, fertilizer, timber, energy) has plateaued and is now trending downward in absolute terms, not merely per dollar of GDP.
“our consumption of the lot of the most important molecules or materials in an economy had plateaued and was now generally trending downward”
- Dematerialization is caused by two intertwined forces: technological progress (repeated innovation) and capitalism—understood as intense competition combined with property and contract rights—which together push firms to economize on materials to cut costs and win in the market.
“my explanation for why dematerialization is happening is about these twin forces of tech progress, and, in the book I say 'capitalism'”
- Total energy use in America has been essentially flat from 2007 through 2018—only about a quarter percent higher—even though the economy is much larger than before the Great Recession, breaking the historical lockstep between economic growth and energy consumption.
“the total energy use in America has been essentially flat from 2007 up through 2018. That is astonishing to me.”
- Of the roughly 72 minerals the US Geological Survey tracks, all but about 6 are now past peak use and experiencing dematerialization; the biggest exception is gemstones, and plastics, while still growing, are growing more slowly than GDP and approaching their own peak.
“the U.S. Geological Service tracks about 72 different minerals... I believe all but 6 of them now are past the peak, and we are now experiencing dematerialization in them.”
- When you overlay total economic output on resource-use graphs, GDP keeps growing exponentially while aggregate use of many resources—iron, steel, copper, gold, fertilizer, paper, timber—begins around 1970 to decouple, grow more slowly, and in many cases decline in absolute terms.
“our aggregate use of a lot of different kinds of resources, around 1970, starts to decouple. It starts to not go with them lockstep with growing the economy.”
Helping poor countries become rich will cause them to dematerialize and reduce global resource burden.
- Because dematerialization occurs once nations grow rich enough to pass the 'hump of maximum exploitation,' the clear policy implication is that the way to reduce the planet's resource burden is to help poor countries become rich, after which they too will begin to dematerialize.
“We have to help the rest of the world get rich. That will bring them past that hump of maximum exploitation of the planet. And they're going to start to dematerialize, as well.”
- Not only has the percentage of people in extreme poverty fallen, but the absolute number of people living in extreme poverty worldwide is now lower than it was roughly 200 years ago, despite enormous population growth.
“there are fewer people--not smaller percentage--fewer people living in extreme poverty today probably than there were 200 years ago”
- Decentralized, economically free societies are demonstrably better at generating prosperity, and small differences in growth rates compound enormously over time—the difference between 2% and 3% growth is effectively a 50% difference—so even granting that markets fail and must be reined in, the conversation should start by recognizing markets as the engine of prosperity.
“decentralized, bottom-up, economically free societies are demonstrably better at generating that prosperity”
- Marshall's deepest insight was that human wants and needs do not satiate: as people get richer they want more of what they have, better versions, and entirely new things that innovators invent—so economic growth continues indefinitely rather than plateauing at 'enough.'
“human wants and needs just don't seem to level off”
Industrial Revolution and technological innovation broke historical patterns of Malthusian population-resource traps.
- The Industrial Revolution let humanity escape the Malthusian trap mainly through agriculture: steamships and trains moved fertilizer sources like Chilean sodium nitrate and South American guano to factories and farms, skyrocketing agricultural productivity so that exponentially growing populations could be fed—not simply through trains and factories themselves.
“the Industrial Revolution is an agricultural story in large part because of fertilizer. Because of things like sodium nitrate in the deserts of Chile; guano--bird droppings--off the coast of South America”
- Malthus was broadly correct as a historian—population and prosperity did oscillate in a trap for centuries, as Gregory Clark's UK data from 1200-1800 shows—but he was one of the worst forecasters because he wrote just as the Industrial Revolution was about to break the pattern.
“Malthus was a deeply lousy forecaster... He was actually broadly correct as a historian.”
- McAfee doubts the economy could have dematerialized without the digital revolution, because computers enable the CAD systems that design ultra-light aluminum cans, the collapse of many devices into the smartphone, and the powerful computing behind fracking.
“I actually don't know if we would have succeeded in dematerializing the economy overall if we had not invented the computer.”
- A 2007 GAO report on Peak Oil never mentioned fracking, and even an energy expert inside the Bush White House dismissed it as an 'old person's scam'—demonstrating that fundamental technological innovation is very hard to predict, yet tends to move toward getting more from less.
“that 2007 report from the GAO does not have the word 'fracking' in it, or 'hydraulic fracturing.' It doesn't appear anywhere.”
Markets require property rights and competition to drive prosperity, but crony capitalism and perverse incentives distort outcomes.
- Much of what people are angry about—Wall Street bailouts, cartels, collusion, cozy regulator-industry relationships—is a perversion of capitalism (crony capitalism), not genuine competition; conflating these with capitalism itself, or equating capitalism with the absence of a safety net ('market fundamentalism'), is a category mistake, as Sweden's free-market-plus-welfare model shows.
