What this covers
Neurologist Robert Burton joins Russ Roberts on EconTalk to discuss his argument that certainty is not earned through reasoning but generated involuntarily by the brain as a sensation. Burton draws on neuroscience, psychology, and everyday examples—false memories, electrical brain stimulation, the physics of perception—to show that the feeling of knowing arrives unbidden, independent of whether what we feel certain about is actually true. The conversation maps the consequences: if certainty cannot be rationed through logic, then argument alone cannot persuade anyone to change their mind, and humility becomes more appropriate than conviction as a stance toward belief.
The discussion ranges widely across implications. Burton and Roberts examine how identical sensory input produces different perceptions across brains shaped by genetics, experience, and prior bias—a hidden layer processing that makes two witnesses to the same event interpret it entirely differently. They explore how quantification disguises subjective judgment as fact, why the placebo effect works even when known to be a placebo, and how scientism conflates shabby evidence with solid findings. Economics emerges as particularly vulnerable: policy effects entangled in complex systems cannot be isolated with precision, yet economists and policymakers routinely assign certainty where none is warranted. The conversation turns toward acceptance—learning to say "I don't know," recognizing that science provides temporary metaphors rather than truth, and understanding that wisdom comes not from age but from the willingness to remember and learn from error.
Burton argues that the 'feeling of knowing'—the sense of certainty—is an involuntary, biologically produced sensation generated below conscious awareness, not a product of rational evaluation, which means certainty is untrustworthy and humility, not argument, is the appropriate stance toward beliefs.
- The feeling of knowing can attach to false memories (the Challenger study) and even be triggered in brain surgery patients with no corresponding thought
- Perception and decision-making emerge from competing unconscious 'hidden layer' processes that vary by genetics and experience, so identical inputs yield different outputs across brains
- Because certainty is involuntary, people cannot be persuaded out of beliefs by argument—only emotionally moved by stories
The mind works beneath conscious awareness in ways the conscious mind cannot fully access or explain, even to itself.
- When a survey result is reported as a number (e.g. '92% of parents glad they had kids'), people file it in the same mental box as confirmed physical facts like 'winter is colder than summer,' even though it rests on subjective, hard-to-interpret survey methodology; translating subjectivity into numbers makes claims sound more scientific and thus more believable.
“when you read that sentence in the newspaper that's not what's there. What you read is, 'Oh. A fact.'”
- Even though you cannot fully fix the brain using the brain, you can become more aware and sensitive to how your priors, experience, and predilections shape your conscious world—as Roberts did by later doubting the Challenger study he had eagerly believed—without ever fully understanding the underlying processes.
“I think it's possible to become more aware of your unconscious world and its impact on your conscious world even if you don't understand it fully”
- Things go on beneath conscious awareness that we have no access to, as when you go to bed unable to recall a comic strip's name and wake with 'Pogo' in mind, or drive a familiar route while daydreaming—your brain works on tasks and executes them without conscious will.
“you wake up and the word Pogo jumps in your mind. You don't will it... Your brain worked on it while you were asleep.”
- Great insights arrive as unexplained 'Aha' moments even for their originators—Andrew Wiles described suddenly seeing the answer to Fermat's Last Theorem, and Kasparov often couldn't explain his own chess moves—showing that the person closest to an insight does not understand how it arose.
“he just said he was just sitting at his desk, looking off in the distance, and suddenly 'I saw the right answer.'”
People become certain about unknowable things because feeling-of-knowing is a powerful urge distinct from rational evidence or identity.
- Unlike the antique-table case where evidence is overwhelming, most social-science and even medical debates (Keynesianism, minimum wage, inequality, tariffs) offer abundant evidence to both sides, so the rational response would be caution and admitting we know little—yet people instead become very certain, revealing the feeling of knowing as a powerful urge distinct from identity protection.
“Both sides has tons of evidence to choose from. There's no shortage of evidence.”
- People resist the idea that complex outcomes are simply too complicated to understand; instead they assume there must be a single magic switch, knob, or dial—like crediting FDR's optimism or the war for ending the Depression—because the explanation 'it's too complicated, we don't understand it' is not acceptable to us.
“As if there has to be like a magic switch or knob or dial that had to be turned to the right setting and the economy would function again. It's just--the idea that it's too complicated--we don't understand it--is not acceptable.”
Complex systems—economic, medical, social—cannot yield precise causal understanding; we confuse plausible narrative for scientific knowledge.
- The back-pain procedure of injecting cement into vertebrae appears highly successful in observational trials, but a randomized controlled trial comparing it to a sham (injecting saline while opening a container of cement for the patient to smell) found no clinically significant difference, indicating the benefit is largely placebo.
“the randomized control trial of that procedure versus injecting saline into the back, into the vertebrae, while opening a container of cement to let them smell it, had the same effect. It was clinically, at least, had no clinical significant difference.”
- Economics cannot tease out independent causal effects of small policy changes (like NAFTA's job impact) from a vast, simultaneously-changing system; it is more like history than physics, able to weave plausible stories but unable to assign precise causal percentages, and pretending otherwise is scientism masquerading as science.
“I've often argued that economics is more like history than it is like physics. Which economists hate to hear.”
Knowing itself is psychologically necessary, but cultivating comfort with uncertainty and embracing life's mysteries offers better wisdom.
- The feeling of knowing is an enormously important part of human experience because total uncertainty would be paralyzing—you'd be constantly trying to figure out what to do next.
“If you were uncertain about everything, you'd be paralyzed. You'd be constantly trying to figure out what to do next.”
- One should get into the habit of enjoying saying 'I don't know'—analogous to acquiring a taste for beer, bitter at first but eventually savored—because there are fundamental mysteries of human existence to be savored rather than solved, embodying Alan Watts's 'wisdom of insecurity.'
“I often counsel people... to get into the habit of enjoying saying, 'I don't know.'”
- Despair is not the natural product of a finite life: just as we don't dismiss a football game or Broadway show as a waste because it doesn't last forever, a non-believer seeking the most satisfying life has no reason to despair over life's temporariness—so purpose's link to contentment is not the same as life's brevity necessarily causing despair.
“There are a lot of things we experience in life that are glorious, that are short-lived-- ... And life is one of them. ... why wouldn't you just enjoy it while you can”