What this covers
Anja Shortland of King's College London joins Russ Roberts to discuss her book on kidnap-for-ransom as an economic system. The conversation centers on how kidnapping operates as a surprisingly orderly market in regions where government authority is weak, governed not by law but by the institutions that private insurance companies—particularly Lloyd's underwriters—have built around it. Shortland argues that ransoms cluster around predictable prices, hostages return alive in roughly 97 percent of insured cases, and the market remains stable despite involving criminals who cannot trust each other and transactions fraught with uncertainty at every stage: price-setting, covert cash movement, proof of transfer, and the hostage's release.
The discussion ranges across how kidnap-for-ransom insurance works in practice—including the paradox that employees must never know they are insured, to avoid moral hazard—to the mechanics of ransom negotiation, where professional crisis responders guide family or company officials while carefully managing the kidnapper's expectations about available money. Shortland explores how the shadow of the future disciplines behavior: kidnappers keep promises because repeat business depends on reputation, and a tight club of Lloyd's syndicates collectively punishes those who misbehave. She also draws distinctions between kidnapping in territories controlled by a single authority (where protection money prevents it) and fragmented areas (where competing gangs make kidnapping the dominant strategy). Throughout, she contrasts the private market's success with government negotiators' failures, arguing that bureaucrats lack the skin in the game that market professionals possess. The conversation touches on how this logic extends to rebel taxation and protection rackets, making kidnapping part of a broader political economy rather than mere criminality.
Shortland argues that kidnap-for-ransom, despite being a criminal trade between distrustful parties, functions as a surprisingly orderly market governed by the shadow of the future, with private insurers (especially Lloyd's) and professional negotiators—not governments—creating the institutions that keep ransoms predictable and hostages alive.
- Repeated interactions and reputation (the shadow of the future) make self-enforcing contracts possible between parties who cannot trust each other
- Kidnap insurance and a small co-located club of Lloyd's underwriters order the market by sharing information and punishing rogue kidnappers
- Governments negotiate badly because they lack skin in the game and the coordinating mechanism that private insurers provide
Kidnappers keep promises because future business depends on reputation transmitted through local gossip and insurer networks.
- A very limited number of insurers and syndicates underwrite kidnap-for-ransom, and they exchange information about trustworthy versus rogue kidnappers, ensuring that kidnappers who break promises find it very difficult to continue in business.
“there's a very limited number of insurers, syndicates, underwrite kidnap-for-ransom; and they exchange information about trustworthy kidnappers and rogue kidnappers. And they make sure that rogue kidnappers will make it very difficult to continue in business”
- The reason ransom trade goes smoothly is the shadow of the future: kidnappers keep their promises this time because doing so benefits their future business, which requires a mechanism for transmitting information about good and bad behavior to future victims—local gossip within a city, or kidnap insurance for transnational victims.
“there's a very limited number of insurers, syndicates, underwrite kidnap-for-ransom; and they exchange information about trustworthy kidnappers and rogue kidnappers. And they make sure that rogue kidnappers will make it very difficult to continue in business”
- While insurers stay in the background, the crisis responder retained by the insurer holds data and experience, has often met the kidnapping group before, and plugs into local knowledge, so reputation stabilizes the game even for individual transnational cases because bad behavior is known to be punished.
“the crisis responder will have the data, will have experience, and will probably have met that kind of group or that group at some previous point... reputation stabilized this game even though the insurers themselves remain in the background.”
- Lloyd's is not a company but a market in which roughly 20 co-located companies compete to underwrite special risks like kidnap insurance, while being close enough together to cooperatively agree what is insurable and to create the shadow of the future by collectively punishing kidnappers who misbehave.
“the interesting thing about Lloyd's is, it's not a company. It's a market in which companies come together to insure Special Risks.”
Professional negotiators and insurers face stronger incentives than governments to negotiate rationally and resist overpayment.
- Professional negotiators occupy a key position because they see things rationally and, through charisma and experience, help not only panicked families make rational decisions but also educate emotional or stupid kidnappers to see that hurting the hostage will not benefit them.
“through the charisma that they have... they not only help the families make the right decisions, but they also help the kidnappers see things through more rational perspective. And, they educate them.”
- Professional ransom negotiators face strong career incentives—paying too much, losing a hostage, or failing to get a clean finish is career-limiting—whereas bureaucrats catapulted into a negotiation can rationalize overpayment ('he never had a chance anyway'), giving negotiators skin in the game that governments lack.
“if they messed up around some negotiation--if they paid too much, if they lose a hostage... they are really in trouble career-wise. It's career-limiting. Whereas, for a bureaucrat paying too much, 'Oh, well, he never had a chance anyway.'”
- The market for negotiators is highly competitive: a negotiator who performs poorly very quickly becomes unable to get freelance or salaried work—get it wrong once and you have a problem, twice and you are out—so incentives discipline the profession swiftly.