“a lot of what people, I think, are angry about is a perversion of Capitalism --is not actual competition. It's collusion. It's a cartel.”
- Perceptions of unfairness—stoked by demagogues blaming groups like 'the Chinese' or 'Wall Street'—are a powerful aspect of human nature, and you will never displace a feeling with a fact, so addressing social discontent requires winning a rhetorical battle about the future rather than simply providing better data.
“you will never displace a feeling with a fact. So we had better figure out how to do better at this rhetorical battle”
- Steam power let factories make fabric more quickly.
“We could make fabric more quickly because you had factories with steam power in them.”
- Jevons argued that making steam engines more efficient would not reduce overall coal use but increase it, because cheaper energy generates ever more uses—a phenomenon a modern economist would describe as the price elasticity of demand.
“when you decrease the price of something... what will happen in many cases is that you will use more of that thing overall, not less”
- The smartphone is a sterling example of dematerialization: it has absorbed about 13 of the 15 gizmos in a 1991 Radio Shack ad (camcorder, film camera, answering machine, radio, clock radio, and more), many of which were energy-hungry, so the counterfactual world without it would use vastly more material and energy.
“There are 15 gizmo-type items on it... Thirteen of them have vanished into the phone that you carry with you in your pocket”
- The Soviet Union killed roughly 200,000 whales beyond its international quota despite having no need for them—because its centrally planned fisheries had to hit rising tonnage targets and whales are heavy—illustrating that totalitarian central planning takes terrible care of the environment by responding to perverse incentives.
“the Soviet Union killed about 200,000 additional whales above and beyond their quota... they didn't need them.”
- China's one-child policy was the one case of imposing population limits, and it was a policy failure and moral catastrophe—Chinese demographers compare its long-term harm to the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward—and it was unnecessary because population growth was already slowing when it was imposed.
“It was a policy failure. It was a moral catastrophe.”
Climate change demands immediate action and carbon pricing is the most effective policy tool available.
- A revenue-neutral carbon tax (or cap-and-trade) is a near-silver-bullet policy tool because businesses flee increased costs and will rapidly shift away from high-carbon production; the tax can be ramped up over time, yet the world is not deploying it at meaningful scale.
“The incredibly powerful, near-silver bullet in the policy- or in the economics-toolkit is a revenue-neutral carbon tax.”
- Climate change is real and ranges from bad to catastrophically bad; following Nordhaus and Weitzman, the worst outcomes are catastrophic and carry a high enough probability that we should act now, even amid uncertainty about exactly how bad it will be.
“Climate change is real. And it's bad. And the range of bad is somewhere between bad and catastrophically bad.”
- Contrary to its scary reputation, nuclear power is by almost all measures the safest form of power—with low death, accident, and pollution rates—and is the one clean, scalable, safe, non-intermittent energy source available, while coal pollution kills hundreds of thousands yearly; rejecting nuclear in green plans is a category mistake.
“Nuclear power, by almost all the measures that I've seen, is the safest kind of power that we generate.”
Dematerialization concentrates economic activity, leaving workers and small communities economically stranded and fueling populism.
- Beyond climate change, the thing that most worries McAfee is that the economists' toolkit for helping communities left behind is sparse—there is little good history with place-based economic policies, and even candid economists admit the playbook is not obvious.
“the economists' toolkit for dealing with those communities that are left behind is not a very full toolkit. We don't have a lot of good history with place-based economic policies”
- Getting more from less means some industries need fewer physical establishments—fewer farms, factories, and places where activity happens—and because workers don't frictionlessly relocate into new jobs, this concentration leaves many small communities economically stranded, contributing to deaths of despair, falling trust, and the rise of populists.
“Manufacturing has fewer establishments, fewer factories, fewer places where manufacturing happens than it did a couple decades ago, even as manufacturing output increases.”
First-wave environmentalism succeeded on pollution and species protection but wrongly predicted resource crises.
- The Earth Day CRIB strategies—Consume less, Recycle, Impose limits, go Back to the land—were largely not adopted at scale (Americans did not consume less, recycling is distinct from falling demand, materials use was never centrally planned, and back-to-the-land was tiny against urbanization), so they cannot explain dematerialization; only the imposing-limits leg on pollution and species succeeded.
“have we voluntarily decided to consume less? Man, you look at the economic growth statistics: it is really hard to make that case.”
- The first wave of the environmental movement was right on two of its four central concerns—pollution and species extinction, which markets won't fix on their own and which required intervention—but wrong on the other two, the predicted population crisis and resource exhaustion.
“they were kind of two for four”
- Pollution in the United States in almost all areas people care about is now a small fraction of what it was in 1970, a major and underappreciated success of environmental policy.
“Pollution in the United States in almost all areas that you or I would care about is a small fraction of what it was in 1970.”