“negotiators that are not good at what they are doing very, very quickly find themselves unable to get a job in the industry... you get it wrong once, you've got a problem; you get it wrong twice, you are out.”
- Governments tend to mess up ransom negotiations and overpay because they have unlimited resources, little time due to media and pressure-group scrutiny, and—being in one-off scenarios hoping the next victim belongs to another country—they lack the coordinating mechanism that private insurers provide, so some governments refuse to negotiate at all because they know they cannot do it well.
“when governments come in with unlimited resources and very little time because they are under pressure from the media... They tend to pay far too much... they are missing that coordinating mechanism, they tend to create big, big problems in the market for hostages.”
Private insurance markets solve ransom problems through institutions that work without perfect competition, perfect information, or government coordination.
- The same protocol for resolution and the same business logic apply to ransom kidnapping regardless of geography—whether the victim is taken in Colombia, Somalia, the Congo, or the Niger Delta, the market works the same way.
“the same protocol for resolution, and the same business ideas apply regardless of whether somebody gets taken in Colombia or in Somalia or in the Congo or in the Niger Delta. It always works the same way.”
- An insurer's Plan A is always that customers do not get kidnapped at all—insurance comes with mandatory training and security protocols to minimize kidnapping probability—because it is never in the insurer's interest to enter a ransom situation; Plan B only mops up the rare failures.
“Plan A, for an insurer is always that their customers do not get kidnapped. It is not in the insurer's interest to get into a ransom situation in the first place.”
- Kidnap insurance is bought by a firm on behalf of employees operating in complex and hostile territories, but a condition of the policy is that employees must not be told they are insured—because if they knew, moral hazard would make them more risk-seeking or careless about minimizing risk.
“the condition of kidnap insurance is that you don't know about it. So, it would be bought on your behalf by a responsible firm... But they must not tell their employees that they have done so.”
- Insurers prevent a ransom from triggering a new wave of kidnappings by ensuring nobody gets rich—ransoms are shared among many people and earned over long captivities—because if kidnapping became more lucrative than ordinary work, the market dynamics would spiral out of control.
“the way that the insurers make sure that a ransom doesn't trigger a new spate of kidnappings is to make sure that nobody gets rich. If people get rich from kidnapping, you cannot control the dynamics of the market.”
- The kidnap-resolution world is a revelation about how good markets—particularly the Lloyd's market—are at creating institutions and processes that solve seemingly impossible problems: making self-enforcing contracts with untrustworthy parties and incentivizing repeated excellent service when running with the money is an option.
“to me it was a real revelation about how good markets are and in particular Lloyd's market is at creating institutions and creating processes that deal with these completely impossible situations.”
- The kidnap and kidnap-insurance markets invert textbook economics: they work well precisely without perfect competition (a small cooperating club), without perfect information (kidnappers must not know insurance details), and with large externalities that must be deliberately contained—and government intervention makes things worse, not better.
“The market for hostages and the market for kidnap insurance turns this textbook wisdom on its head.”
Successful ransom negotiation requires convincing kidnappers they have extracted everything possible through gradual incremental offers.
- An initial ransom demand is a fantasy figure beyond avarice, not a price; if you accept it the kidnappers simply revise it upward, so a well-organized negotiation begins with a low first offer and slowing increments that mimic squeezing a towel dry.
“if you say, 'That's fine; I'm happy to pay that,' then they will just revise their demand upwards. In a well-organized ransom negotiation, you will have increments on a rather low first offer; but these increments have really got to slow down.”
- A successful ransom negotiation must both reach a price and function as a self-enforcing contract by convincing the kidnapper they have extracted everything possible—described as 'squeezing the towel dry,' where slowing increments signal that further holding (which carries weekly costs) is no longer worth it; the key is managing the size of the towel the kidnapper believes they are squeezing.
“The way this process has been described to me, on many occasions, is one of squeezing the towel dry... eventually nothing else comes out... the drips and drabs that come out are not quite worth holding onto the hostage for.”
- Insurers want the hostage to direct kidnappers to contact a financially constrained relative rather than the firm, so that the poorest plausible payer fronts the negotiation, which keeps kidnappers' expectations about available money low and helps achieve both a lower price and a self-enforcing release.
“what that achieves is that the incredibly financially constrained party fronts the negotiation. And that makes it easier to manage the kidnapper's expectations about how much money there is going to be got out of a negotiation.”
- Despite an almost total absence of public transaction information, ransoms hone in on a predictable going rate—e.g., in the Niger Delta hostages were almost always returned within 45 days for $10,000—a price judged to be raisable locally yet low enough not to make kidnapping more attractive than ordinary work, producing an equilibrium kidnapping situation.
“in the Niger Delta: for years and years... They were almost always returned within 45 days for $10,000.”
Kidnapping occurs predictably where territorial control exists but competition or state disruption prevents establishing protection relationships.
- Rebel groups tax business activity within their territory but set the rate low enough to keep that business profitable because they want future business; the FARC roadblock case resembled a government enforcing a tax demand by making an arrest, suggesting kidnapping is often part of an implicit protection relationship.
“the rebel groups will tax business activity within their territory, but they will tax it at such a rate that makes it unprofitable to engage in that business, because they want future business”
- Where a single clear authority controls a territory, paying protection money prevents kidnapping because the warlord saves the hassle of ransom negotiation; kidnapping concentrates instead in areas with multiple competing gangs or where the state disrupts cartels—i.e., where you don't know who to pay for protection.
“If you don't know who governs, who rules a territory, then that gets difficult to organize, protect. And that's where we see kidnapping. So, that would be the pattern: You don't know who to pay for protection.”
- Firms that operate in hostile and complex territories despite kidnapping risk are mostly oil and mining companies, because only enormous profits justify the risk—it is not worth manufacturing cars or printing books in such places.
“mostly the companies that we see operating in these hostile and complex territories are oil companies, mining companies, etc. It's not worth trying to manufacture cars or print books”
Media and public perception distort kidnapping reality by overreporting failures while successful commercial resolutions remain deliberately silent.
- Thousands of people are kidnapped for ransom worldwide every year, but the vast majority are local-on-local kidnappings that go unreported; the true scale only emerges later through mechanisms like Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and there is no official database.
“Almost all of those victims would be local people. So, it would be a local-on-local kidnap. And, we know this because people sometimes report it. But usually people only find out the true scale of kidnappings... when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission comes afterwards”
- Public perception of kidnapping is distorted because media coverage is heavily biased toward cases that go wrong, while people who quietly resolve kidnappings through commercial negotiation deliberately stay silent about paying ransoms.
“the picture we would get from the media is very, very biased toward the kidnaps that go wrong. So, people who quietly resolve a kidnapping commercially through negotiation, etc., they don't want to advertise that they've paid money”
- Every step of a ransom transaction is fraught with uncertainty—settling a price across a multi-million-dollar range, moving cash covertly, transferring it without proof of receipt, and persuading kidnappers to release a future witness—so by Murphy's Law the trade should fail every time, yet about 97% of hostages come back alive if insured.
“there are just so many things that can go wrong with this trade, that you'd say by Murphy's Law this [?] should just fail every time.”
Apparent mutilation threats are typically staged and rewarding them escalates demands toward hostage death, against kidnappers' interests.
- Apparent mutilation, such as a photo of a finger being chopped off, is typically staged (e.g., a knife prepared with a gap) because it is not in kidnappers' interest to actually mutilate hostages and trigger a rescue; reacting to such threats with more money guarantees the threats will escalate until you stop reacting.
“What the kidnappers had done--a carefully prepared knife, with a little bit spared out. So it looked like fingers were being chopped off. But they weren't.”
- Although kidnappers can always threaten and some carry out violence, escalating mutilation has no obvious endpoint except the hostage's death—which is against the kidnapper's interest—and a damaged hostage adds cost and difficulty, so rewarding bad behavior cannot be the right incentive structure.
“where is it going to end? There is no obvious end, except the death of the hostage--which is not in the kidnapper's interest.”
Rescue operations are only appropriate when commercial negotiation is impossible because kidnappers are inherently lethal murderers.
- The dangerous money-and-hostage handoff is solved differently across places—dropping cash in canisters by ship for Somali pirates, or a third party who provides protected neutral territory for the exchange—but all solutions depend on the shadow of the future and only work where a gang or cartel can credibly exclude the police from its territory.
“somebody says, 'My business is to provide a neutral territory, where people can come with the ransom, and people can come with hostages. And I will protect that exchange.'”
- The equilibrium analysis showing a roughly 97.5% safe-return rate does not reflect the lived reality of negotiators, who must cope with terrified people and sometimes dozens of opinionated family members across multiple families and a company at once—each successful outcome is a victory snatched from the jaws of horrendous defeat.
“97.5% of the time it goes right, something that should not go right by Murphy's Law... if you are actually doing it... it's always a victory snatched from the jaws of horrendous defeat.”
- The family or company officially takes responsibility and makes all ransom decisions in the hostage's best interest, but they receive coaching from highly experienced specialists—typically former elite military personnel who are calm under pressure and understand the criminal mindset—who steer the conversation and counsel against reacting to threats.
“The decisions are made by the stake-holder. All that can be offered as advice and guidance; but it is offered by very charismatic, very calm, and very experienced people.”
- A rescue attempt by forces like the SAS is only launched when there is no possibility of commercial resolution—i.e., when kidnappers are horrendously violent murderers who put the hostage's life in jeopardy—because otherwise sending in a rescue team needlessly risks soldiers' and hostages' lives.
“if you know that commercial resolution will work, then you are not going to put the soldiers or the hostages' lives at risk by sending in a rescue team. It's only when you know these are horrendously violent murderers... that you send them in.”